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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Is the machinery of local policing delivery seen as fit for purpose by 
practitioners and community members to anticipate and mitigate the risk of 
harmful radicalisation at street level? 
 
This thesis achieves four objectives. Firstly, it adds to the existing knowledge of 
radicalisation: it discusses the concept, and contextualises it within other forms of social 
phenomena such as drug-related crime. Secondly, it proposes a menu of indicators 
which predict or forewarn of the risk of radicalisation. Thirdly, it establishes 
perceptions of success at street level of modern local policing methods, namely 
Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model, at identifying risk. 
Fourthly, it establishes a ‘toolkit’ of options which might be used by practitioners to 
‘switch-off’ the radicalisation process. I argue that urban unrest, radicalisation and 
terrorism share common roots, with a number of key social pre-conditions existing prior 
to their onset: a sense of injustice, a lack of political representation, declining 
perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities, relative deprivation, (which may include 
unemployment, and a gap between expectation and achievement), discrimination and 
high levels of drug related crime, and I thus propose a theoretical ladder of escalation. I 
critically analyse policy responses arising from five seminal events, and I isolate five 
‘critical success factors’ from them, suggesting that the problem in general terms is a 
failure to implement these success factors, thus contributing to the crisis. I revisit 
‘tension indicators’ first developed following urban unrest in 1960’s America, and I link 
them to the critical success factors and the common roots theory. Using quantitative and 
qualitative primary data which consists largely of face-to-face interviews with 
community members, police officers, council workers and others involved in the 
interaction between the state and communities at street level in Oldham, Greater 
Manchester, I test these proposals and their links. I conclude that Neighbourhood 
Policing is largely successful; however the National Intelligence Model is flawed in its 
ability to deliver risk mitigation in this context. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
This thesis addresses the following research question:  
  
‘Is the machinery of local policing delivery seen as fit for purpose by practitioners and 
community members to anticipate and mitigate the risk of harmful radicalisation at 
street level’? 
 
 
To examine this, the thesis: 
 
 Charts demographic evolution in the post war years and the organisational police 
response to it; 
 Identifies five ‘seminal events’ from which five ‘critical success factors’ are 
isolated. Failure to deliver these is demonstrated, contributing to the current 
crisis;  
 Engages literature, much of it academic literature relating to policing, which 
points towards social unrest and radicalisation having common roots, and 
consequently proposes a hypothetical ‘ladder of escalation’; 
 Proposes methodology to illuminate the research question, thereby adding to the 
existing knowledge of radicalisation.  
 Presents quantitative and qualitative primary data from Oldham, Greater 
Manchester, the ‘theatre of the case study’1, and contextualises it in the corpus 
of literature. The qualitative work consists largely of face-to-face interviews 
with community members, police officers, council workers and others – those 
who can be considered to be directly involved in the interaction between the 
state and communities at street level. 
 
                                                 
1
 I use this expression throughout the thesis because it better encompasses not only the geographic 
location, but also the systems, processes and infrastructure which exist to deliver services and engage 
with communities. 
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One of the principal purposes behind this project is to identify what local policing teams 
can actually do to mitigate the risk of harmful radicalisation and progression to 
terrorism. I argue that urban unrest, radicalisation and terrorism share common roots, 
with a number of key social pre-conditions existing prior to their onset: a sense of 
injustice, a lack of political representation, declining perceptions of legitimacy in state 
authorities, relative deprivation (which may include unemployment, and a gap between 
expectation and achievement), discrimination and high levels of drug related crime. The 
thesis will argue therefore that we already understand what it is we need local police 
officers, Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) and other local public authority 
officials to do because the issues have been met before in the context of urban disorder 
and other key crises. I critically analyse various selected laws, policy responses and 
edicts from the Home Office and elsewhere, largely arising from the five seminal events 
outlined in the second chapter,  and I identify five ‘critical success factors’ from them. I 
suggest that the problem in general terms is a failure to implement these success factors, 
a failure correctly to identify where intervention is necessary, and a failure to 
understand what constitutes effective intervention. I argue that failures by key social 
agencies like the police to address fundamental problems such as racial discrimination 
and perceptions of social injustice, despite early and repeated identification of the 
challenges in the aftermath of the described events, lead and contribute to 
disenfranchisement amongst people from ethnic minority groups, and make them 
vulnerable to extremist influence.  
 
In order to develop successful counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorist strategies, 
vulnerable groups and communities must first be identified, and then agencies must find 
local solutions to alleviate the risk of violent extremist tendencies. These local solutions 
should carry many of the themes which I identify from the policy responses. The 
identification and mitigation of the risk depends on the effectiveness of Neighbourhood 
Policing and the National Intelligence Model, both of which are described in section 
4.12 of Chapter Four, and the thesis sets out to consider whether or not they are 
developed sufficiently to perform this task. That is to say, are these modern policing and 
partnership innovations, primarily designed to deal with crime, actually capable of 
identifying risk as it applies to radicalisation and terrorism, and then developing 
strategies to mitigate it?  
 
 12 
Intrinsic to the research question is an understanding of what is meant by the term 
‘radicalisation’: it is a problematic phenomenon to describe, a theme which recurs 
throughout the thesis.  One respondent from the third sector in Oldham said this: 
 
“There is a radicalisation of young Muslims happening, I would take the word 
harmful away from that, because I don’t think it’s like a pathology and it shouldn’t be 
looked at like a pathology, it’s actually, it is actually a response to their situation, to 
look and to challenge, now unless we’re saying that there’s a pathology why one and 
a half million mostly white people formed the biggest demonstration this country has 
ever seen in London against the invasion of Iraq, if we’re going to pathologise the 
fact that a lot of young Muslims are taking an interest in foreign affairs and in 
international relations, and have a sense of outrage about Britain and Americas 
foreign policy, then we have to pathologise an even greater number of white people in 
this country because they have the same view. So I think we need to be careful in 
terms of how we describe this.”2 
 
 
There is as yet no universally accepted definition of the phenomenon known as 
‘radicalisation’.3 However, in a study financed by the European Union called ‘Causal 
factors of radicalisation’, the definition of violent radicalisation from the Council of the 
European Union is used, and the ancillary description is also helpful: 
 
 
“‘The phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead 
to acts of terrorism’ (EC,2006). Radicalisation is a gradual process that, although it 
can occur very rapidly, has no specifically defined beginning or end state. Rather, 
radicalisation is an individual development that is initiated by a unique combination 
of causal factors and that comprises a drastic change in attitudes and behaviour.”4 
 
 
Thus, I rely upon this definition throughout the thesis to provide an understanding of 
what is meant by the term ‘radicalisation’. 
 
This chapter introduces the programme of research, provides the context, and 
demonstrates why it is so pertinent. It is organised into seven sections. The first section 
introduces me as the researcher, before moving on to illustrate the type of questions to 
which I sought answers, thereby demonstrating how the research question was isolated. 
The second section deals with the relevance of the work, and considers why it is 
                                                 
2
 B0024 
3
 ‘Causal factors of radicalisation’ 1 April 2008, Work Package 4, Transnational Terrorism, Security & 
the Rule of Law, p6, from www.transnationalterrorism.eu accessed  25/4/12 
4
 ibid 
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valuable to researchers, practitioners and the public and, in so doing, it introduces the 
hypothesis. The third section discusses the seminal events used in the thesis together 
with the reasons why they have been chosen, and considers the policy and legal 
responses that they spawned. The fourth section provides an overview of the 
philosophical position the thesis adopts, and how this guides the choice of research 
method; the rationale for the choice of the research location is also discussed. In the 
fifth section, I introduce the research findings, their analysis and concomitant 
discussion. I show how the research has brought data into the public domain which was 
previously hidden, and use the thesis to turn theoretical argument and academic research 
into practical application. I also consider avenues for further relevant work. In section 
six, I critically review the research by considering the reliability of the sources, and 
outlining other significant areas of risk. Finally, in section seven, I provide a brief 
outline of each of the subsequent chapters. 
 
1.1 The Research Question and the Researcher 
 
As a mid-career police professional, I have been for some time certain that the art and 
practice of policing is capable of improvement through the contribution that police 
professionals themselves can make by research: applying sound academic techniques to 
challenge existing practices in order to develop more effective solutions to real-life 
problems. In fact, this view was crystallised in my mind by a prolific researcher and 
writer on the police in the latter part of the 20
th
 Century, who was himself a police 
officer. John Alderson said “it is essential that the police research themselves.”5 He felt 
strongly that no one was better placed, with a unique understanding of policing and the 
problems that police officers and police organisations face, to undertake this task.
6
 
Having worked in operational roles with Devon and Cornwall Police for a number of 
years, including Neighbourhood Policing and patrol policing, and held strategic 
responsibility for the effective delivery of equality and diversity across the two counties 
in the period post-September 11
th
 and during the London bombing incidents, a number 
of fundamental questions concerning the role of the police, and the relevance of past 
failings began to form in my mind. The opportunity presented itself to use my previous 
research experience gained at the University of Exeter during the completion of a 
Master of Arts degree at the Centre for Police and Criminal Justice Studies, and answer 
                                                 
5
 Alderson J (2008), Personal Communication, Ottery St Mary, 19 February 2008 
6
 Ibid 
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some of these questions, thus contributing to the improvement of the practical delivery 
of policing. I wanted to know, for instance, whether there were social reasons which 
contributed to the development of radicalisation in some communities. I suspected that 
the role of the police in society was crucial not only in identifying potential risk, but 
also in the construction of mitigation strategies. I wanted to understand whether 
previous periods of unrest, not necessarily involving Muslim communities, were related 
in any way, and whether therefore they might provide a potential source of knowledge 
to deal with the current threat – and indeed whether the fundamental role of the police in 
society might have contributed in some way.  
 
As already identified, of critical importance is an apparent failure by the police and 
partner agencies to learn past lessons. At the time of the conception of the research 
question, the Commission for Racial Equality had reported on their ‘Formal 
Investigation’7: police organisations had demonstrably failed to implement legally 
binding duties under ‘race’ equality legislation, and yet there had been hugely 
significant events over previous years which should have ensured that the police were 
not only legally compliant but perhaps also paving the way for the service to lead the 
state in the drive for equality. I discuss these events in more detail in section 1.3 below. 
Other ideas and questions followed. For instance, what made someone who was British-
born, brought up and educated in Britain, want to murder fellow countrymen by the use 
of so-called suicide terrorism?  What lessons from the past might be relevant and has 
the failure on the part of the police and partner agencies, alluded to above, contributed 
in some way to the growth of harmful radicalisation and subsequent progression to 
suicide terrorism? Can it be predicted, and if so, how? Are the police and their partners 
continuing to fail in identifying and mitigating risk? Are the current arrangements for 
the delivery of mainstream local policing capable of identifying and mitigating risk? In 
an intriguing contribution to the debate, Tupman and O’Reilly (2004) consider a series 
of ‘tension indicators’ created in the aftermath of riots in the USA and Britain during 
the 1960s through to the 1980s,
8
 and suggest that “if ‘anti-American or anti-Westerner 
or anti-foreigner’ is substituted for ‘racist’ then the creation of ‘tension indicators’ in 
                                                 
7
 Commission for Racial Equality (2005) ‘The Police Service in England and Wales: Final Report of a 
formal investigation by the Commission for Racial Equality’ London: CRE 
8
 For instance see Momboisse R (1967) ‘Riots, Revolts and Insurrections’ Springfield, Illinois: CC 
Thomas; quoted in  Field S (1982) ‘Urban disorders in Britain and America: a review of research’ in Field 
S and Southgate P (1982) Public Disorder: a review of research and a study in one inner city area Home 
Office Research Study no 72 London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office pp1-40, and Brightmore C (1992) 
Urban Rioting in Latter Day Britain: An analysis of causes, tension monitoring, disorder prediction and 
prevention Unpublished MA in Public Order: University of Leicester 
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this area of interest, and thus the need for counter-terrorist intervention, is in the starting 
blocks.”9 This then gives rise to the question of what types of tension indicators might 
exist within communities which forewarn of the risk of the development of harmful 
radicalisation, and how capable are police organisations at detecting them? Moreover, 
how good are they at working with their partner agencies to mitigate the risk posed?  
This series of questions leads directly to the thrust of the research question. I deal with 
the rationale for the choice of the research location below. 
 
 
1.2 Relevance, Consequence, and the Hypothesis 
 
This thesis is of interest to academics, practitioners and the public at large. It is designed 
to contribute to the existing knowledge surrounding the risk of the development of 
harmful radicalisation within communities and, at the same time, provide practitioners 
with a menu of options which they might employ to mitigate that risk. It therefore 
provides a bridge between the theoretical and the practical, and answers the question 
posed by Murray (2005): ‘Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing or Just 
a Shift in Priorities?’10  
 
Problems in neighbourhoods should be subject to a neighbourhood problem solving 
plan, which should include details of the owner and representatives of partner 
organisations.
11
 In appropriate cases, these plans feed into multi-agency tactical tasking 
and coordinating groups and onwards to a more strategic assessment if they are of such 
importance that they might influence strategic decision making. Such problems would 
be supported by community intelligence, created when information from the community 
has been subject to evaluation and risk assessment.
12
 Such information and intelligence 
might include patterns of crime and disorder, changes in tension between different 
communities or indeed within the same community. Clearly, it might also include 
specific information relating to the growth of ‘anti-western’ or ‘anti-American’ graffiti 
or similar signals in a given area, the growth of extremist activity, or one-dimensional 
                                                 
9
 Tupman, WA and O’Reilly, C (2004) ‘Terrorism, Hegemony and Legitimacy: Evaluating success and 
failure in the War on Terror’ Paper presented to PSA conference, Lincoln, 2004 p37 
10
 Murray, J (2005) ‘Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing or Just a Shift in Priorities?’ 
Police Practice and Research 6:4, pp347-361 
11
 ACPO Centrex (2006b) ‘Briefing paper on Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence 
Model 2006’ Wyboston: NCPE p11 
12
 Ibid p14 
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media reporting – those ‘indicators’ discussed in Chapter Three which forewarn of the 
escalating risk. The challenge here is two-fold – firstly, the recognition of these signs 
and thus their evaluation and assessment; and secondly, the understanding of what they 
might signify. 
 
In the examination of relevant literature in Chapter Three, I identify a number of key 
themes from the literature, and propose that certain forms of ‘social protest’ have 
common roots within communities, which, as indicated above, can be described as 
follows: a sense of injustice, a lack of political representation, declining perceptions of 
legitimacy in state authorities, relative deprivation - which may include unemployment 
and a gap between expectation and achievement - and discrimination, and levels of 
drug-related crime may also be important. Using this hypothesis, I propose a model, a 
‘ladder of escalation’, which offers an incremental aspect to the progression towards 
terrorism: 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I exposed the theory and model to critical examination at academic conferences and 
through independent scholarly peer assessment during the construction of the 
argument.
13
  
 
Application in the real world could enable strategic assessments at the macro level to 
determine the vulnerability of a given area, town or city. This might include problems 
                                                 
13
 Presentation of paper at Pisa, European Centre for Political Research, September 2007; HUSS 
Postgraduate Conference, May 2008;  
    PEACEFUL    ------------------------------------------------------------ VIOLENT 
 
 
 
Voting     Demonstrations   Strikes     Increased levels of            Urban Unrest 
                                                         political extremist activity                             Terrorism           Civil war                 
 
 
        Petitions         Sedition        Increased levels                 Growth of radicalisation          Coup 
                                                                                                        and fundamentalism 
                                                                 of ‘hate’ crime 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Ladder of Escalation 
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of discrimination, poor housing, poor education and poverty, perhaps with higher levels 
of right wing activity and hate crime – a detailed environmental scan should reveal these 
issues. This begins to demonstrate the value of partners in the National Intelligence 
Model process. At the tactical level, level 1, shorter-term issues such as activity between 
individuals, within a family, or the identification of ‘tension indicators’, as discussed in 
Chapter Three, would inform the tasking process. Steps or rungs on the ladder of 
escalation would provide further information; thus three sets of ‘warnings’ can be 
postulated: (i) Social preconditions, as identified above; (ii) ‘Policing indicators’ – those 
things identified as indicators of raised tension, acting as a forewarning to the onset of 
urban unrest, which might also be relevant to predict the development of 
disenfranchised groups thus raising the risk of harmful radicalisation; (iii) Steps on the 
‘ladder of escalation’ such as certain types of political activity, escalating towards 
demonstrations, sedition and radicalisation. Once again, the benefit of involvement of 
partners is obvious, and it would include the third sector. True partner engagement 
should maximise the opportunity for intelligence and information gathering, and once 
these things entered the NIM process, and were properly analysed, it would be possible 
to identify resources and plans to mitigate the identified risk. Moreover, the resolution 
or mitigation of the risk is unlikely to be solely within the gift of the police, and partner 
involvement at would enable partner resources to be allocated. This might be important 
in relation to, for instance, access to training. At this point, the value, the centrality, of 
Neighbourhood Policing becomes obvious. Since NIM depends upon intelligence and 
information to work, there must be sufficient contact between the police and 
communities because without this contact there will be no intelligence or information 
flow. 
 
The research work tests the ladder of escalation and the associated processes in the 
theatre of the case study, bringing forward conclusions about their effectiveness, and 
thereby contributing to the academic debate advanced in Chapter Three regarding the 
common roots of radicalisation, terrorism and other forms of social protest. 
 
In its examination of the impact of discrimination and racism at street level, the thesis 
also complements Lambert and Githens-Mazer (2010), where case studies are presented 
demonstrating how prevalent incidents are of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate 
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crime.
14
 Lambert and Githens-Mazer report evidence of institutional discrimination 
against Mosques and Islamic Centres from policing, local Government and politics 
generally, and they state that tackling these issues is a “litmus test for the new Coalition 
Government’s commitment for fairness and social justice.”15 The current research 
project also comments on these issues in the theatre of the case study (section 7.2.4, 
Chapter Seven, and section 8.1.2.7, Chapter Eight). 
 
One of the principal purposes of the thesis is to bridge the gap between theoretical, 
academic argument and practical application in the real world. To this end, it must be of 
significant interest and relevance to practitioners. In 2006, I submitted the research 
proposal to the National Policing Improvement Agency, seeking support from them for 
a Bramshill Fellowship.
16
 I was successful in this application, the research proposal 
being identified as a ‘key leadership issue for the service.’17 The Fellowship has been 
reviewed on an annual basis to ensure the continued relevance of the work as the 
research has progressed, and it has been successful at each review. This demonstrates 
how the police service, the practitioners, consider the work to be of interest to them.  
 
Finally, the thesis is of significant interest to members of the public generally but 
perhaps in particular, to members of Asian communities in Oldham and many other 
demographically similar parts of the UK. Its commentary on how state authorities, 
especially the police, can adjust the services they provide, and tailor them to meet the 
specific needs of communities, offers the opportunity to reduce the incidence of 
discrimination, reduce the perception of social injustice, provide for more inclusion and 
better community cohesion. These things make for safer communities and help people 
to feel safer. 
 
1.3 Seminal Events and Policy Responses 
 
In Chapter Two, I introduce what I argue are five seminal events in the context of police 
and ethnic minority community relations. Briefly, these seminal events are: (1) The 
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Brixton disorders of 1981.
18
 Here, significant urban unrest and rioting developed in a 
deprived inner city location; the area, which had high levels of minority black 
communities, had a poor history of relations with the police. Poor police practices 
precipitated the riots. (2) The murder of Stephen Lawrence.
19
 In this incident, Stephen 
Lawrence, an 18 year old black teenager was attacked and murdered by a group of white 
men in April 1993; the murder was motivated by racial hatred. The subsequent enquiry 
found a series of police failings, including evidence of institutional racism. (3) ‘The 
Secret Policeman’.20 In 2002, Mark Daly, an undercover reporter, joined Greater 
Manchester Police to determine what steps had been taken to eliminate racism from the 
force after its own Chief Constable had labelled it institutional racist. Daly exposed 
extremely damaging racism and racist new recruits at Bruche Training College, where 
he attended for his initial training. (4) Urban unrest in Bradford, Oldham and other 
Northern cities with sections of their ethnic minority communities living in areas with 
extremely high levels of deprivation. Over the weekend 26-28 May 2001, violence 
erupted in flashpoints across Oldham with petrol bombs being thrown and buildings set 
alight; rioting involving up to 500 Asian youths on the Saturday was followed with 
further unrest on the Sunday.
21
 The Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) 
reported that ‘the riots occurred as the culmination of 5 weeks of racial abuse 
orchestrated by right-wing extremists against the town’s ethnic minority community.’22  
(5) The London Transport Bombings.
23
 On 7 July 2005, 56 people were killed in 
simultaneous suicide bomb attacks on London’s underground, and a double-decker bus. 
The four perpetrators were British Muslims; three of them had been born and raised in 
the UK. 
 
In Chapter Four, I examine the policy and legal responses to each of these seminal 
events,
24
 and I isolate a number of ‘critical success factors’ from the first four – themes 
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Inspectorate of Constabulary (1997) ‘Winning the Race: Policing Plural Communities’ London: Home 
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which are common to them all. I argue that successful delivery of these factors 
optimises the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of minority and disenfranchised 
groups, thereby minimising the risk of adverse social protest. The factors are: 
 
 The need to work in partnership with other agencies, especially education and 
housing departments. 
 
 The police organisation needs to strive to reflect the community it serves, and 
the recruitment, retention and promotion of ethnic minority staff is a crucial part 
of this. 
 
 Community representatives should be involved in training, especially 
community awareness training. 
 
 The local ‘beat officer’ or Neighbourhood Policing Team has a vital role and 
must attract officers of high calibre. 
 
 Police organisations must work towards the elimination of racial discrimination 
of all types, and contribute towards the development of cohesive communities. 
 
Since these factors are isolated from the legislative and policy responses from the 
seminal events, and since each of the first four demonstrate significant evidence of 
racism and discrimination (the police in particular have displayed poor judgement, poor 
community engagement and poor understanding of communities), I consider in 
Chapters Seven and Eight the extent to which police and state failings have contributed 
to disenfranchisement by ethnic minority communities, and therefore also contributed to 
the risk of individuals murdering people through suicide terrorism.  
 
Thus, at this point, the thesis is poised to consider a number of linked issues. Firstly, 
having argued that to reduce risk, police forces need to have learned the lessons from 
the past and implemented the ‘critical success factors’, the research sets out to establish 
at a grass roots level what constitutes risk and whether or not the ‘critical success 
                                                                                                                                               
Equality’ London: CRE; Commission for Racial Equality (2005) ‘The Police Service in England and 
Wales: Final Report of a formal investigation by the Commission for Racial Equality’ London: CRE; 
Cantle T (2001) ‘Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team’ London: Home 
Office 
 21 
factors’ have been achieved. Secondly, it tests the hypothesis, i.e. the common roots 
theory and the ladder of escalation that springs from it. Thirdly, it aims to determine 
whether there are reliable indicators of risk and, if there are, whether the mechanisms 
for the delivery of local policing, Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence 
Model (NIM), described in Chapter Four, are capable of identifying and targeting these 
risks. In Chapter Eight, I pull all of these things together, and identify a fundamental 
impediment to the capability of NIM to achieve success on this agenda:  
 
Figure 2: Schematic showing the relationship between the ‘Common Roots’, ‘Critical 
Success Factors’, ‘Policing Indicators’ and the National Intelligence Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tackled by: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measured by: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Common Roots: NIM Level 3 
1. A sense of injustice 
2. A lack of political representation 
3. Declining perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities 
4. Relative deprivation 
5. Discrimination 
6. Levels of drug-related crime 
Critical Success Factors: NIM Level 2 
1. The need to work in partnership with other agencies, especially education and 
housing. 
2. The police organisation needs to strive to reflect the community it serves 
3. Community representatives should be involved in training, especially 
community awareness training 
4. The local ‘beat officer’ or Neighbourhood Policing team has a vital role and 
must attract officers of high calibre 
5. Police organisations must work towards the elimination of racial discrimination 
of all types, and contribute towards the development of cohesive communities 
Policing Indicators: NIM Level 1 
Inter alia:  
1. Crime 
2. Hate crime 
3. Racist incidents 
4. Assaults on police officers 
5. Complaints against the police 
6. Activity on the ‘ladder of escalation’ 
7. Whispers and Rumours 
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I suggest that NIM is inherently ill-equipped to deal effectively with this agenda. It 
becomes slow and lacks the ability to respond dynamically and effectively as a direct 
result of its structure – i.e., whilst there is some overlap, each component part of the 
relationship largely corresponds to a different level within NIM. 
 
1.3.1 The Four Objectives 
 
Thus, I indentify four key objectives for the research to achieve, and they run as a 
continuing theme throughout: 
 
1. Contribute to the understanding of the development of harmful radicalisation 
amongst members of certain communities. 
 
2. Develop a menu of indicators which predict or forewarn of the risk of 
radicalisation. 
 
3. Establish perceptions of success of Neighbourhood Policing and the National 
Intelligence Model at identifying risk. 
 
4. Establish a ‘toolkit’ of options which might be utilised to mitigate risk by 
‘switching-off’ the radicalisation process, and developing multi-agency 
partnership strategies for the same purpose. 
 
 
1.4 Philosophical Position, Methodology and Choice of Research Location 
 
To successfully achieve these objectives, I design a research project and present the 
philosophical arguments in Chapter Five. I specifically examine ontological and 
epistemological issues and, in so doing, I consider the quest for the ‘truth’. By arguing 
that problems exist in societies, whether we know about them or not, I determine that 
the ontological position adopted by the thesis is ‘foundationalist’ – i.e. there is a ‘real’ 
world out there which exists independently of our knowledge of it and that, at first 
glance, this gives rise to a ‘positivist’ philosophical position.25 However, by asking 
whether an observer can identify these ‘real’ and tangible relations between social 
phenomena, and identifying that there is a double-hermeneutic in that the world is 
interpreted by actors (one hermeneutic level) and the interpretation is interpreted by the 
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observer (a second hermeneutic level), I argue that the purely positivist philosophical 
position for the thesis is fatally flawed. I take heed of Halfpenny’s warning that 
“attempts to establish any sort of positivist hegemony in sociology have always faced 
[so many] numerous challenges that alternative understandings of the social world are 
more appropriate to the human nature of its subject matter”.26 Thus I consider the realist 
tradition introduced by Roy Bhaskar as “a comprehensive alternative to the positivism 
which since the time of Hume has fashioned our image of science”.27 Realism is also 
foundationalist in ontological terms but it establishes that there are deep structural 
relationships between social phenomena which cannot be observed but which are 
essential for the explanation of behaviour. Bhaskar’s arguments, however, are related to 
the world of physical science, and pure realism as a philosophical position for 
sociological research is thus difficult to defend. Instead, I specify ‘modern critical 
realism’ as the philosophical position adopted by the thesis; in the words of Marsh and 
Furlong this “‘contemporary realism’ has been significantly influenced by the 
interpretist critique”28, where the interpretist tradition argues that the world is socially 
constructed and therefore does not exist independently of our knowledge of it. 
29
  I 
argue that this presents the solution to the apparent paradox:  the thesis interprets 
interpretations, but this hermeneutic characteristic is permitted within the framework of 
realism modified by an interpretist aspect.  
 
This corpus of thought gives rise to the fallible conception of what constitutes ‘truth’; in 
the words of Sayer (1992), “we can never justifiably claim to have discovered the 
absolute truth about matters of fact”,30 and instead he offers the concept of ‘practical 
adequacy’31, a philosophical argument which reinforces the position adopted for the 
thesis.  
 
Establishing the philosophical position for the thesis and acknowledging one’s own 
ontological and epistemological positions informs the nature and journey the research 
takes as it evolves from conception through analysis to conclusion. The primary 
methodological approach adopted for the research is qualitative, a methodology which 
is consistent with foundationalist ontology but anti-positivist epistemology, or, in other 
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words, a critical realist philosophical position. The arguments I am making are 
philosophical in nature but vital in order to justify the nature and type of research to be 
undertaken. Naively thinking in terms of qualitative versus quantitative only, without 
ontological and epistemological consideration being taken into account would make the 
research design difficult to defend. As Sayer reminds us, “it is quite extraordinary to 
compare the attention given in social science courses to ‘methods’ in the narrow sense 
of statistical techniques, interviewing and survey methods and the like, with the blithe 
disregard of questions of how we conceptualize, theorize and abstract.”32   In fact, the 
two methodological approaches are not mutually exclusive, and some types of 
quantitative data sit comfortably within the critical realist tradition. Acknowledging the 
value of some of this quantitative data to demonstrate the ‘reality’ of relationships, I 
present and discuss such data in the first part of Chapter Seven. 
 
I present the rationale for choosing the location of the case study as Oldham in Greater 
Manchester in Chapter Five. In essence, the components of the hypothesis described 
above, i.e. a sense of injustice, a lack of political representation, declining perceptions 
of legitimacy in state authorities, relative deprivation and discrimination, together with 
drug-related crime, begin to prescribe the essential components of the study area. The 
research design might be described as ‘tight’, characterised by research which is based 
on clearly defined constructs and restricted to the investigation of particular 
relationships in familiar contexts.
33
 This permits the use of the case study in 
instrumental terms: the case is studied in depth in order to provide insight into the wider 
issue - “the case is of secondary interest, it plays a supportive role, and it facilitates our 
understanding of something else.”34 
 
Designing the research project with Flick’s basic principles of ethically sound research 
at its heart,
35
 approval from the University of Exeter’s ethics committee was sought and 
achieved in April 2008. Work then commenced on constructing the research tool, the 
semi-structured interview schedule, using an advisory panel of independent community 
members drawn from students and others at Exeter Mosque. This was refined using 
initial pilot interviews with key players in the theatre of the case study before being 
fixed. In total, 41 people were interviewed and of these, half were community members 
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in the sense that they were not employed by any state agency. The quest for new 
information began to draw to a natural close as the number of interviews increased; 
discovery of new themes and thoughts began to dry up, and the point of theoretical 
saturation appeared to have been reached.
36
 This data gathering process was augmented 
by a period of participant observation where I spent 16 hours on foot patrol with a 
Police Community Support Officer, six hours attending partnership meetings and four 
hours observing youth workers running clubs. I also took the opportunity to engage in a 
public meeting as an observer in the immediate aftermath of a fatal drugs-related 
shooting.  
 
In order to understand the data and become immersed in it, all interviews, whether 
recorded or not, were transcribed, coded and analysed by me, using recognised 
techniques such as memoing.
37
 QSR-N6 NUD*IST software, specifically designed for 
the analysis of qualitative data, was used as an aid. Records of all interviews and the 
identities of the participants have been protected in accordance with Data Protection Act 
principles, and will be subject to a controlled disposal three years after the completion 
of the project. 
 
1.5 Findings, Conclusions and Further Work 
  
In Chapter Seven, I present the findings of the research broken down in to the primary 
themes developed from the construction of the research tool. These five themes are: 
Policing and Social Justice; Local Social Conditions; The Effect of the Media; Global 
Events; and The Role of Islam. Each of these is then further sub-divided into a total of 
27 sub-themes which emerge from the analysis and coding of the data. By using 
interview data, I argue that there is evidence of radicalisation amongst communities in 
the theatre of the case study, and I use this and other findings to contextualise the 
research into the existing literature reviewed in Chapter Three.  Of particular interest is 
the question of identity, and I introduce through the use of interviewee response data the 
notion of ‘Mr Big’ - the young and apparently wealthy Asian male, driving around 
deprived housing estates in large expensive cars and wearing a lot of jewellery; an 
individual who provides a role model for others from the community to emulate. The 
evidence that these material possessions are obtained through the criminal supply of 
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drugs is overwhelming. Thus, I analyse the link between drugs and the risk of the 
development of harmful radicalisation. I also present and discuss the case of Junaid, a 
17 year old Asian male who was fatally shot on the street in the centre of the theatre of 
the case study during the course of the fieldwork, his link to the local drugs market, and 
the community and police reaction to his murder.  
 
The methodology employed, and the unique nature of my position as both a researcher 
and a professional police officer, enabled me to access and present data which would 
have been otherwise unavailable.  For instance, I had free and unfettered access to the 
NIM tasking meetings at which sensitive information pertaining to individuals and 
investigations was discussed; I was able to patrol on foot with members of the local 
policing team to see at first hand their interaction with members of the community and, 
in some cases, engage members of the community who would otherwise have been 
largely inaccessible. Moreover, the freedom with which police interviewees were able 
to talk with me, as a direct result of me being a police officer, added a depth and 
richness to this data. 
 
In the final chapter, I use the findings presented in Chapter Seven to make observations, 
present conclusions and formulate suggestions for practical application in the real 
world. Firstly, I consider the success of Greater Manchester Police in delivering the 
‘critical success factors’ discussed above, and I suggest that in the theatre of the case 
study, the force is not successfully delivering three of the five critical success factors: 
they are not reflecting the community being served, the community awareness training 
is weak, and partnership working is flawed. They are largely delivering two of the 
critical success factors: they have high quality staff who are very well engaged with 
communities, delivering Neighbourhood Policing (though they are not, in the main, 
police officers), and they are working towards the elimination of racial discrimination. 
Secondly, I consider each of the four objectives in turn, and I illuminate each one; this 
includes an assessment of the validity of the hypothesis and the ‘ladder of escalation’. In 
support of achieving the four objectives, I use the data from the case study, in 
conjunction with the literature reviewed in Chapter Three and the policies and edicts 
distilled from Chapter Four, to produce a menu of indicators of risk, and a ‘toolkit’ that 
police and partner agencies can employ to mitigate that risk. In this way, I bridge the 
gap between the theoretical and academic study of social phenomena and the practical 
application in the real world.   
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Although this research project has examined issues at some depth within the theatre of 
the case study, there are three general areas which present themselves as offering 
fruitful avenues for further work. The first of these is linked to the philosophical 
position adopted by the thesis. As discussed above, both qualitative and quantitative 
methods are consistent with critical realism, and this project utilises a qualitative 
approach whilst engaging in an examination of quantitative data. A further project, 
using a bespoke quantitative research design, which is based around surveys and 
questionnaires, would complement this one, since it would help demonstrate and 
develop the understanding of those real relationships which exists between the police, 
partner agencies and the public. The second avenue for future work is linked to the use 
of the case study as an instrumental one (discussed above), and how it ‘relates to things 
beyond the material at hand.’38 I argue that the arguments and ideas which have 
presented themselves through the research in Oldham, and which are articulated in the 
following chapters, are capable of extrapolation to other areas in the country which have 
similar features to those of the case study – but testing of this argument is worthwhile. 
The third avenue for useful research is the relevance and applicability of the 
fundamental basis of the hypothesis and the findings of the research to other types of 
social phenomena – not merely radicalisation. I suggest here, for instance, that there are 
potentially powerful similarities to the development of gang related behaviour, linked to 
the question of identity and the dearth of suitable role models within certain 
communities.  
 
1.6 Risks and Threats to the Research 
 
As the thesis progresses through the background chapter, into the review of relevant 
literature and the examination of the policies and edicts which falls out of the five 
seminal events, it develops arguments based on material from alternative and sometimes 
opposing epistemological positions; the purpose of the current section is not to revisit 
risk in that sense, rather it is to comment on the risks and threats inherent in the research 
project. 
 
Perhaps the biggest risk to the efficacy of the findings is related to sample size. 
Although I deal with the choice of the research location and the manner in which 
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subjects were chosen in a carefully constructed argument in Chapter Five, limited 
resources of time and finance militate against carrying out a research project involving 
qualitative data gathering over vast geographical areas or with huge numbers of 
participants. And yet, to compromise by using a quantitative method, and thereby 
missing the opportunity to establish not only the ‘whats’ but also the ‘whys’ and 
‘hows’39 would be to miss a fundamental goal of the research – to explore the topic 
openly, allowing people to express their opinions and ideas in their own words.
40
 The 
question then, is how to determine the point at which it is reasonable to stop. I 
interviewed nearly every member of staff from the police engaged in delivering 
Neighbourhood Policing in the theatre of the case study; the same might be said of the 
major partner agency, Oldham Borough Council. The same cannot be said of the 
interviews conducted with members of the community. But I appeared to reach a point 
where the collection of further bits of data ceased to contribute anything new, the point 
of theoretical saturation discussed above. Nevertheless, this represents a risk to the 
efficacy of the research.  
 
A more fundamental question is raised regarding the effectiveness of the interventions 
proposed through the resolution of Objective 4. Although I describe a menu of options, 
which have been constructed using the data from the research and contextualised within 
existing literature, the measurement of the success of these interventions is problematic. 
How much radicalisation will be prevented?  Is the research able to detect the effects of 
current policy and then measure or evaluate the effects of a changed policy? I submit 
that it would be able to, given time for the changes to take effect. 
 
Although there are strengths and weaknesses to the work as there are to any project of 
its kind, this research is unique in that it considers the effectiveness of modern and 
mainstream policing techniques in the much wider and frequently specialist effort to 
tackle terrorism. 
 
1.7 Outline of following Chapters 
  
Chapter Two: ‘Background’, provides a background to the social, demographic and 
historical setting of the thesis. It charts the demographic changes in Britain’s society 
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since the end of the Second World War, specifically examining the immigration of 
Muslim people. It then describes the key policing developments over similar time 
frames, before linking the two things together, and discusses police-race relations in the 
UK. It posits the notion that British institutions and society have failed effectively to 
eliminate discrimination and social injustice, and that the price of this failure is high. It 
introduces the five seminal events described in section 1.3 above. 
 
Chapter Three: ‘Literature Review’, presents and discusses literature that examines the 
root causes of terrorism, radicalisation and urban unrest, arguing that their roots are 
similar; it constructs a hypothesis that suggests common roots exist: a sense of injustice, 
a lack of political representation, declining perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities, 
relative deprivation (which may include unemployment, and a gap between expectation 
and achievement) and discrimination. Levels of drug-related crime may also be 
important. Using this hypothesis, I propose a model, a ‘ladder of escalation’, which 
offers an incremental aspect to the progression towards terrorism, and I suggest that 
early identification of the steps provides a further fore-warning that state authorities 
should act to reduce the risk.  
 
Chapter Four: ‘Selected Policies and Edicts since 1981: A Critical Review’, critically 
analyses various selected laws, policy responses and edicts from the Home Office and 
elsewhere which largely arose from the five seminal events introduced in Chapter Two. 
These seminal events and their responses demonstrate a failure by state agencies to 
address problems like racial discrimination, and perceptions of injustice, and the chapter 
therefore suggests that, linked with the common roots theory, the current crisis is an 
almost inevitable consequence of that failure. It isolates the five ‘critical success 
factors’ introduced in section 1.3, above. The chapter describes Neighbourhood Policing 
and the National Intelligence Model, the machinery of local policing delivery, to assist 
with understanding how policing is currently delivered – an important aspect of 
contextualising the findings of the research. 
 
Chapter Five: ‘Research Methodology’, introduces the research methodology, examines 
philosophical theory, including a consideration of ontological and epistemological 
issues, and it argues the case for qualitative research. It describes the philosophical 
position for the research as ‘critical realist’, which has important methodological 
implications. It includes a discussion on ethical considerations, analysis of qualitative 
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data, and a rationale for the choice of research location. Importantly, it outlines some 
practical lessons learned during the conduct of this type of research. 
 
Chapter Six: ‘Policing Indicators and Critical Success Factors’, this chapter consists of a 
literature review and discussion of the following policing indicators: crime, crime 
statistics, crime and place, crime and social indices, crime, ‘race’ and racist incidents. 
The discussion of indicators continues with an examination of assaults on police 
officers and complaints against the police. It describes the difficulty and complexity of 
measuring all these various phenomena. It also brings forward the ‘critical success 
factors’ from Chapter Four, and describes how they link with the common roots and 
policing indicators.  
 
Chapter Seven: ‘Data and Analysis’, presents the data and findings from the research. 
The first part consists of quantitative data, largely in the area of the policing indicators 
discussed in Chapter Six. It then presents rich qualitative data broken down into five 
primary themes, prescribed by the construction of the research tool, and 27 sub-themes 
which emerge from the coding and analysis of the data. 
 
Chapter Eight: ‘Discussion and Conclusions’, consists of a discussion of the findings, 
and contextualises them in the existing literature. It is carefully structured, dealing first 
with the ‘critical success factors’, before dealing with each of the four objectives, also 
identified in section 1.3 above. This forms the major part of the chapter, and ultimately 
addresses the research question. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
 
Background 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out the context of the research. It is organised into three major 
sections. The first provides an overview of the demographic changes in Britain’s society 
since the end of the Second World War, with a particular emphasis on ethnicity. This 
specifically includes immigration of Muslim people to Britain as well as an assessment 
of the impact and expansion of Islam. 
 
The second section identifies key policing developments over the same time period. It 
paints a picture of where policing has come from and where it is now. This provides the 
foundation for section 4.12 entitled ‘The machinery of local policing delivery’ in 
Chapter Four, which examines and describes the principal models for the delivery of 
contemporary local policing: Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence 
Model. 
 
The third and final section knits the first two together. In so doing, it briefly charts the 
post-modern history of police-race relations in the UK, looking particularly at the urban 
unrest of the 1980s. It posits the notion that British institutions and society have failed 
effectively to eliminate discrimination and social injustice, and that the price of this 
failure is high. Five key ‘seminal events’ over three decades are described which 
support this position; state responses to these seminal events are critically dissected in 
Chapter Four.  
 
In short, are the police and other state agencies partly to blame for the position we 
apparently find ourselves in:  
 
“Britain remains a target of the highest possible priority to al-Qaeda and its affiliates; 
we are in a new reality. The sky is dark.” 41 
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2.1 Demographic Evolution 
 
2.1.1 Black and Minority Ethnic migration since 1945 
 
The United Kingdom began the post-war years with a non-white population of some 
30,000 people; it now has in excess of 3 million, whose origins extend from Africa, the 
Pacific Rim, the Caribbean and the Indian Subcontinent.
42
 Political parties, public 
authorities and a suspicious British public, with an acute sense of identity, have had to 
acknowledge the presence and needs of ethnic minorities who are visibly and culturally 
very different. Significant parts of major British cities and towns like London, 
Birmingham, Luton and Leicester, previously traditional homes to white working 
classes became, and remain, home to large numbers of ethnic minority people. 
 
 Hansen (2000) argues that this dramatic evolution was singularly surprising since the 
polling data for the first three decades of the post-war period demonstrate consistent 
majority public opposition to New Commonwealth migration, with primary sources 
from as early as the late 1940s suggesting consistent unease from Whitehall about non-
white migration.
43
 He defines two periods: the first occurring between 1948 and 1961, a 
wave of primary immigration, and the second between 1962 and 1974, a wave of 
secondary immigration, when dependants and spouses of those already in the UK 
started to arrive.
44
  Layton-Henry offers an explanation: he argues that that the war was 
a vital catalyst – it uprooted large numbers of colonial people from their home 
communities.
45
 Many colonial servicemen and workers had experienced favourable 
conditions fighting the war for Britain, and since they were contributing equally, the 
restrictions on entering Britain were lifted. He points out that serious unemployment in 
places like Jamaica, together with labour shortages in Britain contributed to the 
migration but that it was disorganised and usually voluntary – the migrants paid their 
own way.
46
 That there were no colonial immigration restrictions until 1962 only served 
to amplify Commonwealth migration: under the British Nationality Act of 1948, 
citizens of the British Commonwealth were allowed to enter Britain to seek work and 
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settle with their families.
47
 West Indians were the earliest to come, followed by the 
Indians and Pakistani/Bangladeshis (the latter of who came from what had been East 
Pakistan, but after the creation of an independent state in 1972, is now Bangladesh).
48
 
The most recent arrivals were those from countries such as Kenya and Uganda in East 
Africa, who opted, on the independence of these countries, for British Citizenship. Of 
these four major racial minorities, Indians constitute the largest group, followed by 
West Indians, Pakistani/Bangladeshi and finally East African Asians.
49
 Taking the racial 
minorities together, they constituted 1.4 million people in 1971, of which 28% had been 
born in Britain. But by 1977 this had grown to 1.85 million people, of which 40% had 
been born in Britain.
50
 This is discussed below in section 2.1.3 as it specifically applies 
to Islam.  
 
Hansen sums up, stating “the extent and rapidity of the UK’s transformation from a 
largely homogenous society into a multi-cultural society is remarkable, unprecedented 
and complete.” 51 
 
2.1.2 ‘Race’ versus Religion and other conceptual difficulties 
 
It is relevant to consider briefly the juxtaposition of ‘race’ and religion and 
terminological problems. In the theatre of public service delivery, and elsewhere, they 
are frequently confused, with notions of ‘race’ and religion conflated: they are assumed 
to be one and the same.  
 
‘Race’, as a concept is beset with difficulty. It is a term often used to denote a group or 
category of persons connected by common origin. Although it is used socially to denote 
people of different phenotypical characteristics, it is actually a social construct and has 
no scientific basis.
52
 ‘Racism’ can be understood as those ideologies and social 
processes which discriminate against groups of people on the basis of their assumed 
membership of a ‘racial’ group.53 Indeed, the terms ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islam’ are 
themselves problematic. People being classified as Muslim in the UK are in fact 
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heterogeneous as they originate from different cultures, speak different languages and 
follow different schools of Islamic thought.
54
 Even the terms ‘Asian’ and ‘Pakistani’ 
can be misleading since most of the subjects to whom I refer were born in Britain.
55
 I 
continue to use these terms throughout the thesis, acknowledging the caution required 
for their use. For all of these reasons, teasing out the fundamental basis of 
discrimination for instance, or prescribing with high levels of accuracy the 
demographics of an area in terms of both ethnicity and religion is liable to lead to 
misclassification in some cases; nevertheless, as Macey argues, one is bound to rely on 
the notion that in this context, those from Pakistan and Bangladesh are predominantly of 
the Islamic faith, whilst white people living in similar areas are not.
56
 
 
2.1.3 Islamic expansion in the UK 
 
Indians constitute the largest of the Asian racial minorities in Britain, having emigrated 
from two major areas, the Punjab and the Gujarat.
57
 Most Gujaratis and a few Punjabis 
adhere to the major religion in India viz. Hinduism. In Britain, Hindus are heavily 
outnumbered by Sikhs who mainly come from Punjab.
58
  
 
Hewer says that the largest concentration of Muslims from the subcontinent came from 
Kashmir, a state that was left unresolved following Britain’s withdrawal, and although 
political leadership was in the hands of Hindus and Sikhs, the majority of people were 
Muslim.
59
 Familiarity with migrant working patterns and a long association with British 
shipping meant that these areas and parts of North India, which later became East 
Pakistan, were fertile grounds for immigration to the UK.
60
 
 
The ‘Africanization’ of Africa in the early 1960s led to the migration of East African 
Asians from Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, many of whom were descendants of families 
that had been taken from India to the East African colonies by the British; their links 
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with Britain were strong.
61
 Other Muslim groups came from Malaysia, West Africa, 
Somalia and Morocco, and the impact on British business and entrepreneurial flair was 
significant. Here, Hewer provides an indication of the changing nature of the Muslim 
communities in Britain.
62
 In 1951, the number of people in Britain of Pakistani heritage 
was 5000. By 1961, this had risen to 24,900, of whom 1.2 percent were born in Britain. 
By 1971, it was 170,000 with 23.5 percent British born; in 1981 it was 360,000 with 
37.5 percent British born; in 1991 it was 640,000 with 47 percent British born and in the 
last census of 2001 it had risen to 747,285 of whom 55 percent were born in Britain. 
Muslims now make up 9 percent of the population of London and 14 percent of the 
population of Birmingham. He also makes some highly pertinent observations regarding 
the age profile. Of the UK Muslims in the 2001 census, 52 percent were less than 25 
years, compared to 31 percent in the total population and only 6 percent were aged over 
60 compared to 21 percent in the overall population. This means that Muslim 
populations will increase significantly in size in the next couple of decades simply by 
virtue of people marrying and having children. The best estimate using 1991 census 
figures indicated that the Muslim population of Britain would have to double before it 
reached demographic stability – i.e. the same number being born as die. Peach (2007), 
who argues that it was after the rise of the Islamic regimes in the Middle East and North 
Africa following the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that European countries became 
“uneasily aware that many of their ethnic-minority workers and their dependents were 
also Muslim”63, provides an interesting and empirical approach in his analysis of the 
growth of Muslims in Northern Europe, and presents various calculations to chart future 
growth.
 64
 He states that of the 1.6 million Muslims in the UK in 2001, 46 percent were 
Pakistanis, 18 percent were Bangladeshis and 9 percent were Indians.
65
 He also points 
out, which may become relevant, that Bangladeshis arrived during the 1980s, some 
twenty years later than the Pakistanis.
66
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Research has shown that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are consistently at a disadvantage 
with respect to white people, and often with respect to other minorities.
67
 Men continue 
to work disproportionately in manual work and are between two and five times more 
likely than white people to work in semi-skilled jobs; in fact, again evidenced through 
robust empirical analysis, Peach states: 
 
 
“..Muslims are the most economically marginalized of the British faith groups, with 
poor educational qualifications, low participation in the labor [sic] force, poor jobs, 
high rates of unemployment, higher than average health disabilities, large families, 
and high segregation. The young age structure ensures the rapid growth of Muslims 
as a whole. Low educational qualifications and occupational concentrations in 
restaurant- and taxi-driving-type occupations, with limited opportunities to progress, 
suggest that it will be difficult for them to escape their current economic 
position….All of these factors unite to explain the extraordinarily high concentration 
of the Muslim population in areas with high indices of poor housing.”68 
 
 
One third of the Muslim population of England and Wales live in the worst areas of 
multiple deprivation.
69
 The theoretical role of deprivation and poverty in relation to 
social unrest, including radicalisation and terrorism, is discussed in Chapter Three. 
 
2.2 Post War Policing 
 
This part of the present chapter provides an account of the journey of evolution that 
policing in Britain has undergone over the past four decades. How has it developed to 
take account of the dramatic change in the fabric of British society, some of it described 
above? Has it responded effectively, and what lessons have been learned?  
 
2.2.1 The Golden Age? 
 
Critchley characterises the 1900s as the zenith of police-public relations in Britain, 
citing an article in The Times from 1908: 
 
 
                                                 
67
 Modood, T (1997) ‘Conclusions: Ethnic Diversity and Disadvantage’ in ‘Ethnic Minorities in Britain: 
Diversity and Disadvantage’ London: Policy Studies Institute Ch 10. 
68
 Peach, C (2007) op cit p29 
69
 Ibid p30 
 37 
“The police are a body who, though distinctive in their character from all others, as 
the members of any public service must necessarily be, are yet related to the people to 
whom they serve by ties of intimate personal association which are not to be found in 
any other country in the world. The policeman in London is not merely guardian of 
the police; he is an integral part of its social life. In many a back street and slum he 
not merely stands for law and order; he is the true handyman of our streets, the best 
friend of a mass of people who have no other counsellor or protector.”70 
 
 
 Various authors have also referred to ‘the golden age’ of policing, characterised during 
the early 1950s by PC George Dixon who first appeared in the film The Blue Lamp. For 
example, Reiner (1992) says: 
 
“Yet by the 1950s, the police had become not merely accepted but lionised by the 
broad spectrum of opinion. In no other country has the police force been so much a 
symbol of national pride.”71 
 
 
He also cites a contemporary 1955 Police Journal editorial which stated: 
 
 
“‘The law-abiding sections of the community (and in this we include the larger 
majority of all classes, working, professional and leisured, alike) have come to accept 
the police more as guardians and less as oppressors.’”72 
 
 
And he develops the theme later on: 
 
 
“As far as police acceptance by the public is concerned, the 1950’s seem a ’Golden 
Age’ of tranquillity and accord, with only hesitant harbingers of a coming crisis.”73 
 
 
But these impressions are ridden with contextual dilemmas. The class system was rife in 
the early twentieth century: upper classes may well have been supportive of a coercive 
arm of social and political control, but what of the working classes?
74
 Later on, the 
public began to take an interest in the police through the explosion of post-war sitting 
room entertainment in the form of the television, and George Dixon was born. Now the 
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public began to develop a view of the police largely formulated on the basis of 
invention and fiction. Emsley describes matters thus: 
 
 
“Dixon knew everyone on his beat, and was known by everyone. He was always 
polite, whatever the circumstances, and always ready to offer friendly help and advice 
even to those on the wrong side of the law…Above all, he was honest and 
dependable…it was the character of Dixon which began to be used as a benchmark 
against which the behaviour of police later in the century was to be measured.”75 
 
 
But real life was somewhat different. Society was changing dramatically, not only in the 
context of 1930s depression, 1940s world conflict, 1950s and 1960s consumerism and 
technical development, but also, as described above, in societal fabric. Britain was 
turning from a largely homogenous society into a largely pluralistic one, and it was 
happening quickly. Overlaying this were a number of causes celebres, yet to be in the 
public domain but which ultimately lead to the Royal Commission of 1962 and the 
Police Act of 1964.
76
 Bunyan (1976) details one such example where he describes the 
establishing of the ‘ghost squad’ by Scotland Yard in 1946.77 This was a group set up to 
infiltrate London’s criminal underworld but was quietly and without ceremony broken 
up in 1958 because officers were becoming indistinguishable from criminals, and a 
number of them were caught ‘on the job’ by The Flying Squad.78 This was a far cry 
from the community police narrative where the emphasis was on harmonious relations 
within the police force and between the police force and the wider public – a narrative 
epitomized by Dixon of Dock Green.
79
 Major questions also arose over the 
constitutional position of Chief Constables, and some were investigated for fraud and 
corruption.
80
 
 
Other factors contributed to the Royal Commission of 1962. These included year-on-
year crime increases from 1955 onwards, spreading and developing populations, and 
relatively slow increases in police officer numbers.
81
 The nature of the police 
organisation was also changing, with the numbers of policewomen doubling in the years 
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1949-59, and continuing to increase through the next decade.
82
 Similarly, the number of 
civilians employed by the police service doubled between 1949 and 1959 and doubled 
again by 1966.
83
 
 
2.2.2 The Royal Commission and the Police Act 1964 
 
This is not the place for a detailed assessment of the impact of the Royal Commission 
across the full gamut of policing, or indeed the resulting Act; many other writers have 
provided accounts.
84
 However, it is appropriate to provide an overview of the changes 
the Act introduced which may be said to have influenced the way in which policing has 
been delivered for the 40 years since, and indeed to reflect on the impact this has had on 
community and race relations. 
 
The fundamental question the Royal Commission, appointed by the Home Secretary 
R.A. Butler on 25 January 1960, found itself having to confront was where the ultimate 
control of the provincial police should lie.
85
 Whilst most witnesses drawn from central 
and local government, as well as some senior police officers, were of the view that the 
existing system worked well, there were some powerful dissenting voices.
86
 In 
particular, the Chief Constable of Lancashire led a radical faction of chief constables 
who held the view that the requirement was local association but not local control, a 
view supported by the Police Federation who felt that local forces should be grouped 
into large regional units.
87 
The Commission came close: members were of the view that 
there was a logical argument for a single centrally directed force – that such an 
organisation would be clearly accountable to Parliament and that as an instrument for 
fighting crime, it was likely to be more effective than a large number of local forces 
possessing a high degree of local autonomy.
88
 They developed this theme with the idea 
that placing the police under the central control of a well disposed government would be 
neither constitutionally objectionable nor politically dangerous – that if an ill-disposed 
government came to power, then they would seize control of the police however they 
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might be organised.
89
  In the end however, the Commission decided that the present 
system had not failed and that improvements could be found within the existing 
structure, bringing with it the advantage that evolution could occur without a major or 
radical change.
90
 
 
The resulting Police Act of 1964 incorporated most of the recommendations of the 
Royal Commission. It repealed old legislation and attempted to define the functions and 
responsibilities with regards to the police of the Home Secretary, of local Police 
Authorities and of Chief Constables.
91
 It provided the Home Secretary with powers to 
amalgamate forces and, in 1966, the number of police forces was cut from 117 to 49.
92
 
In 1972, the Local Government Act reduced the number of provincial forces further to 
41.
93
 
 
In a stroke, the structure and governance of police forces in England and Wales had 
dramatically changed.  
 
2.2.3 Recruitment and Training 
 
In the aftermath of the war, and in the interests of efficiency, eight district training 
schools were established to provide a uniform instructional grounding for all recruits.
94
 
Against this background was the recognition in the Police Act 1964 of the importance 
of the cadet scheme and that the intake of cadets should be between 30% and 40% of 
total recruitment.
95
 In earlier times, police recruits had invariably spent several years out 
at work because they left school at 13 or 14 years of age and did not qualify for the 
minimum age limit.
96
 However, after 1964 recruits were drawn straight from school at 
the age of 16 or 17; subjecting a young man to a police environment at this young age 
presented problems and a Home Office Working Party made the following comment: 
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“A cadet’s training should be designed to make him a good citizen first; and thereby 
provide the makings of a good police officer, with some insight into the social roots 
of police work.”97 
 
 
Bunyon saw this in a different way: 
 
 
“Police cadets, like all unmarried policemen and policewomen, usually live in a 
station-house. The difficulties in trying to train a good citizen when these cadets are 
brought up in the rarefied social milieu of police life may go some way to account for 
the attitudes and extra-legal actions of young policemen today.”98 
 
 
This argument may extend to the modern regional or district training centres, a point 
brought into very sharp focus by the BBC in January 2003. This is discussed further in 
section 2.3.4.3.  
 
2.2.4 Unit Beat Policing 
 
Partly in response to staff shortages and increasing demand, and partly in response to 
technological advances, an entirely new system of policing was introduced to the UK in 
1966.
99
  The Unit Beat System was originally introduced to cope with the policing 
demands of a new town on the outskirts of Liverpool. Kirby was built with no plans or 
thoughts for anything other than houses, and families that moved into the area were 
identified by police as ‘problem families’.100  The essence of Unit Beat Policing and its 
raison d’être may be summed up in the following terms: 
 
“Although we had divided the town into eleven beats, we were unable to find enough 
policemen to send to Kirby, and we had at the most only six uniformed men 
patrolling the town at any one time, and this in a community which had risen to 
60,000 by 1963. We decided the foot patrol must go, and in May 1965, the eleven 
foot patrol beats were reorganised into five mobile beats patrolled through the 
twenty-four hours by a policeman in a car…. More important, each man carried in his 
pocket a personal radio which enabled him at all times, whether in the car or out of it, 
to keep in touch with his station, so that wherever he was he could summon speedy 
help or be directed to the scene of any incident.”101 
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A detective constable would also be assigned to the area, and a ‘collator’ would collate 
the flow of information and intelligence; in time, small local teams built up. The new 
system was very popular and it spread rapidly: by the end of 1968, some two thirds of 
the population were covered by it.
102
 
 
The system had its critics – the increasing mobility of policemen in ‘panda’ cars tended 
to remove them dangerously far from that close contact with the public which had 
always been so valuable to policing in the UK;
103
 ‘Z Cars’ became the public image of 
the police. Although policing has evolved since the 60s, particularly in respect of recent 
developments around Neighbourhood Policing and the appointment of Police 
Community Support Officers, many police officers are still in police cars and still not 
engaging with the public in non-confrontational situations.  
 
2.2.5 A Crisis of Confidence? 
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the police service was rocked by corruption scandals and 
miscarriages of justice, and politicisation of the function under the Thatcher 
Government, most powerfully illustrated through the miners strike (see below). Emsley 
refers to this period as ‘A crisis of Confidence’ and he provides several examples.104 
They include attempts by Sir Robert Mark (Commissioner of the Metropolis 1972 to 
1977), to root out the cancer of corruption in CID;
105
 the inception of Operation 
Countryman, an investigation by provincial police forces into corruption which was 
established by David McNee, Mark’s successor,106 and devastating problems with the 
investigations into IRA terrorism, most notorious of which were the Guilford and 
Birmingham pub bombings. In August 1989, the entire Serious Crime Squad of the 
West Midlands Police, some of whom were involved in the affair of the Birmingham 
bombers, was disbanded amid allegations of framing and corruption.
107
 It is 
undoubtedly true that these scandals dented the image of the police as impersonal and 
disciplined law enforcers.
108
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2.2.6 Legitimacy and Politicisation 
 
Reiner charts the rise and fall of police legitimacy in the country, arguing that the basis 
for such legitimacy is not so much a function of British society as some writers would 
have it, but actually a product of a deliberate policy dating back to the original architects 
of the ‘new police’, who were conscious of the opposition to their proposals.109  He 
identifies the perceived period of decline in legitimacy beginning in the very late 1950s, 
continuing to develop through the 1960s with the implementation of the Police Act 
1964, and then becoming full politicisation as exemplified by police clashes with anti-
Vietnam war and anti-apartheid demonstrators.
110
 This was a theme which was to 
continue through the 1970s, a period of industrial unrest, and into the 1980s: 
 
 
“Following the arrival of Margaret Thatcher and her first Conservative government, 
the British police entered the 1980s amid widespread suspicion that their role had 
altered irredeemably from impartial citizen in uniform to political partisanship.”111 
 
 
This was compounded with the Government’s implementation of the Edmund-Davies 
pay formula in 1979 at the same time as embarking on a programme of cuts in other 
public services. 
 
The politicisation debate was in the public consciousness – the Chief Constable of 
Greater Manchester Police and Jack Straw MP openly – and strongly – debated the 
issue.
112
 Alderson (1998) identifies the miner’s strike of 1984-1985 as a key example of 
the way in which the police become embroiled in a political battle.
113
 He argues that 
since the dispute was political in the sense that the Government were the employers of 
the miners, then the policing of the dispute was ipso facto a political task.
114
 Images of 
the police fighting with the miners, in the name of the government, are indelibly 
imprinted in the memory of the British Public, and are discussed in the following 
section. 
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As the 1980s drew to a close and the 1990s started, the police service began another 
transition. This commenced with the infamous Home Office Circular 114/83, which 
outlined Home Office expectations around efficiency and effectiveness.
115
 The drive to 
demand value for money from the police, coupled with the squeeze on public 
expenditure forced police organisations to evolve, not least in the area of “the dramatic 
management of the appearance of effectiveness”.116 This may well be extended to ‘the 
dramatic management of corporate image.’ 
 
2.2.7 Media, Press and Public Entertainment 
 
If the police in England and Wales police by consent, that is to say, their existence and 
the way in which they deliver policing are legitimate with broad public support, then 
this depends upon many factors. These include the concept of the rule of law, in which 
all are equal before the law and equally answerable to it; the supremacy of Parliament 
and the independence of the judiciary from the executive arm of government, and the 
doctrine of minimum force.
117
 However, in order for the public to accept the police and 
the policing they do, they, the public, must have a view, an image, an impression or an 
idea of what the police are, what they do, how they work and their attitudes towards 
people. This construct is informed by many sources – the media and how they report 
policing activity, entertainment and the depiction of the police in action, comments of 
politicians, academics and other influential opinion formers, and of course the police 
themselves. 
 
Leishman and Mason (2003) describe these various factors at some length. They point 
out that the 1980s and into the 1990s heralded a new approach to the handling of the 
media, with Chief Constables having media training and the development within forces 
of corporate communications strategies.
118
 They indicate that this new approach, 
although pioneered by Robert Mark in the 1970s, really became important during the 
miner’s strike: 
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“It was widely recognised that the provision of facilities to journalists and other 
programme makers, such as pre-event briefings, interviews with suitable 
spokespersons and access for observation, photography and filming, would all be 
critical determinants in the way the public perceived police handling of 
demonstrations and other public order situations. However, some forces displayed 
more savvy than others in this regard, as the varying coverage of picket line 
confrontations during the Miners’ Strike illustrated only too vividly. In areas where 
more proactive media policies were pursued, filming tended to be shot mainly from 
behind police cordons, thus conveying the images of the back of the ‘thin blue line’ 
straining bravely to maintain public order in the face of abuse, in stark contrast to 
images of cavalry charges captured from behind the ranks of fleeing pickets.”119 
 
 
This passage sets out the potential impact of media depiction of the police in action as 
well as highlighting the importance of media strategies. It also contextualises some of 
the visual imagery which the public have lasting memories of. These are all issues 
pertinent to the debate because they impact directly upon how the police, and therefore 
the state, are perceived by the wider public as well as disenfranchised groups. I present 
primary data relating to this issue in section 7.5 of Chapter Seven. 
 
So far in this chapter, I have sought to chart some of the socio-demographic changes to 
British society in the post-war years, particularly as they apply to race and religion. I 
have overlain this with some of the more impactive changes and challenges in the 
evolution and development of policing. I now turn to melding the two things together by 
looking at causes celebres over broadly the same time parameters – what seminal events 
have taken place where policing has clashed with cultural and pluralistic evolution?   
 
2.3 Policing Plural Communities 
 
This section charts the history of significant events involving ethnic minority 
communities and the police in the post-war years, and briefly touches upon police 
attitudes towards ethnic minority communities and individuals. It outlines five seminal 
events, which are then used and referred to in subsequent chapters. They are chosen and 
recorded in some detail for two principal reasons. Firstly, they have all had a profound 
impact on policing, especially the policing of ethnic minority communities, after the 
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event. Secondly, they all represent a failure on behalf of public authorities, frequently 
the police, before the event. 
 
2.3.1 Advanced Warnings 
 
In 1948, Liverpool experienced a race riot. It took place in the South End of the city 
where 8000 immigrants had settled in order to help the war effort.
120
 Of these, 30 
percent were seafarers, 10 percent were employed on shore and the rest were 
unemployed. Determined to exclude blacks from jobs aboard ship, the National Union 
of Seamen pressured employers not to take on colonial labour: this was the social 
background to three nights of rioting. After police had arrested black people who had 
barricaded themselves into premises, they advanced on a blacks-only club, forcing their 
way in after occupants had run out of ammunition to throw: 
 
 
“The police went on the rampage, breaking into houses and beating up the occupants. 
Sixty blacks and ten whites were arrested.”121 
 
 
Although the police are implicated here in terms of being partisan, this riot had much in 
common with the later riots of Nottingham and London in 1958, being largely based 
upon ‘structured antagonism’ over housing and jobs in the context of economic 
recession and rising unemployment, together with suspicion about black reluctance to 
join trade unions.
122
 
 
2.3.2 Simmering Mistrust 
 
During the 1960s and into the 1970s, the antagonism prevalent between whites and 
blacks transformed into confrontations between black people and the police. This was 
related to economical and political conditions of the period: high unemployment, low 
profitability and soaring inflation. The Immigration Acts of 1962, 1968 and 1971, 
discussed above, are direct examples of state intervention to curb immigration, and were 
accompanied by anti-immigrant sentiments from the media.
123
 Waddington states: 
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“Police and immigration officials were given sweeping powers to stop and search 
blacks or their premises on suspicion of illegal entry, and the authority to impose 
surveillance over ‘ghettos’, and prosecute raids on social centres. This activity 
ostracised and alienated Britain’s blacks…These developments provided the context 
for a series of police-black confrontations in the 1970s.”124 
 
 
Such confrontations included the disorder at the Notting Hill Carnivals of 1976 and 
1977. A formidable police presence was regarded as oppressive by blacks who reacted 
to arrests they perceived as wrongful by smashing the windows of vehicles and 
throwing missiles at the police.
125
 
 
That the police service was very slow to respond to demographic changes taking place 
in wider society, both in terms of employment and of attitude, was becoming apparent. 
As recently as 1963, there was not a single black officer in the whole of Britain, and 
several policemen forecast mass resignations if one were ever appointed. By the start of 
1978 there were 199 in England and Wales, scarcely one fifteenth of their equivalent on 
the national population.
126
 Graef quotes police officers: 
 
‘Detective Sergeant in a Home Counties [sic], age 38, sixteen years service. Now in a 
University City 
 
“You know why there aren’t more black coppers? They’re too fucking lazy, that’s 
why. I think they’re scared of their people. And I don’t think they’ve got the brain 
power for it either. I’m sorry but that’s how I feel. You can get a whole community, 
you wouldn’t get an O Level between them. They’re so bloody arrogant, they really 
are, certainly the people I come across from the West Indian community. I do know a 
couple who are quite nice guys, but 90 percent of them – they really are arrogant. 
And totally ‘anti’. Most of them are bloody born here. Yet they all live in their own 
community, which is not right. What’s the matter with other people? They think 
there’s a war between them and us.” 127 
 
 
He also quotes a Superintendent from a Midlands force: 
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“…That’s a problem with Asians: they make so many allegations that are totally a 
pack of lies.” 128 
 
 
It is worth noting that Graef’s work was carried out in the 1980s and many officers had 
joined the police prior to the passing of race equality legislation. Even now, the 1976 
Act is only 35 years old – those most senior in service (and many of those most senior 
in rank) joined before the Act was passed. 
 
2.3.3 Open Hostility 
 
On 2 April 1980, the first major riot of the decade occurred in the St Paul’s area of 
Bristol. It heralded a new experience for the British Police Service. It began as a result 
of legitimate police action where a West Indian club was raided because illegal sales of 
liquor and marijuana were taking place. Alderson (1984) argues that it is common for a 
routine and proper police action to spark riots and serious disorder where social 
conditions are tense and potentially explosive.
129
 He quotes Ken Pryce’s work of 1979, 
where social conditions in the St Paul’s area of Bristol were characterised by a ‘ghetto’ 
way of life where “wretchedness, subnormal educational development, unstable family 
patterns and a heavy involvement in such predatory activities as violence, robbery, 
conning and living off ones wits” are the norm.130 
 
Although it seemed that commentators and some politicians thought this incident was a 
one-off and an isolated event, almost exactly one year later in Brixton, London, these 
complacent interpretations were shattered.
131
 Further violent unrest in various cities 
occurred in 1981, 1985 and, to a lesser extent, in 1986. A more recent event took place 
in 2001. Alderson highlights that St Pauls was merely a warning: 
 
 
“The omens for the Metropolitan Police could not have been clearer. The graffito ST. 
PAUL’S TODAY BRIXTON TOMORROW, which appeared on some of London’s 
walls, said it all.”132 
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The period of relative public tranquillity which occurred between the end of the Second 
World War and 1980 amplified the shock amongst members of the British public: what 
had gone wrong? Why were young British people throwing petrol bombs on the streets 
of London, Birmingham, Liverpool and elsewhere? “Is this really Britain?” asked some 
of the daily papers.
133
  The element of shock at the time, albeit tempered by 
understanding borne of hindsight since, has some poignant parallels with 2005 and 
2006. The bombings of 7 July 2005 and the attempted bombings of the 21 July 2005 
brought similar incredulity – how could this happen in Britain? It is sobering to note 
that at the time of the St Paul’s riot, there were only 339 black police officers in the 
whole of England and Wales.
134
 This compares with 6,615 today, approximately 4.8% 
of the total number of full time equivalent police officers, still someway short of the 
original target of 7%.
135
 
 
2.3.4 Seminal Events 
 
This thesis draws upon a number of key seminal events. The policy responses to these 
seminal events are examined in Chapter Four, but it is appropriate to describe them now 
in broad summary as part of the background to the thesis. In general terms, each of the 
events in their own right had a profound impact on the public consciousness. Taken 
together, they are capable of a strongly revisionist stance – they represent a broad 
failure of public authorities, and, to some extent, British society, to recognise and tackle 
discrimination and social injustice on a systematic and institutional scale. The price of 
this failure is high. 
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2.3.4.1 Seminal Event 1: Brixton 1981
136
 
 
Social Conditions 
 
Brixton is a commercial and residential area of South London. Although a lively and 
prosperous place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth Centuries, it was in steady 
decline since the 1920s. 
 
At the time, over 12000 dwellings in the London Borough of Lambeth, of which 
Brixton forms a part, were defined by the local authority as unfit. 22% of housing was 
owner occupied, 33 percent privately rented, and 45 percent rented from the council or 
Housing Association. The population was also in decline, dropping 20 percent between 
1971 and 1981. There was a strikingly high figure of children in care (in the two wards 
affected by the disorders, 61 percent of the children in care were black) and single 
parent families which were running at twice the national average - 50 percent of the 
single parent families in Lambeth were non-white. 
 
Population 
 
Some 25 percent of the population in 1978 belonged to non-white ethnic groups. West 
Indians were the largest at 12.5 percent, followed by Africans (3.4 percent), Indians, 
Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, (2.4 percent) and other non-white or mixed origin people (6.5 
percent). 
 
The Black Community in Brixton 
 
The older generation of black people in Brixton largely came to Britain as immigrants 
in the late 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. They came in response to the demand from Britain 
for unskilled workers and in a search for better economic and social conditions. 
 
In raising their children, the older generation of black people had to do without the 
network of support provided by the extended family, a feature of traditional West Indian 
society. The impact of British social conditions on the matriarchal West Indian family 
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structure, whereby the mother was absent from the family home because she became a 
wage earner, was severe. 
 
The children of the first generation of West Indian immigrants were in many cases born 
in the UK. They, and the third generation, shared aspirations and hopes of other British 
young people, but failed to benefit from British society to the extent that might have 
been expected. They underachieved academically, and then were unable to secure 
employment. It was estimated that the level of unemployment amongst black people in 
Brixton stood at 25.4 percent – double the average. 
 
In addition to these difficulties, many young black people faced the burden of 
discrimination, and with no parental support, no job and few recreational facilities 
available, they made their lives on the street and in seedy clubs, where they came into 
contact with criminals. 
 
The course of events 
 
On Friday 10 April, a police officer in Brixton saw a black youth running across the 
street, evidently being chased by two or three other black youths. Unsure what was 
happening but sensing that an offence may have been committed, the officer caught 
hold of the fleeing youth, a male by the name of Michael Bailey. 
 
Bailey was bleeding heavily but before the officer was able to establish the reason why, 
the youth broke away, being caught again with the assistance of another police officer. 
Bailey was found to have a four inch stab wound but before he could be asked about it, 
three other black youths jostled the police officers until Bailey escaped once again. He 
ran to a block of flats where he was taken in by a sympathetic white family. They called 
a taxi to take him to hospital. In the meantime, the police officer had informed the 
police station and colleagues of the serious condition of the youth, and officers in a van 
spotted the taxi, ordering it to stop. One of the two officers administered first aid whilst 
the second summoned an ambulance. However, a crowd of thirty or forty people, manly 
black youths, surrounded the officer and began shouting, saying ‘Look, they are killing 
him’, and ‘We will look after our own.’ 
 
 52 
Although the officers tried to explain that they were helping Bailey, the crowd took no 
notice. They hailed a car and whisked Bailey away. A skirmish developed, involving 30 
to 40 police officers who had answered the call for assistance. Some were in riot gear 
and there were two dog handlers. Up to 100 youths who were mainly black, threw 
bottles and stones. This episode of disorder lasted for about 80 minutes. When it was 
over, 28 officers patrolling on foot and in pairs were deployed, and 96 additional 
officers were sent to Brixton. 
 
Crucially, the police decided to continue with ‘Operation Swamp’, a largely plain 
clothes operation dealing with drug misuse and employing widespread use of stop and 
search powers. This resulted in the frequent and seemingly arbitrary stopping and 
searching of young black males. 
 
On Saturday 11 April, a black taxi driver was detained as a suspect by two young plain 
clothes officers. They had seen him place folded pieces of paper into his sock. He 
asserted that they were bank notes, which indeed they were. The officers searched him 
and also searched his vehicle, carrying out both searches in front of a growing and 
hostile gathering of black youths. Attempts to arrest those abusing them only added to 
the tension – officers were assaulted and vehicles were damaged. Throughout the 
evening and into the night, riots took place involving hundreds of police and violent 
youths, and there was significant damage to property. Petrol bombs were thrown and 
barricades were assembled. 
 
Violent and isolated attacks continued through Sunday and into Monday, when the riot 
came to an end. 
 
Sir David McNee, Commissioner of the Metropolis at the time of the disorders reported: 
 
“Between Friday 10 April, and Monday 13 April 1981, 415 police officers and 172 
members of the public were injured. 118 police vehicles and 61 private vehicles were 
damaged. 4 police vehicles and 30 private vehicles were destroyed. 28 premises were 
seriously damaged by fire and a further 158 premises were attacked.” 137 
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Thus began a period of violent unrest throughout British cities. Academic literature is 
examined in Chapter Three which offers some explanations of riots and urban unrest. 
Policy responses and Home Office guidance is critically reviewed in Chapter Four. 
 
2.3.4.2 Seminal Event 2: The Murder of Stephen Lawrence 1993 
138
 
 
The incident 
 
On 22 April 1993, Stephen Lawrence, an 18-year-old black student, was murdered in 
Greenwich in London. He was on his way home with his friend, Duwayne Brooks who 
was also black. It was about 10.30 at night, and they were waiting for a bus. A group of 
white males saw Stephen and surrounded him. He was stabbed to a depth of about five 
inches on both sides of his body, severing several major arteries. The murderers ran 
from the scene. Stephen managed to run about 100 yards, trying to join his friend, when 
he collapsed and died. His was an unprovoked murder, motivated purely by racism. The 
group of white males were only convicted in 2012, 19 years after the incident.
139
 
 
The Police Response 
 
The police investigated twice at the time, and although suspects were arrested, they 
were not convicted until much later; a private prosecution in 1996 failed because of the 
absence of any firm and sustainable evidence. A catalogue of police errors, ranging 
from inadequate initial scene management, including poor first aid, to a lack of 
understanding by senior officers as to what grounds might constitute a lawful power to 
make an arrest, contributed to the failure to secure a successful prosecution. There were 
serious problems around family liaison and sensitivity towards Stephen’s parents. As a 
result of the failure, the Home Secretary established an inquiry under section 49 of the 
Police Act 1996. The terms of reference were: 
 
“To inquire into the matters arising from the death of Stephen Lawrence on 22 April 
1993 to date, in order particularly to identify the lessons to be learned for the 
investigation and prosecution of racially motivated crimes.” 140  
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This event, and the subsequent Inquiry, had a penetrating effect on the police service 
and indeed on individual officers. Did it make a real and tangible difference to the way 
in which the British Police Service dealt with discrimination and social injustice? This 
matter is addressed in Chapter Four. 
 
 
2.3.4.3 Seminal Event 3: The Secret Policeman 2002 
 
“For many police officers, the media are still frequently perceived as yet another 
hostile and unsympathetic quarter from which unjustified criticism can regularly be 
expected.” 141  
 
 
In the early part of 2002, a BBC reporter by the name of Mark Daly began the 
application procedure to join Greater Manchester Police. This was because he wanted to 
see what steps had been taken by that force to eradicate racism following an admission 
by the then Chief Constable that the force was institutionally racist; a year earlier, the 
Stephen Lawrence Inquiry branded the Metropolitan police with the same label.
142
  On 
27 January 2003, he had his first day of training as PC 2210 Daly.
143
 During his tenure 
as a sworn police officer, Daly covertly filmed his interactions with other officers, and 
recorded racist abuse at the Police National Training Centre in Warrington where he 
spent 15 weeks. He states: 
 
“Racist abuse like “Paki” and “Nigger” were commonplace for these PCs. The idea 
that white and Asian members of the public should be treated differently because of 
their colour was not only acceptable for some, but preferable.” 144 
 
 
This involved officers from forces in Wales and North West England, not merely 
Greater Manchester police, and there were other examples of grossly offensive racist 
behaviour. These included dressing up in Ku Klux Klan hoods, and one officer even 
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claiming that he would kill an Asian “if I could get away with it”.145 The same officer 
was also recorded insulting Stephen Lawrence, saying that he deserved to die and 
referring to Stephen’s parents, Doreen and Neville Lawrence, as ‘spongers’.146 Daly 
pointed out that there had been “countless” reports into institutional racism in the 
police, and a “huge number” of initiatives to deal with it, but the documentary showed 
that racism had been “driven underground” at GMP.147 This type of investigative 
journalism was able to infiltrate the inner workings of the British police service, 
demonstrate not only that racism was prevalent, but also that the service had clearly 
recruited racists, was training racists, and effectively ordaining them into the 
organisation. This would allow racist officers pro-actively to respond to their racist 
drive in their subsequent interactions with the public. If it is true that the timing of the 
application to join the police by Daly was random (and not timed to coincide with the 
first days of people pre-identified as being racist) and the choice of Bruche training 
school was largely random, the discovery of this type of behaviour amongst new 
recruits demonstrates negligence on the part of the police to deliver against their 
assertions to eliminate racism. The then chairman of the Commission for Racial 
Equality commented that “this shows a pattern of behaviour which is widespread, and 
though officially condemned, is tacitly condoned by [the officers’] peers.”148 The 
damage to police-race relations cannot be overstated. 
 
Although Daly’s tactics were heavily criticised in some quarters,149 his investigation 
and his programme, which was broadcast on 21 October 2003, caused widespread 
anxiety. 
 
2.3.4.4 Seminal Event 4: Urban unrest, Bradford and Oldham 2001 
 
“A generation of Asians, discarded for their class, excluded for their race, stigmatised 
for their religion, ghettoised and forgotten, has found its voice – but is yet to be 
heard.” 150 
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Between April and July 2001, Oldham, Burnley and Bradford were the scenes of violent 
confrontations between young Asians and the police, culminating in the clashes of 7 – 9 
July in Bradford in which 200 police officers were injured.
151
  
 
In a portent of what was shortly to come, Walter Chamberlain, a 76 year old World War 
II veteran, was attacked by three Asian youths in Oldham as he walked home from 
watching a local amateur rugby league match in April 2001.
152
 His picture was widely 
published, and it showed a violently beaten elderly man. Over the weekend 26-28 May 
2001 violence erupted in flashpoints across the town with petrol bombs being thrown 
and buildings set alight; rioting involving up to 500 Asian youths on the Saturday was 
followed with further unrest on the Sunday.
153
  The Islamic Human Rights Commission 
(IHRC) reported that “the riots occurred as the culmination of 5 weeks of racial abuse 
orchestrated by right-wing extremists against the town’s ethnic minority community.” 
154
 Indeed, Massoud Shadjareh, Chairman of the IHRC said: 
 
 
“The Oldham riots were therefore rooted not merely in racism, but more particularly 
in anti-Muslim hostility. Groups such as Combat 18, the National Front and the BNP 
have clarified their hostile stance toward the Muslim community in Britain through 
numerous vehemently Islamophobic statements and activities. The Oldham riots 
illustrate the dismal failure of the Race Relations Act to protect the Muslim 
community in Britain from hostile provocation.”155 
 
Whilst right wing activity was clearly of importance, it was only part of the reason why 
Oldham flared. 
 
Further rioting occurred in Leeds and Burnley in June 2001, before serious rioting 
occurred in Bradford, beginning on July 7 – a poignant date. That day saw the worst 
rioting in Britain for many years – the BBC reported that 120 police officers were 
injured and 36 people were arrested during battles between some 900 police officers, 
including officers drafted in from forces in Greater Manchester, South Yorkshire, North 
Yorkshire, Merseyside, Humberside, Cleveland and Northumbria, and about 1000 
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mainly Asian youths.
156
 The Daily Telegraph described it as “..an 11-hour orgy of 
violence, arson and looting.” 157 Although less serious, violence ensued for a further two 
nights, with further arrests and outbreaks of sporadic violence across the city.
158
  
 
Once again, right-wing activity had had a significant part to play in the build up to the 
weekend, with senior police officers acknowledging that they had underestimated the 
scale of the backlash to a planned march by the National Front, even though it had been 
banned by the Home Secretary.
159
 The role of political activity and media reporting as 
‘indicators’ of the risk of social protest is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. 
 
Of particular relevance to this aspect of the discussion is not so much the immediately 
preceding circumstances and political activity, though these are important to the 
discussion of ‘tension indicators’ described and analysed in Chapter Three, but rather 
the sociological and demographic factors which led up to the events. The Northern 
towns where this unrest occurred are old textile mill towns, and Kundnani (2001) 
outlines the social evolution that took place.
160
 His argument contextualises matters, 
bringing the above analysis of post war migration from South East Asia to life. He 
describes how the mills moved to new technologies during the 1960s, and were 
operating 24 hours a day. The night shifts were unpopular with the existing workforce 
and soon became the preserve of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi workers who had sought 
employment in the UK. Gradually the mills began to decline; in a twist of irony, the 
work that was done cheaply by Bangladeshi workers could be done more cheaply by 
Bangladeshi workers in Bangladesh. Whites and Asians were united in their 
unemployment, but discrimination on the part of the public services meant that it soared 
amongst young Asians – reaching around 50% in Oldham.161 Kundnani states that a 
string of Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities, from Oldham to Bradford and Leeds, 
were amongst the most impoverished 1 percent in Britain.
162
 The paper then describes 
how segregation occurred owing to the growing gap between those white people who 
could afford to buy their own houses, and those predominantly Asian people who could 
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not, and who ended up living in very poor quality, cramped terraced housing. Peach 
(2007) advances the notion that the terraced Victorian houses of the mill towns made 
the arrangements for safety and family honour invested in Muslim women, to protect 
them from British society which is “regarded as sexually promiscuous, alcohol abusing, 
non-religious, and non-respectful of parents and elders” 163 much easier, and since they 
were areas that white people wanted to steer sway from, communities became separate. 
Discriminatory housing policies practised by some of the councils amplified this 
problem and the segregation in housing resulted in segregation in education. In a short 
period of time, a generation of whites and Asians were growing up with very little 
contact; mutual distrust festered. The key to the violent unrest, and perhaps to the 
growth in the risk of radicalisation, is held in the following extract: 
 
 
“By the 1990s, a new generation of young Asians was coming of age in the northern 
towns, born and bred in Britain, and unwilling to accept the second-class status 
foisted on their elders.” 164  
 
 
Added into this mix was a poor relationship with the police, perceived as failing to 
protect a vulnerable community against racism. Community fractures became 
entrenched owing to self-appointed community leaders, who largely had their own 
agenda, had no specific mandate to act as community representatives and therefore did 
not represent the community. Such fracturing, segregation, discrimination and the 
perception of poor social justice, illustrated by the relationship with the police, increase 
the vulnerability of communities to a range of damaging external influences. The Cantle 
Report, analysed in more detail in Chapter Four, supports the view of deeply divided 
communities.
165
 
 
There is much debate about the role of the idealistic leader, or the so-called 
‘fundamentalist’ or ‘extremist’ cleric in the development and radicalisation of 
vulnerable people to the point where they commit terrorist atrocities, usually by suicide 
bomb. These concepts and others are analysed in Chapter Three. Although the far right 
were attacked for their involvement in the riots in Oldham and Bradford, as were the 
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media and to some extent the police, little was said about the role of Muslim ‘radicals.’ 
One minor exception to this was Christian Voice, a somewhat controversial 
organisation, with fundamental views of its own. Nevertheless, they reported the 
comments of a so-called leading expert on Islam who suggested that “local Imams had 
recently brought in representatives of the Taliban regime of Afghanistan and Kashmiri 
Guerillas to speak in Mosques in the town. This would only encourage the criminal 
element of Muslim youth.” 166 The accuracy of this may be debated, but intuitively and 
with the benefit of hindsight, such external influences were likely to be present because 
there was a market for them. More detailed discussion in Chapter Three develops this 
idea. 
 
2.3.4.5 Seminal Event 5: The London Transport Bombings 
 
On Thursday 7 July 2005, four co-ordinated attacks occurred on London’s transport 
system. Three bombs exploded around 8.50am on underground trains just outside 
Liverpool Street and Edgware Road stations, and on another travelling between King’s 
Cross and Russell Square.
167
 A fourth bomb went off an hour later on a double-decker 
bus in Tavistock Square, close to King’s Cross. The bombs killed 56 people, including 
the bombers, and more than 700 were injured.
168
  
 
This type of attack had been seen elsewhere in the world, most notably 11 September 
2001, when the twin towers of the World Trade Centre were destroyed, but never before 
on mainland Britain. These events are characterised by four key facets: firstly, they 
consist of virtually simultaneous attacks; secondly, they aim to be ‘mass casualty’; 
thirdly, they occur with no warning; and fourthly, they involve the perpetrator killing 
themselves – i.e. they are suicide attacks. This last phenomenon is analysed more 
closely in Chapter Three.  
 
The four individuals identified as responsible for these attacks were Mohammed 
Siddeque (sometimes ‘Sidique’) Khan, Hasib Hussain, Shazad Tanweer and Jermaine 
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Lindsay. Although the current study does not major on the psychology of suicide 
terrorists, a brief summary of the backgrounds of these individuals is useful to the 
current debate for two main reasons. Firstly, they were British, and three of them were 
British born. This was a jarring shock to the public – previous terrorist attacks had been 
from ‘foreigners’. The second reason was the ordinariness of them. These factors taken 
together begged the question: Why? The next chapter attempts to throw some light on 
this from an academic perspective, but for now, I précis information from the 
government’s Report of the Official Account.169 
 
Khan was 30 at the time of the bombings, and it is generally accepted that he was the 
ring leader. Tanweer was 22, Hussain was 18 and Lindsay, the outsider of the group, 
was 19. Lindsay was a convert to Islam, and was originally from Jamaica. The other 
three were all second generation British citizens, whose parents were originally from 
Pakistan, and who come to West Yorkshire, found work, and settled. All three grew up 
in the Beeston area of Leeds and the neighbouring district of Holbeck – Tanweer and 
Hussain were still living there with their parents when they died. After his marriage, 
Khan moved to Dewsbury, though remained very involved in Beeston as a teaching 
assistant and youth worker. The area is deprived and densely populated with back-to-
back housing, much of which is in poor condition. Average income is low, although 
none of the three were poor by the standards of the area. After leaving school, where he 
was never in trouble, but where he was occasionally bullied, Khan worked locally, first 
for the Benefits Agency, then for the Department of Trade and Industry as an 
administrative assistant.  In 1996, he went to study at Leeds Metropolitan University, 
where he achieved a lower second class degree in business studies. It was also where he 
met his future wife; after marrying in 2001, they had a daughter in 2004. Khan 
developed a vocation for helping disadvantaged young people and took on part-time 
youth and community work, which led him to work with special needs children at a 
local primary school, until November 2004, when extended sick leave resulted in his 
departure. During this time, he continued to be active as a youth worker in Beeston; he 
also apparently turned to religion.  
 
Tanweer was a gifted sportsman, playing for a local cricket team and studying sports 
science at Leeds Metropolitan University between 2001 and 2003. After November 
2004, he had no paid employment and was being supported by his family. 
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Hussain was not a high achiever academically, keen on sport but not outstanding. He 
left school in 2003, going on to study for an Advanced Business Programme which he 
completed in June 2005. 
 
The social life of all three centred on the mosques, youth clubs, gyms and the Islamic 
bookshop in Beeston. It appears to be around these venues that the steps along the road 
to radicalisation were taken, with Khan playing a central role. 
 
Jermaine Lindsay was bright as a child, successful academically at school and good at 
sport. His mother converted to Islam in 2000, and Lindsay converted almost 
immediately thereafter, taking the name ‘Jamal’; he was admired for the speed with 
which he achieved fluency in Arabic. It seems that he was strongly influenced by the 
extremist preacher Abdalah al Faisal (also of Jamaican origin). He met Khan at some 
point during 2004. 
 
The synergy between the social narrative behind the urban unrest in Oldham, Bradford, 
Leeds and the other Northern mill towns and the social background and roots of three of 
the four bombers from July 7 2005 is self-evident.  
  
2.4 Summary and Discussion 
 
This chapter has examined the development of a pluralistic society in the United 
Kingdom, with particular emphasis on the immigration of Asians and the growth of 
Islam. It has overlain this with a focused narrative of the development of policing over 
the same time frames. In so doing, it has sought to highlight those critical events which 
tend to demonstrate that the police have been slow to respond to the rapid cultural 
evolution of British society since the post-war years. The arguments are developed from 
the macro issues at the outset of the chapter, to the micro, with five seminal events 
identified and described towards the end.  
 
The presentation of these seminal events serves two principal purposes. Firstly, taken 
together, they imply that state agencies in the United Kingdom have failed in some way 
to meet the needs of a rapidly changing society. Secondly, they are catalysts which spur 
action. I revisit them in Chapter Four, where I critically analyse various selected laws, 
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policy responses and edicts from the Home Office and elsewhere which largely arose as 
a result of each. From these, I isolate five ‘critical success factors’ - themes which are 
common to them all. I argue that successful delivery of these factors optimises the 
legitimacy of the police in the eyes of minority and disenfranchised groups, thereby 
minimising the risk of adverse social protest.  
 
Bowling points out that the disorder which occurred in Brixton between 10 and 12 April 
1981 and in Southall, Manchester, Liverpool, the West Midlands and numerous other 
locations in July of that year may collectively be seen as the culmination of a 
deteriorating relationship between the police and black communities over the previous 
three decades.
170
 In the context of a sluggish adjustment, an adjustment necessary to 
meet the problem of policing a multi-racial community, this is perhaps unsurprising. It 
also poses the question as to whether British society had yet come to terms with ethnic 
diversity; the police being seen as the agents of a society which is unsympathetic and 
ignorant of the plight of people from certain communities. 
 
Although not exclusively, the inner city riots of the 1980s involved young members of 
minority ethnic communities. Various explanations were offered, including outbursts of 
anarchic criminality, legitimate insurrections against an oppressive and racist state 
(characterised by conflict with the police, seen as agents of the state) and a function of 
social and economic deprivation.
171
 I present data in Chapter Seven which relates these 
factors to the growth of domestic radicalisation and extremism. 
 
If it is the case that there are links with the roots of urban unrest and the growth of 
harmful radicalisation with the potential to progress to terrorism, then it may be said 
that the police, whilst not carrying sole responsibility either for the situation or the 
solution, are well placed as a public authority and state agency in three main areas. 
Firstly, they should be able to identify risk. This will include geographical factors: what 
communities there are and where they are located; sociological and demographic 
factors: where people are meeting, what the age groups and gender issues are, what 
external influences there might be; and policy issues, which include effect of local 
government or police policy as well as the effects of domestic and international 
governmental policy. Secondly, they should be able to detect community tension and 
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changes. This would be informed by having appropriate intelligence mechanisms in 
place – and pre-supposes that the National Intelligence Model works as it should. Such 
intelligence mechanisms would include Cover Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS), 
community intelligence from officers working closely with communities and, assuming 
the engagement structures are right, from the community themselves. These first two 
areas may be wrapped up in the expression ‘understanding communities’. Finally, 
police forces, together with their ‘statutory’ partners such as local councils, should be 
able to intervene in order to eliminate or minimise the risk. Whilst some intervention 
will be in response to specific threats, and may involve security services or the military, 
other appropriate interventions might take place much earlier – as soon as the changes 
and tensions referred to above are identified.  
 
The terrorist incidents of 7 and 21 July 2005, together with intense media coverage of 
police and security service counter-terrorist operations engendered intense public and 
governmental interest. Money became available, research was undertaken and 
significant parts of domestic policy were influenced by this apparently sudden and 
unexpected turn of events. How long can this be maintained? Whilst it may be true that 
“thirty years of terrorism is a likely consequence of thirty years of American military 
supremacy”,172 will it truly remain at the forefront of the public consciousness? Benyon 
re-produces Anthony Downs ‘issue attention cycle’ which identifies the difficulty of 
sustaining interest in an issue: 
173
 
 
 
1. The Pre-Problem stage: some highly undesirable social condition exists, which 
may be of concern to experts and groups, but which  has received little public 
attention; for example, racism and poverty in the United States. 
 
 
 This may be considered to be the exclusion of ethnic minority groups from the polity, 
or the failure of police forces properly to engage with Muslim communities. 
 
2. Alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm: the public suddenly becomes 
aware of and alarmed by the evils of a particular problem, often as the result of 
dramatic events – such as the American riots in 1967. Invariably there is great 
enthusiasm about solving the problem within a relatively short time.  
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The terrorist incidents referred to above are examples. 
 
 
3. Realising the cost of significant progress: gradually there is a spreading 
realisation that the cost of solving the problem is very high and may require 
sacrifices by large numbers of people, as the most pressing social problems 
often involve either exploitation of one group in society by another, or the 
prevention of one group from enjoying something that others want to keep for 
themselves.  
 
 
Problems of Islamophobia and the risk of dramatically raised community tension with 
the potential for race-related riots and racially motivated murder may be examples of 
the high cost of dealing with the current issue in the publicised manner. Other examples 
include the restrictions on the private lives of citizens - for example, the carriage of 
liquids on aircraft. 
 
 
4. Gradual decline of intense public interest: the public become discouraged, or 
they feel threatened, or they get bored and their desire to keep attention focused 
on the issue wanes, particularly if another issue is entering stage two. 
 
 
5. The post-problem stage: the issue moves into a prolonged limbo – a twilight 
realm of lesser interest or spasmodic recurrences of interest. But the public has 
become aware of the problem and it may resurface sporadically, and new 
institutions and policies may have been created which are likely to continue to 
have some impact on the problem. 
 
 
The issues raised by the terrorist incidents in the USA and here appear to have passed 
some way through the issue attention cycle, just as the inner city riots did. Benyon 
comments “..it is possible that unless the root cause of the problems are tackled, the 
issues may again be thrust on to the agenda by dramatic events” 174 I posit here that it is 
the case that our failure to address root causes of problems identified through Brixton, 
Lawrence and elsewhere have been thrust back on to the agenda by the recent dramatic 
turn of events. This then leads to the question of how do we stop the cycle, and maintain 
the momentum to deal with root causes, thus alleviating the risk of future ‘dramatic 
events’?  
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The next chapter argues, using a foundationalist approach, that there are clear 
similarities between the root causes of urban unrest, radicalisation and terrorism.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
Review of Relevant Literature 
3.0 Introduction 
 
The events of September 11
th
 2001 precipitated a flood of research and publication 
loosely falling under the overarching heading of ‘terrorism’. This incident, which 
Freedman describes as ‘super’175, was audacious in its organisation, its choice of targets 
and ultimately in its success. It unfolded live across the world, and the global sense of 
shock, together with the American feeling of humiliation and vulnerability were 
palpable. That the incident influenced and continues to influence domestic and foreign 
policy in the United Kingdom and America is undoubted.
176
 
 
July 7
th
 2005 saw a series of bombs detonated by ‘suicide terrorists’ on the transport 
network of London.  The murder of fifty two people in four simultaneous attacks, 
together with the iconic imagery of the destroyed London bus, not only instilled a sense 
of anxiety but also ignited a painful self-examination of societal infrastructure in the 
United Kingdom that continues today. What made someone who was British-born, 
brought up and educated in Britain, want to murder fellow countrymen?  
 
This chapter constructs a hypothesis: that the development of harmful radicalisation and 
so-called home-grown terrorism have similar roots to urban unrest. It therefore 
examines these various phenomena in some depth and analyses relevant literature which 
may be considered ‘foundationalist’, towards an examination of ‘realist’ policy and 
process which occurs in Chapter Four. These philosophical positions and their relevance 
to the research project are discussed in more depth in Chapter Five. The examination of 
policies and edicts in Chapter Four will illustrate the intention behind them and assess 
whether or not they are capable and fit for purpose. The current chapter is organised into 
six sections. The first section discusses the definitional problems of the word 
‘terrorism’, and compares and contrasts the phenomenon with organised crime. This is 
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important because the variation in the manner in which the state responds will depend 
upon any identified difference. It then moves on to examine the corpus of literature on 
the ‘root causes’ of terrorism.  
 
The second section examines ‘radicalisation’, and again discusses ‘root causes’. It seeks 
to isolate root causes, and scrutinises specific social phenomena to test their role in 
precipitating radicalisation, comparing and contrasting them with the root causes of 
terrorism. This begins to point towards pre-conditions which might need to exist in 
order for radicalisation and terrorism to occur. It is argued here that such pre-conditions 
would constitute the first set of ‘warnings’. 
 
In section three, the discussion turns to research relating to the root causes of riot and 
urban disorder. In so doing, it expressly examines literature relating to the inner city 
riots in the United Kingdom since 1980, as well as some reference to the riots in 1960s 
America, and identifies those social phenomena which were seen as pre-conditions to 
the riots. Policy responses are examined in Chapter Four. 
 
In response to the UK riots of the 1980s, the police developed a series of ‘tension 
indicators’ which were designed to predict the possibility of rioting and interracial 
conflict. Section four re-visits ‘tension indicators’, and examines how they might be 
adapted to assist in assessing the local risk of radicalisation and progression to 
terrorism. This would then provide a second set of ‘warnings’. 
 
Section five draws the preceding sections together. By comparing and contrasting the 
root causes of two forms of politically affected violence - terrorism and riot - the section 
proposes a ‘ladder of escalation’ to illustrate the hypothesis, and examines literature 
which moves the debate towards such a model. The ‘ladder of escalation’ postulates the 
idea that not only are pre-conditions important, but certain discrete steps may occur, 
with low level political activism at one end and more violent responses at the other. The 
model suggests that radicalisation and terrorism are mere examples of such steps and 
early identification of the lower-level events may add a third set of ‘warnings’ of 
escalation towards violence.  
 
Section six provides a summary. 
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The subsequent chapter, Chapter Four, scrutinises neighbourhood level policing by 
critically examining the outpouring of Home Office circulars, national plans and policy 
statements, linked to the five seminal events described in Chapter Two. It isolates the 
critical success factors referred to above, and describes Neighbourhood Policing and the 
National Intelligence Model.  
 
3.1 The terrorism definitional debate – is it just a crime? 
 
Hamm (2005) suggests that recent history of criminological study has largely ignored 
terrorism, and that this criticism has taken on a new urgency since the terrorist attacks of 
11 September 2001.
177
  The problem with the word ‘terrorism’ is that it is far from 
being a value-free word: the United Nations strives to achieve an agreed definition but it 
has remained elusive.
178
  Although some years old now, and the arenas in which 
‘terrorism’ has entered the public consciousness are many and varied, Anthony 
Arblaster’s examination of a series of books from the 1970s on the subject of terrorism 
is still highly pertinent:  
 
“It is an elementary precondition of [arriving at a precise and well thought-out 
definition of terrorism] that we get beyond the essentially propagandist use of 
language…”179  
 
The word conjures up the notion of evil, something abhorrent and despicable. Guelke 
(1998) describes it as “one of the most condemnatory words in the English 
Language”.180  The emotive nature of the term has influenced the political context in 
which it is used because it implies a lack of legitimacy. In some cases, this extends to 
the point where responses to terrorism are one dimensional and seek to treat symptoms 
rather than causes. To focus on causes, motivating factors and grievances implies a 
justification for violence.
181
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Can terrorism be distinguished from other types of violence, and if so, in what way? 
After all, terrorism is a crime.
182
  Crenshaw (1981) advances the concept: 
 
“The term terrorism was coined to describe the systematic inducement of fear and 
anxiety to control and direct a civilian population, and the phenomenon of terrorism 
as a challenge to authority of the state grew from the difficulties revolutionaries 
experienced in trying to recreate the mass uprisings of the French Revolution.”183 
 
 
An important foundation is introduced here: the notion of terrorism being used as a tool 
to achieve an end. In this context, it implies political discontent, because there is a 
challenge to state authority. Guelke  discusses the problem of defining terrorism and in 
so doing, he quotes Schmid at length since he (Guelke) is of the view that Schmid’s 
definition is the most rigorous effort there has yet been to define it: 
 
“Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by 
(semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actor, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or 
political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of 
violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are 
generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or 
symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- 
and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), 
(imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target 
(audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of 
attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily 
sought.”184 
 
Schmid arrived at this definition (though, given its length, it has been suggested that 
description is more appropriate
185
) in the mid 1980s after consulting with the research 
community, and thus it might be considered as an ‘academic consensus definition.’186 
He has recently re-visited it, once again going out to the research community. 
187
 
 
It is a definition which Guelke critiques, examining Schmid’s use of the term ‘violence’, 
which he points out is a term nearly as emotively impactive as ‘terrorism’ itself.188  
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The British Government too has wrestled with the problem of defining terrorism since 
July 7
th
. Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C. was commissioned to review the matter and he 
produced a 48 page report entitled ‘The Definition of Terrorism’.189 His first conclusion 
was “there is no single definition of terrorism that commands full international 
approval.”190 The problem with defining terrorism is the normative judgement which 
each person makes in using the term, especially when it is conjoined with the word 
‘violence’. This inevitably leads to the oft quoted “one man’s terrorist is another man’s 
revolutionary”.191 Jamieson (2005) presents a useful definition which she takes from 
Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f(d) and it is one to which I shall return: 
 
“premeditated, politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an 
audience.”192 
 
This definition is helpful because it deals with several themes in a concise way. Firstly, 
the notion that terrorism is politically motivated - a key difference between terrorism 
and other forms of violent crime. Secondly, it identifies that the target is non-combatant, 
setting terrorism apart from war. It also suggests that the motivation behind terrorism is 
not the actual act of murder – it is the microphone with which to publicise the cause and 
call people to arms. Thirdly, the identification of subnational groups or clandestine 
agents implies some minority status amongst the actors. This is important in the current 
discussion.  
 
Tupman and O’Reilly (2004) shed some light onto the hackneyed question of whether 
one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist in their examination of ‘Legitimacy 
Arenas’.193 Their analysis is interesting because it adopts as its basis American military 
intervention in Afghanistan rather than an incident such as 9/11 or 7/7. This type of 
military activity does not neatly fit the definitional parameters of ‘terrorism’ because, 
whilst one may argue that the activity was both politically motivated and violent, it is 
not aimed at non-combatants per se. But the concept of ‘legitimacy arenas’ that Tupman 
and O’Reilly advance can be applied to terrorist activity. The paper identifies five 
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‘legitimacy arenas’ in the context of this military intervention.194 They are: the US 
domestic arena; the domestic arena in the country where intervention has taken place; 
the international arena; the Muslim or Islamic world and finally the legitimacy of the 
market. The essence of discussing these ‘legitimacy arenas’ is the vexed question of 
whether or not military attacks of this nature actually increase levels of terrorist 
recruitment, and therefore terrorism, rather than reduce them. In a paradigmatic shift, 
Merari (2005) summarises from the terrorism point of view:  
 
“The magnitude of public support for suicide operations seems to affect both the 
terrorist group’s willingness to use this tactic and the number of volunteers for suicide 
missions.”195 
 
 
What does Merari mean by the ‘public’? Based on Tupman and O’Reilly’s ideas, we 
might postulate arenas of legitimacy for so-called Islamist terror attacks in the United 
Kingdom. The following might be considered: firstly, the domestic arena within the 
country attacked. This would include the wider general public, political groups, and 
private organisations – whilst attacks may be condemned, what would the upshot be? 
How might it affect the terrorist organisation’s agenda? Secondly, the minority Islamic 
communities in the country attacked. Clearly, lack of even passive support for terrorist 
activity in this arena might seriously impede an organisation’s political aims. Thirdly, 
the umma – the worldwide Muslim ‘brotherhood’ or family. How would the attacks be 
viewed by the wider Islamic communities? Fourthly, the worldwide arena – what might 
be the world wide reaction, and how might they respond? Fifthly, and perhaps one 
which varies from Tupman and O’Reilly’s framework, the mass media arena – the very 
platform upon which the terrorist organisation hopes to stand. Once again, universal 
condemnation might be the key theme, but what about the sub-text – the ‘message’ for 
which terrorism ultimately exists? 
 
The vast majority of definitions of ‘terrorism’ set the phenomenon apart from other 
crimes because they declare a basis of political motivation. Terrorism is a form of 
political violence. However, it is important to acknowledge that matters are not as 
simple as often portrayed. Jamieson argues that terrorist groups began to take an interest 
in organised crime because of the enormous financial opportunity it presented – and the 
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power that came with it to destabilise economies.
196
 However, she contests that 
organised crime and terrorism should always be viewed as quite distinct phenomena in 
terms of objectives, motivation and tactics.
197
 She then goes on to elucidate those areas 
in which there is some ‘overlap’ between organised crime and terrorism. These are: (a) 
the self-financing of terrorist groups by typical ‘organised crime-type’ activities; (b) 
pragmatic collaboration between terrorist and organised crime groups for political 
purposes and (c) the use of terrorism by organised crime groups for political 
purposes.
198
 She contrasts her definition of terrorism, above, with the UN Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime definition of an organised crime group: 
 
“A structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting 
in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences […] in 
order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.”199 
 
Jamieson’s items at (a) to (c) (above) point towards the ‘terrorism – organised crime 
nexus’ which is so often debated. Although Jamieson cleverly articulates the differences 
between organised crime and terrorism, the definition she uses for organised crime 
groups could well apply to a terrorist group if the part reading ‘a financial or other 
material benefit’ were changed to read ‘a political aim or objective’. This is a 
remarkably minor amendment to the definition which results in a seismic shift in its 
meaning. Perhaps the two phenomena are not so materially different, and is some value 
in thinking of terrorism as a type of organised crime. The umbrella term ‘organised 
crime’ might then have a number of sub-categories of which ‘terrorism’ is just one. This 
has some advantages in terms of police structures because it enables effective 
‘organised crime’ responses to be applied to terrorism. Since terrorism is becoming an 
increasingly transnational beast, with operatives in countries far away from the power 
base, this approach may have merit.  
 
In some countries, the ‘nexus’ becomes ever more blurred, with terms such as ‘criminal 
terrorism’ and ‘economic terrorism’.200 Andresen (2001) makes the point powerfully: 
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“The majority of definitions of terrorism have until now emphasised the political or 
social motives for terrorist acts. However, if applied to Russia, such definitions would 
leave out most of the acts of violence that have been committed during the last 
decade, acts that in other respects qualify as terrorism….The terrorist threat in 
Russia is first and foremost a threat from organised crime.” [His emphasis]201 
 
 
This happens because organised crime groups target rivals, journalists, state institutions, 
politicians and officials who may represent a threat to their material gain. This activity 
looks politically motivated, but actually is not. The Russian example demonstrates the 
blurred boundaries and shows that the terrorism–organised crime dichotomy is not as 
clear cut as Jamieson might assert, and that the ‘nexus’ may take various forms. One 
phrase in Jamieson’s conclusions stands out: “..violent groups do not exist in a vacuum 
but require a degree of consensus to persist in time.”202 This is a very similar phrase to 
one used by Maleckova (2005) – “Terrorism does not occur in a vacuum” where the 
issue under discussion is the need for some degree of public or community support.
203
 
Merari (2005) arrives at a similar point.
204
 Dishman (2005) argues that the 
decentralisation of criminal and terror organisations owing to pressure from 
international law enforcement agencies is allowing synergistic ties to form between 
lower level criminal and terrorist operatives in a manner which their respective bosses 
would probably disapprove.
 205
 He believes that this leadership nexus between criminals 
and terrorists is a phenomenon with far-reaching implications that should be a major 
concern for law enforcement.
206
 
 
In an article published in Prospect Magazine, Shiv Malik visits Beeston in Leeds, home 
to three of the four bombers of 7/7.
207
 In the article, Malik quotes an interviewee of the 
same gender, age and ethnic identity as the bombers: 
 
 
“To be honest with you, the downfall was a few years back. There were a lot of drug 
addicts in the area, which dragged everything down... I wouldn’t say that we’re stuck 
                                                 
201
 Andresen, RIV (2001)  ‘The Threat from Russian Organised Crime’ in  Lia, B and Andresen, RIV 
(2001) (Ed)‘Terrorism, Political Violence and Organised Crime – Security policy challenges of non-state 
actors’ use of violence’ FFI Rapport: Proceedings from an International Seminar in Oslo 
202
 Jamieson, A (2005) op cit p 176 
203
 Maleckova, J (2005) ‘Impoverished Terrorists: Stereotype or Reality?’ in Bjorgo, T (2005) op cit p37 
204
 Merari, A (2005) op cit p80 
205
 Dishman, C (2005) ‘The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge’ Studies in conflict and 
Terrorism 28:237-252 
206
 Ibid p238 
207
 Malik, S (2007) ‘My brother the bomber’ Prospect Magazine June 2007 from http://www.prospect-
magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=9635 accessed 3/7/07 
 74 
up people, but you move to an area and spend your money on your property. You 
want to live there, and if somebody’s gonna come up and throw syringes in your 
garden and put a brick through your window, you want to fight the battle. At the end 
of the day, it’s your pride more than anything else.”208 
 
 
The article then goes on to describe a gang established under the leadership of none 
other than Mohammed Sidique Khan, initially in response to the drug problem, a gang 
of second generation Pakistanis since the older generation did not know what to do.
209
 
This is a hugely important contribution to the debate because it describes, at the micro 
level, how organised crime, standing at the head of street-level drug problems, can 
directly help create the right conditions for radicalisation and ultimately terrorism to 
flourish. Courtenay Griffiths QC adds weight to this. He claims that British prison cells 
have disproportionately high numbers of black African men within, and that very few 
do not contain a copy of the Qur’an.210 He goes on to describe how those involved in 
gangs and gun crime are converting to radical Islam, and that this is a very dangerous 
mix.
211
 These last two areas may represent a ‘crime-terror nexus’ which is not pre-
meditated, merely a consequence of circumstances. It suggests, in this dimension at 
least, a possible causal-consequential relationship. Additionally, it poses these 
questions: should certain types of crime be engaged as an indicator of radicalisation and 
terrorism, in addition to other social pre-conditions? And is the growth in gang related 
violent crime another consequence of social and political conditions which are similar in 
their roots to terrorism? I discuss these issues further, using data from the research, in 
Chapters Seven and Eight. 
 
3.1.1 Root Causes of Terrorism: social and political concomitance? 
 
The idea that certain sociological/economic/psychological/demographic conditions may 
constitute an ideal breeding ground for radicalisation and terrorism is attractive in one 
sense because it implies that remedying those social conditions will mitigate terrorism 
risk. The problem with this notion is the implication that terrorism – i.e. the use of 
violence to kill and maim people – is in some way acceptable given the social 
conditions under which people are living. It also transfers responsibility away from the 
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terrorist. Both of these are inimical to Western policy makers. This section examines 
some of the concepts around ‘pre-conditions’ and assesses their relevance and value. 
 
Two key sociological phenomena are often talked about by politicians and others as 
being linked with terrorism: poverty and educational underachievement.
212
 Krueger and 
Maleckova (2003) examined a potential causal connection between education, poverty 
and terrorism.
213
 At the outset, they acknowledge that the data is sketchy and possibly 
non-representative, but they conclude that there is no indication of a connection 
between poverty and terrorism.
214
 They arrive at this conclusion following examination 
of empirical data relating to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They go further and suggest: 
 
 
“members of Hezbollah’s militant wing or Palestinian suicide bombers are at least as 
likely to come from economically advantaged families and have a relatively high 
level of education as to come from the ranks of the economically disadvantaged and 
uneducated.”215 
 
 
These conclusions seem to support evidence of the backgrounds of the nineteen 
hijackers who committed the 11
th
 September atrocities, who “were neither poor nor 
uneducated”.216 Similarly, Mohamed Sidique Khan, the apparent ‘ringleader’ of the July 
7
th
 bombers was educated to degree level and worked with special needs children and 
did not appear poor “by the standards of the area”.217  In essence, Krueger and 
Maleckova are reporting that neither poverty nor educational attainment are pre-
conditions of radicalisation and terrorism and actually the reverse may be true. This 
general point is supported by other writers (e.g. Caplan (2006)
218
; Gupta (2005)
219
). 
However, there are some important considerations that challenge Krueger and 
Maleckova’s argument. The first is the relevance of their empirical work in the Middle 
East to the evolution of radicalisation and progression to terrorism in a Western 
democracy. This is a weakness bluntly exploited by Brynjar and Skolberg (2004):  
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“Krueger and Maleckova are right in pointing out that poverty reduction alone is not 
the only solution to reduce terrorism, but the validity of their research findings has 
been grossly overstated.” 220   
 
Three of the four bombers of July 7
th
 grew up in a largely residential area which is 
densely populated by back to back terraced housing, much of which is in a poor 
condition; the area is deprived, and average income is low.
221
 Ignoring poverty as a 
potential factor in the vulnerability to radicalisation and subsequent progression to 
terrorism cannot be entirely supported. Poverty may be relative, and it may apply to 
factors other than merely money e.g. poverty of opportunity. A second but related point 
is the effect of social injustice. This consists of several elements (discussed below) and 
Schmid comes to the issue quickly in his assertion that whilst poverty itself is not a 
motivator, unemployment amongst relatively highly educated young men might be.
222
 If 
it is accepted that terrorism is a function of political pre-conditions, then the better 
educated might be the very people who embrace it – particularly if there are other 
elements of social injustice. It would also be prudent to consider the less tangible issue 
of perception. Whilst actual measures of inter alia poverty, education, achievement 
may not provide evidence of motivation, the perception of these issues by key 
individuals may indeed make them relevant. 
 
Newman (2006) explores root causes of terrorism and uses an empirical method to test a 
number of social phenomena to determine their link to terrorism.
223
 He identifies 
‘Permissive Structural Factors’ which include poverty, demography and urbanization, 
followed by ‘Direct Root Causes’ which include exclusion and social inequality, 
dispossession, human rights abuse, alienation, humiliation and a clash of values. It is 
worth dissecting here some of these factors: 
 
 
Demography: ‘Significant demographic conditions include rapid population growth, 
and especially a burgeoning of young males; and uneven population shifts across 
different ethnic groups….A related demographic condition that has been associated 
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with terrorism involves migration and shifts in the ethnic, religious , and social 
balance of society.’224 
 
 
There are parallels with this position and the growth of Islamic communities in the UK, 
described in Chapter Two. This growth has been rapid, and continues to grow at great 
pace. The combined effect of rapid growth of South Asian groups, with the linked 
growth of Islam has undoubtedly resulted in a shift in the ethnic, religious and social 
balance of British society. This is amplified further when one considers the intra-
religious differences which exist within an apparently homogenous group. This change 
has occurred in a matter of decades, not centuries. The controversy this causes is never 
far from the public consciousness, often brought to the fore by politicians and the 
media.
225
  
 
 
Urbanization: ‘Urbanization – especially in conjunction with unemployment and 
poverty – can generate a disaffected population, which enables terrorist recruitment 
and organization.’226 
 
 
Massey (1996) also describes how urbanization and rising income inequality have 
produced a geographic concentration of affluence and poverty throughout the world, 
producing a geographic change in the basis of human society.
227
 He points out that the 
divide is amplified “when they occur in a group that is also segregated on the basis of an 
ascribed characteristic such as race.”228 The notion of macro-economic and 
demographic factors being significant and vital in the consideration of the development 
of moral indignation, and a desire to respond through terrorism receives support from 
Ehrlich and Liu (2002), although their focus occurs in the immediate aftermath of the 
World Trade Centre attack.
229
  But the argument may equally (more appropriately) 
apply to inter alia religion, culture, nationality, regimes. Indeed, Wade and Reiter 
(2007) identify that, though limited, there is a statistically significant interaction 
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between regime type and the number of religiously distinct minorities at risk from 
suicide terrorism.
230
 Massey crucially makes the following point in his conclusions: 
 
 
“…inequality will continue to increase and racial divisions will grow, creating a 
volatile and unstable political economy. As class tensions rise, urban areas will 
experience escalating crime and violence punctuated by sporadic riots and increased 
terrorism.”231 
 
 
 
Here, Massey is implying an escalation process which includes urban unrest and 
terrorism, and he is linking this phenomenon with urbanization and the concentration of 
affluence and poverty. This is significant and I return to it in a later section of the 
present chapter. There is evidence of it in the United Kingdom, and the background of 
Mohammed Sidique Khan and his followers, described above, might be considered as 
an example. 
 
Newman continues: 
 
 
Exclusion and Social Inequality: ‘In particular, poverty and inequality, especially 
when affecting distinct national, religious, cultural and/or ethnic groups – so called 
horizontal inequalities – is a breeding ground for conflict...A combination of social 
tensions and heterogeneity can result in social upheaval, extremist politics and civil 
war’.232 
 
 
It would seem true to say that cultural tension and unrest still exists in the UK. A 
number of high profile incidents bear testimony to this (for example, riots in Bradford 
and Oldham, 2001, described in seminal event 4, Chapter Two). Social tensions bubble 
to the surface – Jack Straw, leader of the House of Commons said the veil worn by 
some Islamic women is “a visible statement of separation and difference.”233 
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Dispossession, Human Rights Abuse, Alienation and Humiliation: ‘Physical 
dispossession and the perception of a denial of rightful resources or territory is a 
common thread to certain types of terrorism. A similar perception can be harboured 
among groups that believe that a particular political or social order denies their rights, 
be they social, linguistic, cultural, or ideological.’234 
 
 
 
Newman quotes other authors who describe a “burning sense of injustice and 
depression”,235 with an asymmetric balance of power of this nature likely to result in an 
asymmetric response. This terminology has resonance with Tupman and O’Reilly’s 
articulation of an asymmetric warfare (terrorist) response to American military 
supremacy.
236
 
 
Newman’s discussion continues with ‘sound bites’ from other writers: “Terrorist leaders 
seek support from people who feel humiliated, threatened, aggrieved and without help” 
237
 and “Terrorism is thus often linked to a sense of injustice and impotence rather than 
sheer poverty.”238 In examining these ‘root causes’, Newman correctly points out that 
there are many cases of terrorism where none of them apply, and that the academic 
study of terrorism is analytically barren whilst being descriptively rich.
239
 Accordingly, 
he attempts to apply an empirical approach by first examining any relationship between 
frequency of terrorist incidents and the socioeconomic conditions in the societies where 
it occurs. He also looks at terrorist organisations and the societies from which they 
emerge. The paper concludes that analyzing a wide range of samples is not conducive to 
generalized conclusions regarding the relationship between social conditions and 
terrorism.
240
 Newman’s analysis is interesting, and his review of other literature 
provides a useful overview of the type and nature of social conditions which may have 
some form of relationship with terrorism. It is also valuable in terms of attempting to 
establish an empirical basis for such a relationship. However, it is flawed in its 
generality, a point which Newman himself acknowledges. Whilst his proposed model, 
which relates permissive conditions, direct grievances and catalytic causes is attractive, 
the empirical findings are not able to support it as a direct result of their generality.  He 
usefully identifies that the findings have implications for counterterrorism and further 
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academic scholarship which firmly establishes the need and context for my own  
research. 
 
The notion that socio-economic factors may provide some basis for terrorism does not 
find favour amongst all writers. Jervis (2002) states: 
 
 
“To see the absence of liberal arrangements as the root causes of terrorism is even 
more perverse. Tolerance for diversity, respect for human rights as the West defines 
them, free and diverse mass media, vigorous political competition, and equality for 
women is not the vision of the good society held by the terrorists and their supporters. 
The very notion of elevating the rights of individuals and the ability to choose one’s 
way of life is anathema to them.” 241 
 
 
But I would contest that this is an over-simplification of the issue since it does not 
delineate ‘leaders’, ‘followers’, those radicalised without a developed understanding of 
what the intentions of leaders and terrorist organisations actually are and it tends to 
impose an ‘our system is obviously better than yours’ ideology. There is further 
evidence of this later in the article: 
 
 
“More reasonable is the argument that the root causes of much terrorism lie in the 
intolerance and hatred preached in many mosques and taught in madrases, often 
supported by Saudi money.”242 
 
 
This stance may be partially explained by virtue of the fact that the paper is American in 
origin, and was written when the wound caused by September 11 was still very raw.  
 
In any case, it moves the discussion towards ‘precipitant factors’.  Crenshaw (1981) sets 
the tenor of the discussion for the next 25 years. She identifies the idea of pre-
conditions – those factors which set the stage for terrorism in the long run, and 
precipitants – specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism.243 
She introduces a number of important concepts, providing the foundation for much of 
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the subsequent discussion and analysis by other authors. Firstly, the so-called 
permissive factor of social facilitation: 
 
 
“This concept refers to social habits and historical conditions that sanction the use of 
violence against the Government, making it morally and politically justifiable, and 
even dictating an appropriate form, such as demonstrations, coups, or terrorism.”244 
 
 
This quote goes to the heart of the question of legitimacy, discussed earlier, and links 
terrorism with other forms of ‘social protest’. This is analysed in further detail in the 
third section of the present chapter. Crenshaw goes on to identify three ‘direct causes of 
terrorism’, looking particularly at ‘background conditions’, the first of which is the 
existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable sub-group of a larger 
population.
245
 In this situation, a broad social movement develops, the extremist faction 
of which might resort to terrorism. The second condition is the lack of opportunity for 
political participation. Regimes that deny access to power and persecute dissenters 
create dissatisfaction.
246
 And finally, the notion of a precipitating event, which might 
include Government use of unexpected or unusual force, be it in the domestic or the 
foreign arena. These ideas of pre-conditions and precipitating events find favour with a 
number of other authors, although they may ‘tamper’ with the specifics. For instance, 
Ross (1993) identifies ten structural causes of terrorism.
247
 The first three are 
‘permissive causes’: Geographical Location, Type of Political System and Level of 
Modernization. The next seven are: Social, Cultural and Historical Facilitation, 
Organizational Split and Development, Presence of Other Forms of Unrest, Support, 
Counterterrorist Organization Failure, Availability of Weapons and Explosives, and 
Grievances.  
 
Bjorgo (2005) provides a list of conclusions at the end of a collection of papers written 
by several notable authors in the field.
248
 His conclusions are highly significant because 
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they pull together much of the preceding work – and again, there are clear links with 
Crenshaw’s paper. Significant conclusions are: 
 
 ‘Lack of democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law is a precondition for many 
forms of terrorism. 
 
Hegemony and inequality of power – where local or international powers possess an 
overwhelming power compared to oppositional groups, asymmetric warfare can 
represent a tempting option. 
 
The experience of discrimination on the basis of ethnic or religious origin is the chief 
root cause of ethno-nationalist terrorism – those groups fighting to establish a new 
order. 
 
Failure or unwillingness by the state to integrate dissident groups or emerging social 
classes may lead to their alienation from the political system. Large groups of highly 
educated young people with few prospects of a meaningful career will tend to feel 
alienated and frustrated. Excluded groups are likely to search for alternative channels 
through which to express and promote political influence and change. To some, 
terrorism can seem the most effective and tempting option. 
 
The experience of social injustice is a main motivating cause behind social-
revolutionary terrorism (acts perpetrated by groups seeking to overthrow the capitalist 
economic and social order [might we add ‘infidels’?] 
 
The presence of charismatic ideological leaders able to transform widespread 
grievances and frustrations into a political agenda for violent struggle is a decisive 
factor behind the emergence of a terrorist movement or group. The existence of 
grievances alone is only a precondition: someone is needed who can translate that 
into a programme for violent action. [Significant figures, such as Abu Hamza, have 
featured prominently in the public eye.
249
] 
 
Triggering events are the direct precipitators of terrorist acts. Such a trigger can be an 
outrageous act committed by the enemy, lost wars, massacres, contested elections, 
police brutality.’250 
 
 
These conclusions are highly relevant. Not only do they intuitively ‘feel’ right – but 
they concentrate much preceding work into a cogent whole. They also provide a direct 
link with other types of social disorder, and some of the ‘root causes’ so identified are 
remarkably similar. Social injustice and a lack of cohesion in British society cannot be 
ignored: Tony Blair’s strategy said: 
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“There is concern about particular groups, eg Afro-Caribbean boys. More recently, 
there has been concern about Pakistani youths, who suffer disproportionately high 
unemployment, feel increasingly discriminated against, and disconnected from their 
parents.”251 
 
 
This then, provides the basis upon which to move forwards. We can identify the 
existence of pre-conditions, such as social injustice, discrimination, alienation from the 
political system, a lack of perceived democracy, and precipitators - trigger events like 
military intervention in Afghanistan, or police raids such as Forest Gate, which may 
provide us with a warning that an act of terrorism might follow. 
 
One further quotation from Bjorgo (2005) sets the context and demonstrates the need 
for the current research project: 
 
 
“The notion of ‘addressing the root causes of terrorism’ may become a dead end if by 
‘root’ we mean the distant and general issues such as poverty, globalization and 
modernization that are far removed from the actual acts of terrorism and extremely 
difficult to change. The approach is far more promising if we focus on the more 
immediate causes and circumstances that motivate and facilitate specific campaigns 
and acts of terrorism. Future research and efforts should move in this direction.”252 
 
 
 
3.2 Radicalisation: why so dirty? 
 
‘Radicalisation’ is an oft quoted term in the media and political world, especially post 
9/11 and more recently 7/7, and tends to be used synonymously with the term 
‘terrorism’.253 This treatment of ‘radicalisation’ militates against a full understanding of 
what it means. Other terms, like ‘fundamentalist’, ‘extremist’, ‘violent jihad’ creep into 
common parlance and tend to be used interchangeably. 
 
Keddie (1998) considers terminological issues, and provides a helpful and much more 
generalised and neutral term: ‘New Religious Politics’, shortening it to ‘religiopolitics’, 
or NRP.
254
 This is useful because it demonstrates that there are principles under 
discussion, not merely the impact of Islam. In fact, Keddie herself identifies that: “The 
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term does not cover all recent religiopolitical movements but can be applied when 
movements exhibit certain specific features.”255 Such features include a reinterpreted 
religious tradition seen as solving problems exacerbated by various forms of secular, 
communal, or foreign power.
256
 She goes on to identify a series of trends which have 
favoured the rise in religiopolitics: first, recent expansive developments in capitalism 
which are uneven by region, class, race and gender; second, economic slowdowns, 
stagnation and insecurity in the developed world; third, increasing migration – 
urbanizing and international migrants experience prejudice, which can encourage 
counter-ideologies; fourth, greater choice for women in lifestyle, jobs, marriage and 
motherhood, leading to disputed challenges to male prerogatives; fifth, the continued 
growth in secular state power; sixth, education and urban growth allow many people 
[though it is probably uneven] to express discontent more effectively; seventh, global 
cultural homogenization brings reactions based on identity politics, including 
nationalism and religiopolitics because they are seen as expressing needs better than the 
current secular order; and eighth, increases in population which skewers towards very 
young age groups, groups that are the main supporters of religiopolitical movements.
257
 
These general trends are important since they introduce a set of global imperatives 
which provide context to the following analysis of local (sub-national) manifestations. 
 
In their Research Proposal ‘The Radicalisation of Young Muslims in Britain: 
Understanding the Roots of the Problem’, Al-Alami and Krishnan (2007) discuss the 
reasons why Islam, a peaceful religion, is such a serious threat to the West.
258
 They 
correctly identify that the problem does not lie with Islam itself, rather with the 
fundamentalist interpretation of it, an interpretation which sees Islam as politically 
incompatible with the West.
259
 Thus begins the debate around the politicisation of 
Islam. They argue, again correctly, that fundamentalism is not a new phenomenon, and 
at times of crisis, people tend to turn to the foundations of their religion and more 
radical ideas become appealing to the masses.
260
 This does not necessarily imply 
terrorism, or even progression to terrorism – merely ‘followers’ finding succour at a 
time of perceived threat. In relation to Islam, Al-Alami and Krishnan identify that the 
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Iranian Revolution of 1979 brought an Islamic fundamentalist regime into power, 
propagating Islam as an alternative model to the Western secularism: Islam is like no 
other religion - it provides a structure for a complete social system.
261
 This point is 
highly relevant because it begins to crystallize the reason behind Islam lending itself to 
exploitation: 
 
 
“..in the United Kingdom, there are more than 1.6 million Muslims living among a 
population of just 60 million. Their radicalisation through fundamentalist ideologies, 
which are spread by Islamic states, organisations and certain individuals, poses a 
great threat to the West, as these ideologies encourage Muslims to reject integration 
and to take part in a general jihad against the West and the Western concept of a 
liberal society.” 262 
 
 
 
The questions then, are these: what type of ‘threat’ would persuade an individual or a 
community to resort to fundamentalist ideas regarding their religion?  
 
Here I provide the experience of a female called ‘Amy’, who describes a process of 
‘radicalisation’.263 She presents her experience as being multi-factorial. Firstly, there 
was her own psychological disposition – she wanted to be someone; she was idealistic 
in the sense that she wanted the world to be better, and religion was important. She 
came from a social/family environment which was strict and authoritarian, and she was 
rebelling against her father. She perceived a lack of answers in society, and was 
disillusioned with mainstream politics and religion. Partly as a result of these factors, 
she felt a pull from the movement – an anti-capitalist ideology, coupled with the 
opportunity to do something.  Once in the group, she felt a womb-like protection; 
spiritual practices like studying and certain other rituals engendered a sense of 
belonging. There was a father-figure who she believed to be infallible, with a direct 
‘hotline’ to God, and so began the development of an ideology such that the ends 
justified the means, and any form of questioning was seen as dishonesty. The 
hierarchical authority contributed to the desire to conform, to prove herself and achieve 
promotion. A strong sense of identity occurred, with powerful group loyalty, putting the 
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group interests above those of the individual, and resulting in detachment from family 
and the wider world, bringing about even greater dependence on the group. 
 
Although Amy’s experience is just one example, it helpfully illustrates in a real sense 
the types of drivers that have a role in compelling an individual along a given route. 
Aspects of the group dynamic, such as the sense of belonging and the overriding interest 
being the group rather than the individual might be seen in other, more legitimate 
circumstances, where it is deliberately cultivated. Such examples might include Special 
Forces regiments. Occasionally it might occur in less legitimate circumstances but 
within the setting of respected agencies: Sir Robert Mark’s battle for control of the CID, 
for example. 
264
 
 
In the ‘Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005’, 
radicalisation is loosely examined in Annex B.
265
 It suggests that there is no consistent 
profile to identify who may be vulnerable to radicalisation  but there are a number of 
factors which may contribute. These include attendance at a Mosque linked to 
‘extremists’ who may be there intent on identifying potential candidates for 
radicalisation and a personal mentor who may ‘groom’ individuals in small groups until 
they feed off each other’s radicalisation. This grooming is part of the journey – initially 
group conversation about being a good Muslim and then moving towards propaganda 
about injustices to Muslims across the world, and identifying parts of the Qur’an which 
mentors would claim was religious justification for violent jihad.
266
 There is little 
evidence of coercion, more a reliance on the development of individual commitment, 
group bonding and solidarity.
267
 This group identity has resonance with the group 
commitment Merari (2005) identifies in his discussion of suicide terrorism.
268
  
 
The document is not a scholarly study of the concept, and it fails correctly to grasp the 
notion of radicalisation – either of its true meaning or indeed of its roots. Instead, it 
prefers to identify ‘spiritual leaders’ and meeting places. Clearly, a lot has to happen, or 
pre-exist, before a person arrives at the point where they adopt a radical or 
fundamentalist ideology. 
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The idea of young men and women, teenagers and those in their early twenties, 
returning to the fundamentals of the belief system of their parents and relatives, or even 
undergoing a conversion, might be attractive to those same parents and relatives. Since 
Islam provides a moral and social framework by which to live one’s life, there might be 
some perceived comfort in seeing one’s children apparently fully embracing the 
teachings of the Qur’an and regularly attending prayer meetings. This begs the question 
when did ‘radicalisation’ become a dirty word? Cummings (2006) argues that what the 
Government maligns as radicalisation is in fact politicisation, and goes on to assert that 
young Muslims taking an interest in global politics and getting engaged in non-violent 
discussion and campaigning is a good thing.
269
 Who could disagree? The point is the 
conflation of radicalisation and terrorism, often pedalled by the media.
270
  It is argued 
here that they are not the same thing; they are in fact separate and discrete points on a 
ladder of escalation. Although not a necessity, there is a gradational aspect, such that a 
person generally undergoes some sort of ‘radicalisation journey’ prior to engaging in 
acts of terrorism, especially suicide terrorism. This implies that radicalisation and 
terrorism have some common roots. The ladder of escalation is examined more closely 
in section 3.5, below. The question of whether or not radicalisation per se can be 
considered as a threat remains problematic, and for this reason we should think in terms 
of ‘harmful radicalisation’. In general, this thesis will consider the term ‘radicalisation’ 
to be ‘harmful’ where it is inimical to the cohesiveness of communities, whether 
through violence, or the intent of violence, or indeed for other nefarious purposes. This 
draws the distinction between ‘radical’ and ‘fundamental’ or ‘extremist’. 
 
The idea that more senior family members tacitly support their offspring as they choose 
to become more immersed in the teachings of the Qur’an, attending prayer meetings 
with much closer observance of Islam is to oversimplify the issue. Conflict within 
Muslim communities, disagreement between generations and anxiety over identity are 
all significant contributors to the debate. This is examined and well argued by Shiv 
Malik.
271
 Here, it is identified that the division occurs because parents attitudes to dress, 
jobs, schooling and socialising all act to drive youngsters away from their parent’s 
generation. This article also makes an important link with urban unrest, demonstrating 
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that approximately thirty years after the establishment of an ethnic minority community, 
there are riots, using the African-Caribbean immigration of the 1950s and the riots of 
the 1980s, and the Pakistani immigration of the 1970s with the riots on Oldham and 
Burnley in 2001 as examples.
272
 The reason for this, argues Malik, is that it takes 
roughly three decades for a community to become frustrated with its status within its 
own community and the wider society – the frustration arises in part from a question of 
identity. Whose culture and values do you affiliate with? Your friends or your family? 
Your country or your community? This identity problem is capable of exploitation, 
making individuals and groups vulnerable to radical Islamic movements.
273
 
 
Al-Alami and Krishnan (2007) present three possible explanations regarding the 
attraction of Islamic fundamentalism to Muslims living in Western societies.
274
 These 
are: (1) Islamic civilianization has failed to adapt to modernity and is still in terminal 
decline. Fundamentalism becomes attractive to people because it promises a revival of 
Islam’s glorious past (the myth of a ‘Golden Age’). The relative weakness of Islamic 
states enables the West to be identified as an outside enemy and thus developing 
political cohesion amongst Muslim states and communities around the world. (2) 
Political and economic marginalisation and their failure to integrate in Western society. 
Here they discuss the controversial point that Muslims in the West are radicalised 
because they have fewer opportunities that Westerners in terms of education and job 
prospects. The issue of whether lack of opportunity is important in this debate is 
discussed elsewhere in this chapter, and is far from clear. However, identification with 
Muslims in other countries who may be perceived as having fewer opportunities whilst 
being oppressed may play a part. The argument is that at the same time as being 
disadvantaged, Muslims in the West feel excluded from the political process, thereby 
being susceptible to an ideology that promises a solution to their personal situation. (3) 
European societies have become a “hothouse of terrorism” because of ideological 
subversion through fundamentalist states and groups. Here, they argue that the main 
cause of radicalisation is identified as outside ideological subversion. Immigration is 
then crucial for supplying terrorists and ideologues, who can spread radical ideas. The 
openness and liberties of Western democracies make them particularly vulnerable to 
ideological attacks against which the West has no counter-ideologies to offer; 
ideologues can advocate jihad against the West more or less openly. 
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The politicisation of Islam, and the manner in which it can be used to great effect was 
intelligently dissected in an article by Euben (2002).
275
 This was written before 9/11 and 
assumed some poignancy at the time of publication, post 9/11. The essay examines the 
subject of jihad, and endeavours to demonstrate that, according to Islamist 
understandings of jihad, violence is a legitimate expression of political action; it is in 
fact but one category of action on a continuum of what is ‘an intrinsically legitimate and 
existentially significant struggle.’276 If politics is said to end where violence begins 
because killing for politics entails, in essence, killing for politics itself, Euben (2002) 
points out that the roots of democracy are firmly based in violent and bloody 
uprising.
277
  Whilst this stance is neither apologia nor indictment, the examination of 
jihad in this way is crucial and a significant contribution to the argument since it aids an 
understanding of motivation. It is all the more important because it is largely unbiased 
by highly emotive events such as 9/11 and 7/7, written as it was prior to these incidents.  
 
In summary, the notion of radicalisation, and indeed the use of the word in the popular 
media at least, are conflated with ‘terrorism’, and are used to indicate menacing and 
threatening behaviour. But I argue that this treatment is shallow, and that a deeper 
examination of the phenomenon, especially with respect to the role played by Islam, 
will bring forward relevant and fruitful debate. The critical time in a person’s life when 
they are searching for an identity, to ‘be someone’ as Amy puts it, is a vital 
consideration, and the positive opportunities provided in some circumstances for a form 
of radicalisation are significant.  As one Muslim respondent put it to me: 
 
“What it is, Islam is so powerful. Once somebody studies Islam, it’s a powerful 
religion. It’s so powerful, how can I describe this, it’s a way of life and people say 
this is it, this is what I’ve been looking for.” 278 
 
This need not be a negative experience. But the rest of the quote demonstrates how it 
might be, and summarises the thrust of the current section: 
 
“Now if a new guy, who doesn’t know anything about Islam, OK, and if an extreme 
guy gets hold of him, then I describe him as clay, he can mould him in any form he 
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wants to take. It’s like a clay because you’re new. Whatever information I will give 
you, I will only give you the information I want to give you, not, I don’t want to give 
you the version of the Qur’an that the prophet say because I have got a different 
agenda, so he’s more vulnerable here it’s true, he’s more vulnerable, and the ones that 
are more vulnerable are the Muslim youth who are on this Jihad, no knowledge of 
Islam, therefore vulnerable, because, you know, they need that gang culture, that 
violent culture, and suddenly someone comes over and says look what’s happening in 
Palestine, look what’s happening in Afghanistan, let’s do something about it, and they 
say he likes fighting, do you understand what I’m saying? What do we do? You’ve 
done nothing all your life, let’s go, let’s do something.” 279 
  
In Chapter One, section 1.0, I introduce a definition of radicalisation which I rely on 
here, and which takes into account much of the foregoing discussion: 
 
“‘The phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead 
to acts of terrorism’ (EC,2006). Radicalisation is a gradual process that, although it 
can occur very rapidly, has no specifically defined beginning or end state. Rather, 
radicalisation is an individual development that is initiated by a unique combination 
of causal factors and that comprises a drastic change in attitudes and behaviour.”280 
 
3.2.1 The Radicalisation Journey: social conditions or ideology? 
 
As already touched upon, since the 7 July 2005, the British Government, UK security 
services and the European Union have taken a very keen interest in radicalisation. It has 
been closely examined by policy makers as a phenomenon, and a number of ‘root 
causes’ identified, with the idea of intervention. The following is an extract from the EU 
strategy for countering radicalisation: 
 
“There is a range of conditions in society which may create an environment in which 
people can more easily be radicalised. Such factors do not necessarily lead to 
radicalisation, but may make the radical message more appealing both to those who 
suffer them and those who identify with their suffering. These conditions may include 
poor or autocratic governance; states moving from autocratic control via inadequate 
reform to partial democracy; rapid but unmanaged modernisation; and lack of 
political and economic prospects, unresolved international and domestic strife; and 
inadequate education or cultural opportunities for young people.”281 
 
MI5, the British Security Service goes further, identifying causes and factors such as the 
development of a sense of grievance and injustice, the process of globalisation, virulent 
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anti-Westernism, specific events such as military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, a 
sense of personal alienation or community disadvantage arising from socio-economic 
factors such as discrimination, social exclusion, and a lack of opportunity.
282
 Other 
factors identified by MI5 include group identification with those who are perceived as 
less privileged, the exposure to ‘radical’ ideas, perhaps through a forceful or inspiring 
figure, peers and contacts, or, less often, through radical literature or websites.
283
 
  
The subject of countering the radicalisation threat and developing intervention strategies 
or ideas is not restricted to policy makers. Cozzens (2006) develops the theme of 
Islamic ideological differences by looking specifically at Salafi-Jihadi ideology.
284
 His 
paper introduces a ‘continuum’ of Salafi-Jihadi radicalisation, a system spanning from 
an individual’s initial embrace of the Salafi-Jihadi world view to the commission of 
violence and its subsequent legitimisation.
285
 This might also be seen as the leap from 
‘radicalisation’ to ‘harmful radicalisation’, discussed above. The intention is to identify 
opportunities on the continuum for intervention. The paper has potential to be 
controversial and divisive since not all Salafi Muslims can be considered as interested in 
violent jihad – and to potentially suggest that this is the case might be considered 
offensive and rather counter-productive. The author acknowledges this point by 
identifying the primary difference between Salafi-Jihadists and reformist Salafis being 
the disavowal of violent revolution against the government under which they live.
286
 
Examining an ideology in this way is an important link in the chain of understanding, 
and controversy should be welcomed. Cozzens notes an important caveat: that ideology 
cannot by itself satisfactorily explain jihadi violence; research has demonstrated that it 
works in tandem with social processes and other grievances to create militants.
287
 It is 
these social processes and other grievances with which this research is primarily 
concerned. 
 
In a research package financed as part of a project by the European Commission under 
the Sixth Framework Programme, a report entitled ‘Causal Factors of Radicalisation’ 
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examines causal factors,
288
 and presents a theoretical heuristic framework of these 
factors, reproduced in Figure 3, below. It is argued that at the centre of the spectrum is 
positioned the individual, whilst the outside layer, the external factors, constrains 
people’s environment such that individuals only have a minor influence on it. It is 
further argued that: 
 
“A complex interaction between factors at the various levels is likely to be crucial for 
the intensity of the readiness for radicalisation. Social factors play an important 
intervening role in the relation between external factors and radicalisation. For 
example, stigmatisation of Islam in the media, an external cultural factor, is likely to 
impose a stronger radicalising force on Muslims than on non-Muslims.”289 
 
This model makes an interesting comparison with a similar heuristic model in relation 
to crime, presented and discussed in section 6.1.3 of Chapter Six.  
 
Figure 3: Heuristic model of causes of radicalisation
290
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Choudhury (2007) identifies five key points which emerge from the literature on 
radicalisation and identity.
291
  These are:
292
 
 
(i) The path to radicalisation often involves a search for identity at a 
moment of crisis. There is a ‘cognitive opening’, a moment when 
previous explanations and belief systems are found to be inadequate in 
explaining a person’s experience. 
 
(ii) Underlying the identity crisis is a sense of not being accepted or 
belonging to society. This is intensified by experiences of discrimination 
and racism, a sense of blocked social mobility and a lack of confidence 
in the British political system. 
 
(iii) As part of the re-evaluation of their identity, individuals seek to construct 
a sense of what it means to be a Muslim in Britain today. The appeal of 
radical groups reflects, in part, the failure of traditional religious 
institutions to connect with young people. 
 
(iv)  A lack of religious literacy and education appears to be a common 
feature among those that are drawn to extremist groups. The most 
vulnerable are those who are religious novices exploring their faith for 
the first time since they are not in a position to objectively evaluate 
whether the radical group represents an accurate understanding of Islam. 
[This is probably also true in relation to politics - Islamic politics as well 
as British domestic and foreign politics.] 
 
(v) The second generation have grown up in the UK long enough that their 
parents’ version of Islam seems distant and irrelevant but there has been 
insufficient time for a home grown religious leadership to develop. 
 
Within these five points and the foregoing corpus of literature, we can tease out themes 
which are in common with other roots of ‘social protest’.  We can delineate the 
existence of several social preconditions which may make groups or individuals 
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vulnerable to radicalisation. These include a sense of isolation, a lack of social identity, 
a lack of confidence in the political system, a lack of economic prospects, perceptions of 
blocked social mobility, all amplified by experiences of discrimination and racism.  
 
The following section of the present chapter examines the literature on the ‘root causes’ 
of urban unrest, with particular reference to the riots in the inner cities of the UK during 
the 1980s. The Oldham riot of 2001 is also discussed. 
 
3.3 Urban Unrest: legitimate violence? 
 
 
“Students of collective action have given great attention to the sources, processes, and 
consequences of changing repertoires of collective action across space and time. One 
important focus of this scholarship has been the integral role of interaction between 
protesters and the police.” 293 
 
 
To a great extent, the above quote sets out the position with regards to the study of 
urban unrest. Major conflict during the twentieth century, both in the USA and the UK, 
spawned an enormous plethora of writings, research and policy development. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to dissect and examine all aspects of the corpus of 
literature; however key parts are examined, particularly in relation to urban disorder 
since 1980 in the United Kingdom. This section of the present chapter sets out to 
identify what ‘root causes’ of urban disorder might be isolated.  
 
Kratcoski, Verma and Das (2001) helpfully examine what it is that constitutes ‘public 
disorder’, making the point that, in a broad sense, it is a disturbance of public order – 
but the types of behaviour threatening public order will vary depending upon the 
political and social conditions of the society in question.
294
 ‘Riot’ is a word which tends 
to be used as shorthand for urban unrest, but will mean different things to different 
people and governments. It has also varied over time. Currently, in the United 
Kingdom, ‘riot’ is defined in the Public Order Act 1986, section 1: 
 
“Where 12 or more persons who are present together use or threaten unlawful 
violence for a common purpose and the conduct of them (taken together) is such as 
would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his 
                                                 
293
 McPhain, C et al (1998) ‘Policing Protest in the United States: 1960-1995’ in della Porta D and Reiter 
H (Ed) (1998) ‘Policing Protest – The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies’ 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press p49 
294
 Kratcoski, P, Verma, A and Das, D (2001) ‘Policing of Public Order: A World Perspective’ Police 
Practice 2(1-2) pp109-143 
 95 
personal safety, each of the persons using unlawful violence for the common purpose 
is guilty of riot.” 
 
 
Although it is useful to have such a definition, police institutions might be reluctant to 
recognise any given event as a riot because the relevant Police Authority, under the 
provisions of the Riot (Damages) Act 1886, will then be responsible for some of the 
costs of the damage, irrespective of any negligence on the part of the police. This begins 
to illuminate the link between urban unrest and policing. 
 
Kettle and Hodges (1982) describe Britain’s riotous history in their introduction, even 
taking some ‘nice irony’ in the fact that the Peasant Revolt was almost 600 years before 
the very day in which the riots in Toxteth set in motion the most widespread phase of 
the 1981 riots.
295
  They point out that throughout British history, “powerless people 
feeling themselves oppressed and seeing no effective response to their grievances, have 
despaired of any improvement, formed themselves into crowds and physically 
challenged the world that seemed to deny them what they wanted.”296 This sets the tenor 
for the analysis of riot and unrest which follows. 
 
Reiner (1998) presents evidence that the link between urban unrest and law enforcement 
reaches back to the beginnings of organised policing, with some commentators 
suggesting that it was riot and disorder which precipitated the development of the 
police, not the need to respond to crime.
297
 This is a theme which is picked up and 
recognised by a number of other writers. McPhail et al (1998) point out that the 
important focus for students of collective violence is the integral role of interaction 
between police and protesters, since the actions of each modify the environments of the 
other.
298
 The stance taken by some of these ideas is fraught with risk. To identify 
policing and police methods as a cause of a riot is to miss the point as to why people are 
rebelling. Waddington (1992) recognises this when he discusses the frustration-
aggression hypothesis: “rioters ‘take-out’ their frustration on a local target of 
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aggression, such as the police or symbols of the establishment”.299 Lord Scarman also 
realised it in his report into the Brixton disorders of 1981, where he first described 
social conditions, and then made the following point: 
 
“..it takes little, or nothing, to persuade them [young black people] that the police, 
representing an establishment which they see as insensitive to their plight, are their 
enemies.”300 
 
 
Occasionally, the role of the police in urban disorder begins to be taken as given, 
illustrating a second point of risk: if the police are in some way responsible for riots, 
then ‘fixing’ the police will mitigate the risk of unrest. Mervyn Jones and Winkler 
(1982) address this by examining the oft quoted ‘the police have lost contact with 
communities’, and conduct research to establish the degree to which foot patrol actually 
occurs in a given police force.
301
 Although they state that they have not taken a stand on 
any suggested causal relationship between the mechanised reactive style of policing and 
the cause of riots,
302
 actually, there is a strong implication in the paper as a whole that 
this is the case: that policing style is responsible for riots and that foot patrol is the 
panacea.  Joyce (1992) supports this position and states ‘a considerable volume of 
literature has cited police practices as a prime cause [my emphasis] of public 
disorder.’303 But the paper does not identify any of the literature. Moreover, he states:  
 
“The view advanced is that public disorder since 1980 has been primarily caused by 
young people who feel they have little stake in society as it is currently constituted.” 
304
 
 
 
 
Young people may have been the main protagonists, but can they realistically be 
considered as the cause?  Cain and Sadigh (1982) take a different view, pointing out 
that “it is necessary first of all to scotch the myth of the ‘traditional’ ‘bobby on the 
beat’”, arguing that there is historical evidence demonstrating that, before the 1964 act, 
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police officers in towns and cities were “divorced from the population policed”.305 
Interestingly, Clutterbuck (1973) charts the history of protest in Britain, and points out 
that, despite some major sociological changes, not one person was killed taking part in 
political demonstrations between 1919 and 1972.
306
 He later states that “the biggest 
single contribution to keeping protest peaceful is the existence of an unarmed police 
force.”307 
 
Thus, policing methods, and police interaction with communities and protesters is of 
considerable importance, but as a cause of a riot, the evidence does not stand up. The 
role of the police, and the unique position which they occupy, is summed up by Kettle 
and Hodges (1982) with a quote from the Drummet enquiry into the Southall riots: 
 
 
“Those who belong to racial minorities and face repeated public and private 
expressions of hostility need some rock to cling to, some social institution they can 
trust to operate impartially, if they are not to be reduced to despair. Of all institutions, 
those whose impartial operation it is most important to maintain are the police and the 
law courts. Deprive people of the sense that they enjoy the protection of the law and 
of the agencies that enforce and administer it, and you destroy their whole feeling of 
security and any sense that they might otherwise have preserved that they are part of 
the society within which they live.” 308 
 
 
The Brixton disorders, examined in Chapter Two, took place in April 1981. In July of 
that year, there was an explosion of rioting which began in Southall, then Toxteth and 
then in many other parts of the country. Kettle and Hodges (1982) examine these in 
some detail, and make the point that there were important differences in the 
circumstances which sparked off the violence.
309
 For instance, Southall began as a fight 
between Asians and white skinheads; in Toxteth, where police-community relations 
were in a state of crisis, blacks and whites took part.
310
 But whatever the actual point of 
ignition, the riots “overwhelmingly broke out in multi-racial inner-city areas where 
black people share the poverty of whites – only much more acutely.”311 On 25th May 
2001, a serious race riot broke out in Oldham, Lancashire. This riot, twenty years after 
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the disorders of the 1980s, begins to point towards a failure of UK policy, including 
aspects of policing, to learn the lessons of two decades earlier. Ahmed et al (2001) 
made the following comments: 
 
“The riots have revealed the extent of antagonism and polarisation between ethnic 
minority and white communities in the town, and indeed across the United Kingdom. 
In particular, they highlight the grave level of discontent felt within the ethnic 
minority Muslim community. The Oldham riots are a manifestation of deep and long-
standing social problems related to racism and deprivation within communities of all 
ethnic backgrounds…” 312 
 
 
The authors interviewed locals in Oldham to give a voice to alienated Muslim youth, 
seeking to understand their perceptions. They came up with five broad categories: 
 
“(1) The Muslim youth face complete alienation from social and political processes 
due to deprivation and discrimination. 
 
(2) The local police have persistently pursued highly discriminatory policies against 
the ethnic and religious minorities of Oldham. 
 
(3) Various institutions including the police and the media provoked the disturbances 
through highly sensitive and inherently discriminatory practice in May 2001. 
 
(4) The far-right has developed and exploited Islamophobic sentiment. 
 
(5) Muslim youth concerns have been deliberately excluded by various authorities, 
from all relevant discussions about local problems both historically and in the wake 
of disturbances.” 313 
 
This paper clearly articulates deprivation and discrimination as issues which contribute 
to alienation from social and political processes. This begins to confirm the idea of 
disenfranchised groups reacting violently to perceived grievances. Deprivation also 
begins to occur as a theme. Ray and Smith (2004) make a scholarly and conceptually 
sound analysis of the Oldham disorders.
314
 Their examination makes a hugely important 
contribution to the argument. They agree with Ahmed et al (2001) that “the perpetrators 
of the Oldham conflicts came from some of the most deprived areas of England”,315 and 
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they identify four underlying structural conditions giving rise to racial segregation. 
These are systematic disadvantage – many members of ethnic minorities can only afford 
cheaper housing; higher unemployment than in the majority community, especially in 
Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities; cultural cohesion and choice among ethnic 
minority communities and discrimination in council housing allocation.
316
 This work 
begins to de-lineate several pre-conditions: discrimination, deprivation and 
unemployment. The paper illustrates that there are no simple explanations for all riots, 
and that a heady mix of pre-conditions need to exist. This paper is re-visited in Chapter 
Five. Neither Ahmed (2001) nor Ray and Smith (2004) address the issue of the effect of 
Islam on segregation and material deprivation. Macey (2002), confronts this issue head 
on, and bases her arguments on work conducted in and around Bradford following the 
riots in 1995 and 2001.
317
 The structural location of Muslims in the UK has already 
been discussed, and some explanation offered. Macey argues that the materially 
deprived, high areas of unemployment and poverty are associated with higher crime 
levels, and it might be suggested that Islamic doctrine has a part to play.
318
 Moreover, 
she suggests that the prohibition on mortgages as usury and the cultural tradition of the 
extended family go some way towards explaining housing disadvantages, has a 
consequence in terms of ethnic segregation, and also results in Muslims buying cheaper 
more affordable housing;  educational underachievement might be a function of very 
tired young Muslim males who have spent long hours in the Mosque learning Arabic 
and sections of the Qur’an, and then spending lengthy periods in Pakistan.319 In a 
similar manner, Islamic definitions of gender roles pre-disposes females to focus on 
family and the home, and may even lead to the permanent removal of Muslim girls from 
school.
320
 This means that they have very little access to employment and, coupled with 
a Muslim preference for large families, contributes to familial poverty. These cultural 
idioms remain undiluted by British society because of the preponderance of 
intercontinental marriages between British and Pakistani partners. This has the effect of 
a constant intake of residents to a community who have little or no access to English, 
and results in the tendency for a highly traditional form of Islam from rural Pakistan to 
replicate in UK urban environments. 
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Macey concludes with the following sentiment: 
 
 
 “Policy-makers, at both the national and local state levels, need to acknowledge that 
incidents of ‘rioting’ and public affray are not simply a response to deprivation, 
marginalisation and white racism, but are the result of complex inter-sections and 
interaction between a large number of variables, some of them specifically related to 
cultural interpretations of Islam.” 321 
 
 
 
She is equally as firm in an earlier article, prior to the unrest in 2001.
322
  By way of 
justification, she argues here that other residents in the area, who share the same 
material deprivation, did not resort to violence, and therefore material deprivation does 
not in itself constitute an explanation for public disorder.
323
 Of course this is flawed – it 
is tantamount to suggesting, for example, that higher rates of promiscuity amongst gay 
men mean that all gay men are promiscuous. The correct position to adopt is not that 
material deprivation constitutes an explanation for public disorder and tension; rather it 
contributes to the requisite conditions. Macey’s arguments regarding the role of Islam 
are highly important: 
 
“Whether this type of Islam is theologically legitimate is irrelevant: as long as men 
use Islam to justify violence, religion must be considered a significant variable in its 
analysis.”324 
 
 
This is a significant argument and one which cannot be ignored, even if it has the 
potential for accusations of Islamophobia. Data relating to this issue is presented in 
section 7.7.3 of Chapter Seven, and I further discuss it in section 8.2.1.3, Chapter Eight 
with respect to its links to social identity.  
 
What is especially interesting about the Oldham example is the role of the media, and 
how representations and perceptions presented by the media began to mould police 
activity. This, coupled with far right intervention, built fear into minority communities. 
These factors are why riots did not occur in neighbouring Rochdale, which was 
demographically similar, and suffered from similar deprivation. Racist crime, political 
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activity (in this case the BNP) and media activity are therefore additional indicators of 
forthcoming politically motivated violence. The factors identified in Oldham in 2001 
were similarly identified by Lord Scarman in 1981.  By drawing on a considerable 
volume of research and evidence, Scarman identified a whole series of pre-conditions 
which he felt were apparent in Brixton prior to the onset of violent disorder.
325
 These 
are detailed in seminal event 1, Chapter Two. His enquiry was scrutinised and examined 
by an army of academics and politicians. Taylor (1981) offered a speedy contribution to 
the wider debate because he advanced some theories and explanations.
326
 He revised 
and reproduced his paper in 1984, and it is worth examining in some depth.
327
 He 
identifies five theoretical approaches to the study of collective violence. The first group 
of theories are sociological – they stress the importance of the dynamics of social 
relations, social institutions and social systems causing riots. Functionalist theory 
“embodies a notion of society as a set of individuals and groups held together by a 
moral consensus as to the appropriate social, economic and political values governing 
the social order.” 328  Social systems sometimes fail; therefore riots are a consequence of 
the system’s inability to adapt to new demands, coupled with the growth of generalised 
beliefs which provide an account of why the system failed, and offering a new basis for 
reconstituted social action. The failure of the social system creates the potential for 
collective violence; this becomes actual violence following the occurrence of a 
precipitator. These malfunctions were regarded as temporary – once social systems had 
adjusted, stimulated by the violence, the violence diminished. Conflictual social theory 
identifies society as an arena within which dominant and subordinate groups compete 
for wealth, status and power. This is a Marxist-type model.
329
  
 
The second group of theories are sociopsychological, which seek to explain riots as 
individual behaviours determined by particular psychological processes. Where one 
person’s cognitive system is consistent with that another person, then they are in 
cognitive consonance. When inconsistencies arrive, they are in cognitive dissonance, 
individuals therefore feel tension, and are motivated to alleviate this tension by adopting 
behaviours to realign the cognitions. Such behaviour would include rioting. The second 
sociopsychological model contends that where individuals are prevented from achieving 
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their goals, frustration occurs. Where individuals become frustrated, psychological 
tension exists, which is automatically transmuted into aggression and thence to 
violence. These two strands suggest individuals act non-rationally. 
 
The third group of theories are the economic ones. That riots can be analysed in terms of 
individuals making rational choices based upon maximising the net differential between 
gains and losses. This is to do with the ‘fun’ value, and looting opportunities. 
 
The fourth group is political variables. (i) Riots and like phenomena are engineered by 
extremist political groups in the hope of destabilising political systems. (ii) Political 
systems take time to adapt to rapidly changing economic and social environment. Riots 
are a response to this. (iii) As for (ii) but the decision for the non-incorporation of 
demands is a rational choice – i.e. a refusal to allow certain demands on to the political 
agenda. For any group thus excluded, riots offer a way of forcing demands onto the 
political agenda. (iv) Political repression as a cause of riots. Over the shorter term there 
is a positive relationship between the level of repression or coercion – the level of 
repression increasing with the level of counter violence by mass populations. In the end, 
collective violence becomes so costly it begins to diminish. 
 
The fifth group suggests that riots may be caused by other riots in three ways: (i) 
Geographical contagion. A riot in one city may become known and stimulate riots in 
other nearby cities. (ii) Media contagion. Very similar but riots occur in remote cities – 
‘copycat’ riots. (iii) Tradition of rioting – riots are more likely where they have occurred 
before. 
 
These theories are pertinent because they contextualise pre-conditions. For example, 
deprivation may fit into the political theory; discrimination the sociological one. Riots 
in places like Oxford during 1981 may fit the fifth theory, and actually represent a 
‘copycat’ riot which would not have taken place but for the unrest in Brixton or 
Toxteth. Scarman’s analysis of Brixton tends to demonstrate a mixture of these theories.  
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Field (1982) takes up these themes and makes some important demographic and 
sociological parallels between the British and American riots.
330
 He identifies five 
similarities between British and American riots, suggesting that the similarities greatly 
outnumber the differences.
331
 Four of these similarities are of particular importance to 
the identity of social pre-conditions and riot precipitators. Firstly, the primary sources of 
perceived grievance contributing to the American riots were police practices, 
unemployment and housing conditions. These were also the three most cited in relation 
to the British riots.
332
 Secondly, a typical American riot was sparked off by a fairly 
minor or routine police action which developed into a confrontation between the police 
and the black community, and then continued with widespread looting, arson and 
attacks on police. This general pattern was identical to the British riots.
333
 Thirdly, 
neither set of riots was the result of organised meetings or demonstrations, nor were 
they strongly linked to any particular group.
334
 Fourthly, and interestingly, American 
blacks have migrated from the poverty of the rural South to industrial employment in 
the cities of the North and West. The black population of these cities grew very fast in 
the 1960s as a new generation, born in the city, grew up. There bears an important 
resemblance to the immigration of South Asians to Britain and the social positions of 
the younger generations are in many respects analogous.
335
 This also resonates with the 
actions of suicide bombers, many of whom are second or third generation. 
 
In a further attempt to contextualise pre-conditions, Waddington (1992) develops the 
theory of a flashpoint model for public disorder, comprising six integrated levels of 
analysis: the structural, political/ideological, cultural, contextual, situational and 
interactional levels.
336
 The structural level refers to inequalities of power, material 
resources and life chances, and he defines this as subjective deprivation. The 
political/ideological level refers to the relationship of a politically or culturally 
dissenting group to key political institutions, and how such institutions react. The 
cultural level refers to ways of life and thought which groups develop on the basis of 
shared material conditions and location within the social structure. The contextual level 
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refers to the way in which a particular incident becomes highly charged or acquires 
greater significance. The situational level refers to spatial or social determinants of 
disorder relevant to the immediate surroundings and the interactional level focuses on 
the quality of interaction between the police and the dissenting group.  
 
Benyon and Solomos (1987) worked with several themes in the decade or so following 
the Brixton disorders,
337
 and Benyon (1993) consolidates some of this work.
338
 He 
suggests that six ‘conflict variables’ underlie increased levels of conflict in Britain. 
These manifest themselves in rising crime, growth in the hidden economy, rising drug 
use and falling levels of cooperation with the police. This therefore links crime with 
public disorder. The six variables are: the effectiveness of government programmes; 
identity with the polity; opportunities for political participation; voluntary consent; 
views of state legitimacy and perceptions of social justice.
339
 The factors are linked such 
that a decrease in one may adversely affect the other. He further suggests that the six 
factors are affected by ‘basic grievances’ and conditions in deprived areas of Britain’s 
cities. These are high unemployment, social deprivation, political exclusion and 
powerlessness, and mistrust of, and hostility to, the police.
340
 Further factors which may 
be present are racial disadvantage and discrimination. Benyon identifies an important 
caveat: “a significant cause of disorder in the nineteenth century was the demand for 
political reform. Many other violent disorders were associated with social grievances, 
unemployment or lack of political representation.” 341 Some of this might be thought to 
imply that riots are a peculiarity of ethnic minority status and ‘race’, but of course they 
are not. As Waddington puts it, “analysis of twentieth century riots in Britain and 
America suggests that disorder most typically occurs in those periods where relatively 
powerless sections of society experience a shattering denial of something they feel 
legitimately entitled to.” 342 This notion gains momentum, and gives credence to the 
fundamental argument that riot is a form of political protest, albeit violent political 
protest. Benyon briefly outlines conservative, liberal and radical perspectives on crime 
and disorder. He considers liberal and radical approaches together, focusing ‘on ‘basic 
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flaws’ in society and its political arrangements, highlighting social injustice, inadequate 
institutions and the maldistribution of resources and political power as causes of 
disorder.’343  A theme behind the liberal approach is that people have unrealised 
expectations, and that this is a cause of discontent.
344
 This again has some important 
parallels with motivation for terrorism where highly educated but discriminated-against 
individuals fail to achieve their objective potential or indeed their own expectations, 
discussed above. These failed expectations result in a build up of tension which 
eventually explodes and the resulting riot is therefore cathartic. This is a point with 
which Alderson (1998) agrees, since he suggests that the test of a ‘well-ordered’ society 
is not so much the absence of protest and disorder, rather the capacity for restoring 
social equilibrium and peaceful social union afterwards.
345
 Some argue that the violent 
outburst is “a rational and purposeful action by those who have been systematically 
excluded from full participation in society” 346, therefore political exclusion as well as 
disadvantage is important as a fundamental factor. Riot forces demands onto the 
political agenda, it must be therefore, a form of political violence in this context. 
 
This perspective raises two issues. Firstly, most riots, especially those in 1980s Britain, 
were spontaneous. Indeed, Crenshaw (1981) uses spontaneity as a characteristic that 
separates urban unrest from terrorism.
347
 But spontaneity does not mean that there is no 
political basis - the pre-conditions described provide the political foundations. 
Perceptions of social injustice, amongst others, create a tinder box; all that is required is 
the ignition. Waddington (1992) defines such points of ignition for 1980’s riots, and 
police activity in one form or another is the ‘lit match’.348 This creates the illusion of 
spontaneity; in truth, discontent has been building and building. The second point is one 
of legitimacy. Again, this is a very similar debate to the one around terrorism. In a 
‘well-ordered’ society, is it not the case that riot, underpinned by perceptions of 
injustice, discrimination, deprivation, is actually legitimate? Once again, Tupman and 
O’Reilly (2004) shed light on the issue with their discussion of legitimacy arenas.349 
Urban unrest, or rioting, is likely to be perceived as broadly legitimate in they eyes of 
those that are politically excluded, discriminated against and otherwise disenfranchised. 
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The literature demonstrates that, although not causes of riots, certain social conditions 
can be crystallised which pre-exist where urban unrest occurs. These are inter alia 
unemployment, relative deprivation (which may include poor housing and a big gap 
between expectation and achievement), discrimination, political isolation and a 
perception of social injustice. Racist crime, political and media activity are additional 
indicators of forthcoming politically motivated violence. Police activity, again not a 
cause of riots, is of major importance because the police represent the state, they exert 
coercive force, and because perceptions of social injustice are directly connected with 
the police as an institution. Their activity may provide the ignition. Benyon (1993) 
states “Social injustice is the central thread running through urban conflict. Above all, it 
is experiences of perceptions of injustice which may develop into a violent urban 
disorder.”350  
 
3.3.1 Partnership responses and community policing 
 
Margaret Simey of the Merseyside Police Authority was one of many individuals and 
groups who recognised that that the police alone could not be held accountable for the 
riots, and similarly could not be the route through which the solution might be found: 
 
 
“Responsibility for public tranquillity on such a vast scale cannot and must not be 
off-loaded on to the police…It was our failure as a society to set about the conditions 
in the inner cities which led to the breakdown of social order in the 1980s…The 
responsibility is ours, and it is one which we cannot delegate to the police.”351 
 
 
Simey was outspoken at the time of the riots, and is quoted as saying that conditions in 
the area are so bad that people ought to riot, that she would regard people as apathetic if 
they did not riot, adding that the police were out of control.
352
 John Alderson, Chief 
Constable of Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, had for some years been an exponent 
of what he termed ‘community policing’: he also recognised that the job of policing a 
complex pluralistic society was one which the police could not do alone, and he 
advocated a ‘social contract’ where the police and public came together under the 
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institution of ‘community policing’.353 It would involve inter-agency cooperation, 
consultative groups and community officers. Simey strongly disapproved: 
 
 
“An equally popular panacea is to talk of ‘community policing’. This has a nostalgic 
appeal, but examined more closely it adds up to no more than a demand for the police 
to take up the burden left behind by the departure…of many of those who stood for 
‘government’: the clergy, the teachers and doctors, local shopkeepers and the rest. 
There is no hope for the future in such backward glances.”354 
 
 
Others argued that community policing may not be compatible with democracy.
355
 
356
 In 
truth, Alderson held the seeds of the development over the next 25 years of a series of 
steps towards group responsibility for policing. Some of this became part of the law: for 
example, a legal duty on police, councils and others to work together is imposed by the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998; and some of it is policy driven: recent policing 
developments and Government edicts around neighbourhood improvement are 
examples, examined in the next chapter. 
 
3.4 Tension Indicators 
 
Research work following the riots in 1960s America identified that there were certain 
indicators which forewarned of the likelihood of urban unrest. Field (1982) quotes 
Momboisse (1967): 
 
 
“Every race riot is preceded by a flood of rumour, expressions of increasing 
antagonism between groups and an increase in the number and intensity of clashes 
between members of antagonistic groups. By developing adequate methods for 
obtaining and recording necessary kinds of information, the police can tell 
approximately how much danger of a riot there is at any given time, what group 
would start it, who their victims would be, and where violence would be most likely 
to break out. Such knowledge would be invaluable both in preventive work and in 
handling any disorders that might occur.” 357 
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He also quotes, at length, the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals (NACCJSG), dealing with the types of thing to look at.
358
 This 
resulted in a systemised means of assessing community tension, and lists the 
following:
359
 
 
i. disturbance calls involving group conflict 
ii. routine police action resulting in abuse of police officers 
iii. stoning of police or fire vehicles 
iv. assaults between groups 
v. assaults against police 
vi. complaints against police 
vii. changes in media coverage of police events or incidents, and 
viii. unwillingness of the public to help the police 
 
 
Brightmore (1992) takes up the theme, quoting Curry and King (1962) on the value of 
rumours: 
 
 
“First, police officials must regard them as symptomatic. If rumours are plentiful, 
they should be reported. If they are then cleared through central police offices they 
can become an effective barometer of the state of mind of the community and can 
indicate the likelihood of trouble in any particular area.”360 
 
 
Home Office Circular 39/1982 was sent to Chief Constables and contained a list of 
eleven ‘tension indicators’ which experience suggested could be identified and used to 
give warning of unrest
361
: 
 
1. Increased hostility to police operations such as the making of arrests. 
2. Unusually large groups of youths congregating in public thoroughfares and 
showing hostility towards the police. 
3. Harassment of individual police officers by groups of youths. 
4. Increases in the numbers of assaults on police officers. 
5. Increases in the number of attacks on police vehicles 
6. The development of heavy anti-police propaganda and the circulation of 
rumours and false information about police activities and practices. 
7. Increased numbers of complaints against the police, especially of alleged 
brutality and harassment. 
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8. The breaking down of previously established liaison and consultative 
arrangements. 
9. Increased numbers of complaints of racial attacks and a lack of police response. 
10. Conflict between or within racial groups, particularly conflict involving 
violence. 
11. Incidents which achieve notoriety, such as the arrest of prominent individuals, 
providing a focus for community discontent. 
 
These indicators are heavily police centric, but get round the problem Field (1982) 
identifies concerning the morality of police officers systematically collecting 
information about certain groups.
362
 He draws the distinction between a close awareness 
of local events and community feeling, and surveillance of groups or communities.
363
 
 
Brightmore (1992) re-produces the Metropolitan Police model developed at the time. It 
includes the Home Office list, but also adds issues relating to schools, international 
events, analysis of local press, national media, consultative committees etc.
364
  
 
The US Department for Justice developed a ‘Distant Early Warning Signs (DEWS) 
System’, listing indicators which may be used to asses the potential for racial tension in 
a community.
365
 They are worth reproducing in full: 
 
 Increased disturbance calls in a particular area 
 Increased number of interracial assaults 
 Increased number of assaults against police 
 Increased citizen complaints of excessive use of force by police 
 Complaints about police use of force 
 Decreased levels of community involvement with local police department and 
officers 
 Presence of or increase in hate groups 
 Scheduled major event likely to attract protesters (opening of a controversial 
movie, music concert, athletic event etc) 
 Media reports exacerbating racial issues, tensions, conflicts, or incidents 
 Increased school-based racial incidents 
 Increased incidents of racial graffiti 
 Major racial or ethnic population changes 
 Harsh weather conditions creating unusual hardships and stress 
 Crowding in housing, schools and community facilities 
 Critical, polarizing, or provocative comments from community leaders 
heightening racial tension 
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 High unemployment and underemployment 
 Perceived disparities in social services and welfare 
 Demonstrations which reflect racial and ethnic polarization 
 History or presence of unresolved racial conflict 
 Rationing of gas, food, water, electricity, etc 
 
The guidance states that consideration should be given to changes and trends in the 
above items.
366
 The list contains the Home Office recommended indicators, together 
with the additions made by the Metropolitan Police; they also contain a number of 
sociological or demographic indices. For example, it lists crowding in houses, schools 
and community facilities, and unemployment. This is relevant to the current discussion 
because I hypothesise that certain social pre-conditions need to exist for unrest to occur, 
and that since unrest, radicalisation and terrorism have similar roots, these pre-
conditions can be used to provide a crude indicator of which communities are at risk. 
Tupman and O’Reilly (2004) take this idea one stage further.367 They suggest that if 
“‘anti-American or anti-Westerner or anti-foreigner’ is substituted for ‘racist’ then the 
creation of ‘tension indicators’,  and thus the need for counter-terrorist intervention, is 
in the starting blocks.”368 Actually, this is not the creation of a new set of tension 
indicators; it is merely the application of previously developed indicators to a new 
threat. This is only possible because ‘terrorism’ in this context has similar roots to urban 
unrest and riot. 
 
A number of these indicators are examined in more depth in Chapter Six, especially 
those that relate to crime, including assaults on police officers, and complaints against 
police. Chapter Seven presents data relevant to these indicators from the case study. 
 
3.5 Ladder of Escalation 
 
To re-capture an earlier point, Crenshaw (1981) describes the idea of the permissive 
factor of social facilitation: 
 
 
“This concept refers to social habits and historical conditions that sanction the use of 
violence against the Government, making it morally and politically justifiable, and 
even dictating an appropriate form, such as demonstrations, coups, or terrorism.”369 
                                                 
366
 Ibid 
367
 Tupman, W and O’Reilly, C (2004) op cit p37 
368
 Ibid p37 
369
 Crenshaw, M (1981) ibid p382 
 111 
 
 
This implies a gradational incremental structure to forms of ‘social protest’. Tupman 
(1987) agrees with this and develops part of it in a more coherent way.
 370
 His idea 
begins with a demonstration countered by force, progresses through the death of a 
demonstrator and revenge killing of a police officer to the ultimate conclusion – ‘sub 
civil war’.371 Massey’s description of urbanization and rising income inequality, 
discussed above, also suggests such a structure. Wilkinson (1977) introduces ‘escalation 
ladders’, making the distinction between ‘Mass Political Violence’ such as riots and 
civil war, and ‘Small Group Political Violence’, including political terrorism, isolated 
assassination attempts, and guerrilla raids on foreign states.
372
 
 
I propose here a ‘ladder of escalation’ which develops these themes, and is depicted in 
figure 1 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A model of this nature is based upon certain assumptions. In particular, that varying 
types of ‘social protest’, be they violent or otherwise, have similar root causes. The 
model in this form is highly simplistic, and clearly a range of other ‘impact factors’ may 
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Figure 1: Ladder of Escalation 
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be brought to bear. These would include the position the media adopt, and, crucially, the 
activity of the police. Since this is capable of control, appropriate police response may 
militate against escalation. The key is to identify the incremental steps early enough, 
and then develop a multi agency intervention strategy appropriate to the situation. In the 
eyes of state Government, the model would tend to show declining legitimacy from the 
left hand side to the right. In the eyes of a group which perceives itself to have a ‘low 
level of identity with the polity’, with ‘low opportunities for participation’ and a ‘strong 
sense of social injustice’,373 legitimacy increases from the left hand side to the right. 
This contextualises the model within Tupman and O’Reilly’s ‘Legitimacy Arenas’ 
whereby the legitimacy of violent action by rebel groups on one hand, and the activity 
(or existence) of state authorities on the other, varies depending upon the position and 
nature of the audience.
374
 It also begins illuminate the question of whether a given 
activity reduces or increases the number of terrorists. 
 
Ross (1993) hints at a similar structure, though he does not articulate it.
375
 He also 
views it from a slightly alternative angle: 
 
 
“The presence of other forms of unrest among populations, violent or non-violent, 
may act as a catalyst for terrorism. These forms of unrest include war, revolution, 
guerrilla warfare, strikes, protests, demonstrations, riots, or other group terrorist 
actions. Unrest can motivate terrorist organizations; provide learning opportunities; 
increase the legitimacy of violent actions; and, heighten a sense of grievance.”376 
 
 
The position Ross adopts is not at odds with the model, since it proposes that the 
existence of other forms of ‘social protest’ might well indicate a risk of progression 
towards terrorism. The subtle difference is that he suggests the progression to terrorism 
is likely to accelerate with the existence of other forms of protest; the model suggests 
that terrorism might be one of the end points of a series of failed attempts to ‘protest’ 
and bring about change. In truth, either one of these situations might occur. Either way, 
I propose that the model serves as a useful tool to forewarn of potential risk. 
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3.6 Summary 
 
Existing research appears to demonstrate the following: Urban unrest and terrorism in 
the current context are both forms of political violence. They share common roots with 
radicalisation, with a number of key social pre-conditions existing prior to their onset. 
Crucially, these include a sense of injustice, a lack of political representation, declining 
perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities, relative deprivation (which may include 
unemployment, a gap between expectation and achievement) and discrimination. Levels 
of drug related crime are also important. Racist crime, political and media activity are 
additional indicators of forthcoming politically motivated violence and pre-conditions 
are essential but precipitators are also required to initiate the event. The existence of a 
powerful figure may be crucial in influencing the path which the ‘social protest’ event 
takes. The ‘common roots’ theory points towards the conclusion that the seeds of 
understanding and therefore the fruit of successful counter-radicalisation and counter-
terrorist strategies are already within our grasp. Similarly, the similarities between 
organised crime and terrorism might suggest that established mechanisms for fighting 
the former may be effective in tackling the latter. 
 
There are a number of areas which require examination and further research. These 
include the following: 
 
 How can state authorities, particularly the police, use the ‘common roots’ theory 
to identify communities which might be vulnerable to radicalisation and 
subsequent progression to terrorism? 
 
 Does a ‘ladder of escalation’ provide an additional mechanism whereby peaceful 
forms of social or political activity can be used to forewarn, in the medium to 
longer term, of  the potential for radicalisation and terrorism amongst some 
communities? 
 
 To what degree can ‘tension indicators’, developed after the urban riots in the 
UK, be adapted to forewarn of the growth of radicalisation and terrorists within 
a given community? 
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 Is the National Intelligence Model, principally developed to tackle crime, 
capable of identifying radicalisation and terrorism risk factors, using the 
foregoing mechanisms, and developing appropriate partnership intervention 
strategy? 
 
 What role does ‘Neighbourhood Policing’ play, and can a ‘toolkit’ be developed 
which enables local officers to assist in the identification of vulnerable 
communities? 
 
 What relevance does the ‘social pre-conditions’ idea have to the current rise in 
gang related activity and the growth in radicalisation linked to Islam? 
 
The following chapter moves the ‘foundationalist’ arguments discussed above towards 
an examination of the ‘realist’. It reviews selected Government sponsored research, 
Home Office and ACPO edicts and guidance intended to safeguard and protect 
communities issued in recent years, and assesses their intention and effectiveness. The 
subsequent chapter outlines methodology which will permit the examination and testing 
of elements of the ideas articulated above. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
 
 
Selected policies and edicts since 1981: 
A critical review 
 
 
 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
As outlined in section 1.0 of Chapter One, a principal purpose of the thesis is to identify 
what local policing teams can actually do to mitigate the risk of harmful radicalisation 
and progression to terrorism. As this chapter unfolds, it will demonstrate that we already 
understand what it is we need local police officers, Police Community Support Officers 
(PCSOs) and local public authority officials to do because the problems and challenges 
have been met before in the context of other examples of social unrest. Although there 
are pockets and areas of very good work (for example, the work of the Muslim Contact 
Unit in London
377
), it suggests that the problem in general terms is a failure to learn and 
implement lessons from the past, a failure correctly to identify where intervention is 
necessary, and a failure to understand what effective intervention looks like. Chapter 
Five outlines methodology to test this assertion. The methodology will also outline a 
means to seek to understand whether recent policing innovation in a specific 
geographical area is capable of anticipating violent radicalisation and developing 
mitigation strategies. 
 
The present chapter has two key themes. Firstly, it critically analyses various selected 
laws, policy responses and edicts from the Home Office and elsewhere which largely 
arose from the five seminal events outlined in the second chapter. The purpose of the 
analysis is to demonstrate that there has been a failure by key social agencies like the 
police to address fundamental problems such as racial discrimination and perceptions of 
social injustice. This has occurred despite repeated identification of the challenges in the 
aftermath of the described events, and it posits the theory that this has led to 
disenfranchisement amongst people from ethnic minority groups, rendering them 
vulnerable to harmful influence. By linking it with the ‘common roots theory’ advanced 
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in Chapter Three, the present chapter aims to establish that the current crisis is an 
almost inevitable consequence of this failure.  
 
The development of successful counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorist strategies 
depends first upon the identification of vulnerable groups and communities, and then 
local solutions must be found by agencies working together to alleviate the risk of 
violent extremist tendencies. These local solutions should carry many of the themes 
advanced by Lord Scarman, and the authors of the other reports contained herein. The 
second thread of this chapter is to consider whether or not the National Intelligence 
Model and Neighbourhood Policing are developed sufficiently to perform this task. 
That is to say, are these new policing and partnership innovations actually capable of 
identifying risk, and then developing strategies to mitigate it? 
 
The chapter is broadly organised in chronological order, and reflects the structure of 
section 2.3.4 of Chapter Two, which presents the five seminal events. It begins by 
outlining certain aspects of the Scarman Report into the Brixton riots of 1981 (seminal 
event 1), bringing forward key themes identified by him as being of critical importance 
for the health of society. It progresses to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (seminal event 
2), highlighting by reference to the Inquiry that the critical issues identified by Lord 
Scarman had not been adequately addressed.  There is a brief examination of the Crime 
and Disorder Act (1998), which endeavoured to enshrine aspects of the Scarman and 
Macpherson recommendations into law. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 
began a series of inspections of police forces, and the chapter re-visits these to illustrate 
the political imperative of the time. The chapter examines the Race Relations 
(Amendment) Act (2000), and the BBC television programme The Secret Policeman 
(seminal event 3) linking the two through the Formal Investigation of Police Forces by 
the Commission for Racial Equality. The discussion then turns to the riots of 2001 in 
Oldham and Bradford (seminal event 4). The resulting Cantle Report is examined and 
recommendations and observations from this report are considered in light of the 
foregoing reports into the Brixton disorder and the murder of Stephen Lawrence. The 
narrative continues to 2005, and provides an account and analysis of some parts of the 
Government response to the suicide bombing of 7 July 2005 (seminal event 5). 
 
The chapter then examines the National Intelligence Model and Neighbourhood 
Policing. It demonstrates the intent behind these models, but exposes their weaknesses. 
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The critical question is: are they fit for purpose to counter threats of violent 
radicalisation and terrorism? The chapter concludes by identifying five common 
themes, which I call ‘critical success factors’, arising from the policy and legislative 
responses to the seminal events. These are revisited in Chapter Seven, where I test as 
part of the research how embedded they are in Greater Manchester Police and the 
theatre of the case study before discussing the findings in Chapter Eight. 
 
4.1 The Scarman Report: The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981 
 
The Scarman Report was produced at the behest of the Right Honourable William 
Whitelaw, then Home Secretary, using the powers vested in him by Section 32 of the 
Police Act 1964 “to appoint the Right Honourable Lord Scarman to inquire urgently 
into the serious disorder in Brixton on 10 to 12 April 1981 and to report, with the power 
to make recommendations.” 378 Seminal event 1, Chapter Two, outlines the key events 
and circumstances of this incident. The report was very wide ranging, and considered a 
rich variety of issues which cut across various areas of responsibility for public 
authorities. There follows an account of the key components of the Report, with some 
associated discussion. 
 
4.1.1 Policing: Proposals and Recommendations 
 
Scarman acknowledged that “the composition of our police forces must reflect the 
make-up of the society they serve”379 but he rejected the notion of a quota.380 He 
pointed out that the number of black police officers at the time fell a very long way 
short of representing the community being served. He therefore recommended that the 
Home Office, with Chief Officers of Police, with Police Authorities and representatives 
of ethnic minority communities conduct urgent research to find ways of improving 
ethnic minority recruitment and of involving ethnic minority groups in police-related 
activities.
381
 “The object of policy must be that the composition of the police fully 
reflects that of the society the police serve”.382 This begins to move the police towards 
being a much more inclusive agency than hitherto. Moving an agency such as the police 
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in this direction begins strongly to address notions of political isolation and non-identity 
with the polity, discussed as key drivers for disenfranchisement in Chapter Three. It 
may also serve to improve perceptions of social injustice. Scarman pointed out that 
racial prejudice cannot be wholly eliminated from the police so long as it is endemic in 
society,
383
 but he recognised the importance of a major institution like the police taking 
a lead and therefore he recommended that scientific means should be used nationally to 
identify evidence of racial prejudice.
384
 
 
Scarman alluded to the debate regarding ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ policing, saying: 
 
 
“Policing is, however, too complex a job to be viewed in terms of a simplistic 
dichotomy between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ policing styles. Community policing – which I 
understand to mean policing with the active consent and support of the community – 
is too important a concept to be treated as a slogan.”385  
 
 
He discussed the role of the ‘Home Beat Officer’, describing how they were considered 
as ‘hobby bobbies’ and that this notion must be absolutely rejected.386 He advanced the 
view that the Home Beat Officer must “be seen not as occupying the bottom of the 
police pecking order (after the CID and specialist units have creamed off the best), but 
at its apex, in the forefront of the police team”387 and that the role of Home Beat 
Officers should be examined to see how and in what ways it can be integrated into 
mainstream operational policing.
388
  He also proposed a mix of mobile and foot patrols 
because patrol cars have distanced the police from their communities,
389
 and he 
suggested that there ought to be the provision of opportunities for operational officers to 
get to know the community they are policing.
390
 This relates directly to the dilemma of 
integrating Neighbourhood Policing and patrol work, a feature of Neighbourhood 
Management and Neighbourhood Policing, discussed below. 
 
Apart from recommending statutory liaison committees and other appropriate 
consultative machinery, Scarman pointed out that “Community representatives must 
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seek to appreciate the difficulties (and dilemmas) of the police, and to avoid extravagant 
language or ill-informed criticism”.391 Scarman might have elaborated here; it is a little 
vague. There is a discussion about the roles consultation and accountability play in 
ensuring that the police in their operations and policies keep in touch with, and are 
responsible to, the community they police; Scarman also points out that “there is no 
satisfactory or sufficient link between accountability and consultation”.392 Specific 
suggestions as to how community representatives might appreciate the difficulties and 
dilemmas of the police might have helped.  Scarman concluded this section with an 
assertion that his approach to policing would be necessary as a response to modern 
social developments even without the presence of ethnic minorities in cities.
393
  
 
The following passage outlines Scarman’s view that social context and not merely 
policing must be addressed to resolve social deprivation. This serves to reinforce the 
position adopted in the preceding chapter that social conditions are crucial indicators of 
social protest: 
 
“The police do not create social deprivation, though unimaginative, inflexible 
policing can make the tensions which deprivation engenders worse. Conversely, 
while good policing can help diminish tension and avoid disorder, it cannot remove 
the causes of social stress where these are to be found, as those in Brixton and 
elsewhere are, deeply embedded in fundamental economic and social conditions. Any 
attempt to resolve the circumstances from which the disorders of this year sprang 
cannot therefore be limited to recommendations about policing but must embrace the 
wider social context in which policing is carried out.”394 
 
 
4.1.2 Social Reconstruction 
 
Although acknowledging the difficulty in a judge commenting about Government social 
policy, Scarman saw it as his duty, since the issues were so inextricably linked with 
social policy. He advanced this duty by examining problems of the inner city. He 
suggested that the failure to tackle inner city problems over the previous three decades 
were linked to a “lack of an effective coordinated approach…between central and local 
government”.395 He further identified two further important aspects. Firstly, that local 
communities should be more fully involved in the decisions that affect them – in 
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planning, provision of local services and in the management and financing of specific 
projects. Secondly, there appeared to Scarman to be a deficiency in the extent to which 
the private sector – for example, banks and building societies – were involved in the 
process of inner city regeneration. These two threads are very interesting: they 
summarise a number of key themes which are being pushed forwards today. These 
themes aim to give communities a greater say in how and what services are delivered; 
they describe much better partnership arrangements, involving private and public sector, 
and they now bring together arguments from other agendas, including Neighbourhood 
Policing and Neighbourhood Improvement. They should be specifically examined and 
seen in the context of our present-day plural society, with an emphasis on ethnic and 
religious minority groups. 
 
4.1.3 Ethnic minorities and community participation 
  
Scarman pointed out that inner city problems should not be equated with those of ethnic 
minority groups: problems of inner city decline were much wider; ethnic minorities 
though tend to suffer the same problems as the rest of the population, only more 
severely.
396
 He identified three areas of disadvantage which particularly affected ethnic 
minority groups – (a) Housing; (b) Education; and (c) Employment. This should be 
compared with the situation in 2001 ahead of the Oldham and Bradford riots – see 
seminal event 4:  in essence, a very similar set of social circumstances, despite the 
intervening gap of twenty years. 
 
Scarman identified housing as a specific area where community participation was 
needed, and he described an example where management had been devolved down to 
neighbourhood level.
397
 The following extract is especially relevant to the policing 
debate:  
 
“The police are involved together with other agencies in the development of a team 
response to problems – such as vandalism – on the estate. Local residents, and the 
local police, have much to contribute not only to management but to re-
development.”398  
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This goes right to the heart of the Neighbourhood Policing, Neighbourhood 
Management, and partnership agendas of today. It has taken a quarter of a century fully 
to articulate this as good practice in tackling local issues. 
 
On education, Scarman stated that “It is essential, therefore, that children should leave 
school able to speak, read and write effectively in the language of British society, i.e. 
English.”399 Scarman stresses the value of police involvement in schools, within 
reason.
400
 
 
The Scarman report points out that the weight of unemployment falls disproportionately 
heavily on black people. The report quotes a Home Affairs Committee “Asians and 
West Indians continue to be at a substantial disadvantage in employment long after their 
arrival in Britain and their children may also suffer substantial disadvantage in this 
respect”.401 He discussed the need for “speedy action if we are to avoid the perpetuation 
in this country of an economically dispossessed black population”.402 Data from various 
sources, discussed in Chapter Two, provide compelling evidence that British society 
has, in fact, reached this point with respect to South Asian, principally Muslim, 
communities. Scarman also contemplates the idea of young people being encouraged to 
participate in projects to regenerate the inner city. Although he does not specify, the 
implication is that the people to whom he refers are currently unemployed, and he 
therefore achieves two goals: regeneration and gainful (albeit unpaid) employment. The 
lack of an incentive in this situation remains unaddressed.  
 
The report introduces an important concept at this juncture. It discusses the notion of 
monitoring. Scarman specifically endorsed the Home Affairs Select Committee 
proposal for improving the extent of the information available about ethnic minority 
needs, including ethnic monitoring by local authorities of the services they provide.
403
 
This was later made mandatory by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, 
discussed below, twenty years after the Scarman report was published. The progress 
made by public authorities in the field of race relations had been too slow. 
 
The following quote is interesting and relevant to the overall discussion: 
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“There are already signs among some black youths, despairing of an end to white 
discrimination, of a disturbing trend towards a total rejection of white society and the 
development of black separatist philosophies”.404  
 
 
The use of this language in this context resonates strongly with the causal models of 
terrorism discussed in section 3.1 of Chapter Three.  
 
Scarman raised some important points regarding the Community Relations Councils 
(CRCs) and the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE). He felt that they should be at 
the heart of attempts to foster a harmonious multi-racial society, and that they 
experience tension between their role in fostering good community relations, keeping a 
dialogue going with the authorities on the one hand, whilst not losing credibility with 
ethnic minority groups on the other. He listed the following criticism of CRCs: 
 
i. Some appear to have a tendency to act purely as a special interest lobby for 
minority groups; 
ii. Some are too readily influenced by extreme political views; 
iii. Many too often expect to be the sole channel of contact and communication 
between the ethnic minorities and official bodies. 
405
 
 
These are interesting because it is possible these problems have persisted with Race 
Equality Councils – and even other meeting centres like Mosques. It is an issue worthy 
of further examination but is beyond the scope of this work. 
 
4.1.4 The Role of the Media 
 
Lord Scarman addresses the role of the media, pointing out that they had a part to play 
in the copy-cat nature of some of the disorders,
406
 (see section 3.3, Chapter Three, for a 
discussion of this). Scarman steered clear of legislation controlling media reporting, but 
emphasised the need to ensure ‘balance’ and the importance of editors and producers 
assessing the likely impact on their reporting. He also pointed out the importance of not 
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perpetuating a label for an area. Always focusing on the problems and difficulties rather 
than the good prevents regeneration and improvement. 
407
 
 
During this brief journey through relevant aspects of the Scarman report, I have drawn 
out certain themes identified by Scarman as being important to the health and well-
being of society. He identifies these things during his inquiry into the tremendous and 
riotous upheaval that occurred in Brixton and elsewhere, and provides a ‘roadmap’ for 
society, including the police and other public agencies, in order to minimise the risk of 
further trouble in the future. These themes remain relevant today, and I present data in 
section 7.2 of Chapter Seven regarding the success of Greater Manchester Police in 
delivering them; I discuss the findings in section 8.1 of Chapter Eight. 
 
4.2 The Stephen Lawrence Enquiry 
 
Stephen Lawrence was murdered on 22 April 1993, and the incident is described in 
seminal event 2, Chapter Two. The subsequent enquiry was ordered by the Home 
Secretary, The Right Honourable Jack Straw MP, in July 1997. The enquiry arose in 
large part because “prolonged police investigations, in two distinct phases, produced no 
witnesses other than Mr Brooks [Stephen Lawrence’s friend] who could properly 
purport to identify any of the attackers” and “sound evidence against the prime suspects, 
or against anybody else, is conspicuous by its absence”.408  Further, “three of the prime 
suspects were taken to trial in 1996 in a private prosecution which failed because of the 
absence of any firm and sustainable evidence.”409 As a result, Mr and Mrs Lawrence, 
Stephen’s parents, applied for a judicial review into the death of their son. 
 
The enquiry reported in February 1999, nearly two years after the Home Secretary had 
asked Sir William to enquire into the matter. The enquiry was extremely thorough, and 
examined records, statements, evidence and cross-examined witnesses and police 
officers involved in the investigation. It makes for depressing reading: the errors were 
significant, fundamental and ultimately extremely damaging, not only for the 
Metropolitan Police but also for the police service in general. The report contains 
numerous references to poor understanding of race and community relations amongst 
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officers dealing with the incident. It also discusses racism and discrimination, and 
provides a definition of ‘institutional racism’: 
 
 
“The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional 
service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. It can be seen or 
detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination 
through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which 
disadvantage minority ethnic people. It persists because of the failure of the 
organisation openly and adequately to recognise and address its existence and causes 
by policy, example and leadership. Without recognition and action to eliminate such 
racism it can prevail as part of the ethos or culture of the organisation. It is a 
corrosive disease.” 410 
 
 
The next paragraph points out that “if such racism infests the police its elimination can 
only be achieved ‘by means of a fully developed partnership approach in which the 
police service works jointly with the ethnic minority communities. How else can mutual 
confidence and trust be reached?’” 411 This paragraph highlights the importance 
Macpherson attached to effective community engagement and partnership working, 
especially as it applied to eliminating racism and promoting trust in the police.  
 
Central to the current theme of this chapter is to demonstrate the links between the 
Stephen Lawrence Inquiry report, and the Scarman Report. It is also important to 
remember that that the Lawrence murder was 12 years after Brixton, and that there were 
other race-related urban disorders in the intervening years. Macpherson makes the 
connection with Scarman very early on, quoting him thus: 
 
‘“The evidence which I have received, the effect of which I have outlined…, leaves 
no doubt in my mind that racial disadvantage is a fact of current British life… . 
Urgent action is needed if it is not to become an endemic, ineradicable disease 
threatening the very survival of our society… racial disadvantage and its nasty 
associate racial discrimination, have not yet been eliminated. They poison minds and 
attitudes; they are, as long as they remain, and will continue to be a potent factor of 
unrest”. 
 
It is a sad reflection upon the intervening years that in 1998-99 those extracted words 
have remained relevant throughout both parts of our Inquiry.’ 412 
 
                                                 
410
 Ibid para 6.34 
411
 Ibid para 6.35 
412
 Ibid para 2.20 
 125 
 
This passage is of critical importance. Firstly, it demonstrates that the issues identified 
by Scarman had persisted, despite his highlighting them, and despite much apparent 
political pressure at the time to endeavour to move public authorities like the police, and 
indeed wider society, on. Secondly, it paves the way for further evidence of our 
collective failure to cure the disease. The previous chapter demonstrates that social 
protest may not be restricted to riots and urban disorder; radicalisation and terrorism are 
also branches of protest.  
 
Aspects of the Lawrence Inquiry Report contrast fairly strongly with Lord Scarman’s 
report. In paragraph 6.32, Scarman makes a reference to ‘institutional racism’.  The 
paragraph explains Scarman’s view that the reluctance of public and private 
organisations to carry programmes which recognise and cater for the needs of minority 
groups owes more to the likelihood of a backlash from the majority than it does from 
‘institutional racism’. [Though I would argue that, if the risk of a ‘majority’ backlash 
exists, then it is the responsibility of public agencies like the police to take the lead in 
tackling it, and that if they do not, then this in itself amounts to institutional racism.]  He 
recognises the phenomenon of institutional racism earlier on where he outlines a 
suggestion that ‘institutionally racist’ means “that practices may be adopted by public 
bodies as well as private individuals which are unwittingly discriminatory against black 
people” and that “this is an allegation which deserves serious consideration, and, where 
proved, swift remedy.” 413 He also says “The direction and policies of the Metropolitan 
Police are not racist”.414 Macpherson disagreed: 
 
“Given the central nature of the issue we feel that it is important at once to state our 
conclusions that institutional racism, within the terms of its description set out in 
Paragraph 6.34 above, exists both in the Metropolitan Police Service and in other 
Police Services and institutions countrywide.” 415 
 
Crucially, the report also states the following at Paragraph 6.54: 
 
“Racism, institutional or otherwise, is not the prerogative of the Police Service. It is 
clear that other agencies including for example those dealing with housing and 
education also suffer from the disease. If racism is to be eradicated there must be 
specific and coordinated action both from within agencies themselves and by society 
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at large, particularly through the educational system, from pre-primary school 
upwards and onwards.” 416 
 
 
This then demonstrates that Macpherson and his team believed that discrimination and 
racism, ‘institutional or otherwise’, existed in Britain in the late 1990s amongst key 
public agencies, and specifically the police. Not only did they show that matters had not 
improved since the Scarman report, they actually re-stated the problem in terms which 
painted a bleaker picture. As Scarman pointed out, “discrimination against black people 
– often hidden, sometimes unconscious – remain a major source of social tension and 
conflict” 417 and therefore British society in the late 1990s had a significant, previously 
identified yet unresolved problem: social tension and conflict brought about by 
discrimination and racism. 
 
What proposals did Macpherson advance to tackle this persistent problem? The 
following is a contraction of recommendations pertinent to the current discussion, with 
some commentary highlighting their relevance. 
418
 
 
Macpherson recommended that a Ministerial Priority be established for all Police 
Services: “To increase trust and confidence in policing amongst minority ethnic 
communities”. The process of implementing, monitoring and assessing the Ministerial 
Priority should include performance indicators in relation to inter alia the degree of 
multi-agency co-operation and information exchange; achieving equal satisfaction 
levels across all ethnic groups in public satisfaction surveys, and levels of recruitment, 
retention and progression of minority ethnic recruits. The links between these and the 
Crime and Disorder Act and Neighbourhood Policing, discussed below, are clear. The 
need to eliminate discrimination is based upon an understanding of the impact of 
perceptions of injustice. Eliminating racial discrimination became enshrined in law by 
the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, and is analysed in more detail, below. The 
overall aim of this series of recommendations is the elimination of racist prejudice and 
disadvantage and the demonstration of fairness in all aspects of policing. 
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Macpherson realised the importance of independent inspection of police services and 
decreed that Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary (HMIC) be granted full and 
unfettered powers and duties to inspect all parts of Police Services including the 
Metropolitan Police Service. This recommendation, now implemented, had and 
continues to have a powerful influence on the activity of police forces. Key HMIC 
inspections are examined below. 
 
Recommendation 17 identified that there should be close co-operation between Police 
Services and local Government and other agencies, including in particular Housing and 
Education Departments, to ensure that all information relating to racist incidents 
(discussed in further depth in Chapter Six) and crimes is shared and is readily available 
to all agencies. This relates to partnership work, and the application of ‘tension 
indicators’ which cuts across agencies, to assess levels of community tension. It also 
implies a responsibility on agencies to intervene and act where circumstances dictate. 
Later events in Oldham and Bradford strongly imply that this recommendation failed to 
be fully implemented. 
 
Recommendations 48 – 54 address issues of training in racism and valuing cultural 
diversity. Again, there is a clear link to Scarman, who advances his view as to the 
importance of training in community relations, and suggests that community 
representatives, especially those from ethnic minority communities, should be involved 
in that training.
419
 Specifically, Macpherson identifies that training courses should be 
designed and delivered in order to develop the full understanding that good community 
relations are essential to good policing and that a racist officer is an incompetent officer. 
All police officers, including CID and civilian staff, should be trained in racism 
awareness and valuing cultural diversity. Recommendation 50 of Macpherson reiterates 
Scarman’s view that local minority ethnic communities should be involved in such 
training. Clearly, there has been some organisational failure if Macpherson needed to re-
state this nearly two decades later. 
 
Macpherson also addressed recruitment and retention, recommending that policing 
plans should include targets for the recruitment and retention of ethnic minority staff.
420
 
Scarman presented this view in 1981: “I recommend that the Home Office….conduct an 
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urgent study of ways of improving ethnic minority recruitment into the regular 
police….” 421 
 
In 2005, a Home Office study was published which examined the impact on policing of 
the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry.
422
 Although it identified some ‘significant 
improvements’ in the relationships with minority communities,423  it said that “the roles 
of [community] liaison and beat officers were generally not integrated into mainstream 
policing.”424 Further, it stated that “BME research participants described mistrust of the 
police and an expectation of discrimination”, and “police tactics that focused activity on 
BME communities, particularly minority youth, were frequently experienced as 
provocative and discriminatory.”425 This has profound implications for the policy 
responses to radicalisation and terrorism, discussed below. 
 
The Scarman Report and the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry were published 18 years apart, 
yet as can be seen, there are a number of similar key themes emerging from both. These 
are the need to work more closely in partnership with other agencies; the need to 
monitor and prevent discrimination in the application of services; the need to recruit 
more people from ethnic minority groups into the police and the need to train staff more 
effectively in community relations and valuing cultural diversity. They are practical 
recommendations aimed at reducing discrimination, increasing perceptions of fair social 
justice, and improving perceptions of state legitimacy, factors which the preceding 
chapter - the review of academic literature - identified as being at the root not only of 
social unrest, but also radicalisation and terrorism. The repetitive nature of some of the 
recommendations of the two reports begins to demonstrate a failure by state authorities 
to provide appropriate services to certain cultural and minority ethnic groups. This 
failure contributes to low perceptions of fairness of social justice, and poor state 
legitimacy. I propose, based on arguments presented from the literature in the previous 
chapter, that these social and political factors set the stage for vulnerability to 
radicalisation and escalation towards violence.  
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4.3 The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
 
The Crime and Disorder Act set out to establish crime and disorder as a political 
imperative, firmly placing the new Labour Government at the forefront in the battle 
against crime, previously the preserve of the Conservative party. It led directly from 
Tony Blair’s ‘Tough on Crime, Tough on the Causes of Crime’: 
 
 
“On Crime, we believe in personal responsibility and in punishing crime, but also 
tackling its underlying causes – so, tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime, 
different from the Labour approach of the past and the Tory policy of today.”  426 
 
 
Amongst such things as parenting orders and Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, section 17 
of the Act introduced the statutory requirement for public agencies to work together: 
 
 
 “..it shall be the duty of each authority to which this section applies to exercise its 
various functions with due regard to the likely effect of the exercise of those 
functions on, and the need to do all that it reasonably can to prevent, crime and 
disorder in its area.’427 
 
 
 The ‘authorities’ include the Police Authority and local authorities, i.e. local councils. 
Further, sections 5 and 6 require the police, the councils, probation and health services, 
and other ‘responsible authorities’ to formulate and implement a three year strategy for 
crime and disorder reduction, following a review and analysis, and to “obtain the view 
of persons or bodies in the area”428 – in other words, consult. 
 
The enshrining of partnership work in this way not only begins to legitimise Alderson’s 
approach (discussed in the preceding chapter), but actually places it on a statutory 
footing. The notion of local authorities having to pay due regard to crime and disorder 
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was anathema – surely that is police business? The degree of adherence to this part of 
the Act varied – and varies – tremendously, both geographically and temporally.   
 
The Act also introduces a range of ‘racially aggravated’ offences. These, in general 
terms, are existing offences which are committed and at the time of commission, or 
immediately beforehand, the offender demonstrates hostility towards the victim based 
on the victim’s membership, or presumed membership, of a racial group. The 
introduction of these offences is a clumsy attempt at eliminating ‘hate’ related incidents, 
and endeavours to take a step along the road of community harmony and cohesion. It 
can be argued that the establishment of these racially aggravated offences under sections 
28-32 of the Crime and Disorder Act begin to enshrine in law the societal evolution 
recommended by Macpherson under paragraph 6.54, quoted above. 
 
Taken together, both of the above parts of the Act have roots which can be traced back 
to the disorder of the 1980s. Although based around crime and ‘anti-social’ behaviour, 
the statutory partnership work has clear links with Scarman - for example, in his 
suggestion that the failure to tackle inner city problems was linked to a “lack of an 
effective coordinated approach…between central and local government”429 and that 
local communities should be more fully involved in the decisions that effect them – in 
essence, consultation and engagement.
430
 
 
There are, of course, some difficulties with ‘partners’ working together. Organisations 
will have different performance indicators, different management structures, and 
different ‘layers’ to them. Communication within agencies is often fragmented; 
communication between partners is fraught with difficulty. Are these inhibitors inimical 
to achieving the very aims which spawned the partnership agenda in the first place? 
Whatever the answer to this hackneyed question, ‘partnership’ working is increasingly 
relied upon to deliver ‘community safety’, and whilst ‘community safety’ may mean 
nothing more than crime and disorder reduction to some,
431
 ‘community safety’ should 
clearly encompass issues relating to radicalisation and terrorism. The nature of 
organisations also varies – councils are subject to political inclination, and are likely to 
have an eye on the next round of elections in a way which the police and others such as 
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the probation service will not. On the other hand, this does make them responsive to 
public opinion in a way that police and other agencies tend not to be. 
 
4.4 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) Diversity Inspections 
 
In 1997, HMIC published the first of a trio of thematic inspections of police forces. The 
first, Winning the Race: Policing Plural Communities found that Community and Race 
Relations (CRR) was not at the core of police thinking but had edged to the periphery, 
and the report made twenty recommendations.
432
 Although phrased in a less 
authoritative manner, the links these recommendations have with Lord Scarman’s 
Report are self evident. For example, Recommendation 4.1 states: 
 
 
“Forces should publicly reaffirm their commitment to investing in good community 
and race relations as a core function of policing, this being reflected in the production 
of sound policies and strategies.”433 
 
 
Other recommendations talk of the importance of training, recruitment and retention in 
respect of police officers and staff from ethnic minority communities,
434
 and the 
importance of the community beat officer.
435
 These are all key themes upon which, as I 
have demonstrated, Scarman focused much attention. 
 
The second thematic, a follow-up inspection in 1999 entitled Winning the Race: 
Policing Plural Communities Revisited, found that little had changed and added a 
further six recommendations.
436
 Once again, the links with Scarman, and the need to re-
state recommendations from their first report, demonstrates a lack of progress by the 
police in learning key lessons for the effective delivery of policing services to ethnic 
minority communities. This lack of progress, set against the reported evidence in the 
Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, resulted in a third inspection in 2000, which uniquely 
involved all 43 police forces in England and Wales rather than the more usual 
representative sample. This third inspection, Winning the Race: Embracing Diversity, 
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set out to bench mark the 43 forces against the 26 recommendations of the previous 
thematic inspections.
437
 
 
The conclusions report a number of relevant points. Firstly, HMIC were pleased to 
record optimism that the police service was on the road to recovery following the 
disappointment of the earlier two inspections.
438
 But the report also stated: 
 
 
“The Service took significant strides forwards in the wake of The Scarman Report 
1981…Whilst some of the post-Scarman progress is still evident, much was allowed 
to ebb away…The gains in response to the thematics, the positive response to the 
organisational catharsis on the publication of The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry report, 
must not be allowed to evaporate in the same way.”439 
 
 
Progress was unsatisfactory and the Government legislated. 
 
4.5 Race Equality Legislation 
 
The Government attempted to combat racial discrimination through a series of Race 
Relations Acts. The first was in 1965, and this outlawed racial discrimination in certain 
places of public resort. The second Act in 1968 outlawed racial discrimination in 
employment, housing and commercial services. Considerable ongoing evidence of 
covert racial discrimination persisted, and the third Act was passed in 1976.
440
 Although 
the Acts considerably tightened the law in relation to discrimination on the grounds of 
race, they fell short of a statutory responsibility on public agencies to pro-actively tackle 
the problem. 
 
4.5.1 The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000
441
 
 
On 3 December 2001, the provisions of the above Act came into effect. It imposed a 
positive duty on public authorities to promote race equality. This meant that public 
                                                 
437
 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (2001) ‘Winning the Race: Embracing Diversity’ London: 
Home Office 
438
 Ibid, Executive Summary, para 30 
439
 Ibid, para 32 
440
 Pilkington (1984) Op cit p150 
441
 www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/34/enacted accessed 7/2/12 
 133 
authorities, including police forces (and police authorities, who are treated as a separate 
entity), must have due regard to the need to: 
 
a. Eliminate unlawful racial discrimination 
b. Promote equality of opportunity and 
c. Promote good relations between people of different racial groups442 
 
By May 2002, all forces were expected to have detailed plans in place demonstrating 
how they would meet these duties. Doing it correctly would ensure public authorities 
eradicated the ‘institutional racism’ first postulated by Lord Scarman, and later 
prosecuted by Macpherson. Much effort ensued, and police forces published Race 
Equality Schemes which laid out how they intended to meet the statutory duties. 
 
Unfortunately, progress was still very slow, and this was thrown into very sharp relief 
by Mark Daly, in his BBC programme The Secret Policeman as described in seminal 
event 3, Chapter Two. 
 
4.6 Commission for Racial Equality: Formal Investigation 
 
Immediately following the programme, there was a severe backlash both within and 
without the police service. Exactly how far had the police moved on? Were they 
complying with their statutory duties under Race Equality legislation? Had they learned 
anything from the previous causes celebres? 
 
On 30 October 2003, Trevor Phillips, Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality 
speaking at the Metropolitan Police Black Police Association’s AGM, announced a 
formal investigation of the police service in England and Wales. The sense of frustration 
of the panel of commissioners can be summed up in the introduction to the final report: 
 
 
“Policing in England and Wales must be among the most regulated and scrutinised of 
public services. In the field of racial equality, this has been reinforced by the Race 
Relations (Amendment) Act 2000. It should not now or in the future be necessary for 
external events, such as the tragedy of the murder of Stephen Lawrence, and its 
flawed investigation, or the BBC documentary The Secret Policeman, to happen 
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before real and measurable progress is made in an area which everyone concerned 
with its governance accepts as being one of the highest importance. Still less should it 
be necessary for the CRE, a small organisation that is responsible for racial equality 
throughout society, to become yet another permanent or semi-permanent, part of the 
actual governance of policing.”443 
 
 
The findings of the investigation were disappointing. Of fifteen forces investigated in an 
initial investigation, fourteen were found to be non-compliant with their statutory duties 
as defined under the Race Relations (Amendment) Act.
444
  Sir David Calvert-Smith QC 
commented: 
 
 
“Willingness to change at the top is not translating into action lower down, 
particularly in middle-management where you find the ice in the heart of the Police 
Service….”445 
 
 
 The report also identified a lack of joined-up governance and haphazard compliance 
with the statutory duty to eliminate racial discrimination and to promote equality of 
opportunity and good race relations. This was a pretty clear assessment that evolution 
by the police to embrace race equality and recognise the needs of minority groups in the 
community was sluggish at best and non-existent at worst.  
 
So far, I have examined legislative and policy responses to the first three seminal events 
described in Chapter Two, and demonstrated slow progress by the police in learning 
lessons from the past. I now consider the responses to seminal events 4 and 5. 
 
4.7 ‘The Cantle Report’ 
 
The Cantle Report was produced by the Community Cohesion Review Team, led by 
Ted Cantle, and was set up following the disorders in Bradford and Oldham in 2001, 
described in seminal event 4, Chapter Two. Its Terms of Reference state “to obtain the 
views of local communities, including young people, local authorities, voluntary and 
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faith organisations, in a number of representative multi-ethnic communities, on the 
issues that need to be addressed in developing confident, active communities and social 
cohesion.” 446 The contribution of the report is significant because it describes in a 
practical sense what earlier academic work (reviewed in Chapter Three)  had forecast. 
  
Before producing a list of 67 practical measures, to be addressed by a range of agencies, 
the team found a number of key issues relating to the question of social cohesion. In 
particular, they were struck by the depth of polarization in towns and cities.
447
 These 
included separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, 
employment, places of worship, social and cultural networks – all meaning that 
communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives.
448
 In an almost prescient 
portent of things to come, they outlined the risk in the following paragraph: 
 
 
“There is little wonder that the ignorance about each others’ communities can easily 
grow into fear; especially where this is exploited by extremist groups determined to 
undermine community harmony and foster divisions.” 449 
 
 
The notion that fearful and vulnerable communities can be exploited by extremist 
groups begins to pave the way for an understanding of how social division and 
community disharmony results in the risk of radicalisation and, ultimately, evolution to 
terrorism. They found that there was little evidence of attempts to resolve this problem, 
and “failure ran through most institutions…”450  
 
Cantle also finds evidence of the identity crisis, clearly illustrated as a key component 
of radicalisation-risk in the preceding chapter: 
 
 
 
“In such a climate, there has been little attempt to develop clear values which focus 
on what it means to be a citizen of a modern multi-racial Britain and many still look 
backwards to some supposedly halcyon days of a mono-cultural society, or 
alternatively look to their country of origin for some form of identity.” 451 
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Cantle and his team recognised that some communities felt particularly disadvantaged 
and that the lack of hope and the frustration borne out of poverty and deprivation 
created a fertile ground for disaffection to grow.
452
 Yet these communities were not 
always well targeted, nor even identified. This goes right to the heart of the issue – the 
failure to identify disadvantaged communities, the failure to develop mitigation action, 
the failure to heed warning signals – whether through ignorance, or through 
inappropriate structures and processes, allows perceptions of injustice and a sense of 
discrimination to grow. As these evolve into declining levels of state legitimacy and 
growing disaffection, so communities and ‘sub-communities’ (often male, often under 
thirty years, the general profile of those engaged in the riots of the 1980s, as well as the 
terrorist suicide missions of the new millennium) become vulnerable to radicalisation.   
 
The report is commendable in its determination to avoid ‘problematising’ any one group 
- making it clear that tackling poverty and disaffection should be seen as part of an 
equalities programme. This is of course partly because the unrest involved fights 
between whites and blacks – some white groups feeing that their needs were not always 
recognised.
453
  
 
The recommendations relating to policing cover such things as protocols between 
councils and police authorities to ensure criminality and tensions can be tackled on both 
sides robustly. They also talk of the value of ‘community policing’.454 In essence 
though, the recommendations are fairly superficial. They do not specify how a police 
team might identify problems, what they should do in response, and with whom. 
Neither do they mention the National Intelligence Model (although this was in its 
infancy at the time) nor the Crime and Disorder Act. The report does not have the scope 
to delve any deeper into the detail; the research aspect of this thesis will develop some 
of Cantle’s themes in more depth, and the resolution of the research objectives at 
section 8.2, Chapter Eight builds on the general recommendations of the Cantle report. 
 
There are two key aspects of the report which are noteworthy. The first is alluded to 
above – the manner in which the proposals and recommendations position themselves 
within the equality realm. The second one is the multi-agency nature of the 
recommendations. It clearly articulates a partnership stance in resolving the problem. A 
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central tenet of the Cantle report is the need to promote community cohesion, and 
establish a greater sense of citizenship.  ‘Community Cohesion’ became a focal point of 
action and discussion, further enhanced by the publication of the ministerial report 
chaired by John Denham MP.
455
 The Ministerial Group stated: 
 
 
“There are no easy answers or quick fixes to the deep fracturing of communities on 
racial, generational and religious lines now evident in parts of Bradford, Burnley and 
Oldham. The causes are multi-layered and complex, and tackling them will require 
sustained effort, over several years, across Government working in partnership with 
local agencies and people….The development of effective policy responses must be 
truly inclusive, involving all sections of all communities.” 456 
 
 
 
They also made the link with terrorism: 
 
 
 
“The importance of our work has been underlined by the terrorist attacks on New 
York and Washington DC on 11 September and the consequent rise in racial incidents 
and community tensions.” 457 
 
 
Some of the work identified by Cantle as being essential to building a cohesive 
community was articulated by the Local Government Association.
458
 They provided a 
report designed to assist local authorities and their partners in strengthening and 
building community cohesion – and addressed such issues as housing, community and 
political leadership, employment and the value of local strategic partnerships. A 
Government department, Communities and Local Government, was established in 2001 
under the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; it was re-branded in May 2006 and Ruth 
Kelly became the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. Her 
successor, Hazel Blears, announced an investment plan to promote cohesion and tackle 
community tensions.
459
 There is still much energy behind the concept. 
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4.8 Assessing the Risk of Serious Public Disorder 
 
In 1999, HMIC published a thematic report called ‘Keeping the Peace: Policing 
Disorder’.460 It specifically addresses the issue of tension indicators, and refers to Home 
Office Circular 39/1982, discussed in Chapter Three. Much of this is therefore repetitive 
– a case of going over old ground from nearly two decades earlier, as well as confirming 
academic work done following urban disorder in 1960s America – also reviewed in 
Chapter Three. It is perhaps surprising then that one of the issues arising from the unrest 
in 2001 is, once again, the question of tension indicators, and how they might be used to 
forecast the likely occurrence of public disorder.
461
 Four tension indicators in particular 
were identified as being a pre-cursor to the violence in 2001. These were a rise in racist 
attacks, a rise in racist graffiti, a rise in racist activity on the Internet and a rise in the 
activities of the Far Right.
462
 Much was made of the value of community intelligence 
and the need to ensure suitable analysis methods in conjunction with strong partnership 
work involving many agencies and people from the community,
463
 and although the 
tenor tends to confirm in a practical sense the ‘ladder of escalation’ model proposed in 
Chapter Three, nowhere is the connection with radicalisation and terrorism made. It is 
perhaps significant that of the six episodes of serious urban disorder taking place 
between April and July 2001, two occurred in Bradford and one in Leeds.
464
 West 
Yorkshire was home to three of the four suicide bombers from July 7
th
. It is thus crucial 
to ensure that the police and other agencies are structured correctly to ensure they 
collect information and intelligence that forewarn of heightened risk, thus enabling 
mitigation action to be implemented. 
 
4.9 Responses to The London Transport Bombings 
 
The discussion turns now to the fifth seminal event described in Chapter Two. The 
London bombings mark a very significant occurrence in the context of policing the 
United Kingdom generally, and policing ethnic minority communities specifically, 
although it is fair to say that the evolution of the UK’s response to international 
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terrorism began prior to the incidents in London in 2005.
465
 This section examines a 
number of areas of relevance, though does not have sufficient capacity to micro-analyse 
each one. 
 
The British police service response to the threat of terrorism evolved during the last 
three decades, based initially around the threat from Irish Republican terrorism from the 
1970s and into the 1980s.
466
 Since early 2003, the United Kingdom has had a long-term 
strategy for countering international terrorism known within Government and to police 
services as CONTEST.
 467
 Its aim is to reduce the risk from international terrorism, so 
that people can go about their daily lives freely and with confidence.  The strategy is 
divided into four principal strands: Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare. The Prevent 
strand is the relevant strand for the purposes of the current discussion. It is concerned 
with tackling the radicalisation of individuals and aims to do this by (i) Tackling 
disadvantage and supporting reform - addressing structural problems in the UK and 
overseas that may contribute to radicalisation, such as inequalities and discrimination; 
(ii) Deterring those who facilitate terrorism and those who encourage others to become 
terrorists by changing the environment in which the extremists and those radicalising 
others can operate, and (iii) Engaging in the battle of ideas - challenging the ideologies 
that extremists believe can justify the use of violence, primarily by helping Muslims 
who wish to dispute these ideas to do so.
468
 
Underpinning this as a concept is the notion that ‘Communities Beat Terrorism’ – a 
much quoted mantra. Sir Ian Blair, Metropolitan Police Commissioner stated “It is not 
the police or the intelligence services that will defeat the terrorists, it is the 
communities. They must be our eyes and ears on the streets and tell us about their 
concerns.”469 He was supported by his Deputy, Paul Stephenson.470 Here lies a 
difficulty. On the one hand, it is essential to engage communities, and identify that 
certain communities – and in a general sense, Islamic communities – are more 
vulnerable than others to exploitation by extremists, intent on causing harm to the UK. 
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On the other hand, there is a pressing need to avoid stigmatising and further alienating a 
community, the likely outcome of which is only to increase their vulnerability to 
radicalisation. Is it, for example, sensible to employ this type of dogma: 
 
“…when will the Muslim community in this country accept an absolute, undeniable, 
total truth: that Islamic terrorism is THEIR problem? THEY own it. And it is THEIR 
duty to face it and eradicate it.” 471 
 
When one considers that this was from a former Metropolitan Police Commissioner, 
one may well question whether there has been much attention paid to the second part of 
the conundrum – i.e. the need to avoid stigmatising and alienating a given community.   
4.10 A Developed Understanding 
The British Government, security services and police forces commenced a journey in 
the aftermath of July 7 2005; a journey at break-neck speed to find a solution to the 
problem of so-called home grown terrorism. The Metropolitan Police reviewed and 
reorganised its structure, merging Special branch with the Anti-Terrorism Branch to 
form the Counter-Terrorism Command on October 2 2006.
472
 All police forces were 
tasked to develop a better understanding of Muslim Communities, to develop a ‘Rich 
Picture’.473 This included an assessment of potential meeting places, details of Mosques 
and bookshops – venues where groups may meet and become radicalised. This approach 
was (is) ‘run’ by Special Branch – more used to dealing with Irish Republican 
Terrorism where invisible means of intelligence gathering was crucial. The Government 
also established seven community-led working groups under the ‘Preventing Extremism 
Together’ (PET) initiative to develop practical recommendations for tackling violent 
extremism.
474
 They were asked to consider things such as engaging with young people, 
education, Muslim women, supporting regional and local initiatives and community 
actions, Imam training and accreditation, the role of Mosques as a resource for the 
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whole community, community security, and tackling extremism and radicalisation, and 
to report within six weeks using a budget of £10k. 64 recommendations were produced, 
27 for Government and 37 for Muslim communities.  
All of these measures were conceived and implemented extremely quickly and very 
soon after the events of July 2005. The potential for further marginalising Muslim 
communities can easily be seen in each of them. Using Special Branch to develop a 
better understanding of Muslim communities, even re-badged under a banner of 
‘Counter-terrorism command’, is fraught with danger (although a notable exception to 
this is the Muslim Contact Unit in the Metropolitan Police, which worked very hard to 
develop pioneering partnerships with challenging partnership groups
475
). Special Branch 
officers are renowned for, and skilled at, working in an undercover secretive manner; 
attributes which are not well suited for promoting an agenda requiring transparency and 
engagement. The PET initiative too has been described as a wasted opportunity in five 
key ways
476
: (i) it was rushed; (ii) the schedule was problematic – it coincided with 
Ramadan, betraying a telling lack of religious and cultural knowledge on the part of 
civil servants; (iii) question marks over the extent to which those Muslims engaged 
were qualified to represent their communities (there were no women, and very few 
people under the age of 50); (iv) accusations that the government  had set the PET 
agenda before the process had even begun; and (v) there has been very little follow-
through on the actions and the working groups have now disbanded. Other problems 
with this agenda included ‘Preventing Extremism Together – Places of Worship’477. 
This had the potential to stigmatise Islam even further.  ACPO agreed: “The focus on 
places of worship is unhelpful as it will lead to identification of faith, especially Islam, 
with terrorism.”478 I present data regarding the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ agenda, 
with some analytical discussion, in section 7.7.2 of Chapter Seven.  
4.11 The Legislative Framework 
It is a common course of events that when the United Kingdom experiences some 
seminal or momentous event, the Government of the day brings forward hastily 
prepared legislation, generally attempting, often in a clumsy manner, to prevent such an 
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incident happening again, and to be seen to be doing something positive. The response 
in this case was no exception, and continues today. The die had already been cast with 
the Terrorism Act 2000, which proscribes various terrorist organisations, enhancing the 
power of the police by providing them with greater powers to investigate terrorism; it 
also provides the police with the power to arrest a person whom the officer ‘reasonably 
suspects to be a terrorist’.479 Under this Act, it is a criminal offence to incite terrorism, 
and this has created clashes with civil liberties groups anxious to protect free speech as 
provided for under Articles 9 and 10 of the Human Rights Act (1998).
480
 
In response to September 11
th 
2001, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001 
became law in December of that year. Key features of this Act were the cutting-off of 
terrorist funding; ensuring cooperation and sharing of information to counter a terrorist 
threat between Government agencies and departments; streamlining appropriate 
immigration procedures; protecting the nuclear and aviation industries and a variety of 
other measures.
481
 The House of Lords found that Part IV (Immigration and Asylum) 
breached the European Commission on Human Rights (ECHR), with Lord Hoffman 
stating that “Terrorist violence, serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions of 
government or our existence as a civil community…The real threat to the life of the 
nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and 
political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these.”482 In many 
ways, this goes right to the heart of the problem with terrorism legislation. Ultimately, it 
represents a diminution of civil liberties, justified some might say owing to the threat 
the nation faces. However, the tightening of these liberties is a dangerous and slippery 
road – and aspects adversely affect, or might be perceived to adversely affect, members 
of minority ethnic communities. This further undermines perceptions of social justice 
and state legitimacy, contributing to the already fertile environment for the development 
of radicalisation and violent extremism.  
The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 followed. It introduced ‘control orders’ in two 
forms.
483
 The first, a strict form, requires the UK government to derogate from Article 5 
(Right to Liberty and Security) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); 
the second is less harsh and requires no such derogation. Control orders can be used to 
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restrict activities such as access to the internet, movement to or within certain areas and 
curfews.
484
 They are highly controversial because of the clash between them and the 
ECHR – inter alia Articles 5, 8 (Right to Privacy) 10 and 11 (Freedom of Association). 
They rest upon the civil standard of proof, (on the balance of probabilities), rather than 
the criminal (beyond reasonable doubt), and may be used for a suspected terrorist – i.e. 
someone who has yet to be charged or convicted of an offence. Although such measures 
may be justified, crucial to their legitimacy is the winning of hearts and minds of the 
public, in particular those sections that are most disenfranchised and most likely to be 
affected. 
On March 30 2006, the Terrorism Act received its Royal Assent. The Act was designed 
with a central aim of tackling those promoting extremist activities, and was intended to 
reform and extend previous counter-terrorist legislation to ensure that UK law 
enforcement agencies had the necessary powers to tackle the threat.
485
 Article 5 of the 
Council of Europe Convention on the prevention of Terrorism requires states to have an 
offence of ‘public provocation to commit a terrorist act’.486 Thus, it became an offence 
to glorify the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism. The Act also covers the 
dissemination of books and other publications, including material from the internet, 
which must be done for the purposes of encouraging or inducing a terrorist act.
487
 The 
Act came at a time of tremendous controversy over detention of suspects without 
charge. The Prime Minister, Tony Blair, suffered his first Commons defeat in his efforts 
to secure a period of 90 days detention-without-charge, on the advice of the 
Metropolitan Police.
488
 A compromise was reached on extending the period from 14 
days to 28 days. Civil rights groups were ‘heartened’ by this decision, and other 
concessions were achieved in the form of judicial review of the detention process.
489
 
This debate has raised its head again more recently, with the Home Secretary, Jacqui 
Smith, saying that the time is ‘now right’ to reconsider extending detention without 
charge and that the 28 day limit had already ‘been pushed’.490 
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Control orders, glorification and detention-without-charge are highly controversial 
aspects of these pieces of legislation. They provide significant power to the state and to 
state authorities such as the police, against a back drop of mistrust and perceived abuses 
of power, including domestic police errors and misjudgements like Forest Gate (the 
arrest of two Asian men, one of whom was shot, during a raid on 2 June 2006 when the 
police were acting on specific intelligence relating to the existence of a bomb; no 
evidence of any terrorist activity was found) to controversial foreign policy such as 
military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. Use of stop and search powers under 
section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 against a suspect profile (“we should not waste 
time searching old white ladies. It is going to be disproportionate. It is going to be 
young men, not exclusively, but it may be disproportionate when it comes to ethnic 
groups”491), and protocols such as Operation Kratos (‘Shoot to kill’) further undermine 
state and police legitimacy amongst ethnic minority communities.  
There was and there remains an energetic reaction to the bombings on London’s 
transport system which manifested itself in a variety of different ways. It might be 
argued that whilst the intent was good, the final product has unravelled, and Muslim 
communities and the Islamic faith have been further disenfranchised. The following, 
from Peter Clarke, Head of the Metropolitan Police’s counter-terrorism command,  must 
be at the forefront of all activity: “Counter terrorism is done with and for communities, 
not to communities”.492 
4.12 The Machinery of Local Policing Delivery 
 
This section examines the National Intelligence Model (NIM) and Neighbourhood 
Policing.
493
 It aims to provide an overview of what they are, and how they are intended 
to work. It builds on the background outlined in the second chapter, and completes the 
process of identifying the areas to which the primary data will be applied in order to 
answer the research question.  
 
                                                 
491
 Johnston I (2005), Chief Constable BTP, quoted in ‘Community engagement to counter terrorism’, 
Metropolitan Police Authority, Report 9, section 23, 26 January 2006 
492
 Clarke P (2007), Head of Counter-terrorism Command, Metropolitan Police, The Today Programme 
BBC Radio 4, 4 December 2007 
493
 For further discussion, see Maguire, M and John, T (2006) ‘Intelligence Led Policing, Managerialism 
and Community Engagement: Competing Priorities and the Role of the National Intelligence Model in the 
UK’ Policing and Society 6:1, pp67-85 
 145 
 
4.12.1 The National Intelligence Model 
The National Intelligence Model (NIM) is a business model for law enforcement and 
was adopted as policy by the Association of Chief Police Officers in 2000.
494
 NIM is 
concerned with the proactive deployment of resources to reduce the crime and disorder 
problems that are detrimental to the quality of life of communities.
495
 Forces underwent 
major restructuring and were allocated new resources to implement it; it became a 
requirement that NIM existed in all forces to national minimum standards by April 
2004. The model takes an intelligence-led approach to policing by identifying patterns 
of crime and intelligence, enabling a fundamental approach to problem solving in which 
resources can be tasked efficiently against an accurate understanding of crime and 
incident problems.
496
  It is intended to promote a cooperative approach to policing since 
many of the solutions to problems will require the participation of other agencies and 
bodies which is further strengthened with joint tasking and co-ordination processes.
497
 
NIM operates at three levels of policing: level 1: local crime and disorder, including 
anti-social behaviour. Level 1 policing activity is often handled through local 
Neighbourhood Policing teams. Level 2: cross-border issues affecting more than one 
Basic Command Unit (BCU) or affecting another force or regional crime activity. Level 
3: serious and organised crime usually operating on a national or international scale.
498
 
There are four foundations known as assets which underpin the NIM. They are 
knowledge assets, system assets, source assets and people assets. System assets include 
technological solutions and rules and policies governing their use, including security 
measures.
499
 Source assets might include ‘informants’ – Covert Human Intelligence 
Sources (CHIS), as well as other information from communities etc. People assets are 
structural in nature – intelligence managers, analysts, ACPO lead officers, for example. 
All of these parts contribute to the ‘intelligence product’. There are four types of 
intelligence product.
500
  They are (1) strategic assessments – giving an accurate 
overview of the current and long-term issues affecting the police force, BCU or region. 
They are used to set the control strategy and are based on the research and analysis of a 
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wide range of information sources.
501
 Information should not be restricted to criminal 
activity and criminals but should include material from a range of other sources, 
including external information on public perception, public satisfaction surveys, and 
health, welfare and education data. The control strategy sets the longer term priorities 
for crime prevention, intelligence and enforcement opportunities, but there is no 
mention here of community risk assessments which may fall outside public perception 
or consciousness. (2) Tactical assessments identify the shorter-term issues in a police 
force, BCU or region in accordance with the control strategy.
502
 The tactical assessment 
should be informed from a wide range of sources too, including records from police 
databases, and through Local Action Group (LAG) forums. It is a review of recent 
performance and actions set at previous meetings. (3) Target profiles are secured by the 
Tasking and Coordinating Group (T&CG – see below) and aim to secure a greater 
understanding of a person or group of people.
503
  (4)  Problem profiles, which aim to 
secure a greater understanding of established and emerging crime or incident series, 
priority locations and other identified high risk issues.
504
 
 
The T&CG is a decision making and resource management body.
505
 It sits at the three 
levels – level 1 (BCU), level 2 (force and regional), and level 3 (national). The Strategic 
Tasking and Coordination Group (ST&CG) – level 2 - consists of senior managers from 
across the force (some forces have introduced partner agencies at this level), and is 
chaired by either the Deputy Chief Constable or the Chief Constable. The group may sit 
as frequently as every six months with a three monthly interim review but any need to 
engage in a full strategic assessment at the quarterly review stage will be established. At 
level 1 sits the Tactical Tasking and Coordinating Group (TT&CG). This group meets 
once a fortnight, and prioritises intervention activity in accordance with the control 
strategy.
506
 It should avoid excessive responses to random events, and authorises tactical 
activity around four elements: crime or incident series, subjects, priority locations and 
other high risk issues. Terrorism falls into ‘other high risk issues’, and is not at the top 
of the list. To what degree is this failure to consider terrorism and related matters at the 
centre of the NIM contributing to the collective failure to mitigate risk? Clearly, the 
identification of potential radicalisation and terrorism risk fits well in this structure, but 
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the entire tenor of NIM is crime and anti-social behaviour-related. Application of the 
‘ladder of escalation’ model postulated in Chapter Three would enable strategic 
assessments at the macro level to determine the vulnerability of a given area, town or 
city. This would be at level 2/3 and might include problems of discrimination, poor 
housing, poor education and poverty, perhaps with higher levels of right wing activity 
and hate crime – a detailed environmental scan should reveal these issues. This begins 
to demonstrate the value of partners in the NIM process. At the tactical level, level 1, 
shorter-term issues such as activity between individuals, within a family, or the 
identification of ‘tension indicators’, as discussed in Chapter Three, would inform the 
tasking process. Once again, the benefit of involvement of partners is obvious, and it 
would include the third sector. This should ensure two things: firstly, true partner 
engagement would maximise the opportunity for intelligence and information gathering. 
Once these things entered the NIM process, and were properly analysed, the TT&CG 
would be able to identify resources and plans to mitigate the identified risk. The second 
reason why true partner engagement is critical then becomes apparent – the resolution 
or mitigation of the risk is unlikely to be solely within the gift of the police, and partner 
involvement at TT&CG would enable partner resources to be allocated. This might be 
important in relation to, for instance, access to training. At this point, the value, the 
centrality, of Neighbourhood Policing becomes obvious. Since NIM depends upon 
intelligence and information to work, there must be sufficient contact between the 
police and communities because without this contact there will be no intelligence or 
information flow. Other agencies who work closely with communities can obviously 
make an enormous contribution. I discuss a fundamental impediment to the effective 
operation of NIM in this arena at section 8.2.3, Chapter Eight. 
4.12.2 The Local ‘Beat Officer’ and Neighbourhood Policing 
“Neighbourhood Policing is an organisational strategy that allows the police, its 
partners and the public to work closely together to solve the problems of crime and 
disorder, and to improve neighbourhood conditions and feelings of security.” 507 
 
It has three fundamental requirements. Firstly, the consistent presence of dedicated 
neighbourhood teams capable of working with the community to establish and maintain 
control – to be visible, accessible, skilled, knowledgeable and familiar to the 
community; secondly, intelligence-led identification of community concerns – prompt, 
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effective, targeted action against those concerns; and thirdly, joint action and problem 
solving with the community and other local partners – to improve the local environment 
and quality of life within the community. Other government publications have set out a 
vision for policing which is accessible and responsive to citizen’s needs, and 
Neighbourhood Policing is seen as a key component.
508
 
 
The notion of ‘indicators’ are introduced to Neighbourhood Policing, albeit in a crime 
and anti-social behaviour context.  ‘Signal crimes’ are described as ‘any criminal 
incident that causes change in the public’s behaviour and/or beliefs about their 
security’509, whilst ‘signal disorder’ is described as an “act that breaches social order 
conventions and signifies the presence of other risks”, which can be social or physical in 
nature.
510
 Additionally, there are three types of priorities that can be dealt with in any 
neighbourhood. These are (1) Policing priorities – non-negotiable crimes and incidents 
that the Police Service has both a duty and responsibility to deal with (e.g. burglary, 
domestic violence); (2) Acute neighbourhood priorities – things that are important and 
serious to a small number of people, and confined to a small number of people (e.g. 
problem families, abusive behaviour); and (3) Chronic neighbourhood priorities – 
highly visible, low level issues that are witnessed by a large majority of the community 
(e.g. graffiti, criminal damage, fly-tipping).  
 
“Neighbourhood Policing establishes a regime for engaging with other agencies and the 
public in collaborative problem-solving mechanisms” and should recognise the 
contributions from volunteers, community advocates and the public.
511
 Collaborative 
problem solving should be within NIM processes, and it is a fundamental requirement 
for the success of Neighbourhood Policing that it is integrated with NIM. Indeed, 
“Neighbourhood Policing should be driven by information that has been rigorously 
analysed, and by the disciplines of multi-agency [my emphasis] tasking and co-
ordination at appropriate levels.”512 It requires the development of demographic and 
social data, and the development within the intelligence framework, of problem profiles 
identifying locations of greatest need and underlying problems. It also requires an 
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effective engagement strategy which should specifically address the needs of minority 
groups such as Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) communities.
513
 
 
A Neighbourhood Policing team should be selected using tough selection procedures, 
be specifically trained for the purpose and permanently deployed to a defined 
geographical area or community, which might include co-location with partners.
514
 
These types of criteria resonate strongly with the description of the Home Beat Officer 
described by Scarman (see section 4.1.1, above) and the community policing concept 
articulated by Alderson some three decades ago.
515
 Other key elements of 
neighbourhood teams are community support officers, a new phenomenon in the 
delivery of local policing. They work within Neighbourhood Policing teams and 
alongside neighbourhood police officers and special constables. 
 
As I demonstrated with the examination of the NIM (above), the essence of 
Neighbourhood Policing as presented by ACPO concerns crime and anti-social 
behaviour; radicalisation and terrorism do not feature. This is probably partly to do with 
temporal factors - the terrorist incidents of 2005 came largely after the concept of 
Neighbourhood Policing came to the fore. Another reason is more insidious. 
Neighbourhood Policing is about engaging with communities, providing them with an 
opportunity to identify their concerns, and working with them to resolve the problems.  
How many communities are likely to identify radicalisation and potential growth of 
terrorism as a problem within their midst? Since radicalisation and terrorism are 
conspicuous by their absence, (see section 3.1, Chapter Three for a discussion of the 
crime-terror nexus) it is worth conjecturing where in the Neighbourhood Policing model 
they might sit. It is argued in the preceding chapter that a ‘ladder of escalation’ can be 
postulated, within which radicalisation and terrorism exist. Whether or not these 
phenomena, and other related examples of ‘social protest’, can be identified by 
communities as policing priorities is arguable, because they are dependent upon other 
social variables. Examples of such variables include perceptions of social justice, 
discrimination and legitimacy, all examined from a theoretical point of view in Chapter 
Three. Declining levels of state legitimacy will militate against a given community 
working with the police, let alone identifying radicalisation as a policing priority. This 
presents a problem, and means that the police and their partners need to be pro-actively 
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looking for the signals – those signals discussed and elucidated in Chapter Three - and 
reacting accordingly. If they do not, the signs may well be missed, and no mitigation 
action taken.  
 
4.12.3 NIM and Neighbourhood Policing in Action 
 
The strategic assessment should include a consideration of issues that are of most 
concern to the community,
516
 thus ensuring the co-ordination of Neighbourhood 
Policing utilising the tasking and coordinating process described by NIM. Therefore 
strategic tasking and coordinating meetings should include a representative of each 
organisation with the authority to direct activity in their own organisation and to commit 
appropriate resources.
517
 Similarly, tactical tasking groups should be attended by 
representatives of the various agencies who can commit resources at a tactical level. 
Indeed, “the chairs of strategic and tactical T&CG can be from any partner 
organisation.”518  
 
An essential element of neighbourhood coordination is a neighbourhood profile, a 
descriptive product which brings together information from a wide range of publicly 
available sources.
519
 It can contain demographic information, levels of deprivation and 
other factors, crime and disorder levels etc, and it should be updated every three to six 
months, widely accessible and used to create the strategic assessment. Clearly, in the 
determination of the risk of a given community to radicalisation and growth of violent 
extremism, this is a crucial aspect of the assessment process, and needs to be considered 
with conscious thought as to the existence of the risk. 
 
Problematic issues in neighbourhoods should be subject to a neighbourhood problem 
solving plan, which should include details of the owner and representatives of partner 
organisations.
520
 In appropriate cases, these plans feed into the tactical tasking and 
coordinating groups and onwards to the strategic assessment if they are of such 
prominence that they might influence strategic decision making. Such issues would be 
supported by community intelligence, created when information from the community 
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has been subject to evaluation and risk assessment.
521
 This information might include 
patterns of crime and disorder, changes in tension between different communities or 
within the same community, and therefore is likely to also include specific information 
relating to the growth of ‘anti-western’ or ‘anti-American’ graffiti or similar signals in a 
given area, the growth of extremist activity, or one-dimensional media reporting – those 
‘indicators’ discussed in Chapter Three which forewarn of the escalating risk. Guidance 
on these issues is, once again, conspicuous by its absence. The challenge is two-fold – 
firstly, the recognition of these signs and thus their evaluation and assessment; and 
secondly, the understanding of what they might signify. 
 
4.13 Summary and five ‘Critical Success Factors’ 
 
Despite the government legislating, and despite the seminal policing mistakes 
exemplified by Lawrence, progress by the police service in the area of race and 
community relations was woefully slow, and other agencies little better. I propose that 
the lack of progress by such a significant agent within the social framework of the UK 
is indicative of the failure of wider British society and governmental social policy to 
recognise and respond to the needs of minority communities and that, moreover, this 
has contributed to the disenfranchised feeling amongst young black people and Asians. 
This has contributed to the risk not only of  race riots but also to the development of 
harmful radicalisation and the desire, in some cases, to attack Britain through the use of 
terror. 
 
To ensure counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation are seen as core business of 
police forces and Crime and Disorder Reduction partnerships, and to ensure that they 
are fully sited within the NIM, notwithstanding the fact that NIM was primarily 
developed as a model to deal with crime and disorder, the starting point is the strategic 
assessment. Properly using Neighbourhood Policing at the tactical level should follow 
on from this process. Tactical tasking and Neighbourhood Policing in their pure form 
should permit true partnership responses to mitigate risk. The obstacles are these: 
firstly, that NIM and Neighbourhood Policing have been developed with crime and 
disorder at their core, not radicalisation, violent extremism or terrorism. Are 
neighbourhood staff - which should include representatives from the police, other 
statutory partners, and the third sector - actively observing, seeking and collecting 
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information which will reliably inform the tactical and strategic assessment of a given 
locality, thus enabling effective mitigation response?  Secondly, Neighbourhood 
Policing, or neighbourhood management, are dependant upon communities identifying 
their priorities. Where radicalisation and terrorism are concerned, this may not be 
appropriate. Communities may not know that they are vulnerable, or, in severe cases, 
may choose to refuse to engage with public authorities – the disenfranchised may not 
consider the state to be legitimate. In these cases, a much more pro-active approach is 
required, capable of execution through Neighbourhood Policing and the NIM, but with 
innovative and challenging engagement of influential and possibly radical groups and 
individuals within communities. The third challenge is the level to which partners – 
statutory as well as third sector – are truly part of the tasking and coordinating structure. 
If this is not in place, then neither the information/intelligence gathering arm, nor the 
mitigation arm will be effective. 
 
In the examination of the legal and policy responses from the first four seminal events, 
certain key themes emerge which pertain directly to policing and police organisations. 
These might be termed ‘critical success factors’, since successful delivery of them 
optimises the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of minority and disenfranchised 
groups, thereby minimising the risk of adverse social protest. They can be summarised 
as follows: 
 
 The need to work in partnership with other agencies, especially education and 
housing departments. 
 
 The police organisation needs to strive to reflect the community it serves, and 
the recruitment, retention and promotion of ethnic minority staff is a crucial part 
of this. 
 
 Community representatives should be involved in training, especially 
community awareness training. 
 
 The local ‘beat officer’ or Neighbourhood Policing team has a vital role and 
must attract officers of high calibre. 
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 Police organisations must work towards the elimination of racial discrimination 
of all types, and contribute towards the development of cohesive communities. 
 
These factors are revisited in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, where they are 
contextualised within the theatre of the case-study, reality-checked, and conclusions 
drawn.  
 
The following chapter describes methodology which takes the foundationalist 
arguments from Chapter Three and the realist responses critically examined above into 
the theatre of the case study, testing the ‘common roots’ hypothesis and examining 
whether the National Intelligence Model and Neighbourhood Policing are actually 
capable of identifying and mitigating threat in the real world. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
 
 
 
Research Methodology 
 
 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
The previous four chapters have outlined the nature of the research question, and 
focused thought on potential failings of public authority policy in general, and police 
policy in particular. They describe and argue that social conditions might be seen to 
fertilise the growth of radicalisation and so-called ‘home grown’ terrorism. Chapter 
Three proposes a link between social pre-conditions and ‘social protest’, offering a 
model called a ‘ladder of escalation’, and the chapter concludes with a series of 
questions which are distilled from the review of relevant literature. The questions are: 
 
 How can state authorities, particularly the police, use the ‘common roots’ theory 
to identify communities which might be vulnerable to radicalisation and 
subsequent progression to terrorism? 
 
 Does a ‘ladder of escalation’ provide an additional mechanism whereby peaceful 
forms of social or political activity can be used to forewarn, in the medium to 
longer term, of  the potential for radicalisation and terrorism amongst some 
communities? 
 
 To what degree can ‘tension indicators’, developed after the urban riots in the 
UK, be adapted to forewarn of the growth of radicalisation and terrorists within 
a given community? 
 
 Is the National Intelligence Model, principally developed to tackle crime, 
capable of identifying radicalisation and terrorism risk factors, using the 
foregoing mechanisms, and developing appropriate partnership intervention 
strategy? 
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 What role does ‘Neighbourhood Policing’ play, and can a ‘toolkit’ be developed 
which enables local officers to assist in the identification of vulnerable 
communities? 
 
 What relevance does the ‘social pre-conditions’ idea have to the current rise in 
gang related activity and the growth in radicalisation linked to Islam? 
 
Chapter Four outlines policy responses to key causes celebres that occurred over the 
years 1981 to 2005. In so doing, it identifies a number of key themes, which I called 
‘critical success factors’, and I argue that successful delivery of them optimises the 
legitimacy of the police in the eyes of minority and disenfranchised groups, thus  
minimising the risk of adverse social protest. As already outlined, these factors are: 
 
 The need to work in partnership with other agencies, especially education and 
housing departments. 
 
 The police organisation needs to strive to reflect the community it serves, and 
the recruitment, retention and promotion of ethnic minority staff is a crucial part 
of this. 
 
 Community representatives should be involved in training, especially 
community awareness training. 
 
 The local ‘beat officer’ or Neighbourhood Policing team has a vital role and 
must attract officers of high calibre. 
 
 Police organisations must work towards the elimination of racial discrimination 
of all types, and contribute towards the development of cohesive communities. 
 
The research methodology outlined in this chapter provides a means to deal with these 
questions and issues, and others, thereby facilitating the achievement of each of the 
objectives for the research identified in section 1.3.1, Chapter One.  
 
The chapter is divided into six sections. It begins with a discussion of the philosophy of 
science and research, examining ontological and epistemological issues. It establishes 
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the critical realism stance of the thesis and discusses the search for objective reality, or 
the ‘truth’, and therefore the rationale for the choice of qualitative methodology.  The 
second section discusses reliability, validity, triangulation and bias, with particular 
reference to the impact on the research of my position as a researcher on the one hand, 
and a professional police officer on the other. The third section specifies and critically 
discusses the nature of the qualitative method; it includes a resume of ethical issues. The 
fourth section is a rationale for the choice of the fieldwork site, emphasising the 
diversity and history of the area. Section five discusses analytical issues, whilst the final 
section outlines some of the practical lessons learned in conducting fieldwork of this 
nature. 
 
5.1.1 Belief and Knowledge: Ontological and Epistemological Orientation 
 
 
“Each social scientist’s orientation to their subject is shaped by their ontological and 
epistemological position….Most often, these positions are implicit rather than 
explicit, but, regardless of whether they are acknowledged, they shape the approach 
to theory and the methods which the social scientist utilises.”522  
 
 
Recognising and acknowledging one’s own ontological and epistemological position is 
important for two critical reasons: firstly, to be able to defend them against critiques 
from other, perhaps opposing, positions and, secondly, to inform the nature and journey 
the research takes as it evolves from conception through analysis to conclusion.  
Ontological questions deal with the very nature of ‘being’.523 The key question is 
whether there is a ‘real’ world ‘out there’ that is independent of our knowledge of it. 
What might the ontological position be in relation to this thesis? In both Chapters Two 
and Three, I have posited the notion that discrimination and state failure have 
contributed to the growth of radicalisation and violent extremism. I argue that this is 
linked to poor economic opportunity and segregation amongst minority communities. 
The hypothesis I advance therefore is that ethnic minorities are disadvantaged and 
discriminated against by state authorities and indeed wider society, and this 
disenfranchisement contributes to the risk and growth of violent radicalisation.  These 
problems are reflected nationally across many (all?) ethnic minority groups, and exist 
independently of our knowledge of them. However, I also suggest that there are deep 
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relationships which cut across time and space which are not directly observable.  The 
religion of Islam and the wider context of Muslim oppression come together to make 
Islamic communities (principally Asian) particularly vulnerable to this insidious 
problem. The ontological position this thesis adopts, which is implicit in the foregoing 
chapters, is therefore foundationalist, i.e. there is a ‘real’ world out there which exists 
independently of our knowledge of it. 
 
An epistemology reflects a researcher’s view of what we can know about the world, 
literally, an epistemology is a theory of knowledge.
524
  There are two key questions. 
Firstly, can an observer identify ‘real’ and tangible relations between social phenomena, 
and if so, how?  An interpretist might argue that no observer can be ‘objective’ because 
they live in the social world and are affected by social constructions of ‘reality’. This is 
known as the double-hermeneutic: the world is interpreted by the actors (one 
hermeneutic level) and their interpretation is interpreted by the observer (a second 
hermeneutic level).
525
 This is clearly of importance to the approach of this thesis, since 
it seeks interpretations of phenomena, and these interpretations will in turn be 
interpreted. The questions are these: does this render the interpretations, or responses, 
specious, or misguided? How useful are they? At first glance, it might appear to 
challenge the foundationalist ontological position because I have argued that solutions 
are sought based on the idea of a ‘real’ world; solutions which will ultimately resolve 
the social and political problem of disenfranchisement which has been described above. 
I identify that the thesis seeks interpretations of the phenomena, but here I suggest that 
they might also be considered as arenas: the view will be different depending upon 
where one sits, but the phenomenon still exists. In this way, the thesis will utilise 
interpretations of the phenomena, and since these will take varying perspectives, the 
reality of the issue will be illuminated. I discuss this in more detail in relation to 
triangulation, below, and relate it to overall findings in Chapter Seven. 
 
The second question is related. Is it possible, through direct observation, to establish the 
‘real’ relationship between social phenomena, or are there some relationships which 
simply exist but are not directly observable?  Specifically, the question is one of 
interpretist versus positivist versus realist positions. Positivists believe in an ontological 
and epistemological position which is foundationalist i.e. they believe that the world 
exists and is independent of our knowledge of it, and they aim to establish causal 
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relationships between social phenomena and therefore develop explanatory and even 
predictive models.
526
 Halfpenny (1982) describes various types of positivism, making 
the point that there are many different understandings of how the term ‘positivism’ is 
used.
527
  He identifies twelve positivisms, exposes their strengths and weaknesses, and 
demonstrates how introspective examination of positivism might lead towards realism, 
‘where the crucial features of science are thought of as manifestations of ontologically 
real structures and process which are only partly revealed to experience but which 
guarantee the objectivity of science.’528 Importantly, he discusses the leap from physical 
science to sociology, highlighting that “attempts to establish any sort of positivist 
hegemony in sociology have always faced [so many] numerous challenges that 
alternative understandings of the social world are more appropriate to the human nature 
of its subject matter”.529 In the context of this research, we are dealing with human 
subjects and social structures. Since these social structures and the human subjects are 
inextricably linked, Halfpenny’s warning is highly relevant, and the applicability of 
positivism in its pure form to this thesis is fatally flawed. 
 
The antithesis of positivism is the interpretist position. The interpretist tradition argues 
that the world is socially constructed and therefore does not exist independently of our 
knowledge of it.
530
 This stance leads to the double hermeneutic, discussed above. 
 
The realist is also foundationalist in ontological terms, however the tradition establishes 
that there are deep structural relationships between social phenomena which cannot be 
directly observed but which are essential for the explanation of behaviour. Roy Bhaskar 
was a philosopher who introduced the idea of realism as “a comprehensive alternative to 
the positivism which since the time of Hume has fashioned our image of science.”531 
His arguments are related to the world of physical science, and he describes ‘intransitive 
objects of knowledge’ – those things which would continue to occur even if man did not 
exist, such as the specific gravity of mercury, and ‘transitive objects’ – the artificially 
created models, methods and techniques available to scientific workers.
532
 The first is 
ontological in nature (being); the second epistemological (knowledge).  The arguments 
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developed by Bhaskar hold importance in the world of social science, a term itself 
which has some ontological emotion. Marsh and Furlong believe that “‘contemporary 
realism’ has been significantly influenced by the interpretist critique”.533 They describe 
this as ‘modern critical realism’, and suggest it acknowledges two points.534 The first is 
that while social phenomena exist independently of our interpretation of them, our 
interpretation affects outcomes.
535
 Here lies the solution to the apparent paradox I 
identify above: this thesis interprets interpretations, but this hermeneutic characteristic 
is permitted within the framework of realism modified by an interpretist aspect. Their 
second point is that our theory of the world is fallible – we need to “understand both the 
external ‘reality’ and the social construction of that ‘reality’ if we are to explain the 
relationships between social phenomena.”536 This has clear implications for the 
research, which has as its theatre social constructs, with human subjects an integral part 
of the overall framework. 
 
5.1.2 The Quest for ‘Truth’ 
 
In his preface to the second edition of his highly accessible book Method in Social 
Science, Andrew Sayer articulates the importance of implications of realist philosophy 
for method and is clear that “realism is a philosophy of and for the whole of the natural 
and social sciences”.537 Realism philosophy enters the realms of truth and concept and, 
in so doing, confronts the epistemology of positivist and interpretist traditions. What is 
the relationship between thought and the material world?  Describing our observation of 
‘facts’, or the ‘truth’ is inherently metaphorical; terminology such as ‘relationship 
between’ and ‘corresponds to’ demonstrates this problem. Moreover, the description is 
dependent upon a fallible conception of what the truth actually is, and “we can never 
justifiably claim to have discovered the absolute truth about matters of fact”.538 Sayer 
introduces an important substitute for the concept of ‘truth’ (he refers to it as a 
modification), and describes ‘practical adequacy’.539 This intellection acknowledges the 
fallibility of our knowledge of ‘truth’ and suggests that, in order to be ‘practically 
adequate’, “knowledge must generate expectations about the world which are actually 
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realized”540 and that “knowledge is useful where it is ‘practically adequate’ to the 
world”.541 This philosophical argument reinforces the position I adopt for the research – 
we are not aiming to establish absolute truth, the objective is to discover ‘practically 
adequate’ explanations which provide the opportunity to develop effective policy 
responses. 
 
Unsurprisingly, critiques of realism come from two quarters. Firstly, the positivists 
argue that positing the notion of unobservable social phenomena and relationships 
makes realism claims untestable and therefore unfalsifiable.
542
 In contrast, those from 
the interpretist tradition criticise the foundationalist ontological stance of realism, and 
therefore reject realist claims that structures exist which cause social action.
543
 I have 
negated these arguments to a significant degree because the conflation of aspects of the 
positivist and interpretist traditions found in modern critical realism deals with both 
challenges. The position has important methodological implications. Although it might 
be argued that it is impossible to combine realist and interpretist traditions because of 
their diametrically opposed ontological and epistemological positions, the approach 
intuitively makes sense, bringing with it as it does, the best parts of both philosophies. It 
paves the way for permitting discussion with human subjects about the social constructs 
which exist in the case study, described below. 
 
5.1.3 The Philosophical Case for Methodological Choice 
 
Thus, this corpus of thought, and the ontological and epistemological orientations begin 
to prescribe the nature of the research approach of the thesis – i.e. whether it should be 
quantitative, qualitative or a combination of the two.  A researcher from an interpretist 
tradition is concerned with understanding rather than explanation and therefore the 
tradition lends itself to qualitative evidence.
544
 Conversely, a positivist, looking for 
causal relationships will seek a more quantitative analysis and will want to produce 
‘objective’ findings. Since a realist believes that there are causal relationships, but there 
may also be social phenomena which are not so easily described, a qualitative or 
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quantitative approach might be utilised.  In order to obtain triangulation, some research 
programmes might adopt both, and they need not be seen as mutually exclusive.
545
  
 
The stance this thesis adopts is one of foundationalist ontology but anti-positivist 
epistemology, or, in other words, a critical realist position. Consequently, the primary 
methodological approach chosen for the research is qualitative, which is consistent with 
this philosophy. However, the data and analysis chapter, Chapter Seven, examines some 
quantitative data such as census information, numbers of police complaints, levels of 
hate crime and graffiti in order to quantitatively gauge and demonstrate casual 
relationships, which also sits comfortably within the critical realist tradition.  
 
In this way, the thesis acknowledges the ‘reality’ of the relationship between the police 
and the communities, the ‘reality’ of the concept of Neighbourhood Policing and the 
National Intelligence Model, but deals with perceptions of these things, or, more 
appropriately, considers them from various arenas; thus demonstrating the belief in the 
existence of the relationship but endeavouring to deduce the nature of that relationship 
through perception or interpretation. This is discussed in more depth in relation to 
‘triangulation’, below. 
 
 
5.2.1 Triangulation, Validity and Reliability 
 
These three concepts are linked to the hypothetical and arbitrary point of reference one 
adopts, and are themselves intricately interwoven. Positivists see no difference between 
the natural and social worlds and are therefore concerned with producing reliable 
measures of social life.
546
 Conversely, the interpretist who treats social reality as always 
in flux need not worry whether the research instrument measures accurately.
547
 But 
what do the terms mean? Kirk and Miller (1986) provide the following explanation in 
relation to validity and reliability: 
 
“A thermometer that shows the same reading of 82 degrees each time it is plunged 
into boiling water gives a reliable measurement. A second thermometer might give 
readings over a series of measurements that vary from around 100 degrees. The 
                                                 
545
 Read M and Marsh D (2002) ‘Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Methods’ in Marsh D and 
Stoker G (2002) op cit pp231-248 
546
 Silverman D (1993) ‘Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction’ 
London: Sage Publications Ltd pp145-146 
547
 Ibid p146 
 162 
second thermometer would be unreliable but relatively valid, whereas the first would 
be invalid but perfectly reliable”548 
 
 
They go on to describe three types of reliability. The third of these, synchronic 
reliability, the reliability of observations within the same time period, might be assessed 
through triangulation of methods,
549
 discussed below. 
 
Silverman quotes Hammersley (1990) to define validity: “By validity, I mean truth: 
interpreted as the extent to which an account accurately represents the social phenomena 
to which it refers.”550 The concept of ‘truth’ has already been discussed above.  Denzin 
and Lincoln are clear that “objective reality can never be reached.”551 It might be 
suggested that triangulation can make an experiment or research project more valid. For 
example, different methods might enable one to see whether the results corroborate one 
another.
552
 Flick asserts that “triangulation is less a strategy for validating results and 
procedures than an alternative to validation… which increases scope, depth, and 
consistency in methodological proceedings”.553 Triangulation is now examined in some 
detail to consider its contribution to both validity and reliability. 
 
 
“The concept of triangulation means that an issue of research is considered – or in a 
constructivist formulation is constituted – from (at least) two points….[it] includes 
researchers taking different perspectives on an issue under study or more generally in 
answering research questions. These perspectives can be substantiated by using 
several methods and/or in several theoretical approaches.” 554 
 
 
This generalisation of the concept of triangulation leaves it open to a number of 
interpretations.  
 
The combination of qualitative and quantitative method in accord with the critical realist 
philosophy offers some interesting possibilities for triangulation in this thesis. The aim 
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here might be to address aspects of the research question that the exclusive use of either 
one cannot cover, or to add validity to the findings of one method or the other.
555
 
However, this pre-supposes that a ‘fixed point’ represents some reality, and, as noted in 
the discussion concerning the concept of ‘truth’ above, this has important ontological 
and epistemological problems. This is summed up by Silverman: “..if you treat social 
reality as constructed in different ways in different contexts, then you cannot appeal to a 
single ‘phenomenon’ which all your data apparently represents”.556 The approach this 
thesis adopts is one of simplicity and rigour, and although the critical realist stance 
dictates that attempting to arrive at a more complete picture by using a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative method enjoys potential triangulation advantages, I suggest 
that a further project might be undertaken to complement this one as an alternative to 
combing two methodological approaches in this one project. However, some 
quantitative data is presented and discussed in Chapter Seven. 
 
Flick draws extensively on the writings of Denzin, and he describes four forms of 
triangulation.
557
 Data triangulation refers to the use of different sources of data as 
distinct from different methods. Investigator triangulation involves the use of different 
investigators to minimise biases emanating from an individual researchers. Theory 
triangulation, which involves testing varying theories against a fixed data set, 
supposedly preventing researchers from ignoring alternative explanations. The fourth 
form is triangulation of methods, both within-method and between-method, and this, 
claims Flick, was for Denzin above all to validate field research.
558
 Much discussion 
takes place about the role triangulation plays in terms of validity and reliability: does 
employing several methods increase reliability compared with employing just one 
method? 
 
In their introduction to The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, Denzin and 
Lincoln describe a crystallization process, where the tale is told from different points of 
view; there is no ‘correct’ telling of the event; a crystal is a prism, with multiple 
reflecting surfaces.
559
 The following passage sums up this conception, and successfully 
describes the basis upon which the research strategy of this thesis is built: 
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“Viewed as a crystalline form, as a montage, or as a creative performance around a 
central theme, triangulation as a form of, or alternative to, validity thus can be 
extended. Triangulation is the simultaneous display of multiple, refracted realities. 
Each of the metaphors “works” to create simultaneity rather than sequential or linear. 
Readers or audiences are then invited to explore competing versions of the context, to 
become immersed in and merge with new realities to comprehend.”560 
 
For the current thesis, this form of triangulation is introduced, using an intra-method 
approach. Semi-structured interviews are used for local staff and local police officers 
engaged in working with communities. This in itself provides triangulation – local 
authority employees will have a different perspective on the ‘phenomenon’ than local 
police officers. Interviewing people from the community themselves introduces a third 
dimension, and offers a third perspective on the ‘phenomenon’. These perspectives may 
indeed compete – and this is de facto important to the research. They contribute to the 
construction, or conceptualisation, of the form of the crystal.  
 
Triangulation is further introduced by using a participant observational method, 
working with local staff to assess how their interactions with communities actually 
work.  
 
The essence of this approach is not to seek an objective reality, but a deeper 
understanding of the issues. 
 
5.2.2 Bias and the ‘Insider’ 
 
The thesis endeavours to introduce triangulation into the research process in the manner 
above described. But how objective is this, given the researcher’s position as a 
professional police officer? What impact on the three perspectives might the 
professional position have? In the words of Bill Tupman “cops might just say what they 
think you want to hear.” 561 Similarly, how ‘honest’ will be members of communities, 
knowing they are speaking with a police officer? They may be fearful of incriminating 
themselves, especially since it has been asserted that the police represent agents of the 
state. These factors, coupled with the perceptions of social injustice to which the thesis 
has referred, may result in disengagement. 
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The ontological and epistemological orientation of the research project has been set out 
above.  This will have been influenced by the professional experience of the researcher. 
Since it has been established that objective reality is not sought, but a deeper 
understanding is, the impact of the researcher’s position begins to be mitigated. A 
different researcher may develop a modified crystal, but this is permissible within the 
critical realist tradition established for this project. Indeed, there may be advantages 
from the research point of view in being a police officer engaged in this type of 
research. Punch (1993) describes the police organisation as erecting “barriers against 
prying outsiders”, forming an “occupational culture which is solidaristic, and wary of 
non-initiates.”562 He suggests that prolonged participant observation is the most 
appropriate, if not the sole, method for penetrating the mine-field of social defences to 
reach the “inner reality of police work”.563 There is an alternative, articulated by John 
Alderson: “it is essential that the police research themselves.”564 The researcher’s 
position as a police officer may in fact grant access to parts of the organisation, and the 
thoughts of staff working within it, which are closed to outside researchers. Bishop 
(2005) also considers the insider/outsider issue in relation to indigenous settings.
565
 He 
discusses both sides of the argument – whether being an insider means easy access and 
the ability to ask more meaningful questions, or whether insiders are inherently biased 
or too close to the culture to ask critical questions.
566
 However, he goes on to assert that 
such understandings ignore the diversity and complexity that characterises indigenous 
people’s lives: age, class, gender, colour and education are among other variables which 
might impact upon the research relationship.
567
 In the context of the current research 
programme then, it is important to discuss and recognise the possibility of bias, and the 
impact of the researcher’s position, but they are far from fatal to the project, and indeed 
may offer some advantages. Careful construction and preparation of the interview 
schedule, with appropriate ethical standards will minimise adverse impact. 
 
5.3.1 The Qualitative Process 
As previously identified, this research project is founded upon a qualitative method, 
principally using a semi-structured interview approach. Using this tactic enables some 
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of the variables discussed above to be included (age, gender etc) as well as providing an 
opportunity to establish not only the ‘whats’ but also the ‘whys’ and ‘hows’.568 The goal 
is to explore a topic more openly and allow interviewees to express their opinions and 
ideas in their own words,
569
 and is in accord with the critical realist stance of the thesis. 
The research design might be described as ‘tight’, characterised by research which is 
based on clearly defined constructs and restricted to the investigation of particular 
relationships in familiar contexts
570
: the thesis has attempted to define the relationship 
between the police and ethnic and religious minority groups, providing evidence of its 
evolution over several decades. We now want to investigate the nature of that 
relationship, including the degree to which partner agencies are involved – in the guise 
of ‘Neighbourhood Policing’.  An approach of this nature makes it easier to compare 
and summarize data from different observations,
571
 building the crystal described above. 
Tighter designs are based on a clearly defined plan for ‘sampling’572 (see below). This is 
augmented by a short period of participant observation – working with local teams to 
observe the interaction with members of the community. This type of research has 
strong parallels with ethnographic interviewing: in depth, open ended and 
unstructured.
573
 Much of the data in participant observation comes from observation in 
the field.
574
  
 
The choice of interview subjects amongst the public agencies involved was based 
around who is appointed in the particular geographic area concerned. Key local staff – 
police officers, police community support officers, social workers, teachers and others 
with responsibilities in a specific and defined geographic area, or neighbourhood(s) 
were interviewed, and these have been triangulated with interviews of Asian and 
Muslim people living in the area concerned. This enables intended comparison,
575
 i.e. 
the views and perceptions of the participant groups are compared with each other, and 
judgements made as to whether these are case-specific or group-specific. Access to 
community members was facilitated largely through community advocacy groups such 
as Race Equality Partnerships and other gateways into the community, using a 
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‘snowball’ approach. This is discussed more fully below. It is then, a case study which 
permits the intensive analysis preferred in qualitative research.
576
 This approach poses 
the question of how representative are the findings across a wider area, or a different 
location; is it possible to generalise? The aim of this case study is not merely to 
describe it, or, in Stake’s terms, it is not an intrinsic case study, but rather the thesis 
aims to use it as an instrumental case study.
577
 Here, we are studying the case in depth 
in order to provide insight into the wider issue: “the case is of secondary interest, it 
plays a supportive role, and it facilitates our understanding of something else”578 – in 
this instance, we are aiming to use the case study to illuminate our understanding of 
how effective Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model are at 
anticipating radicalisation and developing mitigation strategies, not only on the stage of 
this case study but also in the wider theatre of police-community interaction. Whereas 
quantitative research normally achieves generalisation through statistical sampling 
techniques,
579
 the type of qualitative research undertaken here is built upon theoretical 
concepts established in preceding chapters, especially Chapter Three. To this end, 
theoretical sampling has been employed in this project to identify the case study. In the 
words of Mason: 
 
“theoretical sampling means selecting groups or categories to study on the basis of 
their relevance to your research questions, your theoretical position…and most 
importantly the explanation or account which you are developing. Theoretical 
sampling is concerned with constructing a sample…which is meaningful, because it 
builds in certain characteristics or criteria which help to develop and test your theory 
and explanation.” 580 
 
The case has been chosen on the basis of its potential ‘fit’ with the concepts developed 
earlier, principally in Chapter Three, namely that urban unrest, radicalisation and 
suicide terrorism have common roots which consist of inter alia perceptions of social 
injustice, discrimination, relative deprivation and a lack of political representation. In 
fact, the thesis extrapolates rather than generalises – it presents arguments in the final 
two chapters which demonstrate how the analysis “relates to things beyond the material 
at hand.” 581 The basis for extrapolation is established as being one of similarity: the 
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commonality between geographical areas of demographic, social and economic factors 
and the similarity of perceptions of the police through the media as discussed in Chapter 
Two, for example, are used to draw inferences about different locations.  
 
The rationale for the choice of the research site is examined in more detail in section 
5.4. It also raises the problem of representation amongst participants from the 
community. Here, the limiting factors are those of resources and time. Some decision 
has to be made about the number and the nature of the community members who will be 
interviewed. The thesis has majored on the theory of disenfranchised younger members 
of communities as being those most vulnerable to radicalisation processes which may 
lead to violence, and typically male members under the age of 35. This type of profile 
conforms to profiles of those engaged in violent unrest as well as those involved in 
suicide terrorist bombings, described in Chapter Three. It is therefore not unreasonable, 
given the above arguments and the ‘tight’ design of the research, to endeavour to 
engage community members who fit this profile as participants for the research. A 
‘snowball’ approach is adopted here, using a key initial interviewee to engage further 
participants.
582
 This approach is particularly important for ‘stigmatized’ groups, or those 
who engage in illicit behaviour.
583
 Although there is some subjectivity in the choice of 
case for this thesis, and indeed the choice of human subjects, any case might be chosen 
which has some typicality, but “leaning toward those that seem to offer opportunity to 
learn”.584 The choice of the research area is theoretically grounded,585 and is articulated 
below.  
 
In order to mitigate the effect of insider bias, and to promote the efficacy of the research 
design, a panel of independent community members drawn from students and others at 
Exeter Mosque were engaged to assist with the initial development of the questionnaire, 
a copy of which is attached at Appendix 1. A specific framework for this questionnaire 
was agreed; it needed to elicit information to assist with answering the research 
question, as well as testing the ladder of escalation hypothesis proposed in Chapter 
Three. Careful refinement followed, using initial pilot interviews with key individuals in 
the area of the case study: senior representatives from the agencies involved, and 
individuals from the communities in question. These included local leaders of 
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community groups, head teachers, and other senior personnel. The questionnaires were 
then fixed. In total, 41 people were interviewed, and of these, half were community 
members in the sense that they were not employed by any state agency. The quest for 
new information began to draw to a natural close as the number of interviews increased; 
discovery of new themes and thoughts began to dry up; the point of theoretical 
saturation appeared to have been reached.
586
 
 
The gathering of qualitative data using semi-structured interviews was augmented by 
participant observation. As identified above, this introduces an alternative triangulation 
opportunity, and will further mitigate insider bias: 
 
 
“In principle, participant observation can produce data which are better able than is 
the case with other methods to reflect the detail, the subtleties, the complexity and the 
interconnectedness of the social world it investigates.” 587 
 
 
 
The nature of this aspect of the data gathering process was 16 hours spent on foot patrol 
with a Police Community Support Officer, attendance at six hours worth of partnership 
meetings, and four hours observing youth workers running clubs and a mobile bus 
aimed at engaging young people. Further opportunity was taken to observe the manner 
in which a fatal shooting of a young Asian man, which occurred in the middle of the 
research period and geographical location, was handled by the police and reported by 
the local press. I also attended and observed the subsequent community reassurance and 
Partners and Communities Together (PACT) meetings aimed at keeping the 
communities informed regarding progress of the investigation.    
 
5.3.2 Ethical Considerations 
 
The overriding importance of a programme of research which involves, engages and 
studies human subjects is the protection of those subjects. This is morally imperative – 
the first ethical codes were developed following particularly horrifying examples carried 
out by doctors in Nazi Germany.
588
 Failure in this regard will not only undermine 
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opportunities for participation in future research, but may also actually place subjects at 
risk of some harm, including risk of loss of life. The current research project has been 
built with Flick’s basic principles of ethically sound research at its heart:589 
 
 Informed consent which means that no one has been involved in the research 
as an active participant without knowing about this and without having the 
chance of refusing to take part. 
 
 Deception of key research participants (by covert observation or by giving 
them false information about the purpose of the research) has been avoided. 
The identity of those involved incidentally by way of participant observation 
is completely unknown and therefore no risk to them exists.
590
 
 
 Participants’ privacy has been respected and confidentiality guaranteed and 
maintained. 
 
 Accuracy of the data and their interpretation is the leading principle, which 
means that no omission or fraud with the collection or analysis of data has 
occurred in the research practice. 
 
 In relation to the participants, respect for the person has been seen as essential. 
 
 Beneficence, meaning the consideration of the well-being of the participants. 
 
 Justice, i.e. addressing the relation of benefits and burdens for the research 
participants. 
 
 
In order to ensure an ethical programme of research which is in line with the University 
of Exeter’s guidelines, a submission to the School of Humanities and Social Science 
ethics committee took place in April 2008. In summary, the following areas and activity 
are central to the research design:  
 
 The voluntary nature of participation. Permission to engage participants from 
the various public agencies involved was sought from the chief executives or 
chief officers of those organisations. Approaches were first made in writing, 
including a copy of the participants consent form. These were followed up with 
personal contact to begin focusing the interview schedule. The opportunity was 
also taken to discuss the form of the period of participant observation. Once 
initial permission was established, individual participants were approached, and 
a consent form supported by the respective organisations written consent, where 
required, provided. In the case of community members, local advocacy and 
support groups were approached to facilitate the engagement of community 
members in a similar way to that used for the chief executives of the public 
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agencies. The chairmen or directors of these groups were similarly used to focus 
the interview schedule. ‘Snowballing’ was then used as a means to reach further 
into the community. 
 
 The informed nature of participation. Chief executives, chief officers and 
participants were provided with an information sheet and consent form outlining 
the scope of the project, a copy of which can be found at Appendix 2. In addition 
to this, a verbal explanation was provided at the outset of the interviews, and 
there was an opportunity for participants to ask questions and clarify any issues 
before taking part.  
 
 Assessment of possible harm. The protection of the identity of the participants 
(see below) will assist with mitigating risk of harm associated with legal, 
political or other forms of external harm. It is not expected that the research 
process will damage participants psychologically but risk assessments were 
carried out on a case by case basis. A greater level of risk is associated with 
community participants taking part in a research project being run by a police 
officer.  
 
 Data protection. Interview details and records of interviews are managed using 
a standalone record management system, accessible only by the researcher. 
Material is anonymised using a coding reference method known only to the 
researcher. With the written consent of the participants, recorded data will be 
kept securely stored for a period of three years after the completion of the 
project before controlled disposal. Anonymised transcripts will be kept by the 
researcher in accordance with Data Protection Act principles. 
 
 Declaration of Interests. Participants were advised of the independence of the 
researcher insofar as he was not commissioned to do the research. Financial 
contribution towards the project was provided by the Association of Chief Police 
Officers and the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary’s Diversity Directorate, and 
this was identified on the information sheet. The purposes for which the results 
will be used were clearly stated, including the possibility of publication with 
appropriate safeguards surrounding the protection of the identity of the 
participants. 
 
 User engagement and Feedback. The interview schedules were developed 
using key individuals as identified above. This was to focus those areas which 
might be of interest to participants. Participants were given the opportunity to 
review their interview transcripts. 
 
 
5.4 Rationale for the Choice of Research Site 
 
This section outlines characteristics of Oldham, Greater Manchester, the site chosen for 
the fieldwork of the project. In so doing, it links the theoretical framework discussed 
above, especially the corpus of thought around case studies and generalisation, to the 
foundationalist arguments developed in Chapter Three. By describing relevant 
characteristics of the area, it shows how apposite the choice of site is for the purposes of 
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testing the hypotheses described. A detailed examination of the characteristics of the 
case study is provided in the following chapter, preparing the thesis for analysis and 
conclusion. 
 
5.4.1 Essential Features for the Study Area 
 
In Chapter Three, it was argued that urban disorder and terrorism in the current context 
are both forms of political violence and that they share common roots with 
radicalisation. These roots exist in certain minority communities, and as outlined in 
Chapter Two, South Asian communities, predominantly of the Islamic faith, are 
disproportionately represented. Such roots include a sense of injustice, a lack of 
political representation and identity with the polity, declining perceptions of legitimacy 
in state authorities, relative deprivation (which may include unemployment, a gap 
between expectation and achievement) and discrimination. Levels of drug related crime 
may also be important. A ‘ladder of escalation’ was postulated, a model which might be 
used by state authorities to predict or forewarn of risk to communities, and a series of 
questions were posed. These are reproduced at the beginning of the current chapter.  
 
Thus, the choice of research site must maximise opportunity to illuminate these matters, 
and at the same time, have a level of ‘typicality’, enabling extrapolation beyond the case 
study. In searching for a suitable research site then, certain features were sought. These 
included a higher proportion of South Asian communities than the national average, 
higher indices of deprivation than the national average, and some history of social 
protest. A poor history of relationships with the police would permit exploration of the 
current relationship – assessing the impact of the recent advent and implementation of 
the National Intelligence Model and Neighbourhood Policing. Some examination of the 
role of the media in public perception of the police occurs in Chapter Two, and an area 
with a history of important media involvement is also of particular interest. Seminal 
event 4, Chapter Two, describes the urban unrest that took place in a number of 
Northern mill towns in 2001.  Many of these towns have characteristics in common, and 
therefore any might be chosen which offer some typicality enabling extrapolation. 
Oldham has been chosen primarily on the nature of the media involvement and right 
wing activity during the unrest in 2001: these are factors which Chapter Three suggests 
might be used by police and other agencies to forewarn of a growing risk of 
radicalisation, community polarisation  and progression towards violent social and 
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political protest – be it urban unrest or terrorism. It also presents the opportunity to 
revisit the issues described by Ahmed et al in their study ‘The Oldham Riots – 
Discrimination, Deprivation and Communal Tension in the United Kingdom’.591 The 
key aspects of this paper are outlined in Chapter Three, but some parts are worth 
expanding upon here to demonstrate the value in returning to Oldham. The paper, 
bearing the stamp of the Islamic Rights Commission, describes the alienation of Muslim 
youth in the context of discrimination and deprivation, describes and provides evidence 
of police discrimination and the development of defensive self-reliance within Muslim 
youth communities, and examines the escalation of the tensions into riots. It goes on to 
consider the role of Islamophobia, and whilst citing the part played by the National 
Front and the BNP, it specifically illustrates the role ‘New Labour’ has played in 
maligning Muslim aspirations.
592
 Based on interviews with locals in Oldham, the report 
aimed to give a voice to a ‘particularly alienated group i.e. the Muslim youth.’593 It 
came up with perceptions in five broad categories: 
 
“(1) The Muslim youth face complete alienation from social and political processes 
due to deprivation and discrimination. 
 
(2) The local police have persistently pursued highly discriminatory policies against 
the ethnic and religious minorities of Oldham. 
 
(3) Various institutions including the police and the media provoked the disturbances 
through highly sensitive and inherently discriminatory practice in May 2001. 
 
(4) The far-right has developed and exploited Islamophobic sentiment. 
 
(5) Muslim youth concerns have been deliberately excluded by various authorities, 
from all relevant discussions about local problems both historically and in the wake 
of disturbances.” 594 
 
The current project will revisit these issues and consider evolution over the intervening 
eight years: where are we now? What progress has been made, and does Oldham 
contain communities which might be at risk of exploitation: is there a risk of 
radicalisation and progression to terrorism? It will also provide some of the depth of 
detail lacking in the Cantle Report, which was set up following the disorders in Oldham 
and Bradford. This gap is identified and discussed in the preceding chapter. 
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 The following section presents key features of Oldham in closer detail.  
 
5.4.2 Oldham, Greater Manchester 
 
The metropolitan borough of Oldham, situated in the North West of England in the 
county of Lancashire, makes up one of the ten districts of Greater Manchester. It covers 
an area of 142 square kilometres and was home to a population of 217,273 people at the 
last census in 2001.
595
 The only town in the borough is Oldham, although there are other 
population centres at Chadderton, Failsworth, Royton, Lees and Saddleworth. This 
thesis is concerned with the town of Oldham, and will focus particularly on one part of 
the town, analysed in the following chapter. 
 
In 2004, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister published ‘Indices of Deprivation 
2004’, a means of assessing deprivation at a local level.596 Indices of deprivation are 
published by the government in order to identify the most disadvantaged areas in 
England so that resources can be appropriately targeted.
597
 At that time, Oldham 
featured in the top 50 for five of the six measures.
598
 Matters had not improved in 2007, 
when updated figures were produced by the Department for Communities and Local 
Government.
599
  Oldham again featured in five of the six measures, with a poorer score 
in four of them.
600
 This situation developed in the aftermath of the decline of the textiles 
industry - described in seminal event 4, Chapter Two: at the end of the 19
th
 century, the 
town of Oldham was recognised as one of the most productive cotton-spinning towns in 
the world.
601
 In 2004, 43% of the Special Output Areas (SOAs - the smallest areas, 
containing roughly 200 households, for which census statistics are published) in 
Oldham were in the 20% of the most deprived SOAs in England.
602
 One SOA, in the 
Coldhurst ward, was in the 1% of most deprived SOAs nationally; Oldham has 
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disproportionate numbers of deprived neighbourhoods as compared with the rest of the 
country.
603
 Census data from 2001 also paints an interesting story. There are 
significantly fewer males employed in the higher earning brackets in Oldham as 
compared with the rest of the country, whilst those in the lower brackets are 
significantly higher. For example, 14.51% of males aged 16-74 in employment were 
engaged in elementary occupations compared with a national average of 11.79%; those 
in professional occupations 8.62% compared with a national figure of 12.22%.
604
 
Overlaying these facts are the high numbers of minority ethnic communities in the 
borough. 6.33% defined themselves as Pakistani, 4.52% Bangladeshi, compared with 
national figures of 1.44% and 0.56% respectively.
605
 Similar disparities are shown with 
those who describe themselves as Muslim: 11.06% against a national average of 3.10%. 
We begin to see in these figures confirmation of the issues raised and discussed in 
Chapter Two, in particular that Muslim communities are concentrated in areas of high 
deprivation, and that the metropolitan borough of Oldham is a typical example. Ray and 
Smith also draw attention to the social differentiation in Oldham: Saddleworth East and 
Saddleworth West are in the least deprived 10 percent of the country, whilst those wards 
most affected by the disorders in 2001 were among the 20% most deprived.
606
 They 
identify that the pattern of deprivation was further ‘racialised’ since only 16% of whites 
lived in the worst 20% enumeration districts, compared with 71% Pakistanis and 87% 
Bangladeshis.
607
 They say that these factors, coupled with the disproportionate impact 
of unemployment, “have resulted in a pattern of urban segregation and deprivation 
structured by and exacerbating racism”.608 
 
These characteristics of Oldham – its high levels of deprivation, high concentration of 
Muslim communities which are concentrated in those higher areas of deprivation, 
together with the town’s history of urban unrest make it a highly relevant case study for 
the current project. The research will further build-on and revisit the earlier academic 
and policy work described both above and in Chapter Two, taking the debate one step 
further on. 
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5.5 Data Analysis 
 
Where interviewees agreed to be recorded, each of the interviews was transcribed and 
stored as a project under a unique reference number. Where respondents declined to be 
interviewed, contemporaneous notes were taken and then written up as soon as 
practicable, usually later the same day. Similarly, notes were made and written up 
pertaining to the elements of the research that constituted participant observation. At the 
conclusion of each day of research, notes were made as to the thoughts and feelings 
about the day, in order to capture the more nebulous concepts which transcription alone 
might not capture.  Analysis and appropriate coding of the data took place, initially 
using the five themes established as the basis for the semi-structured interview, but 
additional themes were identified and further explored. Memoing was used as a 
technique to assist with the development of themes and to provide an audit trail of 
thought as the transcriptions were completed, and these complemented the notes made 
at the time. Memoing is recognised as good practice to act as a reminder to the 
researcher about new thinking, and also serves to support the audit trail.
609
 QSR-N6 
NUD*IST software, specifically designed for the analysis of qualitative data, was used 
as an aid, although the development and refinement of the themes and the interpretation 
of the data and the coding was conducted by me. This technique closely mirrors that of 
Kenney
610
; the data was analysed line by line, drawing out the five key themes, but 
those other emergent themes were identified and refined by repeated re-working of the 
data. While key issues supporting the hypotheses posited in earlier chapters were of 
specific interest, so too were those interconnections which exposed flaws in the 
argument.  Moreover, in order to understand the data and become immersed in it, all 
transcriptions, notes, analysis and memoing were conducted by me. 
 
5.6 Experiential Learning 
 
This section aims to outline in brief some key practical learning points and observations 
which presented themselves during the course of the research.  
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5.6.1 Adversarial Process 
 
As I developed the hypothesis in Chapter Three, I introduced an ‘adversarial process’, 
deliberately exposing my ideas to critical peer review. This process of challenge 
provided credence to the efficacy of the research ideas, and enabled me to refine my 
thinking, and thus focus the research question and the research tools. Examples of the 
challenge process include the presentation of a paper at the ECPR International 
Conference at Pisa in 2007, presentation of a similar paper at the HUSS Postgraduate 
Conference at Exeter University in 2008 and a presentation at the Global Centre in 
Exeter in 2007. I continued with this process of challenge, utilising a panel drawn from 
the Mosque in Exeter, totally separate from the university, to test parts of the 
questionnaire, once again helping to refine and focus the research onto areas where the 
maximum information could be gleaned.  
 
5.6.2 Brokering relationships 
 
 I chose Oldham as a research theatre for a number of reasons which have been 
discussed and presented; essentially, Oldham came forward as a result of academic 
argument. I had no contacts whatsoever in the town or in the police force and, 
consequently, my approach to the site of the fieldwork was totally cold. In order to 
conduct meaningful research singlehandedly in these circumstances, the ability to 
broker effective and trusting relationships with the intended targets for the research was 
critical. To this end, I adopted a carefully considered approach to each personal 
interaction, whether or not this interaction was an intended interview. For example, I 
thought very carefully about the manner of my dress, the type of bag I used to carry my 
recording equipment and paperwork, where I met with people, and how I spoke with 
them. All of these considerations were designed to maximise their trust in me, enabling 
me to engage them properly for the purposes of conducting the research, and optimising 
the effectiveness of the ‘snowball’ approach, discussed in section 5.3.1, above.    
 
5.6.3 The Mechanics of the Interview 
 
As discussed above, the approach was to use a semi-structured interview schedule, 
allowing the interviewee to expand where they wanted to whilst ensuring a framework 
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for the interaction. The effect of this in some cases was to ‘manage’ the conversation, 
resulting in a freer and more open interview. Part of the reason this occurred was 
because of the need to develop a coherent rapport with the interviewees, especially the 
younger Asian respondents from the community. Significant activity therefore took 
place outside of the formal interview environment, and I refer to some of this in Chapter 
Seven where I present and analyse the data used for the project. Interviewees were 
offered the chance to review their transcriptions in order to maximise the integrity of the 
research; none took up the offer. 
 
5.7 Summary 
 
This chapter has set out the methodology employed for the research, demonstrating the 
philosophical position and arguing the case for qualitative methodology. It has also set 
out the ethical considerations when dealing with human subjects, and specifies how 
those subjects are protected during the course of the work.  
 
The following chapter consider ‘Policing Indicators’ and ‘Critical Success Factors’, 
contextualising themes from earlier chapters into critical realist philosophy. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
 
 
Policing Indicators and Critical Success Factors 
 
 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
 
So far, this discourse has considered policing evolution over several decades in general 
terms, but especially in response to Britain’s developing plural society. It has also 
identified and outlined five seminal events over the previous twenty-seven years, 
describing and critically appraising legal and policy responses to each. From this 
analysis, five critical success factors are isolated, successful delivery of which optimises 
the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of disenfranchised and minority groups. I 
suggest that there is evidence of a failure on the part of public agencies in general, and 
the police in particular, to learn lessons from the past.  A ‘ladder of escalation’ is 
postulated, theorising that urban unrest, violent radicalisation, suicide terrorism and 
other forms of ‘social protest’ have common roots, and that this provides state agencies 
like the police with an opportunity to identify risk and plan mitigation activity. The 
preceding chapter advances a methodological proposal to examine these ideas and 
themes, and to consider whether Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence 
Model are capable of successfully tackling the invidious development of harmful 
radicalisation with the risk of progression to terrorism at street level.  
 
This chapter is presented in two parts. The first considers the foundationalist aspect of 
the thesis, discussed in Chapter Five, acknowledging the ‘reality’ of the relationship 
between the police and the communities: it scrutinises the policing dimension of some 
of the arguments developed in Chapters Three and Four, and specifically examines 
policing indicators, thus building on section 3.4 of Chapter Three. It consists of an 
academic literature review and general discussion of the following: crime as a 
phenomenon, and then crime in relation to a number of specific issues of interest: crime 
statistics, crime and place, crime and social indices, crime, ‘race’ and racist incidents 
(with a particular focus on South Asian groups and Islam). The discussion of indicators 
continues with an examination of assaults on police officers and complaints against the 
police. It describes the difficulty and complexity of measuring all these various 
phenomena, outlining the impact of certain variables, thereby demonstrating not only 
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the difficulty in their sole use as indicators which portend of forthcoming violence, but 
also the impediment to simple foundationalist analysis in the context of this thesis; by 
so doing, it demonstrates the importance of the qualitative methodology employed for 
the research. These indicators are specifically examined within the case study in the 
following chapter. 
 
The second part brings forward the critical success factors from section 4.13, Chapter 
Four, and discusses the link between them, the policing indicators above, and the 
‘common roots’ identified in section 3.6, Chapter Three. 
 
In this way, the chapter develops concepts initiated in preceding chapters, and 
contextualises them within the theoretical framework of critical realist philosophy. It 
provides the basis upon which the thesis moves towards a critical analysis of the data 
generated from the research, locating it within the existing literature, and identifying 
avenues for further work. 
 
6.1 Key Policing Indicators 
 
6.1.1 Crime 
 
Although this is not the place for an extended discussion and analysis of the concept of 
crime, consideration of the phenomenon is essential because it serves to underline the 
nebulous nature of what is essentially an artificial construct. It is pertinent because the 
level and nature of crime is used as a key indicator of community tensions and the 
overall effectiveness of state agencies like the police. It is drawn upon  in several guises, 
as will be seen.  
 
The examination of what precisely crime is has exercised the minds of social theorists 
for many years. Durkheim argues that “crime is normal because a society exempt from 
it is utterly impossible”.611 Indeed, he goes further, and asserts that since it is bound up 
with the fundamental conditions of social life, it is not only necessary but useful.
612
 This 
is an erudite and thought provoking concept. But consider the challenge of ‘outsiders’, 
whereby a person may have a different view of a given society’s rules - not only might 
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he not accept the rule, he might not accept the legitimacy or competence of those 
providing judgement over him
613
- and one has a potent theoretical basis upon which to 
contest or challenge the ‘common notion’ of what crime actually is. This ‘common 
notion’ might be articulated as “behaviour that is prohibited by criminal law”614 and 
therefore, “no act can be considered a crime, irrespective of how immoral or damaging 
it may be, unless it has been made criminal by state legislation.”615 But a closer scrutiny 
of this apparently straightforward conceptualisation exposes weaknesses in the 
criminalising process. An example is the killing of another person - acceptable or even 
heroic in wartime, evil at other times.
616
 Nor is it the case that a crime must always have 
a victim – some sexual acts between consenting adults or certain types of drug taking 
might be cited in this context.
617
 Although advancing the idea that laws are useless and 
harmful, Kropotkin, writing in 1898, helpfully pointed out that if one studies the 
millions of laws that rule humanity, it is easy to see that they are divisible into three 
main categories: protection of property, protection of government and protection of 
persons,
618
 and this holds true today. Crime, then, is a social construct which is subject 
to arbitrary variation based on the establishment of laws. Since the concept of what 
constitutes a crime is defined by a transgression of ‘the law’, regardless of the 
‘usefulness’ of that law, and since we are limiting the discussion to the situation in the 
United Kingdom, a free democracy, the challenge of whether a given law is legitimate 
or not recedes to a degree (though might still be cogently challenged - see, for example, 
the legitimacy of stop and search powers or control orders under terrorism legislation, 
discussed in Chapter Four).  
 
I propose to use this as a basis upon which to move forwards – a crime is committed 
where there is a transgression of the law, and in general terms, they relate to the three 
categories described by Kropotkin. The discussion now turns to crime levels and 
statistics. 
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6.1.2 Crime Levels and Statistics 
 
The true extent of crime in the United Kingdom, and the degree to which it has risen or 
fallen is beset with ambiguity. Yet the epidemiology of crime is purported to be a 
fantastically important indicator and barometer of the health of society: “The left is still 
convinced that crime is a social and economic disease, produced by poverty, bad 
housing, poor schools…” 619 The first British Crime Survey was mounted in 1982 by 
the Home Office, and drew on a representative sample of 16,000 people.
620
 Its main aim 
was to estimate the extent of various crimes, whether or not reported to police, which 
brought with it some political risk of exposing a substantial ‘dark figure’.621 In broad 
terms, the survey indicated that there were around four times more offences of property 
loss and damage, and around five times as many offences of violence than in official 
police statistics.
622
 Other work demonstrates the significance of this ‘dark figure’ of 
crime which remains unreported to the police. Accident and emergency data from a 
large inner city accident and emergency department demonstrated that around one 
quarter of victims of assaults had reported the matter to the police.
623
 Shepherd et al 
(1989) cite reasons for not reporting, which include the perceived trivial nature of an 
incident, the feeling that the police could do nothing about it, or that they themselves 
could deal with the matter at a later time.
624
 Crucially, the authors make the point, 
which is supported by other work,
625
 that fear of the police and a belief that they would 
not be believed were also reasons for failure to report;
626
 this is an important 
consideration in the context of ethnicity, and is a subject to which I shall return. Linked 
to this are findings which tend to suggest that those who are unemployed are far less 
likely to report an incident of burglary than those in work,
627
 and since I am examining 
a case study in an area with disproportionate levels of unemployment, this is important. 
Other problems with crime statistics relate to the changes over time of the law, court 
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organisation, and methods of categorising and recording offences.
628
 Police activity, 
such as drugs operations, and chief constables ‘playing the crime card’ in order to boost 
funding from police authorities, can dramatically affect recorded crime figures. In 
summary, although we use crime statistics, and the present chapter will consider them in 
the theatre of the case study, they do not provide an incontrovertible objective measure 
of criminal behaviour. 
 
6.1.3 Crime and Place 
 
Crime is a very unevenly distributed phenomenon: whatever geographical scale is used, 
disparities consistently emerge.
629
 Indeed, neighbourhoods may have an effect on 
criminal behaviour quite separate from and independent of those of family, peer group 
or status.
630
 The purpose of this section is to consider the impact and relationship 
between crime and ‘place’, and it represents a nexus of several disciplines – geography, 
sociology, criminology and philosophy, and an examination of each will illuminate the 
others. The discussion begins from a sociological and philosophical perspective.  
 
The previous chapter examines critical realism and establishes it as an appropriate 
philosophy upon which to base the current research. Here, I am examining the link 
between crime and place, and space and time are intrinsic to this consideration. They are 
also central to the theory of structuration,
631
 and it is therefore appropriate to deviate 
briefly to consider aspects of structuration theory, and draw the parallels with critical 
realism.  
 
In their consideration of the use of critical realism to evaluate policy, McEvoy and 
Richards (2003) illustrate the stratified character of critical realism by using an example 
of a model of disability described by Williams (1999) which emerges as a result of the 
interplay between three levels of a stratified reality.
632
 These are the biological reality of 
physiological impairment, the reality of the structural constraints that are often placed 
                                                 
628
 Carrabine E et al  (2002) op cit p5 
629
 Davidson N and Locke T (1992) ‘Local Area Profiles of Crime: Neighbourhood Crime Patterns in 
Context’ in Evans D, Fyfe N and Herbert D (1992) (Ed) ‘Crime, Policing and Place: Essays in 
environmental criminology’ London: Routledge ch3 p60 
630
 Ibid p61 
631
 Bottoms A and Wiles P (1992) ‘Explanations of Crime and Place’ in Evans D et al  (1992) op cit ch1 
p17 
632
  McEvoy P and Richard D (2003) ‘Critical realism: a way forward for evaluation research in nursing?’ 
Journal of Advanced Nursing 43(4) pp411-420 p412 
 184 
on people with disabilities and the wider reality of cultural attitudes towards disability 
in which these structures are embedded.
633
 Williams’ paper has a strong theoretical 
basis but manages to relate philosophical argument with the practical world.
634
 
Although disability is moored by the reality of physiological impairment, the cultural 
responses to disability also have a real impact on the lives of people with a disability. 
This conceptual schema lends itself to parallels with victims of crime, and ethnicity. 
The contingent relationship between these layers, or stratifications, is the essence of the 
ontological parallel with Gidden’s theory of structuration.635 An important aspect of 
Gidden’s theory is that the structures which result from human action may be 
unintended consequences as well as intended ones.
636
 He helpfully uses an analogy 
which plays directly into the context of the crime-place discussion: 
 
“A pattern of ethnic segregation might develop, without any of those involved 
intending this to happen, in the following way, which can be illustrated by analogy. 
Imagine a chessboard which has a set of 5-pence pieces and a set of 10-pence pieces. 
These are distributed randomly on the board as individuals might be in an urban area. 
It is presumed that, while they feel no hostility towards the other group, the members 
of each group do not want to live in a neighbourhood where they are ethnically in a 
minority. On the chessboard each piece is moved around until it is in such a position 
that at least 50 per cent of the adjoining pieces are of the same type. The result is a 
pattern of extreme segregation. The 10-cent [sic] pieces end up as a sort of ghetto in 
the midst of the 5-cent ones. The ‘composition effect’ is an outcome of an aggregate 
of acts – whether those of moving pieces on the board or those of agents in a housing 
market – each of which is intentionally carried out. But the eventual outcome is 
neither intended nor desired by anyone. It is, as it were, everyone’s doing and no 
one’s.”637 
 
 
This goes some way towards explaining ethnic segregation and can clearly be seen at 
work in Oldham, the social structure of which is introduced in Chapter Two, and 
described in more detail in the preceding chapter. I discuss the concept of ‘white flight’ 
in section 8.2.1.6, Chapter Eight.  
 
Bottoms and Wiles (1992) draw heavily on structuration theory to examine the crime 
and place relationship, linking it with environmental criminology.
638
 Of particular note 
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in their paper is the ‘Heuristic model of the context of offending’, which has some 
considerable relevance to the current arguments regarding the development of 
radicalisation and terrorism. It is reproduced to illustrate the point: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Heuristic model of the context of offending
639
  
 
This heuristic model bears striking similarities with that of the causes of radicalisation, 
presented and discussed in section 3.2.1 of Chapter Three. Just as the impact of the 
“complex interaction between factors at the various levels is likely to be crucial for the 
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intensity of the readiness for radicalisation”640 so too are they crucial for the intensity of 
the readiness to commit crime. Within this, there are important lessons to glean: whilst 
the concept of radicalisation is prominent in the public consciousness, and ‘feels’ new, 
many of its features and relevant factors are familiar and have been the subject of 
intense scrutiny for a long time. 
 
6.1.4 Crime and Social Indices 
 
By reference to academic literature and research, the thesis has illustrated in Chapter 
Three that common roots can be identified which link so-called home-grown terrorism 
with other types of ‘social protest’ like urban disorder. These roots are pre-conditions 
which need to exist prior to the onset of the unrest, and they include a sense of injustice, 
a lack of political representation, declining perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities, 
relative deprivation, which may include unemployment, a gap between expectation and 
achievement, and discrimination. The purpose of this section is to consider in brief 
terms the relationship between these factors and crime, and comment upon this 
relationship as a comparator with violent radicalisation and urban unrest.  
 
Lea and Young (1984) note that “discontent is a product of relative, not absolute, 
deprivation…[it] occurs when comparisons between comparable groups are made which 
suggest that unnecessary injustices are occurring.”641 This argument is framed in the 
context of crime and criminological perspective; nevertheless, it has striking resonance 
with the arguments discussed around the development of urban unrest, radicalisation 
and suicide terrorism in Chapter Three. In their discussion of the concept of relative 
deprivation as opposed to absolute deprivation, they raise the same dichotomy that was 
similarly discussed in the radicalisation/terrorism context in Chapter Three. They 
identify that: 
 
“Relative deprivation is the excess of expectations over opportunities. The 
importance of this concept is that it gets away from simplistic notions that try to relate 
discontent and collective violence to levels of absolute deprivation”.642  
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The burden of argument in Lea and Young’s paper is the consideration of the effect of 
relative deprivation on levels of crime, and it discusses the effect of acute political 
marginality and unemployment in this regard. There are arguments that have important 
parallels with the development of violent radicalisation, brought into sharp relief by the 
authors’ use of the word ‘discontent’. The aspect of the paper is narrow insofar as it is 
silent on other important considerations, such as the ready availability of drugs and 
cheap alcohol, but it was written in 1984, and these issues where less advanced in the 
public consciousness than they are in the present day.  Nevertheless, the parallels lend 
credibility to the argument that modern policing methods principally developed to 
tackle crime might be capable of adaptation to the current crisis. The arguments also 
point towards crime and violent radicalisation having an important contingent 
relationship, which may have relevance to the high incidence of gang related violent 
crime experienced in some British cities.  
 
It might be said that unemployment and crime constitute the two major social problems 
faced by governments, and this has contributed to the plethora of research of the 
relationship between the two phenomena.
643
 In their investigation of the relationship, 
Carmichael and Ward (2000) conclude that younger unemployed men appear more 
likely to commit acts of criminal damage than theft, while the opposite is true for older 
men.
644
 Although this particular finding might be important in the consideration of anti-
western graffiti (discussed in Chapter Three as a potential indicator of growing risk of 
violent radicalisation within a given community), the paper demonstrates that the 
relationship between unemployment and crime in general, let alone different crime 
types, is far from clear cut.  
 
Closely linked to the discussion of crime and social indices is the consideration of crime 
and social cohesion. Here, the hypothesis at work is that the level of crime in 
disadvantaged areas will be influenced by levels of social cohesion. Hirschfield and 
Bowers (1997) examine this theory using two methods for delineating areas of 
disadvantage: geodemographic classifications and the British Government’s official 
deprivation measure, the Index of Local Conditions.
645
 The two independent 
components of social cohesion used were the level of ‘social control’ in an area, and the 
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degree of ‘ethnic heterogeneity’.646 The level of social control was assessed using police 
information – three years worth of ‘command and control’ data. The number of calls 
made per year which related to juvenile disturbances was used as a direct indicator of a 
lack of social cohesion.
647
 They argue that command and control data do not relate to 
crimes and therefore it is more precise to treat them as an indication of the demand for 
formal social control from the public. They supposedly reflect an inability of parents 
and guardians to supervise and control the behaviour of young people.
648
 I argue here 
that this appears to be a pretty loose indicator of social cohesion. Do these types of calls 
relate directly to a problem of social cohesion? What about other indicators such as 
neighbour disputes and domestic incidents? There is a sense of assumption in the 
indicator they describe. Nonetheless, the research indicates that socially disorganised 
and ethnically polarised communities face a greater risk of crime, especially burglary, 
assaults and robbery.
649
 Given the polarised nature of the community forming part of 
the case study, relatively high rates of these types of crime might therefore be an 
important indicator of risk of the development of violent radicalisation. 
 
Bottoms, Clayton and Wiles (1992) postulate a notion of ‘community careers’ in the 
context of crime, which they relate to the housing market.
650
 They stake a central 
argument that “the key to an understanding of [offender-based] residential community 
crime careers lies in the operations of the housing market”, and describe three main 
concepts used within this central theoretical claim.
651
 The first is the observation by 
Albert Reiss (1986) that “communities, like individuals, can have careers in crime, 
[and] today’s safe environment can become tomorrow’s dangerous one”.652 The second 
speaks of offender-based residential community crime careers rather than offence-based 
(picking up the distinction between area offender rates and area offence rates), whilst 
the third concept is the ‘housing market’.653 This includes not only the economics of 
private house-buying but also the “bureaucratically determined rules of public housing 
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authorities in Britain”.654 Seminal event 4, Chapter Two describes the situation in 
Oldham, and makes a particular reference to the housing practices of local authorities in 
the town - not only bureaucratic but also discriminatory. In identifying an appropriate 
case study for this thesis, discussed in some depth in the preceding chapter, certain 
characteristics were stipulated. They included a higher proportion of South Asian 
communities than the national average, higher indices of deprivation than the national 
average, and some history of social protest. It was identified that a history of poor 
relationships with the police would permit exploration of the current relationship – 
assessing the impact of the recent advent and implementation of the National 
Intelligence Model and Neighbourhood Policing. That I identified certain characteristics 
in this way suggests the possibility of the existence of a community career in a similar 
vein to that described above, i.e. a community that might ipso facto engage itself in 
marginalisation, contributing to political isolation and the feeling of disenfranchisement 
amongst its constituent community members. Whether or not there is consciousness to 
this career is debatable – and politically sensitive, since it risks further labelling a given 
community and thereby contributing to the career.  It is not impossible to conceive 
though, in the light of the current argument, that a community career might exist where 
certain social conditions are prevalent. The course the career takes may well be 
dependent upon the influence of a leader.  
 
In their consideration of crime and everyday life, Carrabine et al (2002) argue “that the 
risk from crime is unequally distributed among the population, with the poor generally 
bearing the greater burden.”655 They further argue that various British Crime Surveys 
have found that minority ethnic groups are generally at greater risk of crime 
victimisation than whites, young people rather than the elderly are more at risk, and 
those living in urban environments are also exposed to a greater risk of victimisation.
656
 
This then begins to build a heady picture of that group of people experiencing the most 
significant risk – and they fall into the same bracket as the target community groups of 
the case study: ethnic minority, under 35 years of age, in a deprived urban environment. 
But all this comes with caveats: the problems of inter alia the measurement of crime 
and unemployment, the impact of varying social indices on the incidence of certain 
crime types, the effect of culture on the likelihood of committing and reporting crime, 
the variation between age and gender etc, all make for significant difficulty in defining 
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causal relationships between social indices and crime. The following section examines 
crime and ‘race’ with specific consideration of South Asian groups and Islam. 
 
6.1.5 Crime, ‘Race’ and Racist Incidents 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the number, type and location of racist crimes and 
incidents is acknowledged as being an indicator of community tension. However, the 
measurement and recording of racist crimes and incidents is beset with difficulty. The 
following discussion serves to further demonstrate the problem of relying on purely 
quantitative data, even with a foundationalist philosophical position, by building on the 
‘crime’ discussion, and overlaying the contentious notion of ‘race’, identified in Chapter 
Two as being a social construct. 
 
In Britain, the British Crime Survey has revealed that racist incidents and crimes are far 
more extensive than the number represented by police statistics.
657
 Why? The answer to 
this question is illuminated to a degree by work carried out by Sharp and Atherton 
(2007),
658
 although parts of it are open to criticism. They carried out a study in the West 
Midlands in which responses by the participants were characterised by hostility, lack of 
confidence in the police and a mistrust of authority. This impacted on the strategies the 
respondents employed in all their interactions with the police - and the findings suggest 
that there is still much to be done by the police to improve relations with black and 
other ethnic minority communities. This type of research serves to reinforce the 
argument that reported crime levels are riddled with cavities where ethnic minority 
communities are concerned. The study involved interviews of 47 people aged between 
15 and 18 years, using a qualitative method. The article also refers to ‘community 
policing’,659 embarking on a discussion as to the effectiveness of ‘community policing’, 
in particular drawing on research from Hawdon et al (2003)
660
 to suggest that 
‘community policing’ was introduced “as a means to legitimize the police as the lead 
institution to address law and order issues at a more local level, by consulting with 
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communities to set their priorities and target their resources more effectively”.661 This is 
open to debate. The article is silent on ‘Neighbourhood Policing’ as a concept, in 
particular the role that other statutory partners must play, in accordance with the 
legislation, to deal with crime and disorder, described in Chapter Four. What the paper 
does highlight is that black and other ethnic minority communities may feel excluded 
from consultation with the police, and, importantly, from engagement with their local 
community. In their findings, they state: 
 
 
“There is a lack of confidence and trust both in terms of who the police are and what 
they can do. In short, the refusal to report a crime and a desire to sort out difficulties 
themselves without referring to the police is the way that these young, black 
respondents strategize about crimes committed against them or their families.”662 
 
 
They also refer to police attitudes, and illustrate, using the following extract, that police 
officers who are themselves from ethnic minority groups, display aggressive attitudes in 
their interactions: 
 
‘ “This Indian cop was sent to my dads shop ‘cos of some trouble there and my dad 
tried to talk to him in Punjabi because he could explain better but the cop just said 
‘speak English’, all aggressive like. It was like he had to prove he was really a cop 
not an Indian (Male, 17 years).” ’ 663 
 
 
This type of issue raises very important questions regarding the legitimacy of the police 
in general terms. There is insufficient space here to examine the minutiae of this, but an 
organisation which is predominantly male and white enjoys general support from the 
white majority in the population; when the police exercise their authority over minority 
groups, the contribution to this imbalance of power is significant. Moreover, the 
introduction of Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model might be 
destined to fail simply because of police culture, characterised by Reiner (1992) as 
conservative, cynical, action-oriented, inward looking and suffused with machismo and 
racial prejudice.
664
 In sections 7.2.2 and 7.3.1 of the next chapter, I present data which 
comments on the ethnic make-up of the police organisation in the locale of the case 
study. 
                                                 
661
 Sharp D and Atherton S (2007 op cit p749 
662
 Ibid p755 
663
 Ibid 0756 
664
 Reiner R (1992) The Politics of the Police 2
nd
 Ed, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf Ch 3 
 192 
 
In many respects, the issue of crime and race is best examined from the perspective of 
those concerned. Garland et al (2005) contest that umbrella terms like ‘black’ and 
‘Asian’ mask a host of ‘hidden’ communities.665 Although their paper is linked to 
academic research (and indeed the issues it raises are borne in mind throughout the 
course of the current research), the point they make might equally apply to the police 
and other public agencies, who often tend to employ the term ‘BME’, denoting Black 
and Minority Ethnic, and who also tend to think of communities in terms of substantial 
numbers of people concentrated in a relatively small geographic space.
666
  
 
The broader panorama of violent racism is examined by Bowling (1998).
667
 Historical 
documents indicate that white Britons have been ambivalent over centuries about the 
presence of dark-skinned minorities living on ‘their’ island,668 but Bowling goes on to 
chart the evolution of violent racism in the UK, arguing that speeches such as Enoch 
Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech marked a destruction of fragile bipartisan consensus 
on race and immigration, igniting a ‘moral panic’: the “presence of black people 
provided the political space for the emergence of new and explicitly racist political 
forces.”669 He identifies that for British ethnic minorities, violent racism has always 
been on the political agenda.
670
 This adds credence to the need for an alternative view, 
considering the experience from the perspective of those on the receiving end, 
something which public authorities have been so slow to do.  
 
The current definition of a ‘racial incident’, adopted by the Association of Chief Police 
Officers, has come directly from The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, examined in Chapter 
Four. Recommendation 12 of that report stated that the definition should be: 
 
“A racist incident is any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any 
other person.”671 
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The Report went on to state that the term ‘racist incident’ should be understood to 
include crimes and non-crimes and that they must be reported, recorded and 
investigated with equal commitment, being adopted by the police, local Government 
and other relevant agencies.
672
 The important variable, relevant to the current 
discussion, is that the more incidents that are being reported as ‘racist’, the more 
community tension is rising. 
 
Bowling also discusses ‘racial incidents’ and reproduces a definition used by the 
Metropolitan police in the latter part of the 1970s.
673
 He dissects this definition and 
points out that it only partially matched the violent racism experienced by ethnic 
minorities at the time. He goes on to describe a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ for the police by 
the mid 1980s over the issue of their response to violent racism.
674
 Later, he asserts the 
crisis of legitimacy receded owing to improvements in ‘performance’ because racial 
incidents were made a force priority: recording and monitoring improved, contact with 
the community improved, and yet, he argues, “operational [his emphasis] practice 
remains largely unchanged.”675 He concluded by making the following statement: 
 
 
“For deep-rooted legal, organizational, structural and cultural reasons, the police still 
do not prevent violent racism; they offer little or no protection for victims and tend 
not to enforce the law against perpetrators.”676 
 
 
 
Bowling’s work was produced before the Stephen Lawrence Enquiry Report was 
published, though he was involved as a consultant. The points he makes are central to 
the current argument, and demonstrate sluggishness at best, negligence at worst, on the 
part of the police to understand the problem and react appropriately. The observation he 
makes regarding ‘lip-service’ rather than true operational evolution in dealing with the 
issue is highly pertinent, and is an area upon which this thesis will throw some light. 
 
So far, I have demonstrated that the nebulous nature of the phenomenon of crime, 
coupled with the variables around ‘race’, perceptions of the police and criminal justice 
system, impact of social indices and ‘place’ complicate the quantitative examination of 
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the subject: the data is essentially unreliable. The reassurance aspect is similarly 
problematic – crime rates are dropping whilst fear of crime is not,677 which poses 
interesting parallel questions around perceived risks of terrorism.
678
 The effect of this is 
that any examination of the subject cannot rely simply on a quantitative analysis of 
available crime and incident data, or indices of social deprivation. 
 
Yet there are important parallels between the phenomenon of crime and that of 
radicalisation and terrorism, highlighted in section 6.1.3 (above), which examines 
‘Crime and Place’, and section 3.2.1 of Chapter Three, which examines the 
radicalisation journey. This demonstrates the opportunity for police forces and their 
partners to apply similar techniques. The acclaimed and famous Kansas City Preventive 
Patrol Experiment tended to show that the three basic elements of traditional task-
focused policing – random and unfocused preventive patrol, rapid response, and 
reactive investigation – were an ineffective means of tackling crime.679 The failure of 
this one-dimensional approach to policing is part of the reason why Alderson developed 
his ‘community policing’ ethos of thirty years ago, discussed in section 3.3.2 of Chapter 
Three, and the more recent development of Neighbourhood Policing and the National 
Intelligence Model. In the same way, a one-dimensional policing response to the current 
crisis which consists of random examination of ‘extremist’ websites, rapid response to 
scenes of terrorist incidents, and reactive investigation at scenes, together with lengthy 
periods of detention without charge will be an ineffective means of tackling violent 
radicalisation and terrorism on their own.   
 
The discussion now turns to the subjects of assaults on police officers, and complaints 
against the police. The purpose of considering these specific issues here is because, like 
racist incidents, they are identified and discussed in Chapter Three as being of 
importance in detecting changes in community tension, and perhaps forewarning of 
impending political or social unrest. Any discussion of these indicators must 
acknowledge their intrinsic link to the broader umbrella of police legitimacy, but this is 
not the place for a discursive analysis of police legitimacy in a free society such as 
exists in the United Kingdom. Reiner (1992) examines the issue in some depth.
680
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American discourse is provided by Tyler (2004), which discusses public cooperation 
with the police,
681
 and also Sunshine and Tyler (2003), a paper which addresses the 
issues of performance of the police in fighting crime and the fairness of the distribution 
of police services.
682
 
 
6.1.6 Assaults on Police Officers 
 
There is an intuitive sense to the concept that declining levels of police legitimacy will 
manifest themselves in increasing levels of assaults against the police, and a rise in 
complaints. Other factors which might become apparent at the lower end of declining 
levels of legitimacy could include a drop in public cooperation: fewer people willing to 
provide help to the police in the form of criminal and community intelligence, a 
reluctance to provide victim and witness statements, and adverse press and media 
reaction to police activity. In the section entitled ‘Crime Levels and Statistics’ above, 
the nebulous nature of recording standards and the ambiguity of the data was discussed. 
Much the same situation exists with respect to assaults on police officers, with 
recording standards varying temporally within forces, and spatially between forces. For 
example, Watson (2006) gives a figure of 84 for assaults on police officers in 
Lancashire in 2003-2004; in 2004-2005, this rose to 1,492.
683
 Meanwhile, Merseyside 
police, an adjoining force, saw figures drop from 182 to 165 over the same time 
period.
684
 It is against this backdrop that we move to the discussion regarding assaults 
on police officers.  
 
A study in South Wales in 1990, entitled ‘Why Police are Assaulted’ examined features 
of assaults against police officers, which included interviews with assailants.
685
 In this 
study, 80% of offenders had criminal records, 70% considered the police were to blame 
for the incident, and, perhaps unsurprisingly, alcohol was a pervasive feature. The study 
did not reveal any pattern associated with length of service, and figures for those 
officers with less than two years service who had been assaulted, though marginally 
over-represented, appeared to dispel the myth that officers young in service were those 
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at greatest risk of assault. Of note were the number of multiply assaulted officers, and 
the authors suggested further work in this regard. The study is silent on the subject of 
‘race’, and whilst raising some interesting points, does not answer the question posed in 
the header. The visible appearance of the police officer has changed very significantly 
over the last thirty years and perhaps most significantly over the last fifteen, moving as 
it has from truncheons and chain link handcuffs to side-handled or extendable batons, 
rigid handcuffs, pepper sprays, leg restraints, stab proof jackets and, most recently, 
Taser weapons. This creates an image of a paramilitary force, where “we understand the 
term to mean specially trained and equipped cohorts of police with a repressive 
capability which places them mid-way between the traditional peace-keeping police and 
the military”.686  As Watson (2006) notes, this equipment may change the image of the 
police officer to such an extent that it actually encourages assaults.
687
 The South Wales 
study is silent on this issue too. In a comparable study in Cheshire over a three year 
period from 1994-1996,
688
 more than half the assaults were against officers with one to 
six years service (reflecting the fact that most frontline policing is done by officers with 
this length of service), and, as with the South Wales study, assaults on female officers 
were in proportion to the ratio of female to male officers. Once again, ‘race’ is 
conspicuous by its absence, both in terms of the ethnicity of the officers assaulted, and 
that of the assailants. There was of course, no mandatory requirement at the time to 
monitor with respect to ‘race’ this data, but given the findings of the Scarman Report 
ten years previously, and the link with tension indicators (discussed in Chapter Three), 
it is surprising that it does not feature as a consideration.  
 
A highly publicised report published in 2007 by Grant Shapps MP stated that “…across 
Britain respect for the police has crumbled”.689 This conclusion is based on a number of 
assertions, including that in 2006 “a police officer was assaulted somewhere in Britain 
every 20 minutes.”690 This report identifies very high levels of assaults against police 
officers, but does not deal with the nature of the assault, or any of the other variables 
discussed above. It does not materially add anything to the debate and is only included 
here to demonstrate the propensity for this issue to be used as political weaponry.  
 
                                                 
686
 Alderson J (1984) ‘Law and Disorder’  London: Hamish Hamilton, p168 
687
 Watson M (2006) op cit p304 
688
 McBride M (1997) ‘Assaults on Police’ Police Research and Management’ Autumn 1997 pp33-39 
689
 Shapps G (2007) ‘Police on the Beat: A comprehensive new study into the alarming level of assaults 
on front-line Police Officers’ p12, downloadable at  www.shapps.com/reports accessed 28 May 2008 
690
 Ibid p2 
 197 
In summary, the inhibitors to an accurate assessment of levels of crime and their 
changes over time, discussed above, are equally applicable to assaults against police 
officers. The problems are compounded by the diverse manner of recording, both 
spatially between forces, and temporally within forces. The lack of data regarding the 
specifics of precisely where and exactly when a given assault, or series of assaults 
occurred against police officers, together with the dearth of information on ethnicity of 
both offender and victim, further complicates any process of historical analysis of the 
phenomenon for the purposes of assessing its level of importance around increasing 
levels of community tension.   This issue is discussed further specifically in the context 
of the case study in Oldham in the following chapter.  
 
6.1.7 Complaints Against the Police  
 
An examination of police complaints and the history of the governance arrangements 
are conducted here for the same reason as that for assaults on police officers: because 
the number of complaints against the police might be considered as a tension indicator, 
and as discussed in Chapter Three, any increase might serve as a warning of raised 
community tensions. The concept at work here is that complaints against police will 
increase as police legitimacy declines. To this extent, it might be a rung on the ‘ladder 
of escalation’ postulated in Chapter Three. Of course, complaints made against the state 
arrangements for enforcing law and order is based upon an important assumption. There 
has to be an acceptance by the public in general, and the complainant in particular that it 
is worth complaining. This then is an important component in police legitimacy. 
Complaints against the police would be not be made in a totalitarian state. Thus, 
complaints made against the police will have a ceiling – and progression along any 
ladder of escalation will ultimately see a drop-off in numbers of police complaints. In 
the context of public confidence in the police being fundamental to democratic policing, 
together with public satisfaction in a complaints system for wider public support, Smith 
(2001) points out that the complaints process is the only means by which criminal 
proceedings are initiated against police officers after allegations by members of the 
public that they were the victim of an offence committed by officers when in the 
purported execution of their duty.
691
 He goes on to describe the net effect of this - 
namely that police officers alleged to have committed an offence are treated differently 
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to citizens who might have been on the receiving end of the same allegation.
692
  Whilst 
it can be argued that police officers find themselves in difficult, confrontational 
situations, where allegations might be made against them, and therefore some protection 
is needed to mitigate the risk of spurious allegation and consequential wrongful arrest 
by colleagues, Smith raises an important point.  He goes on to assert: 
 
“The impression here is of a complaint process operating as an instrument of police 
management. Even where complaints have been substantiated, under 3 per cent 
annually of the total number of recorded complaints, it is apparent that the complaints 
process operates primarily to identify malpractice in the interest of police 
administration with scant regard for vindication of the complainant.” 693 
 
 
Overall, Smith has a pessimistic opinion of the complaints process (and perhaps the 
police), but he raises important questions in relation to the police complaints system and 
its impact on public confidence. (For a more functional analysis of the complaints 
system and suggestions for a rights-based approach, see Smith (2004),
694
 and Kennison 
(2002)
695
). Some of this lack of confidence is aggravated by the role the media play, and 
Reid (2004) identifies two negative effects.
696
 Firstly, since the media rarely report the 
outcome of successful complaints, it increases the impression that making a complaint 
through the internal system is a waste of time.
697
 This might well have significant 
importance in an area like Oldham, where the role of the media was of demonstrable 
importance in the build up to the urban unrest described in seminal event 4, Chapter 
Two, and also in section 3.3 of Chapter Three. The second negative effect is that it may 
undermine confidence in the fairness of the process among police officers given that 
cases that are reported are big ones with outcomes which are often highly critical of the 
police officers involved. Seneviratne (2004) notes that “accountability is an essential 
prerequisite of public confidence in the police service because…police misconduct, if 
unfettered, can threaten the credibility of the criminal justice system” 698 and “a 
complaints process for police misconduct must therefore command the confidence of 
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the public in order to achieve public support for the police.”699 The complaints system is 
one of three pillars of police accountability- the other two being accountability to the 
law and accountability to the police authority. There has always been a threat to public 
confidence in the complaints system in the UK – namely the impression that the police 
investigate the police, and that it can therefore never be free from partiality. The seminal 
events which have already been presented precipitated reviews of the complaints system 
in the UK, notably Lord Scarman’s report into the Brixton disorders of 1981 (see 
seminal event 1, Chapter Two), which saw the demise of the Police Complaints 
Board,
700
 and then Sir William Macpherson’s report The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry 
(seminal event 2, Chapter Two) was highly critical of the Police Complaints Authority 
(PCA) which replaced the Police Complaints Board. This report highlighted that serious 
complaints against police officers should be independently investigated and that 
“investigation of police officers by their own or another Police Service is widely 
regarded as unjust, and does not inspire public confidence.”701  
 
In April 2004, the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) was established; 
it was designed to introduce an element of independence to investigations of 
misconduct by police officers. Seneviratne argues however that it is very similar to its 
predecessor, the PCA, highlighting some of the drawbacks, including the continued use 
of police officers and ex-police officers to carry out investigations; she also raises a 
query over the governance structure – the Home Secretary having responsibility for both 
the IPCC and policing.
702
 But the IPCC state that “A key aim of the Independent Police 
Complaints Commission (IPCC) is to increase confidence in the police complaints 
system.”703 Do they achieve this aim? A study involving 4000 respondents published by 
the IPCC in 2006 suggested mixed success.
704
 It reported that nearly a third of people 
surveyed thought that the IPCC was part of the police, with black and Asian people 
more likely to think this than white people.
705
 Moreover, they concluded that “there 
were a number of key groups who were either sceptical about the complaints system or 
disinclined to use it.” 706 Crucially, and highly relevant to the current study, these 
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groups included ethnic minorities, those who had a previous negative experience of the 
police, those from socio-economic groups D and E (the lowest socio-economic groups), 
and ‘to some extent’ young people.707 In these groups we have the main components of 
the community that the current study engages: South Asian, low socio-economic 
groups, and younger members of the community, with a history in the location of poor 
relationships with the police.  
 
In 2006/2007, 28,998 complaints were recorded against police, a rise from 15,885 in 
2003/04 when recording complaints became statutory in the Police Reform Act 2002.
708
 
The statistics show 61% were white, with 5% Asian, 7% black and 2% ‘other’; an 
enormous 25% were recorded as ‘unknown’.709 This figure is difficult to access with the 
available data; additional research and analysis is required. The Ministry of Justice 
affirm that the IPCC will be working with police forces to improve recording in this 
area.
710
 
 
Thus, once again, the use of quantitative data viz ‘complaints against police’ as a 
reliable indicator for changes in community tension is beset with problems and 
ambiguity. There are important and tenuous assumptions associated with the data – first 
and foremost that people are willing and able to complain, an assumption which is 
highly questionable as it applies to ethnic minority groups in particular.  Secondly, the 
manner of recording varies temporally and spatially, and data elating to ethnicity of 
complainants is unreliable.  
 
6.2 Critical Success Factors 
 
In the summary to Chapter Four, section 4.13, I propose five themes which I call 
‘critical success factors’. I isolate them from the examination of the legal and policy 
responses to each of four of the five seminal events, where they can be seen as ‘golden 
threads’ running through each. The seminal events are: (1) The Brixton disorders of 
1981.
711
 Here, significant urban unrest developed in a deprived inner city location; the 
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area, which had high levels of minority black communities, had a poor history of 
relations with the police, and poor police practices precipitated the riots. (2) The murder 
of Stephen Lawrence.
712
 In this incident, Stephen Lawrence, an 18 year old black 
teenager was attacked and murdered by a group of white men in April 1993; the murder 
was motivated by racial hatred. The subsequent enquiry found a series of police failings, 
including evidence of institutional racism. (3) ‘The Secret Policeman’.713 In 2002, Mark 
Daly, an undercover reporter, joined Greater Manchester Police to determine what steps 
had been taken to eliminate racism from the force after its own Chief Constable had 
labelled it institutional racist. Daly exposed extremely damaging racism and racist new 
recruits at Bruche Training College, where he attended for his initial training. (4) Urban 
unrest in Bradford, Oldham and other Northern cities with sections of their ethnic 
minority communities living in areas with extremely high levels of deprivation. Over 
the weekend 26-28 May 2001, violence erupted in flashpoints across Oldham with 
petrol bombs being thrown and buildings set alight; rioting involving up to 500 Asian 
youths on the Saturday was followed with further unrest on the Sunday.
714
 The Islamic 
Human Rights Commission (IHRC) reported that ‘the riots occurred as the culmination 
of 5 weeks of racial abuse orchestrated by right-wing extremists against the town’s 
ethnic minority community.’715   
 
 The themes can be summarised as follows: 
 
 The need to work in partnership with other agencies, especially education and 
housing departments. 
 
 The police organisation needs to strive to reflect the community it serves, and 
the recruitment, retention and promotion of ethnic minority staff is a crucial part 
of this. 
 
 Community representatives should be involved in training, especially 
community awareness training. 
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 The local ‘beat officer’ or Neighbourhood Policing team has a vital role and 
must attract officers of high calibre. 
 
 Police organisations must work towards the elimination of racial discrimination 
of all types, and contribute towards the development of cohesive communities. 
 
 
In conclusion to Chapter Three, section 3.6, I said this: 
  
‘Existing research appears to demonstrate the following: Urban unrest and terrorism in 
the current context are both forms of political violence. They share common roots with 
radicalisation, with a number of key social pre-conditions existing prior to their onset. 
Crucially, these include a sense of injustice, a lack of political representation, declining 
perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities, relative deprivation (which may include 
unemployment, a gap between expectation and achievement) and discrimination. Levels 
of drug related crime may also be important. Racist crime, political and media activity 
are additional indicators of forthcoming politically motivated violence and pre-
conditions are essential but precipitators are also required to initiate the event. The 
existence of a powerful figure may be crucial in influencing the path which the ‘social 
protest’ event takes.’ 
 
Whilst the critical success factors will not necessarily directly impact on each and every 
one of the policing indicators discussed in section 6.1 above, they provide the best 
opportunity for the police to tackle the key themes which underlie social protest 
phenomena such as urban unrest and the development of harmful radicalisation. The 
reason for this is because, as Benyon puts it, “Social injustice is the central thread 
running through urban conflict. Above all, it is experiences of perceptions of injustice 
which may develop into a violent urban disorder.”716 By working with education and 
housing departments, by recruiting and promoting ethnic minority staff to help reflect 
the communities being served, by involving members of the community in training, by 
having high quality staff engaged with communities at a local level, and by working 
towards the elimination of racial discrimination, the police organisation maximises the 
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opportunity to minimise the reality and the perception of social injustice, and thus the 
risk of harm to communities in this context. The second benefit is the reduction in the 
likelihood of a precipitator, such as the inappropriate use of stop and search tactics as 
was seen in Brixton (see section 2.3.4.1, Chapter Two). A third benefit is possible too:  
bringing police and communities closer together to improve trust and confidence, and 
therefore legitimacy, leading to improved information and intelligence flows.  
 
The following schematic illustrates the relationship. 
 
Figure 5: Schematic showing the relationship between the ‘Common Roots’, ‘Critical 
Success Factors’ and ‘Policing Indicators’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tackled by: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measured by: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Common Roots 
7. A sense of injustice 
8. A lack of political representation 
9. Declining perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities 
10. Relative deprivation 
11. Discrimination 
12. Levels of drug-related crime 
Critical Success Factors 
6. The need to work in partnership with other agencies, especially education and 
housing. 
7. The police organisation needs to strive to reflect the community it serves 
8. Community representatives should be involved in training, especially 
community awareness training 
9. The local ‘beat officer’ or Neighbourhood Policing team has a vital role and 
must attract officers of high calibre 
10. Police organisations must work towards the elimination of racial discrimination 
of all types, and contribute towards the development of cohesive communities 
Policing Indicators 
Inter alia:  
8. Crime 
9. Hate crime 
10. Racist incidents 
11. Assaults on police officers 
12. Complaints against the police 
13. Activity on the ‘ladder of escalation’ 
14. Whispers and Rumours 
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Thus, whilst acknowledging the problematic nature of them, the policing indicators 
discussed in section 6.1 might provide a barometer against which the success of police 
organisations in delivering the critical success factors can be measured. 
 
6.3 Summary 
 
In conclusion to this chapter, the above discussion of selected police-related indicators, 
namely crime and its links to social indices, crime statistics, crime and ‘place’, together 
with racist incidents, assaults on police officers and complaints against the police, 
demonstrate that the foundational aspect of the thesis carries with it considerable 
complexity, and that the use of these as ‘tension indicators’ as described in Chapter 
Three must be treated with caution.  Although a superficial consideration of the data 
may tempt researchers to focus entirely and exclusively on the quantitative dimension, 
actually to do so would incur an error fatal to useful conclusions.  
 
I propose that since the critical success factors isolated from the policy and legal 
responses to the seminal events described in Chapter Two recur in each successive 
response, they are critical to optimising the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of 
minority and disenfranchised groups, acting as they do on the ‘common roots’ thereby 
minimising the risk of adverse social protest. Police activity is of major importance 
because the police represent the state, they exert coercive force, and because perceptions 
of social injustice are directly connected with the police as an institution. Their activity 
may provide the ignition. Success can be measured by the policing indicators described. 
 
In the following chapter, I present quantitative data against the policing indicators for 
the case study itself. I also provide a commentary on the degree to which Greater 
Manchester Police has delivered the critical success factors before presenting rich 
qualitative data secured through the methods described in Chapter Five. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
 
Data and Analysis 
 
 
7.0 Introduction 
 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to present and analyse key findings of the 
research which will be used to crystallize conclusions in the final chapter. It does this 
whilst also acknowledging the ‘arenas’ from which the issues are viewed or considered, 
linking clearly with the ontological and epistemological philosophy of critical realism 
discussed in Chapter Five.  
 
The chapter is organised into eight sections. The first presents publicly available 
quantitative data from the location of the case study. This aids an understanding of the 
research locale, which enables subsequent sections to be understood in their correct 
context. It also serves to illustrate the challenge associated with relying on a 
quantitative-only method as discussed in the previous chapter. Most importantly, it 
provides data against the policing indicators for the case study, before moving onto the 
second section, a commentary on the degree to which Greater Manchester Police has 
delivered the critical success factors discussed in section 6.2 of Chapter Six. I discuss 
this further in section 8.1.6 of Chapter Eight, including their impact on policing 
indicators, and taking into account the relationship between them, The following five 
sections present rich qualitative data, reflecting the construction of the research 
questionnaire: policing and social justice; local social conditions; the effect of the 
media; global events and the role of Islam. There are 27 sub-themes within these 
sections which are identified through the coding and analysis of the data (see section 
5.5, Chapter Five). These are examined and their links with the critical success factors 
are identified. Where possible, the data is presented from the differing perspectives of 
the participants: this then demonstrates the use of triangulation and enables the ‘reality’ 
of the relationships to be illuminated, acknowledging the ontological and 
epistemological position adopted in accordance with critical realism. The data and 
evidence presented in all these sections is used in the final chapter to address the 
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research question. The eighth section consists of a short summary, pulling together each 
of the preceding areas.  
 
A table showing the demographic information, and the appropriate codes used to protect 
the identity of the participants can be found at Appendix 4. 
 
7.1 Oldham West, Oldham Division, Greater Manchester Police 
 
In Chapter Five, I outlined the rationale for choosing Oldham as a suitable location for 
the case study. The current section is designed to do two things. Firstly, it is intended to 
build on the discussion presented in Chapter Five: it will distil the arguments by 
providing a description and account of the demographic and social characteristics of the 
exact neighbourhoods where the case study is located, and in so doing will contextualise 
the discussion of key policing indicators from section 6.1, Chapter Six, into the case 
study. This is important in order to develop the foundationalist character of the research, 
consistent with its critical realist position, and for offering avenues for further research 
which are discussed in more depth in the final chapter. The second purpose of the 
section is to promote a coherent understanding of the nature of the area of the case 
study, enabling analytical arguments developed in the final chapter to be understood in 
their correct context. 
 
Oldham West lies centrally within the borough and consists of four wards: Coldhurst, 
Werneth, Alexandra and Medlock Vale.
717
 Although these names existed at the time of 
the riots in 2001, boundary changes in 2004 mean that statistics do not exactly correlate 
with the present day. Unrest in 2001 took place in geographical locations very close to 
or actually in these wards. The following information is provided by Oldham 
Metropolitan Borough Council, and consists of ward profiles published in September 
2007.
718
 It is intended to provide an overview only; reference should be made to source 
material for full details.  
 
Coldhurst has a young population with children under 16 years making up 32.4% of 
the population, the highest in the Borough. People belonging to black and minority 
ethnic groups make up 56.9% of the population, the highest proportion in the Borough. 
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48.9% of the population are of Bangladeshi heritage (again the highest in the Borough), 
with Pakistani people making up 2.4%. For families claiming Child Benefit, 22.2% of 
families claim for four or more children, five times the average for England. 54.8% of 
households receive Housing Benefit and/or Council Tax Benefit; 40.6% of households 
receive Income Support. Nearly four in ten people experience ‘income deprivation’, 
compared to an average 18.3% in the Borough, and 13.9% of the population of England. 
Half of all children aged under 16 years live in ‘income deprived’ households, and 
42.9% of school children are eligible for free school meals, twice the Borough average. 
The claimant count unemployment rate at 14% is the highest in the Borough, and is 
more than three times the rate for England. More than half of all 16 – 74 year-olds have 
no qualifications, and 7.3 % of 16 – 74 year olds have degree level qualifications as 
their highest level of qualifications, less than half the average for England. 46% of all 
households live in terraced housing, with the lowest proportion of owner-occupiers in 
the Borough at 40.5%. Coldhurst also has the highest proportion (36.3%) of households 
that are local authority tenants, and the highest proportion of households in the Borough 
classified as being ‘overcrowded’ (22.8%). The recorded crime (BCS comparator) rate 
in Coldhurst is the highest in the Borough, with rates per 1000 population of 147.4, 
compared with 79.1 in the Borough. 
 
Werneth has a relatively young population, with children under 16 years making up 
29.6% of the ward’s population. People belonging to black and minority ethnic groups 
make up 56.9% of the population, with the highest proportion of residents of Pakistani 
heritage (38.2%) in the Borough; 11.6% of residents are of Bangladeshi heritage. For 
families claiming Child Benefit, the ward has the 3
rd
 highest proportion (16.7%) of 
families claiming for four or more children. 42.8% of households receive Housing 
Benefit and/or Council Tax Benefit and 32.1% receive Income Support. 32.6% of 
people in Werneth experience ‘income deprivation’, with 35.7% of children under the 
age of 16 years living in ‘income deprived’ households, and 32.1% of school children 
being eligible for free school meals. The claimant count unemployment rate is 9.5%.  
Nearly 10% of 16 – 74 year-olds have a degree level qualification as their highest level 
of qualification, and 49.2% of all 16 – 74 year-olds have no qualifications. 57.2% of all 
households live in terraced housing, with owner-occupiers in the ward at 54.2%. 
Werneth has the second highest proportion of households in the Borough with no 
central heating (13.9%) and 17.5% are classified as being overcrowded. The recorded 
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crime (BCS comparator) rate in the ward is 83.1 per 1000 population, 7
th
 highest in the 
Borough. 
 
Alexandra has a relatively young population, with 25.4% of the ward’s population aged 
under 16 years. Of the 20 wards in the Borough, Alexandra has the 5
th
 highest 
proportion (17.6%) of residents belonging to black and minority ethnic groups. 10.7% 
of the residents are of Pakistani heritage, and 2.2% are of Bangladeshi heritage. For 
families claiming Child Benefit, Alexandra has the fifth highest proportion (8.3%) of 
families claiming for four or more children, twice that for England. 41.5% children aged 
under 16 years in Alexandra live in ‘income deprived’ households (twice the national 
average), and 38.7% of children are eligible for free school meals. 45.6% of households 
receive Housing Benefit and/or Council Tax Benefit and 35.5% of households receive 
Income Support. 31.5% of people in the ward live in ‘income deprived’ households. 
The claimant count unemployment rate is 10.1% and 49.5% of all 16 to 74 year olds in 
Alexandra have no qualifications. 8% of all 16 – 74 year-olds have a degree level 
qualification as their highest level of qualification. 10.1% of households are classified 
as overcrowded, 9.5% have no central heating and 35.8% are ‘local authority’ tenants 
(compared with 18.1% Borough-wide). The recorded crime (BCS comparator) rate in 
the ward is the 3
rd
 highest in the Borough at 118.7 per 1000 population. 
 
Medlock Vale has a relatively young population, with children under 16 years making 
up 26.6% of the population. More than 22.7% of the ward’s population belong to black 
and minority ethnic groups: 14% are of Pakistani heritage, and Bangladeshi heritage 
people make up 2.8% of the ward population. For families claiming Child Benefit, 9.6% 
claim for four or more children. 33.3% of children aged under 16 years live in ‘income 
deprived’ households, and 26.2% of school children are eligible for free school meals. 
33.3% of households in Medlock Vale receive Housing Benefit and/or Council Tax, and 
24.6% of households receive Income Support. The claimant count unemployment rate is 
7%, and 46.7% of all 16 – 74 year-olds have no qualifications. 9% of all 16 – 74 year-
olds have a degree level qualification as their highest level of qualification. 53% of all 
households live in terraced housing, and 30.7% of households live in accommodation 
rented from the local authority. Medlock Vale has the 5
th
 highest proportions of 
households in the Borough without central heating (9.2%) and 9.1% of households are 
considered to be overcrowded.  The recorded crime (BCS comparator) rate in the ward 
is the 6
th
 highest in the Borough, with rates per 1000 population of 96.0. 
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7.1.1 Key Policing Indicators, Oldham: Crime 
 
On 17 June 2008, I made a Freedom of Information Act request to Greater Manchester 
Police (GMP). The request, a copy of which can be found at Appendix 3, sought 
information relating to burglaries, assaults, robberies, assaults on police officers, 
complaints against police officers and racial incidents. It also included a request for 
ethnicity data in respect of offenders for assaults on police, and ethnicity of those 
making complaints against police. The information was sought for the years 2001-2002, 
and 2007-2008 for both Oldham Division, and Oldham West Neighbourhood Policing 
Area. The rationale for choosing the time spans was to include the period of unrest in 
Oldham in 2001, and compare the relevant data with the present day. A reply in relation 
to burglaries, assaults and robberies was received, and is reproduced in Table 1 below. 
A written response was also provided in relation to the request for racial incident data; 
the letter explained that the data was not held in the format requested, and gave an 
explanation: the boundaries of the relevant policing areas changed in 2004, and the 
method of recording changed in 2005/06.
719
 Data was supplied for the years 2005/06 
and 2006/07, and is reproduced in Table 2. Data for 2007/08 was not available at the 
time of writing. Further contact was made to establish why the boundary changes 
affected racial incident recording but not crime recording. The answer provided by 
GMP explained that the force uses several different crime recording databases, and that 
the data was correct.
720
 
 
This exercise is worthy of note for two significant reasons. Firstly, boundary 
adjustments and changes to recording methods have both been provided by GMP as 
reasons why data cannot be supplied, or comparisons cannot be made. This serves to 
support the arguments made in section 6.1.2, Chapter Six. Secondly, the data as initially 
supplied by GMP was incomplete, and did not constitute a full response to the request. 
For example, I had requested ethnicity data, and no explanation was offered to explain 
the absence of this information. Technically, their compliance with the Freedom of 
Information Act was flawed. These issues complicate reliable statistical analysis of 
police data, and, perhaps more importantly, render the service somewhat opaque to 
examination. This has profound implications for accountability, and therefore trust, 
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especially amongst ethnic minority communities. Bad data also undermines the ability 
of Greater Manchester Police to understand where services need to be improved, or 
where there are opportunities to gather better intelligence. 
 
Crime Type Year Oldham West Oldham Division 
Burglary Dwelling 2001/02 1740 3785 
2007/08 538 2105 
Burglary Other 2001/02 1293 2878 
2007/08 345 1806 
Serious Wounding 2001/02 93 166 
2007/08 41 165 
Less Serious 
Wounding 
2001/02 1039 1782 
2007/08 459 1651 
Table 1: Crime Statistics for Oldham.
721
 The statistics are for the financial years 1 April 
to 31 March. Assault statistics are recorded as Serious and Less Serious Wounding – 
Less Serious includes Robbery.  
 
Notwithstanding the difficulties already discussed in interpreting these figures, it is 
worth highlighting a number of features. Oldham West, which saw the worst of the 
urban unrest in 2001, has seen a significantly greater drop in all types of crime than has 
the division as a whole (which will of course include the figures for Oldham West). 
This difference is most significant with reference to the levels of assault, which have 
remained largely static in the division as a whole. This is a hint towards the usefulness 
of crime statistics as an indicator of raised tension with the associated risk of urban 
unrest. Further study, utilising a bespoke quantitative survey in the specific 
geographical locations would illuminate this aspect of the relationship more clearly. 
This is examined in more detail in the final chapter. 
 
7.1.2 Key policing indicators, Oldham: Race Hate Incidents 
 
In 2005/06, GMP introduced new crime recording codes so that they could qualify 
whether a hate incident was motivated by race, religion, sexual orientation, gender or 
disability.
722
 Prior to this, hate incidents were recorded under one code, irrespective of 
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the motivation.
723
 Thus, race hate data pre 2005 is not capable of isolation without an 
intensive and time-consuming examination of individual crime records. Table 2 outlines 
the situation in Oldham West and Oldham Division. 
 
 
Victim’s Ethnicity Year Oldham West Oldham Division 
White 2005/06 52 141 
2006/07 87 207 
Mixed Ethnicity 2005/06 6 24 
2006/07 5 23 
Asian or Asian 
British 
2005/06 42 165 
2006/07 69 221 
Black or Black 
British 
2005/06 3 22 
2006/07 16 36 
Chinese or Other 
Ethnic Group 
2005/06 11 17 
2006/07 4 13 
Ethnicity Not 
Recorded 
2005/06 19 96 
2006/07 21 63 
Total 2005/06 133 465 
2006/07 202 563 
Percentage 2005/06 28.6% 100% 
2006/07 35.9% 100% 
Table 2: Race Hate Incidents for Oldham 2005/06 and 2006/07.
724
 
 
Here again, some interesting features can be observed.  According to the figures, the 
largest number of victims of race hate incidents in Oldham West were white, whilst in 
the division as a whole, the largest number of victims were Asian/Asian British. In the 
absence of additional statistical work, postulating reasons for this amount to conjecture. 
Population is likely to play a part, with proportionally higher numbers of Asian/Asian 
British people in Oldham West as compared with the division as a whole. Other 
important factors might include variations in community tension and relationships with 
the police. In the latter, the willingness of sections of communities to report matters to 
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the police, a function of trust and confidence, discussed in section 6.1.5 of Chapter Six 
is crucial. Data relating to this issue is presented in section 7.3, below.  
 
Between 2005/06 and 2006/07, reported race hate incidents have risen in the division as 
a whole by 21%, whilst they have risen by 52% over the same time period in Oldham 
West. Once again, any explanation for this can only be conjecture without additional 
research and data (including a consideration of other ‘indicators’, such as complaints 
against the police, discussed below), but possible reasons might include an increase in 
real terms, or they might indicate an increase in the confidence of people to report 
matters. In either case, there are important considerations for the police – the data might 
signify raised community tension, and therefore, as I discuss in Chapter Three, highlight 
a need for the police and their partners to think of mitigation activity. It might be a rung 
on the ‘ladder of escalation’, or it might be indicative of improved relations with the 
police, brought about for instance by the introduction of the Neighbourhood Policing 
model, which occurred in the area in 2004.
725
  Data and analysis relating to the general 
issue of trust, policing and social justice is presented in section 7.3, below, and there is 
further discussion in section 8.2.1.4, Chapter Eight. 
 
7.1.3 Key Policing Indicators, Oldham: Assaults on Police Officers 
 
Between 1 April 2007 and 31 March 2008, there were 20 assaults on police officers in 
the Oldham West area.
726
 Data is unavailable for 2001-2002 because “the information is 
not held in a comparable breakdown to provide the data.”727 In the division as a whole, 
there were 74 assaults on police officers in 2001-2002, and 83 in 2007–2008. This 
information is limited in its value, although it is interesting to note that during 2001, 
when Oldham was the scene of such unrest, the level of assaults on police officers 
appears to be less than in 2007-2008. The information relates only to officers attached 
to the Oldham division rather than those drafted in, and this is an important 
consideration.
728
 It also highlights the difficulty faced in using such data as an indicator 
of increased tension: forces are unable to say whether or not there are increases in levels 
of these indicators owing to simple self-imposed constraints such as boundary changes. 
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GMP were unable or unwilling (on the grounds of cost) to provide a breakdown of the 
ethnicity of the offenders for these offences.
729
   
 
7.1.4 Key Policing Indicators, Oldham: Complaints against Police 
 
The final strand of the current discussion of policing indicators concerns complaints 
against police. Data was again requested under the Freedom of Information Act for both 
Oldham West and Oldham Division (see Appendix 3) to underline the theoretical issues 
discussed in relation to complaints in section 6.1.7, Chapter Six. The response from 
GMP in relation to Oldham West was that “this information is not broken down into 
sub-divisional level.”730 However, for the division as a whole, there were 88 conduct 
complaints in 2001-2002, and 89 in 2007-2008. The ethnicity of the complainants is 
shown in Table 3: 
Ethnicity 2001-2002 2007-2008 
Any other Asian Background 2 1 
Any Other Black Background 1  
Any Other Ethnic Group  1 
Any Other White Background 7 2 
Asian - Bangladeshi  4 
Asian - Indian  3 
Asian - Pakistani  8 
Black - Caribbean 1 1 
Chinese  1 
Declined  1 
Missing Data 96 9 
Mixed – White & Asian  1 
Mixed – White & Black Caribbean  1 
White British 7 90 
White Irish  1 
Total Complainants 114 124 
Table 3: Ethnicity of complainants, complaints against police, 2001-2002, and 2007-
2008, Oldham
731
 
                                                 
729
 Ibid 
730
 Ibid 
731
 Ibid 
 214 
 
The variation in the number of complaints made and the number of complainants is 
because there can be more than one complainant per case.
732
 At a superficial level, the 
numbers of complaints in the two periods concerned do not show an enormous 
discrepancy. However, data for 2001-2002 pre-dates the statutory requirement to record 
all complaints, described in section 6.1.7, Chapter Six. Moreover, closer examination of 
the data reveals some interesting features. In 2001-02, there are no complaints recorded 
by complainants who are of an Asian Bangladeshi/Indian/Pakistani background; there 
are however 96 complainants where the data is ‘missing’. This of course underlines the 
issue of ‘unknowns’, discussed in section 6.1.7. It also begs this question: given the 
unrest at the time, might this missing data originate from the Asian community, and if it 
does, why has ethnicity data not been recorded? The difficulty is that we are merely 
guessing, and it is impossible to tell. This figure drops to 9 in the years 2007-2008, but 
there is no corresponding rise in complaints from Asian people. In fact, the rise is seen 
in complaints from the White-British category, rising from 7 in 2001-02 to 90 in 2007-
2008. Rises in complaints from the Asian categories are extremely modest, the largest 
being from zero to 8 amongst the Pakistani community. Nevertheless, the percentages 
of complaints from each category in 2007-08 broadly mirror the ethnic make-up of the 
population, discussed in the previous chapter. The change in the statutory recording of 
police complaints in the Police Reform Act 2002 renders the data from 2001-2003 
problematic. Had the same statutory requirement existed then as exists now, complaints 
against police in that year, especially from Asian communities, might have been 
significantly higher. This demonstrates the point made in section 6.1.2, Chapter Six, 
regarding variations in the law over time, and changes in recording and categorising 
matters. 
 
The first section of the previous chapter provides a theoretical overview of certain key 
policing indicators. It draws on literature to comment on the complexity of the 
foundationalist aspect of the research question, highlighting various impediments to 
simple statistical analysis of available data. The current section demonstrates these 
arguments by drawing on police information for the location of the case study and the 
surrounding area. This sets the scene for identifying avenues for a further research 
project, utilising police information, but additionally designing a project which elicits 
reliable data independent of official sources. This proposal is examined in more detail in 
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the final chapter, and is consistent with the critical realist philosophical position of this 
thesis.  
 
In the following section, I begin by commenting on the degree to which key themes of 
the policies and edicts examined in Chapter Four have been successfully implemented 
by GMP. The section then goes on to describe the local arrangements for the delivery of 
policing, with specific reference to Oldham West. This then will be the link with the 
concluding section of Chapter Four, and the second part of Chapter Six, providing 
reflections on the application of the National Intelligence Model and Neighbourhood 
Policing in the theatre of the case study, and again building an understanding of the 
nature of the research locale. 
 
7.2 Greater Manchester Police (GMP): A Commentary on Critical Success 
 
In Chapter Four, I examine a series of legislative and policy responses to five key 
seminal events which were described in Chapter Two. These events are: The Brixton 
Riots (1981), The Murder of Stephen Lawrence (1993), The Secret Policeman (2002, 
with links to 2000), Urban Unrest in Bradford and Oldham (2001), and the Terrorist 
Bombings in London (2005). Rather than attempt to examine GMP against compliance 
and implementation of each of these legislative and policy responses (which is the 
function of various Government bodies), I consider in this part the themes identified 
within Chapter Four which were common to all or most of the responses described in 
that chapter. I argued that police forces and other public agencies had failed to learn 
lessons from the past, and that to some extent, this was demonstrated by the recurring 
themes in the various Inquiries and policy responses to the five seminal events, 
occurring as they did over a 25 year period. I call these themes, critical success factors. 
They are reproduced below: 
 
 The need to work in partnership with other agencies, especially education and 
housing departments. 
 
 The police organisation needs to strive to reflect the community it serves, and 
the recruitment, retention and promotion of ethnic minority staff is a crucial part 
of this. 
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 Community representatives should be involved in training, especially 
community awareness training. 
 
 The local ‘beat officer’ or Neighbourhood Policing team has a vital role and 
must attract officers of high calibre. 
 
 Police organisations must work towards the elimination of racial discrimination 
of all types, and contribute towards the development of cohesive communities. 
 
In Figure 5, Chapter Six, I present a schematic showing how the critical success factors 
relate to policing indicators. Here, I provide quantitative data and comment on the 
degree to which GMP has been successful in delivering the critical success factors, 
although further light is thrown on it by the qualitative data later in the Chapter. I 
discuss the impact of this delivery on the policing indicators in section 8.1.6, Chapter 
Eight, and indeed Section 8.1 of Chapter Eight draws conclusions from the data in 
relation to the delivery of each of these critical success factors. 
 
I deal with some of the factors with reference to GMP as a whole, and some with 
specific reference to the Oldham Division, and Oldham West. Thus, I examine the 
‘machinery of local policing delivery’ for the case study, focussing general issues 
discussed in section 4.12, Chapter Four, into the arena of the fieldwork. 
 
7.2.1 Partnership Working and NIM Tasking  
 
HMIC report encouraging progress in the partnership arena: 
 
“The Local Area Agreement (LAA) has provided the impetus for development within 
Oldham’s sustainable neighbourhoods framework, and has brought agencies together 
to work in collaboration for the common good of Oldham. Partnership tasking 
processes have been developed and since May 2007, they have been driven through 
SNMG [Safer Neighbourhoods Management Group] of the local strategic 
partnership.”733 
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This type of approach to building cohesive communities is referred to in the Cantle 
Report, discussed in section 4.7, Chapter Four, and is clearly moving matters in the 
intended direction. 
 
However, tactical tasking and coordinating group meetings (see section 4.12.1, Chapter 
Four) have evolved into meetings which focus on priority crime and, although there is 
some partnership representation, are principally about police tasking.
734
 Other tasking 
meetings include daily tasking (in line with the National Intelligence Model), and 
monthly “Safer Stronger” partnership tasking at strategic level.735 At the more local 
level, multi-agency partnerships, consisting of local police officers, housing providers, 
local authority departments and representatives of local residents exist,
736
 and in 
Oldham West efforts have been made to take these down to a lower (ward) level.
737
 This 
has met with mixed success owing to the difficulty of full partner support. Where they 
do exist, they provide a means of tasking partners through the police led weekly 
Neighbourhood Police Team intelligence/tasking meeting. 
 
7.2.2 Reflecting the Community 
 
GMP is a large metropolitan police force with some 8,000 police officers.
738
 Table 4 
shows the proportion of officers in GMP and the Oldham Division who are from self-
defined ethnic minority groups: 
 
 
 Total Officers Minority Ethnic 
Officers (%) 
Asian/Asian 
British (%) 
GMP 8053 316 (3.9) 118 (1.5) 
Oldham 449 25 (5.6) N/A 
Table 4: Proportion of officers from self-defined ethnic minority groups as at 31 March 
2007
739
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Although falling short of representing the ethnic make-up of the community, GMP has 
seen an increase of seven officers from ethnic minority groups compared with the 
previous year (2005/06), and they report that this is slow but steady progress.
740
 Further, 
Oldham Division shows a higher proportion of officers from ethnic minority groups. 
Although still falling short of reflecting the ethnic make-up of the community in 
Oldham (see section 5.4.2, Chapter Five), the fact that Oldham Division shows higher 
numbers of officers from ethnic minority groups, just as Oldham itself has a population 
which has higher proportions of ethnic minority communities than most of the rest of 
the Greater Manchester area is encouraging. GMP also has a ‘Positive Action 
Recruitment Team’ actively engaged in recruiting from minority groups.741 
 
Table 5 deals with the issues of recruitment, promotion and retention: 
 
Recruitment Promotion All Reasons for Leaving 
Total White BME(%) Total White BME(%) Total White BME(%) 
359 345 14(3.9) 152 141 11(7.2) 398 384 14(3.5%) 
Table 5: Recruitment, Promotion and Retention of BME staff, 1 April 2006 – 31 March 
2007, Greater Manchester Police
742
 
  
The figures in this table demonstrate that rates of recruitment exceed rates of loss of 
minority ethnic members of staff, resulting in a steady increase of representation. They 
also show promotion rates which exceed percentages of total minority ethnic staff, 
demonstrating encouraging opportunity of progression.  
 
Although this data is a ‘snapshot’, and has not considered aspects of it in greater depth 
(for example, the progression of ethnic minority staff into higher ranks of the 
organisation), overall the picture is one of optimism. There is much work to do in order 
to meet recommendations first articulated by Lord Scarman in 1981, but progress 
appears to be slowly under way.  
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7.2.3 Community Awareness Training 
 
GMP provides diversity awareness training to its entire staff, and has an increasing 
number of external customers.
743
 Publicly available sources are silent on the 
involvement of community representatives in the training, however Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) reported that the Commission for Racial Equality 
(CRE) had noted that training by the force to members of staff contained elements of 
good practice.
744
 HMIC also report other significant strengths in the diversity arena for 
GMP, including inter alia chief officer lead on confidence and equality issues, a force-
wide diversity framework with divisional diversity action groups and Independent 
Advisory Groups (IAGs), which advise the force on service delivery.
745
 The actual 
practical effectiveness of some of these developments is assessed in the research 
component of this thesis through the interviews with members of communities and 
operational staff in Oldham. 
 
7.2.4 The Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
 
In Chapter Two, seminal event 3, I described the activities of Mark Daly, an undercover 
reporter for the BBC, who joined GMP posing as a new recruit. In the programme that 
followed, The Secret Policeman, new recruits to the police service (some from GMP) 
were not only exposed as racist, but also demonstrated the willingness and desire to 
discriminate on the grounds of their prejudices.  This was at a time shortly after the 
enactment of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, which imposed certain 
positive duties on public authorities, including the police (see section 4.5, Chapter 
Four). The positive duties are to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination, promote 
equality of opportunity and to promote good relations between people of different racial 
groups. This then is a statutory requirement, and enshrines the third of the themes into 
law.  The formal investigation of police forces, described in section 4.6, Chapter Four, 
arose directly from The Secret Policeman. GMP was one of 14 forces subject to an 
initial investigation, and who were found to have fallen short of their statutory 
requirements under the Race Relations (Amendment) Act, and as a direct result, entirely 
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re-wrote their race equality scheme with some significant enhancements.
746
 They had 
already responded to The Secret Policeman by establishing a ‘Respect Programme’, 
which focused on key issues arising from consultations and scoping exercises which 
centred on, amongst other things, feedback from communities and staff in the 
immediate aftermath of the programme, and a revisit to ‘Operation Catalyst’, the force 
response to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, examining issues relating to ‘race’ and 
police processes.
747
 The programme board was chaired by the Deputy Chief Constable, 
and was comprised in the majority by lay community members.
748
 Initially then, GMP 
were found wanting, both through the BBC documentary, and the subsequent CRE 
Formal Investigation. However, these two formative experiences galvanised GMP into 
action, and at the time of writing, the force appears to be not only fully compliant with 
the auspices of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act, but also working hard to promote 
racial equality in all areas of its business. By using IAGs capable of influencing service 
delivery, they are also working towards building cohesive communities. This aspect is 
further considered in the following sections. 
 
7.2.5 Neighbourhood Policing  
 
Here I describe the manner in which Neighbourhood Policing has been implemented in 
GMP by referring to the system in Oldham Division generally and Oldham West 
specifically. This will engender an understanding of the policing arrangements in the 
area and, at the same time, demonstrate the wider implementation of Neighbourhood 
Policing by the force. Together with the next section, it constitutes an explanation of the 
‘machinery of local policing delivery’.  
 
Oldham Division was the Neighbourhood Policing (safer neighbourhoods) pathfinder 
site for GMP.
749
 The division is divided into six safer neighbourhood areas, known 
locally as townships, each of which consist of three or four local authority wards.
750
 
Each of these townships has a team of ‘neighbourhood’ police officers and Police 
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Community Support Officers (PCSOs) – all except one led by a police inspector.751 
Oldham West is the busiest of these townships, and the inspector is supported by a team 
of one sergeant, seven constables and 14 PCSOs, although additional staff are provided 
by ‘New Deals for Communities’, which funds two additional constables, and GMP are 
running a 3 year Priority Neighbourhood initiative for a further sergeant and five 
constables for the Alexandra and Coldhurst wards.
752
 The patrol teams, covering the 24 
hour, seven day a week response capability, are the responsibility of a different 
inspector, and although they are theoretically allocated  neighbourhood areas as car 
beats, the reality is that they respond to urgent calls all over the borough at the 
discretion of their supervisors.
753
 The result of this is little continuity of patrol staff 
working in the townships.
754
 Additionally, HMIC noted in 2006 that “there is a 
perception among safer neighbourhood officers that they are frequently abstracted from 
their core role”,755 whilst in 2008, response constables reported that they feel they carry 
heavy workloads and do not get enough support, “particularly from neighbourhood 
teams.” The difficulty of fully integrating the patrol function with Neighbourhood 
Policing is a weakness reflected in many areas, and probably represents the biggest 
challenge to optimum benefit from the Neighbourhood Policing ethos.
756
 So, the 
policing arrangements in Oldham and Oldham West are typical examples of the 
implementation of the Neighbourhood Policing model, with officers dedicated to 
working closely with communities.  
 
I now move on to present qualitative data elicited from interviews and participant 
observation work from the case study. The sections are structured around the five major 
themes from the semi-structured interview questionnaire, but there are 27 sub-themes 
which emerge as a result of the analysis and coding of the data.  
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7.3 Policing and Social Justice 
 
7.3.1 Recruitment and Deployment of Ethnic Minority Staff 
 
Like the UK Police Service in general, data in the previous sections demonstrates that 
Greater Manchester Police struggles to reach targets around the recruitment of ethnic 
minority staff in its pursuit of the second critical success factor identified above – i.e. 
the need to reflect the community served. This problem appears to be compounded by a 
lack of sophistication in the choice of deployment for officers recruited from minority 
communities, and a lack of bespoke training for non-ethnic minority staff deployed to 
areas of high ethnic minority numbers.
757
 Moreover, police staff identify language itself 
as an enormous barrier when engaging with certain communities.
758
 This is a key area in 
which recruits to the service from minority groups can prove to be a win – it is not 
merely some tokenistic virtue linked with legitimacy of policing; local police team-
leaders identify that there are real and tangible benefits,
759
 language being just one. 
Other vital contributions concern the understanding that ethnic minority officers 
engender in others, especially around culture and understanding of Islam. It was said by 
one of the neighbourhood sergeants that “diversity training in the force is limited, you 
only learn it by immersing yourself in the community, and the only way to do that is to 
utilise those members of the team with the appropriate background”. 760 During the 
course of research work with the neighbourhood team, I also observed that this mixture 
of ethnicities within the team engendered some very positive views of each respective 
culture; this complements the notion discussed with the consultation panel I established 
for the construction of the questionnaire,
761
 and appears in a more coherent form in 
section 7.4.8 below entitled ‘The Successful Community’. This lack of success of 
reflecting the make up the community in ethnicity terms is also experienced by the 
council according to a senior member of their communities unit, albeit to a lesser 
degree.
762
 He points out that the turn-over in a large organisation like Oldham Borough 
Council is small, and that to reach the targets will either take a very long time, or there 
has to be massive disproportionality in the numbers of Asian recruits when compared 
with white. The housing department of the council fares a bit better – they report that 
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they deliberately moved people into the department from elsewhere in the organisation 
to overcome language difficulties working closely with communities.
763
 One of the 
supervisors from the neighbourhood management team within the council also reports a 
good diverse mix of staff, similarly reporting that the value brought by these members 
of staff around language and engendering wider understanding is huge.
764
 
 
Although statutory agencies clearly articulate and identify the advantages of having a 
diverse cross-section of cultures and ethnicities within their teams, especially those 
working closely with communities, what about the perception of people from 
communities themselves? Many of the younger interviewees I spoke to had been 
stopped and searched by the police (discussed in more detail in section 7.3.9, below), 
and this has given them, in general, an adverse view of the police whether the officers 
were white or Asian. It was commented by a young Asian male that it would probably 
be good if there were more Asian police officers but made the point that Asian recruits 
would still need to meet the standard.
765
  Another commented that “you hardly see 
any”766, and in general it made no difference to the community members whether or not 
the police officers were Asian or white, they were still police officers, and subjecting 
individuals to stops and searches. One respondent even commented that “..it’s like 
they’ve gone on the other side now…it’s seen as a betrayal in some ways.”767 Linked 
with the discussion above regarding the appropriate deployment of staff to police in 
certain areas, one male Asian respondent observed that it would be helpful for officers 
who lived in the local area to police the local area “because they would know who does 
it [crime], where it goes on.”768  
 
In essence, the major advantages in the second critical success factor appear to lie with 
the organisation itself, manifesting themselves through a better understanding of culture 
and an ability to communicate with minority communities by overcoming the language 
barrier.  The notion that trust from these same minority groups in a state agency like the 
police is automatically elevated as a result of increased ethnic minority representation 
appears to be misguided; legitimacy still needs to be worked at, and appropriate 
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recruitment and deployment of staff drawn from ethnic minority communities should be 
driven by the business need, rather than merely the pursuit of a target.  
 
7.3.2 Use of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) 
 
There are two PCSOs in the team that speak several different languages and, as 
identified above, language is a significant barrier to high quality engagement with 
minority communities. PCSOs have made an enormous impact in this area; the role is 
seen by prospective recruits to the police from ethnic minority communities and, 
crucially, their families, as being much more appropriate than a full-time regular police 
office, partly because communities have difficulties seeing past the uniform, regardless 
of the individual’s background and ability to speak their languages.769 This sits very 
comfortably with the views outlined above from some community members, and raises 
the question of whether the police service should use Genuine Occupational 
Requirements to employ people preferentially from ethnic minority communities for 
deployment as PCSOs in a given area. This gets round the problem of positive 
discrimination but meets an identified business need, and helps towards the delivery of 
the second critical success factor discussed above.  Views from community members 
are a little mixed: “ a lot of PCSOs grass us up man, they see us and call the police.”770 
Others have a positive view of PCSOs and feel that policing is fair.
771
 That PCSOs have 
furthered relationships between the police and Asian communities, both through the 
fundamental reasons for having PCSOs – to work with communities – as well as 
through the recruitment of people from hard-to-reach communities seems undoubted.
772
 
Although not a representative sample, the PCSOs seem to understand the communities 
much better than police officers and they are truly engaged with them. 
 
As part of the fieldwork for this research project, I spent time on foot patrol with an 
Asian PCSO.
 773
 He knew nearly everyone we saw or came across on the beat, including 
young children, and was able to converse with them in their first language. The positive 
impact this had was self-evident, and the opportunity for information and intelligence 
gathering was enormous. This opportunity, and the value in having PCSOs working as 
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part of the safer neighbourhood team more generally, was thoroughly recognised by 
police officers from within the team:  
 
 “There’s an officer, if you can arrange a meting with him, he’s really good, [names 
officer] a Police Community Support Officer, he knows absolutely everybody and 
everything. He’s been here a lot longer, I’ve only been here 12 months. He’s got a 
really good relationship with the Imams, you know, for the Mosques. So if we’ve got 
a particular problem in the area, then, he speaks Urdu as well, and that’s obviously a 
great benefit because that’s the language the majority of people speak on this area. He 
goes into the Mosques and he puts the message out to all the communities that are 
coming in regular, so that’s been good. I take him out quite a lot with me, for my own 
purposes as well you know, because sometimes, I’ve learned a couple of words, you 
know, at the front door to get past and get a bond with people, but he’s a really good 
benefit.”774 
 
And: 
 
“Couldn’t do it with out them. We haven’t got enough cops to do what we need to do. 
The PCSOs are brilliant. We’ve got some fantastic PCSOs.”775 
 
The fourth critical success factor distilled from the work of Scarman and others, 
critically examined in Chapter Four, describes the importance and value that must be 
attached to the local officer who is part of the Neighbourhood Policing team. Any role 
the police have to play in the reduction of risk associated with the development of 
harmful radicalisation or raised community tension will clearly rest heavily on those 
officers with that crucial community role, and PCSOs appear to be very successful in 
the theatre of the case study.  
 
7.3.3 Opportunities for Intervention 
 
Although linked to questions around partnerships, identity and influence, together with 
whispers and rumours discussed below, it is worth examining intervention opportunities 
here as part of the effectiveness of the National Intelligence Model. The precise 
mechanics and theory behind this model are examined and discussed in Chapter Four, 
and the intended method of delivery in the theatre of the case-study is outlined in the 
preceding chapter.  
 
A situation is described by one police respondent (though several others make reference 
to the same situation) whereby the development of radicalisation was identified by 
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youth services, i.e. a partner agency.
776
 Here, the issue was identified through the use of 
a kick-pitch by a group of young Asians not normally engaged in using the kick-pitch. 
Members of staff communicated this issue to the PCSOs, and intelligence was 
submitted, and then there was a pause to see what happened. There was no thought from 
within the local teams that intervention might occur immediately and that responsibility 
for initiating and leading that intervention might lie with them. Why? Is this a fault of a 
reliance on the infrastructure around the National Intelligence Model to effectively task 
a response? A supervisor of the neighbourhood management teams at the council also 
cannot be sure that warning signs and appropriate mitigation activity would occur, 
although he remains optimistic that it would be.
777
 There are some important barriers to 
prompt and effective mitigation activity, which are linked with the problems associated 
with partnership working, discussed below. But of course, the question remains, how do 
you intervene successfully and with credibility? Chapter Four introduces Briggs et al 
(2006), who examine the work of the Muslim Contact Unit which conducted pioneering 
partnership work in London, engaging credible (although controversial in some cases), 
individuals from Muslim communities to work with the police to ‘switch off’ the 
radicalisation process.
778
 This approach finds resonance in Oldham: 
 
 
“..if people are getting drawn into extremism in the name of Islam, the only people 
who are going to have any clout with them in terms of influencing that thinking is 
actually other Muslims who have a really detailed understanding of Islam, and who 
can say no, no, that’s not what the Qur’an is about.” 779 
 
 
One of the interviewees is used by the police and the local authority to engage with 
harder-to-reach communities, and whilst he may not be described as radical, he has a 
lengthy criminal record for a number of serious offences; yet his influence is such that 
the agencies are keen to use him. He has this to say on the subject: 
 
“I think it would be good if we engaged with certain radical people, and reason with 
them…not sit here and tell them we have come to beat you… This is sensible.” 780 
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There are clearly opportunities for intervention, and there are opportunities for using 
key people from within communities who carry much more credibility that the agencies 
themselves to assist. But there are barriers to the success of such an approach, and these 
are discussed below.  
 
During the course of the participant observation component of the research, I attended a 
‘tasking’ meeting chaired by a police superintendent.781 This was a multi-agency 
meeting, and was well placed to meet the intention of the National Intelligence Model:  
 
 
“It is intended to promote a cooperative approach to policing since many of the 
solutions to problems will require the participation of other agencies and bodies 
which is further strengthened with joint tasking and co-ordination processes.”782 
 
 
But the meeting was attended by over forty people. There was a focus on performance 
issues (police) and was a reporting mechanism for progress against targets (crime 
reduction and ‘sanction detections’ – Home Office approved resolutions to crimes - in 
the main). There was no discussion about community tension, radicalisation, local 
problems of crime and disorder, and no tasking of resources. It amounted to a good 
intention but a missed opportunity.  
 
7.3.4 The ‘Trust Deficit’ 
 
The concept of legitimacy and policing by consent is introduced in Chapter Two, and 
then expanded upon in Chapter Three, where the legitimacy of the state is discussed.  In 
the theatre of the case study, there appear to be factors which contribute to a ‘trust 
deficit’ between some state authorities, especially the police, and the Asian 
communities, which focuses attention on the question of police legitimacy. It is 
articulated in its strongest form by a key member of a third sector organisation in the 
town, although he acknowledges that politically it is not something the police would be 
keen to admit.
783
 He describes the application of the laws on terrorism, examined in 
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Chapter Four – and specifically refers to the glorification of terrorism, using an example 
from Oldham: 
 
 
“It’s a stupid stupid law, and it’s a stupid stupid prosecution but it’s happening in all 
our names, and how it’s going to be reported I do not know, but how it is going to be 
understood by Muslim communities in Oldham is of victimisation….. the trust gap 
between the police and the community has suddenly got a lot bigger.”784 
 
 
He points out that the decision to prosecute had no connection whatsoever with the local 
authority and the local police. So we have a situation whereby the trust gap between the 
police and the Muslim communities has increased as a direct result of a decision made 
at a distance from the community. A leading member of the local safer neighbourhood 
team says this: 
 
“Generally, Oldham is one of those towns where the community is broadly supportive 
of the police. Certainly when I speak to officers who have worked in other parts of 
Greater Manchester, more urban areas, more city centre areas, they would comment 
on the support, they get a different attitude, a different approach, the police are not the 
enemy here, as much, not saying that’s across the board, I mean this was more so in 
the immediate aftermath of the disturbances , that there was always one rule, the 
police always behave one way towards white British residents and a different way 
towards Asian heritage residents, and those accusations come at us from both sides. 
It’s still there to a certain extent amongst those people who have hardly any, or who 
have deeply entrenched views along those lines but I think it’s easier now, and I think 
there is a perception that the police are even handed now, more widely, although 
some of those hard held beliefs are still there in the hardcore and the public are 
broadly supportive of the police..”785 
 
The trust deficit is a critical issue recognised by the strategic lead for Prevent within 
Greater Manchester Police: 
 
“You know, it’s about how you build up trust and confidence to the point where like 
you said earlier on, a lot of the communities don’t want radicals, they don’t want the 
violent extremists, they don’t want these people who run off to terror training camps 
and all the rest of it. So we want to get to the point where there is sufficient trust and 
confidence for them to say actually there’s an issue about foreign policy that we want 
to talk about, or there’s an issue about you know we’ve got concerns about 
individuals within our community, and we’ve got concerns about this particular 
group, and they’re starting to talk about the terrorism agenda, and you can’t, I don’t 
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think you can always go in and say, OK neighbourhood policing, right, let’s talk 
about counter terrorism, because the door will be slammed in our face.”786  
 
 
A female Pakistani ‘elder’ also describes a latent mistrust of the police by the Asian 
community, especially Pakistanis, but this is owing to the corrupt nature of the police in 
Pakistan. She identifies that this latent mistrust makes it extremely difficult for the 
police in the UK to engage with this section of the community, whether it is in relation 
to drug dealers, the investigation of murders, or counter terrorism/radicalisation.
787
  
 
In essence, the police appear to have a well-developed understanding of the need to 
narrow the trust gap in order to maximise the flow of community intelligence and 
information to tackle threats, which includes development of harmful radicalisation as 
well as drug dealing. Yet their efforts appear to be hampered by decisions that they have 
to take apparently in the wider interests of the community, as well as dealing with pre-
existing latent mistrust born out of cultural differences from some parts of these 
communities. Whilst always being a point of tension, critical to success here is the link 
between NIM levels one, two and three – i.e. how effectively local neighbourhood 
policing is servicing and working to reduce perceived threats at force level and beyond. 
 
7.3.5 Partnerships and Silos 
 
The effectiveness of partnership working is brought into sharp relief by speaking with 
the partners themselves; communities are on the receiving end of outputs, and therefore 
less able to comment on how well partnerships operate. The first critical success factor 
distilled from the policies and edicts in Chapter Four, from which Neighbourhood 
Policing and the machinery of local policing delivery springs, identifies how important 
effective partnership working is, and within the locale there is much partnership work 
going on. For instance, one of the members of the council’s neighbourhood 
management team said: 
 
“Our action teams are multi-partnership, and we’re looking at issues now. So if we’ve 
got a high burglary rate, we’ll go in and try and target harden, you know, securing 
houses – the physical stuff that we can do. Anti social behaviour, you know, we’ll put 
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more people on the street, look at where they are selling alcohol, all that type of 
stuff.” 788 
 
 
But there is also a lot of ‘silo working’, whereby organisations focus on their area of 
responsibility only.  A housing officer commented: 
 
 
“It’s quite clear you can identify with the deprived areas, but I think the problem 
arises, as you get, as gets raised all the time, you work for an agency, what exactly are 
you responsible for?  And its trying to work out some kind of responsibility, it seems 
to be, and again perhaps people within our sector are guilty of it as well, where they 
would just say, well, is it a housing related matter? No it’s not, right, well it’s not 
our.. and the same with social services. We have a major issue between ourselves and 
them, you sort of say, well, we’re not really responsible for that. But you can’t have, 
if you’re trying to impact in an area, and improve it, it can’t be lack of my, there are 
grey areas, and someone has to be responsible for those grey areas. Well at the 
moment, there just isn’t.” 789 
 
 
A PCSO, (and, as indicated above, PCSOs might be considered to be the principal 
means by which the police engage with the community), talks about a man from 
Connexions; he was unable to name this man, but he thought it was his responsibility to 
engage wayward youngsters – the PCSO had no idea how successful the man from 
Connexions was, and was not wholly aware of the role he himself had to play.
790
   
 
Key police staff continue the theme of partnerships not functioning as effectively as 
they could, with the notion that staff from the council do not get out into the community 
as much as they should, and through apologising for his view, it is clearly a source of 
frustration for some: 
 
“We’ll persevere. It’s not easy, but like I say, it would be easy if all the multi 
agencies got their fingers out, and I apologise for saying that. They need to be 
listening to people and, you know, too often these glossy magazines, leaflets, this is 
what we do, and that’s fine, but who’s going to read a glossy magazine? Get out there 
and just talk. Communicate with people, it’s easy.” 791  
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Neither is the journey towards effective partnership work with community groups 
smooth, despite the advantages of such an approach in brokering better relationships 
with sections of the community as discussed above. This appears to be, in part, because 
of the shifting sands of various agency agendas, which in turn are linked to the fickle 
political winds of change. The second interview of key individuals from a community 
group working for racial equality provides evidence of this problem. The group has 
experienced a decline in interest as the agenda has changed. The weekly meetings with 
the police and the council which focused on hate crime have been replaced by the 
Oldham community tension framework, so the police and the council are now engaging 
with others instead.
792
 In this case, the Preventing Violent Extremism agenda, discussed 
below, has altered the perspective and affected the flow of funding streams.   
 
7.3.6 The ‘Democratic Deficit’, the ‘Homeland’ and ‘Tribal Influence’ 
 
Two key police respondents talk about how important ‘the homeland’ is – that it is more 
important than what is going on in the local community, and thus introduce the concept 
of a flaw in the democratic system amongst Asian communities.
793
 A community 
respondent also says “Asian politics is complicated because it is tribal”.794 This is 
developed more explicitly by others from community groups, who talk passionately 
about the local ‘democratic deficit’ – arguing that local representatives have been 
corrupted by the British political system.
795
 The mainstream politicians have cultured 
relationships with people from the community – the heads of clans – who then mobilise 
members of their ‘Biraderi’ – clan – to vote. The BBC have previously reported on the 
damaging nature of the Biraderi networks, describing the term as meaning 
‘brotherhood’, and then explaining that they are essentially tribal networks influencing 
nearly 1 million of the UK’s Pakistani population, and are extensions of systems of 
allegiance in Pakistan itself.
796
  The result of this is that the young Muslim who is 
radicalised politically by foreign policy has nowhere to go – he perceives a complete 
lack of opportunity to be elected. This is potentially hugely damaging: it plays directly 
into the notion of a lack of political representation being a contributor to 
disenfranchised groups, and makes no distinction based on poverty or education 
(arguably, the more educated will be more profoundly affected by this situation.)  
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Other, more independent respondents also identify this phenomenon. One, a prominent 
member of the infrastructure of the town, who was directly involved in the riots of 
2001, and who has been associated with Oldham for over forty years, talks about a 
political driver which might contribute to increasing distrust and tension: 
 
 
“….because the volatile political areas in Oldham are in the sort of inner city areas 
around the town centre, and both the major parties, the liberal democrats and the 
labour party knew that to get control of the council, they needed to have a majority of 
seats in these areas. So they were inclined to throw money at these areas. And that 
obviously created a tension in the poorer white communities…”797 
 
 
These arguments, which start to describe a particularly murky political environment 
since they imply transparency operating within a transparent democratic process but are 
in reality corrupt, are lent further weight by an example provided by a key police 
respondent.
798
 He cites an example of a young person complaining about her elected 
representative bringing tribal practices to Oldham – essentially the same argument 
described above. The affiliation has nothing to do with representing the interests of the 
local area, and much more to do with ancient tribal provenance. Community members 
themselves comment that whether councillors were Asian or not, they are not very 
representative,
799
 and one prominent ‘elder’ comments that it is OK in terms of 
accountability to have councillors irrespective of background in general terms, provided 
that they understand their duty to the whole community, although he acknowledges the 
advantage of having Asian councillors to tackle language and cultural barriers.
800
 
 
7.3.7 Whispers, Rumours and Tension Monitoring 
 
One of the purposes behind the fourth critical success factor described above is to 
enable members of local Neighbourhood Policing teams to work ‘cheek by jowl’ with 
the communities they serve. Chapter Four describes how the machinery of local 
policing delivery works in theory, outlining the principles behind Neighbourhood 
Policing and the National Intelligence Model, whilst the mechanics which exist in the 
theatre of the case study are provided above. The fuel which feeds Neighbourhood 
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Policing and the National Intelligence Model is the flow of information and intelligence 
from communities and individuals via local teams, through the assessment and tasking 
process, and then the allocation of resources to mitigate the problem. During the course 
of the participant observation phases of the fieldwork, I saw this in action: the gathering 
of community intelligence during various phases of foot-patrol,
801
 the discussion of the 
analytical product at a tasking meeting, and then how resources should be allocated to 
tackle crime hotspots.
802
 Of crucial and highly significant importance to the research 
was the identification of the value of ‘whispers’ or ‘feelings’. In assessing tension 
within communities, previous measures, outlined and discussed at some length in the 
review of literature in general terms in Chapter Three, and then more specifically in 
relation to Oldham (above), have included increased levels of racist crime for instance, 
or assaults on police officers. But various respondents refer to “feelings”, those ‘softer 
things’ which local neighbourhood management or policing teams might ‘pick up’ 
during the course of their close interaction with communities, and groups of 
individuals.
803
 For instance, a neighbourhood manager from the council says this in 
relation to the teams’ monitoring of tensions: 
 
“Between us, PCSOs, housing association, what we’re looking for is that touchy-
feely stuff you can’t explain. It’s just people commenting to you and, it’s something 
slightly different this week…” 804 
 
This is reinforced by a police officer from the neighbourhood team: 
 
“…there’s been a few things that have happened that have not been reported, you 
know, they tend to sort them out themselves, and we only find out that information by 
speaking to people…”805 
 
And a PCSO from the same team talks about how the use of a kick-pitch came to light 
through talking to people, and how this led to the identification of a group on the 
radicalisation route; this was exposed through listening and talking to communities, not 
through the analysis of quantitative data.
806
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This makes an interesting comparison with Dave Sloggett’s rumours theory, which 
describes how rumours, in dangerous circumstances, may be of an extreme nature and 
become rapidly embellished over short time frames.
 807
 He argues that it is of crucial 
importance therefore to make sure that law and order officials maintain contacts with 
key individuals within communities to assess the traction such rumours gain within 
those communities.
808
 The value and importance of whispers and rumours in the 
assessment of community tension, and what contribution they might make, is revisited 
in the following chapter.  
 
7.3.8 Asymmetric Resourcing and Community Tension 
 
The build-up to the unrest and the resulting riots that occurred in Oldham in 2001 are 
presented in seminal event 4, Chapter Two, and further analysed as part of the review of 
academic literature in Chapter Three. Here, there is a discussion about the way in which 
Asian communities were discriminated against by the local agencies (see Ahmed et al 
(2001) in particular),
809
 and how this discrimination contributed to the backlash. One 
interviewee who is currently working within the neighbourhood management team at 
the council feels that the “alleged discrimination against Asians, which was supposed to 
have provided the tinder prior to the riots of 2001 was perception rather than reality”.810 
He was working for the council at the time and is an ex-police officer. The distinction 
between perception and reality is, however, somewhat blurred. A community 
respondent, also talking about the riots, and how Asian communities might react to 
perceived unfairness states: 
 
“They don’t know how to. One of the ways [is] they just get frustrated and they say 
the police is racist, the court is racist, everyone is racist, they just get really angry and 
then brand everybody as racist when they are not..”811 
 
 
The way in which these perceptions work inevitably varies, depending on one’s 
position, making the mission of agencies even more problematic. It is certainly true that 
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the most deprived areas were (and still are) occupied by mostly Asian communities; the 
reasons for this are discussed at some length in preceding chapters. According to one 
respondent from the media, this creates a perception of favourable treatment – these 
areas attract higher levels of funding, to the exclusion of white working class estates, 
and the perception then is that Asian people are treated more favourably: 
 
 
“There was a huge perception that a lot of money was being spent on the Asian 
communities to the exclusion of the poor white communities on the council estates. 
To some extent, in fact to a large extent, that was true, because the volatile political 
areas in Oldham are in the sort of inner city areas around the town centre, and both 
the major parties, the liberal democrats and the labour party knew that to get control 
of the council, they needed to have a majority of seats in these areas. So they were 
inclined to throw money at these areas. And that obviously created a tension in the 
poorer white communities. And also brought us into contact with our friends in the 
BNP.” 812  
 
 
 
Interestingly, this notion appears to have some current support. The Head of the 
Communities Unit at Oldham Borough Council said: 
 
“To be honest, I would say all communities really [have a lack of trust]. I mean, if 
you look at our survey results about people’s perceptions of the area, and of the 
council, actually probably the ethnic minority communities are more positive than the 
white communities…” 813 
 
 
This can very readily have the effect of building community tension. In 2001, it 
provided an opportunity for the BNP to develop a power base, further enhancing and 
exploiting these community differences. The evidence appears to suggest that Asian 
communities, whilst living in the most deprived areas, are not further penalised by a 
lack of financial investment by the local authority. Consequently, the perceptions of 
communities, which I examine in more detail below, become highly relevant. 
 
7.3.9 Police and Young People 
 
One respondent, who works for the council to reduce Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB), and 
who is another ex-police officer, is of the view that attitudes towards the police will 
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vary between ‘Asian kids and white kids’.814 He also concurs with the thrust of the 
notion that the police are seen as representatives of the state, and that the actions of the 
police could further alienate these groups: 
 
 
“And it’s all negative. It’s all negative towards.. They don’t name names if you like 
about communities, but it is geared towards the Muslim community. Certainly that’s 
the perception. If it’s the perception of us as white people it’s going to be the 
perception of the Muslim community, the victim again, so you are opening up doors 
for people to come in and say ‘I know you’re the victim, lets pay these bastards back. 
Lets do something that’s going to…’ Yeah, why not? Because everything else has 
failed.” 815 
 
 
It is of some concern then that the views of many of the younger respondents, especially 
the Asians, were negative. Many of them had been stopped and searched by the police, 
with a perception that it was for no purpose: 
 
“Yeah, I’ve been stopped and searched for nothing, I haven’t been searched, and still 
they sent a letter to my house saying I been in a robbery area, doing this and doing 
that, what’s that all about?” 816 
 
 
It was also said that there were delays when they called the police and yet when people 
call the police in relation to them, they show up within a few minutes: 
 
 
“Yesterday after college, I went down to the area, and there was some boys in this 
house, it was like caged up, but there was some boys in there anyway, and we called 
the police and they didn’t turn up. I was waiting there like a good 45 minutes, they 
didn’t even turn up. And if we didn’t call them, and some white person call them 
yeah, then they would be there in five minutes.” 817  
 
 
This perception enhances the notion that the police act in a discriminatory way, 
potentially increasing feelings of disenfranchisement. Interestingly, one white female 
respondent asserts that “Most coppers are racist”, and says she gets treated differently 
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by the police when she ‘hangs around with Asians’.818 This view of racism amongst 
police officers gains some support from two young Pakistani respondents, who think the 
police are racist in the way they act towards Asians.
819
 Another, also a Pakistani, 
reckons that “the police are muppets, not good for anything.” 820 
 
It is, however, clear that PCSOs in particular are doing much to promote the 
relationship between young people and the police. I saw this during the foot patrol I 
carried out,
821
 but it was also independently confirmed by a local youth group leader: 
 
“In the past, police wouldn’t have gone to youth clubs, but now the PCSOs do. They 
are promoting relationships between community and police partners.” 822 
 
The challenge for the police in these circumstances is that their interactions on the street 
are a vital and necessary part of tackling drugs and crime – a fact acknowledged by 
some respondents: 
 
“Well, they [the police] are doing their job but it’s not good enough is it. The people 
that are dealing stuff, they are still on the road. Fair enough, you see the police 
patrolling in the area, but what’s the point, crime is still going on.” 823 
 
But such interactions will inevitably result in a negative perception. The key is to 
equalise the perception across different groups. 
 
7.4 Local Social Conditions 
 
7.4.1 Polarisation and Community Tension 
 
At the beginning of one interview, the respondent, a member of the Bangladeshi 
community who is also a volunteer at the Oldham Muslim Centre, continues the theme 
initiated in the first section of the current chapter, and provides ‘on the ground’ support 
for the argument that Oldham is a divided community, although he does indicate that 
people have come together more in recent years than before.
824
 He also makes a clear 
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link between lack of education and jobs, and also a gang culture, discussed in more 
detail below. This notion of a divided community is described in more explicit detail by 
some local staff, who are able to define the boundaries between communities down to 
street level: “..Rochdale Road divides the Coldhurst side from the Westwood side, 
Westwood side is predominantly Bangladeshi community, the Coldhurst side 
predominantly the white British working class community.”825 The lack of 
understanding between communities springing forth from such divisions is profound, 
and is played out within the responses amongst the community respondents. For 
instance, one white respondent talks about disrespect from some members of the Asian 
community in that they use their own language when in the company of others who 
cannot understand them.
826
 He is 75% convinced that people are ‘radical’ so far as Islam 
is concerned in Oldham, and seems to partly base this on their reluctance to speak 
English, so it is difficult to know what is going on.
827
 There is also a distinct difference 
in those Muslims who describe their national origins as Bangladeshi as opposed to 
Pakistani. Some of this is observed by others. For instance, two white female (non-
Muslim) respondents both suggest that Bengalis have more respect for people than 
Pakistanis (though both have Pakistani boyfriends), and there is an implied tension 
between these groups; one male Pakistani respondent states that Bengalis “have no 
manners, repeat, no manners.” 828 
 
What role do the police have to play in the resolution of such differences, especially in 
support of the fifth critical success factor identified, above? 
 
There are a number of contributory factors identified by interviewees giving rise to this 
situation. One, an elder female, seen as a community ‘wise woman’ where others go for 
advice, expresses the view that in the 25 years she has been in Oldham, relations 
between the Asians and the Whites has turned from the Whites hating the Asians to the 
Asians hating the whites, and that this is a function of the bad treatment of the older 
generation of Asians when they first came to Oldham.
829
 She develops this further in her 
ideas around the reasons why young Asian men pick fights with young white men – she 
claims it is as a result of the perceived treatment of older people when they first settled 
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in the town.
830
 Another argument put forwards by a Pakistani male from a third sector 
organisation identifies that Asians are frequently employed in low paid and fringe jobs 
like taxi driving.
831
 He argues that “white kids will get drunk and are then driven home 
by Asian taxi drivers – who then tell their wives and family about ‘drunk white kids’”, 
and this then reinforces a negative opinion of white people which is very damaging to 
social cohesion.
832
  
 
Amongst people who have lived and worked in Oldham for longer periods of time, and 
who have observed or been a part of the expansion of Asian communities, the 
development of these divisions has taken time to evolve. One, a prominent white 
member of the community who works in local media, does not believe that there was 
tension between ethnic groups for the first two or three decades.
833
 Another, who 
arrived from Pakistan in the early 1970s, describes how the Asian people kept 
themselves to themselves – working long shifts seven days a week at the cotton mills, 
tending to avoid mixing at all, and therefore not experiencing any prejudice.
834
 This 
tends to support the intellection, discussed in Chapter Three, that it takes that long for 
communities to become polarised, and for urban unrest to occur.
835
 
 
Taken together, all this tends to indicate that divisiveness in communities breeds 
distrust, and makes communities vulnerable to exploitation through political or quasi-
political means, just as the BNP did in the build up to the riots of 2001.  
 
7.4.2 Deprivation 
 
It has already been demonstrated in this thesis that the study area experiences extremely 
high levels of deprivation. The question, then, is to what degree does this level of 
deprivation contribute to the risk of the development of harmful radicalisation? One 
Pakistani police respondent said this: 
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“I understand radicalisation as in it’s the young people particularly who in one sense, 
you know, have no opportunities, no aspirations perhaps, they feel down in the 
doldrums.” 836 
 
 
This is his understanding of radicalisation. Given his links with the community and his 
faith, this is quite interesting. He is also firmly of the view that a lack of employment 
and education opportunities increase vulnerability of young people.  This is not the view 
of a Bangladeshi member of a third sector organisation, who had this to say in response 
to the issue of Asians living in socially deprived areas: 
 
 
“That’s not going to radicalise, that will just create distrust in the institution, the 
police and the council, that will just create distrust, that’s all. That’s not going to turn 
them into terrorists.”837 
 
 
Others are also sceptical. A member of the council’s community unit suggests this: 
 
 
“I think we’ve got a set of assumptions around this, and I don’t think there’s the 
evidence base at the moment, at a common sense level it kind of makes sense, but I’m 
not sure that there is the evidence base yet around extremism, you know, what are the 
real risk factors for people generally, and young men in particular being drawn into 
it.”838 
 
 
This theme relates directly to the construction of the hypothesis in Chapter Three, and I 
return to it in the final chapter, but the idea that deprivation in itself is a major 
contributory factor in the development of harmful radicalisation finds little evidence in 
the case study locale; and deprivation crosses the cultural divide: there are very poor 
white communities too. 
 
7.4.3 Identity and Vulnerability 
 
The issue of identity and vulnerability also goes to the heart of the construction of the 
hypothesis. That these things exist amongst some of the communities in Oldham 
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appears to be accepted fact. A PCSO with 6 months service talked about a minority of 
18 to 25 years of age people who are ‘lost’.839 He goes on to describe how they are 
money orientated, and influenced by a culture which has come over from America. It’s 
reflected in the music, and he thinks they look up to it. They see people in valuable cars, 
and aspire to achieve the same. This is examined further in subsequent sections, but it 
links with observations by other respondents.
840
 Indeed, I saw it for myself: on an 
independent visit to Werneth, I saw young lads driving Range Rovers and Golf GTIs in 
deprived neighbourhoods, and it was oddly incongruous.
841
 Controversially, the same 
PCSO thinks that ‘they’, and by this he means young Asian men, want the money but 
do not want to work for it.
842
 Might it be the case that the opportunities don’t exist for 
one reason or another?  He answers the question regarding those that are lost, and 
therefore capable of being influenced and directed, in the affirmative, but he sees it as 
an opportunity for him as a PCSO. This is fascinating and represents the first 
opportunity for intervention – mitigating the risk of someone else doing it for harmful 
or criminal purposes – although the upshot of not intervening is not recognised by this 
PCSO.  
  
Another PCSO from the team expresses the view that the prevalence of single parent 
families contributes to the vulnerability of young males to a raft of external influences 
which may lead to harmful activity.
843
 Such harmful activity he identifies as including 
drug taking, alcohol abuse, ASB and radicalisation, and he suggests that the fact that 
their single mothers do not speak English amplifies this problem.
844
 
 
A key respondent from a third sector organisation in the town makes reference to the 
generational differences,
845
 a point which illustrates the debate around identity 
discussed in Chapter Three. Whose culture and values do you affiliate with? Your 
friends or your family? Your country or your community? He develops the theme with 
the idea that people, young people especially, need to be ‘rooted’ in a culture which 
satisfies them across a range of areas. This is interesting because it serves to minimise 
risk. If the ‘rooting’ is right, vulnerability is lower and hence the risk is lower – of 
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crime, of gang related behaviour (discussed below) and of vulnerability to harmful 
radicalisation.
846
 He describes those that are “psychologically damaged” – people who 
have not led consistent lifestyles, not been fully accepted, not been able to create for 
themselves – “which doesn’t mean that they may not be fully functioning human 
beings, and people with degrees”.847 This last point is very important in terms of dealing 
with the poverty/education/ radicalisation link, discussed at length in Chapter Three. It 
implies that those who become radicalised may well be highly educated. A superficial 
glance at an individual’s antecedence is insufficient: a detailed examination of 
influences and experiences, including exposure to issues such as low-level racism (anti-
locution), is likely to be much more illuminating. 
 
In a similar vein, a respondent who works for the council as an ASB officer, also talks 
about the conflict in young Asians minds because he thinks they are being westernised 
on the one hand and yet have their cultural and religious teachings on the other, and that 
this creates tensions.
848
 This issue is identified by others, and one who works for a 
college, acknowledges that it must be very difficult for some Asian students, as if 
“they’re almost living in two worlds.”849 I posed a question to a prominent Head of an 
educational establishment about identity, and whether tension exists in the minds of 
young Asian people: 
 
 
“…I’m really interested in this, because it must create a big question mark in young 
people’s minds about who do I identify with, do I identify with my peer group, who 
will have and display behaviours and things which are at odds with my other option, 
which is to identify with my parents and my religion, and which way am I going to 
jump?”850 
 
 
However, the young Asians I spoke to indicated very little of this tension, they say that 
it is all to do with self, and what they themselves can achieve.
851
 They identify that 
being a Muslim is a struggle and therefore there will be degrees of success. It appears to 
be little different to other behaviour that young people engage in, whether that is unsafe 
sex, speeding, smoking etc. So although these contradictions exist, the notion that they 
                                                 
846
 Ibid 
847
 Ibid 
848
 B0025 op cit 
849
 C0030(b) 
850
 C0030(a) 
851
 For example, A0034 op cit, A0039(a) op cit, A0039(b) op cit 
 243 
somehow create tension, and increase vulnerability does not appear to have much 
substance, at least amongst the individuals themselves. 
 
One interviewee, a white member of staff at a school, refers to boys finding an 
allegiance with ‘gangs’ based on locality, and this is more of an issue in recent years 
than it was.
852
 What does this mean about role models, and the search for an identity? 
Continuing the theme, she also states: 
 
 
“In terms of their position in society or within a structure, a gang warfare, that’s 
really outwith the college isn’t it, and we always have this that within the college, we 
have very good race relations, and we have very little of the tension that seems to be 
going on outside. I don’t feel particularly well enough informed to give you any 
specific view on that, I think it is endemic in a minority, where you have a minority 
group who are trying to assert themselves in an area, and that happens in a lot of 
places doesn’t it?”853 
 
 
This is an interesting observation on the reaction of ‘oppressed’ groups in society, 
where it was identified that some common roots around terrorism and urban unrest 
might be identified; it is intrinsically linked to the common roots theory advanced in 
Chapter Three, and I return to it in the following chapter. 
 
There are links coming forwards in this theme around identity and vulnerability to gang 
related behaviour and other types of crime. A respondent from a prominent position in 
the Communities Unit within Oldham Borough Council talks about identity, and the fact 
that different paths might be taken at a crucial point in someone’s life.854 Those paths 
might be criminality and gang related behaviour, or radicalisation, but he would not be 
drawn on the suggestion that these phenomena have common roots because he feels the 
evidence base is not currently there. He also talks about intervention where extremism is 
identified, and suggests that this should form part of the common assessment framework 
methodology, and therefore dovetail with any other interventions which might be 
required.
855
 The links to gang related and criminal behaviour are brought out again in 
subsequent themes, below, and discussed in the following chapter. 
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7.4.4 Mr Big, Mr Parent, Mr Radical 
 
Following very naturally on from the theme of identity is the issue of what the 
prominent influences are within the sphere of those that might be vulnerable. Who 
might they look to for inspiration? Who might they model themselves on? Very early 
on, the notion of ‘Mr Big’ was introduced to me by a Pakistani PCSO.856 He paints a 
picture of ‘Mr Big’ in a short punchy statement: “Range Rover, Bling bling”.857 The 
essence of the intellection is that young Asian men are driving around extremely 
deprived neighbourhoods in very expensive cars, they are heavily bejewelled, and they 
are presenting an image of wealth. The upshot? “I want some of that”858 – ‘Mr Big’ then 
becomes a role model. A local youth worker agreed with the notion of Mr Big, saying 
that young people used to look up to their elders, but now they look up to Mr Big -  role 
models have changed.
859
 He suggests that they see the ‘elders’ as people who put 
restrictions on them and therefore they do not perceive them as role models which 
consequently creates a gap. Furthermore, heroin is coming in through Oldham, and 
Dads of young people are going to prison. In a quote which serves to reinforce the 
defensive view of Mr Big expressed by one of the young Asian respondents, below, the 
youth worker said this: 
 
 “They [the young people] watch the stuff on the telly, and justify other young people 
–‘he’s a nice bloke’. ‘Mr Big’ has influence, and so do other role models, there is a 
risk of radicalisation in Oldham”.860  
 
 
He suggests that educating the community from within is the key to saying that certain 
role models are unacceptable. That this phenomenon exists is undoubted – as outlined 
above, I saw it for myself, and other respondents have identified the same thing.
861
 One, 
with extensive experience of working in the third sector in connection with race equality 
issues, refers to those ‘guys’ dripping with gold and driving BMW cars, linking it to 
poverty but also a lack of satisfaction with their lot.
862
 The younger generation do not 
want to follow in their father’s footsteps, into running taxis or working in takeways, 
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they want more, influenced as they are by Western material gain as a measure of 
success.
863
 There is then a heady mix here – culture and tradition on the one hand, 
boredom and a lack of fulfilment on the other. Drugs and crime beckon. What else? So 
how close is the link between drugs, crime and radicalisation? I discuss this issue in the 
following chapter. 
 
Many of the young Asian respondents were defensive about ‘Mr Big’: 
 
  
“Yeah, it’s like the police nowadays think that if you drive a sporty car, if you are 
wearing a gold chain, wearing like four or five bracelets, they think this guy is doing 
something dodgy, illegal yeah? So we need to keep an eye on him, but at the end of 
the day if you think about it, it’s more going to be a business or something, if a guy 
owns three or four shops, the money they get from that it’s like, what they earn in 
profit, they can spend it on what they like, they can spend it on what they desire.”864 
 
And: 
 
“That doesn’t mean they are selling drugs now does it? It’s the Asian boy innit, in his 
flashy car, with the bling, and the, yeah? And the police look at that and pull him, for 
what? Drugs. How do they know, how do the police know he hasn’t been working all 
his life for that?”865 
 
One of the ‘elder’ respondents describes a generation gap, which links to the cultural 
tension argument – the traditional form of an Islamic way of life versus the more 
‘westernised’ behaviour. He argues that elders brought up in the East [Pakistan] brought 
with them habits and cultures and they try to impose the same thing on their children.
866
 
But there is much less respect – and there is a need to spend more time with children 
because time not spent with them means they have no role models, and then they are out 
on the streets and looking up to ‘yobbos’ instead of people at home.867 This is not quite 
confirmed by one of those who  was actually brought up in Pakistan; he does not speak 
English, but he describes coming from Pakistan to Oldham to work in the cotton mills 
‘for a better life’ in the 1970s.868 There they would work for 14 hours a day, and there 
was very little time to interact – he is firmly of the view that it is worth going to 
university, getting educated and getting a degree. This is at odds with most of the 
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experience and opportunity of those young Asians in Oldham. He argues that respect is 
a big thing in the family and chastising is important, but it has largely stopped, 
especially in schools. Parents should be role models and they are not.  
 
In relation to anti-social behaviour (ASB), one respondent, who works for the council, 
comments that there is a big difference between ‘Asian kids’ and ‘white kids’ – Asian 
kids do not do ASB on their doorsteps – they go elsewhere, owing to extended family in 
neighbourhoods.
869
 White kids do not care and do it on the doorstep.
870
 This makes it far 
more difficult to identify and therefore engage with Asian kids. But clearly there is a 
role model gap which is being exploited, and which offers opportunities for state 
agencies to minimise risk. 
 
7.4.5 Drugs, Girls and Alcohol 
 
There is a common thread from the police, and to some extent the partner agencies, that 
the issues are about drugs, money and girls. For instance, the local police leader says: 
 
“…I’m trying to move us all away from talking about race because the reality is that 
some of the things that look like they are about race are actually about money and 
girls.” 871  
 
 
And a key member of the local safer neighbourhood policing team is even more 
explicit: 
 
“My personal view is there is a split personality: the identity is important, the Muslim 
identity and the cultural values that that gives are valued by the young people, but 
there’s also the draw of dealing drugs, drinking alcohol, getting involved in sexual 
practices with young white girls, you know, and all those things, there’s kind of a 
split, a kind of tension there, a split personality.”872 
 
 
This moves the debate away from being race and culture related, to much wider issues: 
to things like social cohesion. Consequently, agencies need to be thinking of these 
broader aspects and not narrowly focusing on one issue or another, despite the 
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inevitable complexity that occurs, and recognising that ‘race’ can twist the response: we 
think it must be race-related, therefore it is.   
 
Some argue though, that the nature of criminality does indeed have a racial bias to it, 
which should be recognised. For example, a respondent from the neighbourhood 
management team in the council describes a phenomenon by which Asian males are 
more engaged in drug related criminality, such as dealing, than their white counterparts, 
who he argues are more into burglary.
873
 He asserts that this is due to cultural 
differences – Asian family units are stronger, which helps to perpetuate deprivation 
because young men do not move around in the same way as their white peers.
874
 They 
also tend to follow in their father’s footsteps, working in low paid employment, 
sometimes setting up on their own.
875
 But this does not deal with aspiration, and role 
models are provided by other Asian peers who make a lot of money from dealing drugs, 
and flaunt it by driving around in big 4X4s.
876
  As an aside, there was a slight sense 
with this respondent that he had not achieved everything he wanted in life: “you can’t 
sit here and tell me you don’t want a big brand new car, go on holiday when you want, 
big house, the draw is there for anybody, I defy anybody not to want that.” 877  
 
A senior police officer, who has a leading position for Greater Manchester Police in the 
delivery of Prevent, also talks about the link between drugs, and a search for identity. In 
response to a question around the strength of the link between drug use, the risk of 
being radicalised and other types of criminal activity like gang-related behaviour, he 
says: 
 
 
“I think it’s difficult because at the end of the day, when you look at the profile of the 
people who have been arrested and detained [under terrorism legislation], they don’t 
automatically fit that profile. But having said that, there is a danger that you just go 
and profile the people that you know about. I mean, I think in due course, we will 
uncover things about those types of relationships.”878 
 
 
This is important, and I return to it in the final chapter. 
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Young Asian respondents confirm the notion that drugs are a problem in their part of 
Oldham, and that they have a profound influence.
879
 One states “[Drugs] are corrupting 
our area. You need to sort it out.”  880  
 
A senior member of the communities unit within Oldham Borough Council brings 
together much of the arguments of this theme, and the two previous themes. He talks 
about ‘schizophrenic identities’, with some young Asian men behaving differently 
depending on where they are:  
 
 
“…some young men who behave one way with their families, and then actually 
behind the scenes are going off and smoking dope, and going out with girls and 
drinking alcohol, and it’s all kept completely hidden.”881 
 
 
 He then goes on to describe “baggage…around attitudes to women and you know, it’s 
almost like if she sleeps with me she’s a slag…and so I’ll treat her as bad news..”882. 
This underlines the huge complexity and interdependencies of the many issues at play, 
and finds resonance amongst some of the young Asian respondents themselves: 
 
“It’s like not eating Halal meat, it something we shouldn’t be doing but we do but it’s 
not that bad though is it, drinking and smoking, it’s still got the Muslim thing of 
intention.” 883 
 
So it seems that there are ‘pulls’ in a number of directions, but they are not obviously in 
tension: young Muslim men appear capable of reconciling these various influences in 
their own minds.   
 
7.4.6 ‘White Flight’ 
 
“…there’s also white flight, and various other movements in Oldham…”884 
 
The first time I heard this phrase used was in a matter-of-fact manner, as if it is used in 
general common parlance; later, I noticed others used it in a similar manner.
885
 It has 
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sinister and disturbing overtones. In order to explain the phenomenon, an interviewee 
from the council’s neighbourhood management team uses a donut analogy: 
 
“..in the middle, you’ve got your jammy bit, and as with everything, the jam always 
seeps into the sponge bit, it never stays in the middle. If you can imagine the jam bit 
being the Asian community, which is what has happened in Oldham, because that’s 
the centre of Oldham, and, I’m generalising here, jam seeps into certain areas of the 
donut, right. We can tell you that all those areas, we can tell you what’s happening, 
and we can tell you the feelings in that area, and they tend to be, if anything is going 
to happen, they’ll be the sparking points.” 886 
 
 
It is not an intellection with which a prominent member of the communities unit at the 
council wholly agrees, yet uses a similar metaphor: 
 
 
“It’s a term we’re trying to avoid using, and I think it’s, and I’m not sure it adequately 
describes what we’re getting really. Because we’re getting, the Asian heritage 
communities are growing. So in places like Westwood and Glodwick and Clarksfield, 
and that’s a sort of as a result of things like higher birth rate, people marrying partners 
who are coming from overseas, so basically those, and also those communities are 
just very young, so there are just loads of people who are at an age where they are 
starting to marry and have kids. So those communities are growing, and that’s then 
creating pressures on housing and the gradual moving out of those areas, so it’s 
almost like a donut where we’ve got, you know, if the Asian communities are the 
centre of the donut, and it’s gradually expanding out.” 887  
 
 
One member of the Asian community describes an evolution in Chadderton which 
begins to confirm this notion of ‘white flight’ – or more specifically, an expanding 
Asian community and population.
888
 But he does not indicate the same level of 
community division that others in the agencies have described: he will go to a different 
Mosque to his Pakistani friends (“there are Mosques in every area”) and he confirms 
that he has both white and Bangladeshi friends.
889
 
 
Another adds weight to the notion of ‘white flight’, though he does not describe it as 
such. He states: 
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“You see, the side I’m living on, there’s a lot of Asians there, but now day by day, 
there’s more going more going, and further down further down, and I don’t think the 
white people are really liking that. That’s what I feel. The area I used to live in before 
now there was a lot of white people living there, now it’s just full of Asians. Every 
type of Asian.” 890 
 
 
The concept of ‘white flight’ is significant, and plays into the theory discussed in 
Chapter Two which relates to the expansion of Asian communities. But it is also 
indicative of a more sinister notion of a lack of tolerance between communities of 
varying ethnic origin, which not only results in raised community tension, it also 
permits the concentration of Asian communities in deprived areas to persist. It 
necessitates state action, but it is not discussed at all by any of the local police 
respondents. A prominent member of the local media states: 
 
 
“Yes, well there are Asian groups in probably two main areas of Oldham, and both of 
the areas are spreading out slowly but surely. And increasing in size. And the areas 
where almost exclusively white people live, which are largely in the large council 
house estates, there are in fact people moving out of there, and moving out of Oldham 
altogether, and, it’s a hideous term I know, but we have experienced a fair amount of 
‘white flight’, in Oldham, people moving out, but I think it was cheapness of  
property in the first place that brought people , and the fact that some of the mills 
where they worked were close to where they were living, and then people coming 
over – we all like to be with people with whom we have a lot in common, and English 
people living in Spain all live together in little enclaves.”891  
 
 
The only police respondent to discuss it, and only then when he was questioned 
specifically by me about it, was GMP’s lead for the PREVENT agenda. He says this: 
 
“..white flight, that’s what it is…and I think you’ve got, there is, this notion that you 
can bring communities together is all very well and good but you can’t force them 
together. It’s a bit like in the school playground getting two kids who hate each other 
to like each other. Well it ain’t going to happen. And I think you’re looking at some 
of the traditions that exist within Britain, part of that is, well if we’re truly multi-
cultural then at the end of the day, perhaps in one, two or three generations time, we 
might actually achieve a situation where we truly are multi-cultural and we do get 
that integration of communities. But you’re not going to solve this overnight, so for 
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me it’s about well, what is the overall strategy from government to turn round and 
say, well how do we actually make this happen.”892 
 
 
This effectively sums up the position, and I discuss it again in the final chapter. 
 
7.4.7 Racism 
 
Racism is an insidious and damaging phenomenon; it might manifest itself as 
antilocution between individuals, or more systematic racism, examined and identified in 
Chapter Four as institutional racism. Here, I consider it at the individual level, to 
‘scratch at the surface’ of the experience of people living in the community.  
 
A key respondent from the third sector does not think the housing authorities or the 
police treat people unfairly but then describes an incident of discrimination: 
 
“…once I can say a guy applied for a job with his name on, with his Muslim name, he 
got rejected. The same person applied for the same post with a different name, do you 
know what I’m saying, a Christian name, and he was called for an interview, do you 
understand what I’m saying? These are the things that a lot of youngsters are facing 
in terms of discrimination.” 893 
 
 
The term ‘Paki’ seems to be used as a pejorative term frequently, by white members of 
the community, but perhaps more by the Bengali members. One respondent, a Bengali, 
said this in response to a question about his experience of things that have been aid to 
him: 
 
 
“Like what are you doing here you Paki boy, or how can this Paki.. We’re not Pakis, 
that’s what it is. They’re calling me a Paki, and I’m telling them look I’m not a Paki. 
I’m a Bengali.”894 
 
 
Some also describe being called a terrorist and a “Paki Bastard” in the street and 
elsewhere.
895
 The following is a quote from a Bengali community respondent: 
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“Yeah, I’ve experienced it but you get called Paki bastard, terrorist, and you just turn 
around and say I’m not a Paki and I’m not a terrorist. Just ignore it, whatever. 
In the street, whatever, if you go out at night, stuff like that. How many times? Once 
every two weeks…It’s quite often but you just got to get in the wrong place at the 
wrong time, and you see pissed people outside… At the end of the day, I know I’m 
not one of them and nothing can change that, so no matter how much you call me 
names and stuff like that, I still won’t get offended.” 896 
 
 
It has been around a long time: 
 
“when I was a kid, about 16-17, I worked in a paper mill, lots of Asian lads worked 
there, and there was a culture of, you know, there would be racist abuse. Not there’ll 
be racist comments, not meant as an abuse, as a normal, it was meant as a joke 
between these people, and I was guilty of that myself when I was 16 years old, 
walking around you know, they were my friends, you know, and they, well, on the 
surface, they did not say to me, well I’m concerned about that, I’m bothered about 
that, I don’t want you to do that anymore. But if you spread that out, people must get 
absolutely naffed off with that..”897 
 
These lower-level things are very rarely reported to the police, but their impact may be 
profound – perhaps contributing to the ‘psychological damage’ referred to above in the 
‘identity and vulnerability’ section.  
 
7.4.8 The Successful Community 
 
Perhaps one of the most important themes arising from this research, which I draw on 
significantly when I address the conclusions in the next chapter, is the notion of what a 
successful community looks like, and how conditions can be established that allow it to 
flourish. A prominent member of staff at Oldham College, which has 40% of students 
of an Asian heritage, massively out of proportion with the resident population, offers 
this: 
 
 
“If we have an issue about something, you appeal to them [students] for support, and 
they do, and if there’s going to be any trouble, they’ll come to the door and they’ll 
say it’s going to kick off somewhere but it won’t come here. Now, why do they do 
that? They do that because they feel there’s somewhere that’s going to take them 
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somewhere, in other words they have some share in a prosperous feel. They like a 
place where people are polite and friendly to them, and where they can succeed. 
There’s an element of self-interest as much as social behaviour.”898 
 
 
And then, developing the theme: 
 
 
“… there’s no way I would know if we had violent extremists here. I wouldn’t even 
know how to start to combat that. What you can do is create a place where consensus 
marginalises these people and pushes them to the extremes… because there are 
models where you can set things up and end up with a stable community, and that 
stable community has an interest in there not being terrorists, and that’s what we can 
do” 899 
 
 
The limited educational attainment in Oldham, together with the high levels of 
unemployment and low paid work has already been documented in the previous chapter, 
and is reinforced by Asian respondents, who confirm that only low paid shift work is 
available for them and their friends.
900
  But what role do schools and colleges play in 
the wider community sense? “It’s a really really long and hard road, and you end up 
getting really unexpected obstacles put in your place,”901 but creating that pluralist 
community, which marginalises extremist groups, is not only suited to the learning 
environment, it actually takes root there before reaching into all corners of society. This 
appears to be a vital and highly pertinent position to adopt.  
 
But creating this environment does not have to be limited to schools and colleges.  The 
notion of developing understanding within communities and between people from 
different cultural or ethnic backgrounds can occur in the workplace. This is articulated 
by one of the neighbourhood managers working in the council,
902
 and is directly linked 
to critical success factors two and three: the need to reflect the community served so far 
as possible, and to involve members of minority communities in training.  
 
A key member of the Communities Unit at Oldham Borough Council echoes some of 
the above views with regards to promoting good relations between different ethnic 
groups: 
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“And the other side of engagement is getting communities to engage with each other, 
so we know the last survey shows that where people from different ethnic 
backgrounds are regularly coming into contact with each other, actually their attitudes 
are more positive, so what we’re trying to do is to find lots of different ways to break 
down the barriers between communities because actually, if people get to know each 
other, what we find is that people aren’t as different, the more they get to know them, 
the more they find they find they’ve got thing in common rather than difference.”903 
 
 
Oldham council are also working to bring communities into contact with each other by 
creating more ethnically diverse secondary schools under their Building Schools for the 
Future programme. 
 
Respondents from the Oldham Race Equality Partnership develop a strong pro-active 
argument, saying that when people move into an area through housing associations etc, 
there is a need for ‘community infrastructure’, and that active investment in these things 
is very important for better community cohesion and a reduction in the risk of 
radicalisation.
904
 Such things might be mothers and toddlers groups, family support 
groups, sessional play. Family support workers would go with people to support them at 
these groups, so there is active investment. Many of the local communities have been 
left to their own devices in excess of twenty years, and this has contributed to 
polarisation and lack of understanding.
905
 This position has powerful resonance with 
other views articulated in this section, because it provides support for the idea that it is 
possible to ‘construct’ the right environment for communities to flourish.  
 
Other ideas are advanced by respondents, all of which form part of the jigsaw of the 
successful community. For instance, a local youth leader states that “educating the 
community from within is the key to saying that certain role models are unacceptable. 
There cannot be an ‘us and them’”.906  Promoting mixing at a younger age is talked 
about by one of the ‘elder’ Pakistani respondents – integrating young people together to 
reduce tension.
907
 He feels that sport is a very good way, although acknowledges that on 
the other side of the coin, rival Asian gangs and territorial divisions between Asian 
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groups themselves within Oldham may require different facilities to be made 
available.
908
 The key is to ensure that it is about citizenship: 
 
 
“Need to build rapport in terms of citizenship and community cohesion – what will 
they be teaching their children? It’s about citizenship, not just white or Asian. 
Everyone needs to be friendly and their children to be friendly. Religion is a big thing 
– it tells you to look after your neighbour.” 909 
 
 
7.4.9 Crime, Radicalisation and Junaid 
 
During the course of the fieldwork, an incident occurred which is worthy of closer 
examination, since it illuminates so many issues. The name of the individual concerned 
is real - it was widely reported in the local media, however I only use his first name as a 
mark of respect to his family. The description of Junaid’s lifestyle and his activities 
deserve a closer look because they depict a modus operandi which is very similar to 
radicalisation, but they actually revolved around drugs and crime.  
 
Junaid was an Asian lad of 17 years of age. He lived above a small shop run by his 
family in the Werneth area of Oldham. One of the ‘elder’ respondents who lived very 
close said that “all the lads were always outside, smoking the weed, you know, the cars 
parked up, music blaring…”910 and the police were “always busting the shop”.911 Junaid 
was influenced by ‘Mr Big’, and saw an opportunity to make money by selling drugs. 
But Junaid went further: 
 
 
“…I don’t know if you’ve seen his photograph where he had a bandana on and the 
bullet proof…and on the computer they actually made their own website, and he was 
there with all money around him, and he was holding I don’t know, a gun or a 
rifle…there were a few pictures of him, wearing a bullet proof vest.”912 
 
 
This builds a heady and powerful image, not so far removed from images of freedom 
fighters or ‘terrorists’ seen on Al Qaeda videos.  
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By piecing together conversations, some of which formed part of the peripheral 
information provided by respondents during the course of the fieldwork, most of which 
did not and were ‘offline’ conversations with other individuals with whom I had 
contact, the following is an account of events. A short time before the incident outlined 
below occurred, a house in the neighbourhood was being used as a base for dealing 
drugs, and Junaid, together with another Asian lad, went to break into the house 
intending to steal the drugs. One of the neighbours called the police, who arrived 
promptly. Junaid ran off, but the female police officer who attended successfully 
detained the other lad. However, Junaid returned to the house and, pointing a gun at the 
officer, ordered her to let his friend go, or he would shoot. So she released him.  
 
Here we have the beginning of an escalation process, which was, with the benefit of 
hindsight, capable of identification by the police. Additional information from partner 
agencies and the community, in the form of whispers and rumours, would have aided 
the development of the jigsaw, thereby offering the chance for early intervention. The 
simplified escalation process was: (i) repeated warrants executed against the shop; (ii) 
websites showing Junaid appearing armed and surrounded by money; (iii) a threat to 
shoot a police officer; all these things occurring over a period of a few months. That this 
was on course for a violent crime is clear. 
 
Junaid was shot 17 times with an automatic weapon in the car park of a doctor’s surgery 
in the middle of a residential area in the early hours of 9 July 2009.  His killers have still 
not been found, and yet a large gathering of Asian youths ‘appeared’ very quickly after 
his murder. As part of the normal engagement process with communities, the 
Neighbourhood Policing team conducted a ‘PACT’ meeting three weeks after the 
shooting. PACT is an acronym for Partners and Communities Together – the intention 
being that the police and their partner agencies engage with communities to establish 
what people living in neighbourhoods think are the local priorities for the agencies to 
tackle. It is a cornerstone upon which Neighbourhood Policing depends. As part of the 
‘participant observation’ aspect of the fieldwork, I attended this PACT meeting, which 
was arranged some months earlier. The venue was approximately three hundred yards 
from the scene of the shooting; anxiety about reprisals was running high (“one of his 
brothers has said that the person who done this to my brother, I’m going to put him in a 
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coffin”913); the body had not yet been released; it was a serious crime linked to a drugs 
problem which was high in the public consciousness; and the Senior Investigating 
Officer was present at the meeting to answer questions. Although the meeting was in an 
overwhelmingly Asian-dominated resident population, the meeting itself was 
overwhelmingly white-dominated. No one at the meeting challenged the police or any 
of the other agencies in relation to drugs, violent crime, shootings, reprisals, or any 
other matter associated with Junaid’s death. In fact, the issues raised were parking, 
speeding, and dog mess. This raises some fundamental questions about the way in 
which the police consult the public about their policing priorities, as well as providing a 
commentary on a divided community. 
  
What this real-life, real-time example tends to indicate is that the process of escalation 
towards violent crime is very similar to the escalation process involved in radicalisation 
and progression to terrorism. I discuss this in more detail in the following chapter. 
 
On the subject of radicalisation and gangs, GMP’s senior leader for the PREVENT 
strategy states: 
 
 
“you can’t put your finger on one thing and say this is the cause of radicalisation 
because in some parts of the country, and if you look at gangs and guns for example, 
in London, in Brixton, there are gangsters who are renaming their gangs to The 
Baghdad boys for example, and this type of thing because it’s it gives them a lot of 
street cred and kudos amongst other gang members.”914 
 
 
And a prominent member of the Oldham Race Equality Partnership discusses 
‘radicalisation’ in the following terms: 
 
“But there is also something else happening, and this is maybe a challenge to the 
perspective your research is coming from. There is a radicalisation of young Muslims 
happening, I would take the word harmful away from that, because I don’t think it’s 
like a pathology and it shouldn’t be looked at like a pathology, it’s actually, it is 
actually a response to their situation, to look and to challenge, now unless we’re 
saying that there’s a pathology why one and a half million mostly white people 
formed the biggest demonstration this country has ever seen in London against the 
invasion of Iraq, if we’re going to pathologise the fact that a lot of young Muslims are 
taking an interest in foreign affairs and in international relations, and have a sense of 
outrage about Britain and Americas foreign policy, then we have to pathologise an 
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even greater number of white people in this country because they have the same 
view.”915 
 
 
I argue in Chapter Three that the notion of radicalisation of Muslim people is not 
necessarily a bad thing, and use the word ‘harmful’ to indicate, not a pathology, rather 
an activity, which becomes damaging to society, to Islam, to communities. He argues 
that young Muslims rigidly following Islam is a form of conservatism, not radicalisation 
- an interesting contribution to the debate.  
 
One key Asian member of a third sector organisation strongly refutes the idea that 
certain issues and events might contribute to vulnerability to radicalisation, saying: 
 
“These things [being treated badly by the authorities, or having the perception of 
being treated badly by the authorities] wouldn’t get them to become radicalised, or 
extreme, or commit suicide and kill people. You know, these petty things they will 
see as petty things, as an individual incident.”916 
 
 
And he is also very clear that social deprivation will not radicalise, it will merely create 
distrust: 
 
 
“That’s [social deprivation] not going to radicalise, that will just create distrust in the 
institution, the police and the council, that will just create distrust, that’s all. That’s 
not going to turn them into terrorists…”917 
 
 
I discuss this in more detail in the following chapter, since it goes right to the heart of 
the construction of the hypothesis.  
 
 
7.5 The effect of the media 
 
7.5.1 Tolerance levels 
 
The council’s ASB officer talks about the role of community cohesion, and the 
demarcation that exists in Oldham – which he says is at sharp contrast to Bolton, just up 
the road.
918
 He also talks about the role of the press, and links it to tolerance levels: 
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“So any sort of, any issues that are highlighted through media, it’s a self-fulfilling 
prophecy type stuff, you know. I’m living on this estate, I’ve been told this estate has 
all these issues, I’ve been told this estate has got idiots running around who do x, y 
and z – I put up with that tolerance up there [indicates high], expectations down there 
[indicates low]. We’ve got to balance that press bit out like you say, between us being 
more concentrated on, yeah, we know the negatives are going to get in there, but 
concentrating on the positive stuff that we are doing to build up the confidence.” 919 
 
 
This fits to some extent with views that communities in Oldham have been neglected 
for a very long time by the authorities: 
 
 
“The communities here, I am afraid to say, not just from the police, but from the 
council, from the political parties, the whole lot, are used to neglect. That’s what they 
get, they get, yes there are problems there, but if we go in heavy handed we’ll be 
accused of racism, so we’ll leave them to it to a degree, we’ll leave them to it and 
that’s what they’re used to, and there’s been a long history of neglect.” 920 
 
 
This issue of tolerance and expectation is important because it acts as an inhibitor for 
agencies and communities to mobilise and address problems and weaknesses within 
communities, consequently increasing risk of vulnerability. And the role of the press is 
critical in perpetuating this conception. 
 
This respondent also talks about the development of groups of young people in the 
community – with a leader - and how these groups may be involved in ASB. The quote 
from him is interesting since it also betrays a frustration with the apparent impediment 
of ‘political correctness’- i.e. things that might be considered racist: 
 
 
“Well, with anti-social behaviour, with young people, there’s a group dynamic. The 
group dynamic is the followers, the integrated members and the leaders, and that is 
there for their own protection. They see that as a protection mechanism, because if 
you don’t belong to that group, not only may you be picked upon by a white group 
that may enter the area, or that you may come across, but also that group may see you 
as a threat or a target and seek you out for some sort of retribution. Now, with the 
leaders from within that group, are not necessarily radicals as such, not potential 
radicals as such but they are definite potential criminals and they are, and I think 
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sometimes, let me get this point across, sorry, and I know I ramble on, but I think that 
sometimes the Muslim community fall back on this race, sorry, this, the radicalism 
question, you know, I am the victim, well no, hang on, you’re an idiot, you’re a thief, 
you’re a criminal, I don’t care whether you’re pink, black, blue, striped, polka-dot, 
I’m not bothered, you know, you cause… and there’s this sort of ‘I am the victim in 
all this…”921 
 
 
The evolution of these groups is connected with gangs, and there is also some similarity 
with the development of radical groups.
922
 There are links here to do with the role 
model gap – conflating aspects of crime, radicalisation, ASB and gang related 
behaviour. He also describes the racial abuse that went on in the factories and paper 
mills he worked in as a youth – and wonders what impact that type of behaviour has on 
people.
923
 This is linked to the questions I pose around the effect of discrimination and 
racism, and is addressed in the following chapter. It also has resonance with the 
experiences of young Asians, discussed above, where they discuss being racially abused 
at some level.  
 
7.5.2 Perceptions 
 
The manner in which perceptions are formed seems to occur in a number of ways, 
although much of it is undoubtedly through the media. One of the police respondents 
was very clear in her thought that people were influenced by what they read in the 
papers.
924
 She also suggests that it is the things not being reported to the authorities, in 
terms of raised community tension, which are important.
925
 This links with the point 
being made by others that it is listening to people on the street which counts, not merely 
the analysis of reported crime.
926
 
 
A member of the Oldham Muslim Centre offers this: 
 
 
“…it’s the media now also, you know, like trying to demonise the Muslims you 
know, it’s like all the bombing, all the terrorism, so they feel you know, it’s the media 
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and certain institutions also giving them a bad name because as a result of that they 
are not getting the job they are supposed to.”927 
 
 
A college Principal also talks about how groups are perceived: 
 
“….when you look at the sections at the end of the day and during the day a lot of 
Asian students hang around in gangs with their friends. A lot of that is because they 
like college, they don’t want to give it up, they’re actually being very sociable and 
friendly, if you’re driving past that, what you see is potentially a weird looking gang. 
I went to the shopping centres yesterday and saw all these Asian kids and they just 
closed in around me, all ex-students. And they wanted to talk, that’s what they 
wanted. And they were really friendly, absolutely great kids, some of them will end 
up being doctors, police, teachers, but if you see them, to me I see them, and it’s 
great, it’s a good chance to talk to them but you can quite easily see people staring 
and think that’s quite frightening, what are they going to do.” 928 
 
 
He also talks about elements of fracture within Oldham, and further illustrates how 
perceptions are used for capital: 
 
“One of our strengths is the fact that we do have these kids coming to us, but the 
schools with sixth forms rather than colleges they use it against us because part of 
their marketing as well is you wouldn’t want to go to the college with all those 
pakis.” 929 
 
 
Another Head considers the issue of the development of perceptions from an alternative 
viewpoint, and provides an insight into cultural differences within the wider 
community: 
 
“But it’s interesting isn’t it, you know, when we’ve been into some Asian homes, 
they’ll be watching celeb TV on sky, and you’re thinking, why, you why would you 
be watching day to day all the time TV from somewhere you haven’t lived in for a lot 
of years.” 930 
 
 
A Pakistani community member is of the view that the normal British television 
channels:  
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“show people getting, English soldiers getting killed. They won’t show what really 
happened, and they just say that, so the country doesn’t go against them and you 
know, what happened to the Americans in Vietnam.”931 
 
 
It is interesting to consider what he thinks ‘really happens’, and whether his Pakistani 
roots influence these views. I discuss issues in relation to this particular respondent in 
more detail, below. 
 
Thus perceptions form across the cultural divide, serve to reinforce stereotypes, and the 
media has a significant role to play. Perceptions, like stereotypes, can be dangerous, 
becoming an unnecessary reality. 
 
7.5.3 Readership and Community Access 
 
One of the respondents, a white British/Ukrainian is able quickly to refer to the 
‘Oldham Chron’ – he reads it regularly for the football results, and thinks the paper is 
good for reporting on local stories.
932
 This is in contrast to young Asian respondents: “I 
don’t tend to read the local newspapers”933 and one of the elders who does not speak 
English, confirms that he does not buy papers, and so is not aware of their content.
934
 
This begins to confirm the view that the paper is not read in big numbers by the Asian 
community. The white British/Ukrainian respondent also makes a reference to the 
prominence of stories in the paper where the victims of assaults are Asian, whereas 
when they are white, the stories get less prominence: 
 
“…like I’m not racist or anything, I know a lot of Asians and other races, but I have 
like noticed that a lot of these that are put in are like, when they are put in, say like, a 
couple of months ago, a white guy was picked up in this, in a Landover, and beat up 
and then chucked back out on the street, and he dies, and it wasn’t even in the paper 
that much, but like a couple of months before that, an Asian guy was beat up and that 
like on the front page, so it was like a bit of… It was actually on the front page, but 
like, the white guy was on page 6, with a little column about it. It’s like unfair, it 
should have both equal to each other.”935 
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This has featured as an issue elsewhere and perhaps results in increases in tension 
between communities and consequential exploitation by the BNP, even though the 
paper has positive intention (promoting the paper to the Asian communities, and trying 
not to be racist towards them.).
936
 This respondent also interestingly agrees that you 
could get a distorted view of Islam from the television or the main papers, but then 
mentions “I think that’s just a minority of Muslims, because all the Muslims I know 
don’t have anything wrong with them”937 – which tends to suggest he believes the 
media, but thinks it does not apply to the Muslims he knows – rather than assuming that 
the media might be inaccurate or biased. Other (Asian) respondents assert that the 
papers just lie.
938
 
 
According to a key interviewee from the local media, not many papers are sold to Asian 
communities, despite much effort: 
 
“…we don’t sell a great many newspapers in the Asian communities, as indeed very 
few daily papers do. They are not great, Asian communities are not great readers of 
white English newspapers. They read papers such as the Jang, the Daily Jang,..We’ve 
tried all sorts of things to try and boost our readership in those areas, but nothing we 
have done, indeed nothing that has been done across the industry has worked really. I 
mean Leicester started publishing part of their newspaper in Asian languages, and the 
white audience of the newspaper dropped off alarmingly. So they abandoned that and 
went back to publishing it in full English language.” 939 
 
 
This will inevitable mean that most of the letters published are from white contributors, 
and the paper will aim its stories at the target audience in order to maximise sales, 
which may have the effect of creating a polarised view of communities and things going 
in within them. This interviewee makes the point that there is no mechanism for getting 
information out to all the communities in Oldham, other than the council newsletter. 
This, from the editor of a local paper, points towards a communication failure which 
contributes to polarisation of communities, because there is no mechanism for 
promoting joint understanding. He also identifies that the flow of letters and phone 
calls, and their nature indicated ‘a rise in temperature’ in the lead up to the riots of 2001. 
This is a key aspect of the model I propose in Chapter Three, and is discussed in the 
next chapter.  
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7.5.4 Internet, DVDs and ‘Messages’ 
 
One of the respondents, a Pakistani Muslim, is particularly interesting, and deserves 
closer examination. He is of the view that British intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq is 
wrong, and he holds views that everything is the fault of the freemasons.
940
 At first 
glance, this sounds a bit ridiculous, and it is tempting to dismiss it out of hand. 
However, on describing matters further, there is a clear modus operandi to his 
behaviour which resonates strongly with how some people become radicalised, 
discussed in Chapter Three; after all, to many others, radicalised views sound 
ridiculous. He describes a DVD which has influenced his thought in this area, and he 
informs me that it is available by typing in the relevant name on the internet. The video 
describes a New World Order, and was produced by ‘some guys’.941 According to this 
respondent, the video explains what the freemasons are trying to do, and why they are 
doing it, and describes a connection to George Bush. He says the DVD is very long, 
with lots of seven or ten minute clips – and it offers reasons for the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, and why the “Twin Towers were knocked down, or the main reason for it.”942 
He says the video was going around and everybody was watching it, so he decided to 
watch it. This might be evidence of more community whispers, or rumours, discussed 
above. When asked how the video made him feel, he responds:  
 
 
“Well you just think shit on them basically, you know, what they’re doing and this 
that. But you really can’t do nothing about it. So you just let it go. You do your own 
thing.” 
  
 
It is easy to dismiss these thoughts as coming from someone not very well informed and 
not very intelligent, but actually this respondent is not stupid, and he has given thought 
to things in a way which other respondents have not, especially those of Bangladeshi 
heritage. The feeling that he is naïve and not so bright might well be the very 
impression one gets when speaking to an individual with polarised views. In fact, the 
Arrivals series does relate to a conspiracy theory involving the New World Order, and is 
available on mainstream websites.
943
 But it is of significant note that many of the other 
key requirements are there and in place, not least the belief in what is being said. These 
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things are all ingredients, with subtle amendments, of someone either radicalised or on 
the road to radicalisation.  One community respondent is unequivocal; he states “there is 
a risk of radicalisation in Oldham”.944 
 
7.6 Global events 
 
Here, the question of whether or not global events have an impact on people locally is 
examined, and if they do, in what ways. This is linked to the commonly held notion that 
it is foreign policy which is the main contributor to disenfranchised Muslim 
communities. 
 
7.6.1 Global versus Local 
 
One of the non-Muslim PCSO respondents is of the view that global events do not 
affect communities in a big way because they are struggling to deal with their own lives 
in a much more local sense: 
 
“Not much to be honest. No I don’t think so. I think they’re struggling to get on with 
their daily lives. But most of them I would say are comfortable with living in this 
country and where they are, I think they do realise they’ve got to, there are benefits to 
living here, even in Oldham. And the majority are just trying to live like the rest of 
us. I don’t think, for instance, no one ever talks to me from that community about 
what’s going on in Iraq and Afghanistan, it never, you never get throw away 
comments – such as you need to get out of there – don’t see graffiti about any of 
those topics. It’s all just about sex, all that stuff that they put on the walls. So really I 
don’t think it’s bothering them at all. But you never know do you, but I don’t see it. I 
don’t see it and I don’t hear it.” 945 
 
 
He says people never speak to him, or make throw away comments about those topics, 
and you never see graffiti about it either. This is interesting, and relates to the notion of 
tension indicators discussed in Chapter Three, and I discuss it further in the following 
chapter. His view is at odds with that of a Muslim respondent from a third sector 
organisation in Oldham. In relation to the notion that people might be vulnerable to 
being radicalised by virtue of being treated badly, or having the perception of being 
treated badly, he says this (partly quoted above): 
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“These things wouldn’t get them to become radicalised, or extreme, or commit 
suicide and kill people. You know, these petty things they will see as petty things, as 
an individual incident. But what will radicalise them, if you’re asking the question, 
then I say bad, or you know, policies, towards the Middle East, especially Palestine 
issue, do you understand what I’m saying? Reactions to extremism. Do you 
understand what I’m saying? Bad policy.” 946 
 
 
He later qualifies this, because the interview occurred in the immediate aftermath of 
Israeli attacks on Gaza, and he was of the view that issues around unemployment and 
lack of opportunities would have been higher in people’s minds in general – but 
identifies that international issues can have a major impact in very short timescales.
947
  
 
Notably, one of the Pakistani PCSOs is strong in his opinion that foreign policy is a 
topic of conversation amongst his communites: 
 
“I mean, from grass root levels, you know, invariably there will be relatives, extended 
families, friends, who still living in Pakistan and Afghanistan you know, and they are 
greatly affected by that you know. And what is mentioned is foreign policy, and that 
will come up time and time again.” 948 
 
 
This raises some questions about the efficacy of a relationship between a white PCSO 
and Asian communities, as compared with that of an Asian PCSO and Asian 
communities, perhaps lending weight to the reported advantages of an ethnic make-up 
of the police organisation which reflects that of the community. Is it the case the 
Muslim community members are more willing to share their thoughts and feelings with 
a fellow Muslim, or is it in fact that as Muslims themselves, these two latter respondents 
feel it more strongly? 
 
A respondent from the Oldham Race Equality Partnership talks knowledgably about the 
concept of terrorism, and identifies ‘Shock and Awe’ and ‘Carpet Bombing’ as tactics 
which effectively amount to terrorism – thereby not recognising the distinction between 
American/allied military tactics and terrorism. Members of the community believe that 
the Afghan conflict does affect people locally, with one asserting that it is because: 
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 “we’re Muslims, and they’re Muslims in Afghanistan and you white people you are 
fighting against them…All Muslims are terrorists – that’s what they [white people] 
are going to think by looking at things that are happening over there…”949 
 
 
So matters of foreign policy appear to be a factor at one level, but also, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, people are pre-occupied with living their own lives, which can be 
challenging in an area with limited prospects of well-paid employment, and when 
finances are tight.  
 
7.6.2 Afghanistan, Iraq and Gaza 
 
I consider these areas specifically (as distinct from more general global issues) because 
they are very high-profile military operations in which Britain has played a key part.  
 
A non-Muslim respondent from the race equality partnership postulates the idea that it 
is a mainstream Muslim belief that military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq has 
occurred because they are Muslims.
950
 But his own view is that it is nothing to do with 
that, and it is everything to do with oil and other natural reserves.
951
 Another respondent 
from a key local third sector group, who is Muslim, says that foreign policy and the 
treatment of Muslims in places like Palestine certainly does contribute to the risk of 
radicalisation.
952
 It should be noted, though, that this interview took place just after the 
Israeli action against Muslims living in Palestine, and there had been recent (peaceful) 
public marches in Oldham, voicing opposition to the Government’s stance. In fact, the 
research revealed surprisingly divided opinion on the local impact of these types of 
foreign policies. A community member, a 17 year old Bangladeshi male, identifies the 
difference between being Bangladeshi and Pakistani in terms of the military action in 
Afghanistan, based around the close geographical location and tribal ties between the 
two countries: 
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“I suppose it does have an effect, like, well, I’m not a Pakistani so it doesn’t really 
bother me but, but if, say I was like Pakistani or something, and it’s like, say for 
instance you were in the war in Afghanistan, and I was, like, a Paki, then you know, 
even though you would not say to me, you would think I was one of them, if you 
know what I mean. It would encourage others, if you see what I mean. It would be 
like, and if I was a Paki, I would be encouraging other Muslims. Yeah. It does affect 
the Pakistani the more because that’s their family, we’re not Pakistani.” 953 
 
 
[Note the use of the word ‘Paki’ in this context.] 
 
This notion is expanded upon by one of the Pakistani ‘elders’ who is a first generation 
immigrant. He identifies that the enemies in places like Afghanistan and Iraq are not the 
only ones being targeted – civilians are being killed and this breeds resentment, and 
people who you want on your side go over to the other side.
954
 The problem is that in 
most hotspot areas, people have ties, complex tribal groups.
955
 He develops this further 
by saying that not all Israelis are bad, and it is wrong to demonise all Israeli people – 
good must prevail.
956
  
 
Another Bengali respondent, who was 18 years of age, responded to the question of 
whether these matters affected Muslims locally by saying: 
 
 
“No. It’s the other side of the world. It doesn’t affect us, it’s just killing other people, 
like Muslims, you know, it’s bad innit, but that’s them innit?”957 
 
 
Once again, we have a division of view: there may be tribal and family links through 
Pakistan to action in Afghanistan, but this does not appear to cut across the Islamic 
panorama more generally; Iraq was barely mentioned, and Bengali Muslims were less 
interested or informed. 
 
The local Safer Neighbourhood Team leader said: 
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“I can’t say I’ve had first hand experience of that. All I can say is that the issues that I 
see on a day to day basis are issues for everybody, drugs, anti-social behaviour, drug 
dealing, crime in general. I’m sure there will be opinions of that sort of thing but I’ve 
certainly not been personally made aware of you know it making a major impact.”958 
 
 
7.7 The Role of Islam 
 
7.7.1 Training and Knowledge of Police Personnel 
 
One of the white British PCSOs, who was previously a Special constable, and had six 
months experience as a PCSO, refers to the ‘unknown’ when he talks of Islam and goes 
on to describe how working with officers who are of the Islamic faith significantly 
improves his confidence: 
 
 
“And that picking up knowledge from [Muslim PCSO]. You know I’ve been asking 
[Muslim PCSO] quite lot, you know, how things work and questions about the 
Qur’an, cultures, you know, he’s taught me a lot really. And how, you know, I was 
talking to him about how Islam can be misinterpreted to do harm to people, you 
know, and he’s helped me quite a lot really. But other than that it’s been myself 
really, cos, you know, we’re all human beings, and I don’t see any difference in 
people, you know, we’re all the same. But it’s quite a good mix in the community.”959 
 
 
This is linked to the discussion above regarding the use and deployment of PCSOs, and 
supports the second and third critical success factors. This PCSO thinks that the general 
lack of understanding of Islam as a religion contributes to the rise in tensions – people 
go by what they read in the papers and see on the television.
960
 Interestingly, there was 
some reticence by some officers to use certain terms. For instance, one of the local 
police officers seemed reluctant to use the term ‘Pakistanis’, and the term ‘Indian’ was 
used instead, yet the area is not noted for large numbers of Indians.
961
 This sort of 
reluctance was demonstrated, albeit in a slightly different way, by more senior officers, 
one of whom seemed to show some reticence around the term ‘Muslim’.962 This 
respondent was also keen to move the discussion away from ‘race’, as if it would be 
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frowned upon – arguing that there was a need to avoid “badging the thing under race 
because that’s what 2001 was” [a reference to the riots].963 This issue was not obvious 
at all with any of the other respondents.  
 
Most police respondents said that training around community and race relations was 
superficial or virtually non-existent; their knowledge had developed from working 
closely with communities. This from the Safer neighbourhood Team Leader: 
 
“No [training]. I’ve found it being on the neighbourhood side of things you’re more 
tuned to it and you get the training, it’s not training, it’s being involved in the 
community…”964 
 
And from a white British PCSO: 
“Obviously we did the diversity training but other than that, I’ve learnt it on the job. 
From the diversity training, you obviously, you’re made aware, very aware, that this 
is the way you’re expected to behave, and we’re all aware, particularly in Oldham 
where there were all the riots, so you know first hand that experience is a big thing 
and you do need to behave in the proper way.”965 
 
The white British police officers and PCSOs felt they had received little in the way of 
formal training, and instead had learnt from doing the job and working with 
communities, as well as depending heavily on their colleagues who knew the culture 
and spoke the language. 
 
7.7.2 The Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) agenda 
 
‘Prevent’ is part of CONTEST, the Government’s response to the threat of terrorism 
from ‘Islamist’ groups, discussed in Chapter Four. The PVE agenda relates to the 
investment by Government of millions of pounds, designed to tackle violent extremism, 
and is aimed at stopping people from becoming terrorists. The tax payer’s alliance 
reported in 2009 that over £12m had been given to local authorities to fund community 
groups, but owing to insufficient monitoring, Government were unsure as to what 
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groups had received money.
966
 It has been openly suggested that the whole agenda has 
been a waste of public money.
967
 
 
A key respondent from a third sector organisation suggests that the PVE agenda is a 
source of discontent for Muslims because the state’s arguments do not have any moral 
resonance at all. Specifically, he says: 
 
“There is a moral deficit in the way in which the PVE agenda and the anti-terrorist 
agenda is put to the Muslim community. Because if you stand back from it at all, you 
know, the Muslim community is outraged about the revelations about Abu Garhab, it 
is not just something that appeared on BBC news five times and the rest of society 
has fallen back, people are still outraged about that. They see it as absolutely 
despicable. People are still outraged about Guantanamo, and they do not recognise 
the moral high ground of the state in terms of its anti-terrorist activities.”968 
 
 
He believes that the PVE agenda is damaging, because it requires organisations to spend 
money on something which they don’t believe in: 
 
“…but what you’ve got to use it for is something you don’t necessarily believe in, 
and I’m telling you, people who run small Muslim organisations who have got this 
cash are agonising [his emphasis] over this at the moment, they are not sleeping 
well..”969  
 
 
He goes on to say: 
 
 
“The PVE agenda is there as part and parcel of trying to win the hearts and minds 
battles in this country behind the war….. It’s there in order to try and win people 
away from criticising British and American foreign policy.”970 
 
 
In essence, he is saying that the PVE agenda is a politically motivated tactic to engender 
support for foreign policy, regardless of the potential damage to communities – thereby 
creating and storing bigger problems for the future. Offering a mildly opposing view, 
GMP’s lead for ‘Prevent’ makes the point that ‘Prevent’ is politically sensitive and that 
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it therefore attracts a high level of scrutiny, even though there are other pieces of 
Government business which are financed to a far higher level.
971
 
 
The net effect of this investment on individuals in the community might be illustrated 
by a quote from one of the respondents, a Pakistani youth worker living in Oldham. 
Although he is well qualified he is unable to find a job, but describes some reluctance 
even to consider joining the police because it is seen as a betrayal: 
 
“They look at this, with this whole terrorism thing as well, it’s perpetuated it, it’s 
made it worse, they all, there’s this idea that you’d get hauled up to a terrorism 
charge, that you’d have to arrest someone, infiltrate a mosque, it’s a dual identity, 
you’re Asian and Muslim as well. Yeah, you know, it’s seen as a type of betrayal in 
some ways.” 972 
 
7.7.3 The Power and Influence of Islam 
 
A Muslim PCSO talks about the radio link Mosques have, enabling the call to prayer to 
be heard at home (where there is a receiver).
973
 He is very enthusiastic and earnest, a 
point which comes across with many of the Muslim interviewees. Islam appears to be 
an integral part of this enthusiasm. The Muslim respondents seem to give examples to 
illustrate their points to a much greater degree than the non-Muslim respondents.  
 
On Islam, one Asian community respondent says this, which goes some way to 
articulating what it is about Islam which leads people to believe that they can use it to 
pedal harm: 
 
 
“Islam is so powerful. Once somebody studies Islam, it’s a powerful religion. It’s so 
powerful, how can I describe this, it’s a way of life and people say this is it, this is 
what I’ve been looking for.”974 
 
 
Two others discuss the westernisation of Islam, implying that it is a myth – being a 
Muslim is a struggle, and people achieve it to a lesser or greater degree.
975
 Islam seems 
to help young people make life decisions, and this serves to illustrate the power of 
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Islam: “it helps us make our choices. Choices at work, choices at home.”976  But it is 
still a struggle, wrestling with those other things which attract some young people:  
 
 
“It’s like not eating Halal meat, it’s something we shouldn’t be doing but we do but 
it’s not that bad though is it, drinking and smoking, it’s still got the Muslim thing of 
intention.”977 
 
 
This clearly poses questions about vulnerability and internal struggles, and also 
demonstrates the persuasive nature of Islam.  
 
Certain physical aspects of Islam present themselves as important ‘players’ in the lives 
of young Muslims, a point recognised by those in communities who are not themselves 
Muslim but who live or work closely with those who are. For example, one of the 
college Principals talks of the impact of Ramadan on tension because people, especially 
young people, are going for lengthy periods of time without food and drink.
978
 With 
Ramadan starting for boys as young as seven, it represents a major undertaking.
979
 
Others identify cultural problems around such things as the Christmas lights in the 
shopping centres, and the practical problems of getting hold of people.
980
 
 
7.8 Summary 
 
This chapter has acknowledged the critical realist philosophical position adopted for the 
thesis by first producing quantitative data for key policing indicators in the theatre of 
the case study, thus building on themes developed in the previous chapter. It has then 
presented rich qualitative data based on face-to-face interviews with members of the 
community, with police officers and other employees from state agencies working 
closely with communities, and using participant observation. The semi-structured nature 
of the interview schedule, developed in conjunction with members of the community 
and with the aid of an independent panel drawn from a local Mosque , and the coding of 
the data, have had at their heart the aims and objectives of the research. Thus, it enables 
the following chapter to utilise the data presented here and contextualise it within the 
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corpus of literature reviewed in Chapters Two and Three to address the objectives and 
answer the fundamental research question. 
 
This thrust of this chapter, and most of its themes, might be summed up with a largely 
unprompted statement from one of the respondents, a member of the third sector, 
representing the interests of Muslims in Oldham: 
 
“What it is, Islam is so powerful. Once somebody studies Islam, it’s a powerful 
religion. It’s so powerful, how can I describe this, it’s a way of life and people say 
this is it, this is what I’ve been looking for. Now if a new guy, who doesn’t know 
anything about Islam, OK, and if an extreme guy gets hold of him, then I describe 
him as clay, he can mould him in any form he wants to take. It’s like a clay because 
you’re new. Whatever information I will give you, I will only give you the 
information I want to give you, not, I don’t want to give you the version of the Qur’an 
that the prophet say because I have got a different agenda, so he’s more vulnerable 
here it’s true, he’s more vulnerable, and the ones that are more vulnerable are the 
Muslim youth who are on this Jihad, no knowledge of Islam, therefore vulnerable, 
because, you know, they need that gang culture, that violent culture, and suddenly 
someone comes over and says look what’s happening in Palestine, look what’s 
happening in Afghanistan, let’s do something about it, and they say he likes fighting, 
do you understand what I’m saying? What do we do? You’ve done nothing all your 
life, let’s go, let’s do something.” 981 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
8.0 Introduction 
 
In Chapter Three, it was argued that urban unrest, radicalisation and terrorism share 
common roots, with a number of key social pre-conditions existing prior to their onset. 
These include a sense of injustice, a lack of political representation, declining 
perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities, relative deprivation (which may include 
unemployment, a gap between expectation and achievement) and discrimination. As 
shown in the previous chapter, levels of drug related crime are also important. A ‘ladder 
of escalation’ was proposed, arguing that such a model offered an opportunity to 
identify and therefore mitigate the process of disenfranchisement of individuals and 
groups of individuals which may ultimately lead them to commit acts of terrorism. A 
number of other policing indicators were examined in Chapter Six, and then data 
presented in Chapter Seven relating to these indicators for the case study. Thus three 
sets of ‘warnings’ can be postulated: (i) Social preconditions, as identified above; (ii) 
‘Policing indicators’ – those things identified as indicators of raised tension, acting as a 
forewarning to the onset of urban unrest, which might also be relevant to predict the 
development of disenfranchised groups thus raising the risk of harmful radicalisation; 
(iii) Steps on the ‘ladder of escalation’ such as certain types of political activity, 
escalating towards demonstrations, sedition and radicalisation. The identification and 
mitigation of the risk depends on the effectiveness of Neighbourhood Policing and the 
National Intelligence Model (NIM).  
 
The purpose of the present chapter is to address the research question, using the data 
presented in the preceding chapter: ‘Is the machinery of local policing delivery seen as 
fit for purpose by practitioners and community members to anticipate and mitigate the 
risk of harmful radicalisation at street level’? 
 
To achieve this, the chapter is carefully structured and argued, addressing questions 
posed in earlier chapters as it proceeds, and locating the findings within the reviewed 
literature. 
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It is structured in four major parts. The first summarises the position in relation to the 
‘critical success factors’ in Oldham, distilling them from the previous chapter.  These 
are themes which I isolate from the examination of the legal and policy responses to 
each of four of the five seminal events, where they can be seen as ‘golden threads’. I 
have argued the police service and others has failed to deliver them effectively, thereby 
contributing to the current crisis.  
 
The second part deals with each of the four objectives, using the data and analysis 
presented in the last chapter, and linking the findings and discussion with the corpus of 
literature used in Chapter Three to construct the hypothesis. The objectives are: 
 
5. Contribute to the understanding of the development of harmful radicalisation 
amongst members of certain communities. 
 
6. Develop a menu of indicators which predict or forewarn of the risk of 
radicalisation. 
 
7. Establish perceptions of success of Neighbourhood Policing and the National 
Intelligence Model at identifying risk. 
 
8. Establish a ‘toolkit’ of options which might be utilised to mitigate risk by 
‘switching-off’ the radicalisation process, and developing multi-agency 
partnership strategies for the same purpose. 
 
 
I produce a schematic which demonstrates how the common roots theory, critical 
success factors, policing indicators and the National Intelligence Model fir together.  In 
this way, this part forms the major thrust of the chapter and addresses the fundamental 
research question. I use it to contextualise the research findings within the literature, and 
it includes a discussion of the ‘ladder of escalation’; the examination of each of the four 
objectives includes a summary and conclusion section. The third part comments on the 
ability to ‘extrapolate’ the research findings to other settings, whilst the fourth and final 
part identifies avenues for further work. 
 
8.1 Critical Success Factors 
 
In the last chapter, I brought forward themes which I identified as ‘critical success 
factors’, and I argued that successful delivery of them optimises the legitimacy of the 
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police in the eyes of minority and disenfranchised groups, thereby minimising the risk 
of adverse social protest. I described them as follows: 
 
 The need to work in partnership with other agencies, especially education and 
housing departments. 
 
 The police organisation needs to strive to reflect the community it serves, and 
the recruitment, retention and promotion of ethnic minority staff is a crucial part 
of this. 
 
 Community representatives should be involved in training, especially 
community awareness training. 
 
 Police organisations must work towards the elimination of racial discrimination 
of all types, and contribute towards the development of cohesive communities.  
 
 The local ‘beat officer’ or Neighbourhood Policing team has a vital role and 
must attract officers of high calibre. 
 
 
These themes were distilled from the analysis of the legal and policy responses relevant 
to the seminal events in Chapter Two, and I analysed and discussed them in Chapter 
Four. I argued that failure to deliver these critical success factors represented a 
fundamental failure on behalf of state agencies generally, and the police in particular, 
which ultimately contributes to the current challenges now faced. I now make an 
assessment of the degree to which they are embedded and effective in the theatre of the 
case study, using the data presented in Chapter Seven.  
 
8.1.1 Partnership Working and NIM Tasking 
 
In section 3.3.1 of Chapter Three, entitled ‘Partnership responses and community 
policing’, I quote Margaret Simey from the Merseyside Police Authority, speaking after 
large scale urban disorder in Toxteth, Brixton (see seminal event 1, Chapter Two), and 
elsewhere:  
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“Responsibility for public tranquillity on such a vast scale cannot and must not be 
off-loaded on to the police…It was our failure as a society to set about the conditions 
in the inner cities which led to the breakdown of social order in the 1980s…The 
responsibility is ours, and it is one which we cannot delegate to the police.”982 
 
 
Later, in section 4.3, Chapter Four, I demonstrated how this intellection had effectively 
been enshrined into law through the Crime and Disorder Act 1998: 
 
 
“..it shall be the duty of each authority to which this section applies to exercise its 
various functions with due regard to the likely effect of the exercise of those 
functions on, and the need to do all that it reasonably can to prevent, crime and 
disorder in its area.”983 
 
 
I also outlined in this section some of the difficulties with partners working together: 
organisations having different performance indicators, different management structures 
and different ‘layers’ to them; communication within agencies is often fragmented, 
communication between partners is fraught with difficulty. I then posed this question: 
Are these inhibitors inimical to achieving the very aims which spawned the partnership 
agenda in the first place? I discussed in section 4.12.1 of that chapter how the NIM is 
intended to work, optimising effective partnership working by ensuring appropriate 
tasking of partner resources to counter community problems – the intention being to 
give life to the legislative framework, and I return to this subject in the discussion 
relating to objective 3, below. 
 
I have presented and discussed the qualitative findings of the research in relation to this 
critical success factor in section 7.3.5., and the commentary can be found at section 
7.2.1., Chapter Seven. There was some evidence of where partnership working was 
effective at a local, tactical level within Oldham West, usually attributable to the way in 
which individuals developed personal relationships with members of partner agencies 
(for example, the use of the kick-pitch facility, section 7.3.3 ‘Opportunities for 
Intervention’). But the question posed by the Housing Officer ‘what as an agency are 
you actually responsible for?’ -  goes right to the heart of the difficulties outlined above. 
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Police staff also identified that partnerships were not functioning as they should, 
suggesting that staff from the council do not get out into the community as much as they 
might. These findings, coupled with the ineffective multi-agency tasking meeting I 
observed (section 7.3.3), leads to the conclusion that the ability of the state agencies to 
work effectively together in the theatre of the case study is flawed, and that therefore 
this critical success factor is not being delivered effectively. 
 
8.1.2 Reflecting the Community 
 
In section 7.2.2 of Chapter Seven, I present data demonstrating the extent to which 
GMP generally has been successful in reflecting the community in the make-up of its 
workforce, and I focus this further into the theatre of the case study using figures for 
Oldham Division specifically. Although slow, progress appears to be underway.  
 
The findings from the present study serve to emphasise the value of recruiting staff 
from minority communities: section 7.3.1 of Chapter Seven provides evidence of where 
and why these members of staff are successful. In the main, it is linked to the ability to 
overcome language barriers, and therefore enable communication to occur between the 
police and the community. Two other advantages are also articulated. The first is that it 
helps other officers and staff understand the cultural aspects of communities: parts of 
the Islamic way of life, which they had not been taught in other ways, for instance. 
Secondly, and crucially, it establishes a real-life point of reference for some very 
positive views of each respective culture, rather than relying on perceptions from the 
media and elsewhere. I return to this extremely important point in the second section, 
below. It was clear that a sophisticated decision-making process regarding the 
deployment of a paucity of ethnic minority staff was absent – i.e. where is the best 
business benefit achieved?  
 
Three linked and successive conclusions might be drawn from the findings: firstly, the 
advantages of reflecting the community are primarily for the organisation itself, i.e. 
overcoming language barriers and a lack of cultural understanding; the community 
response was ambivalent, even talking of it being a betrayal; secondly, the notion that 
trust is improved automatically by virtue of increased representation is flawed; and 
thirdly, recruitment and deployment of staff drawn from ethnic minority communities 
should be driven by business need rather than merely the pursuit of a target. Although 
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progress has occurred, especially through the deployment of PCSOs, there is a relative 
failure to deliver this critical success factor. 
 
8.1.3 Community Awareness Training 
 
In Chapter Four, I compare the recommendations of the report of Sir William 
Macpherson into the murder of Stephen Lawrence,
984
 and the comments made by Lord 
Scarman into the Brixton disorders twenty years earlier.
985
 I demonstrated in section 4.2 
of the chapter that training in racism awareness and valuing cultural diversity was 
highlighted by both reports as being essential to good policing, and that local minority 
ethnic communities should be involved in that training. In section 7.2.3 of Chapter 
Seven, I discussed the publicly available sources which GMP had produced in relation 
to their community awareness training, and I commented that these sources were silent 
on the issue of whether community members were involved in the training. Although 
the training department of Greater Manchester Police did not feature in the research 
component of this study, I show that the recipients of ‘diversity training’ in the theatre 
of the case study, a location with an acknowledged history of problematic inter- and 
intra- community relations, consider their training in this arena to have been ‘limited’ 
(section 7.3.1), and ‘superficial or virtually non-existent’ (section 7.7.1). The 
development of knowledge for these largely untrained staff had occurred on the ground, 
working closely with communities and staff from those minority communities, on 
whom they depend heavily. Although more difficult to demonstrate, there also appeared 
to be a reluctance to use certain terms by some police officers, which is also discussed 
in section 7.7.1. This reticence is potentially dangerous because it is capable of being 
misconstrued, and might easily manifest itself in the institutional racism of which 
Scarman and Macpherson have much to say. 
986
 
 
Although some progress is demonstrated through an open-minded attitude amongst 
staff, there is largely a failure effectively to deliver the third critical success factor by 
GMP in the location of the case study.  
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8.1.4 The Elimination of Racial Discrimination  
 
Although this is one of the themes distilled from the examination of policies and edicts 
found in Chapter Four, it is also enshrined in law, and I describe the requirements in 
section 4.5.1, of that chapter. In section 7.2.4 of Chapter Seven, I assess the degree of 
compliance by GMP, and indicate that at the time of writing, it was fully compliant. 
There was nothing I observed or heard during the course of the research that suggested 
that the police and other agencies were not working hard to eliminate racial 
discrimination. The second part of this critical success factor – ‘contributing towards the 
development of cohesive communities’ – is more problematic. It is analysed in more 
detail in the discussion surrounding the objectives of the research, below. 
 
8.1.5 The local ‘Beat Officer’ and Neighbourhood Policing  
 
Writing in 1979, John Alderson had this to say for a new model of policing: 
 
“…The role will go beyond that of the traditional “village bobby” but will embody 
the spirit of that tradition within it. The community constable will be a high status 
officer.”987 
 
 
In truth though, it is probably fair to say that this role is the epitome of what British 
policing has been about for many centuries. Critchley (1978) says this of constables in 
the 13
th
 Century: 
 
 
“Among these officers, the titles of whom attest the special purpose for which each 
was appointed – ale-taster, bread-weigher, swine-ringer – the constable was pre-
eminent, carrying a special responsibility, as the principal representative of the 
manor….”988 
 
 
In section 4.12.2 of Chapter Four, I set out how Neighbourhood Policing is intended to 
be established in each of the 43 police forces of England and Wales, and in section 7.2.5 
of Chapter Seven, I describe the manner in which it has been achieved in Oldham West, 
the theatre of the case study. In that section, I refer to a quote from an inspection carried 
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out by HMIC in 2006: “there is a perception among safer neighbourhood officers that 
they are frequently abstracted from their core role”.989 In section 7.3.2 of the previous 
chapter, I describe and demonstrate the impact that the introduction of PCSOs has had 
on developing police-community relations.  
 
I conclude that the fourth critical success factor is being delivered in the theatre of the 
case study, but it is being delivered by PCSOs and not police officers. 
 
8.1.6 Critical Success: Summary and Conclusion 
 
To summarise the conclusions in this section, Greater Manchester Police are not 
successfully delivering three of the five critical success factors in the theatre of the case 
study: they are not reflecting the community being served, the community awareness 
training is weak, and partnership working is flawed. They are largely delivering two of 
the critical success factors: they have high quality staff who are highly engaged with 
communities, delivering Neighbourhood Policing (though they are not, in the main, 
police officers), and they are working towards the elimination of racial discrimination. 
 
8.2 The Four Objectives 
 
This thesis contributes to the existing knowledge surrounding the risk of the 
development of harmful radicalisation within communities, and, at the same time, 
provides practitioners with a ‘toolkit’ of options which they might employ to mitigate 
that risk. It is therefore a bridge between the theoretical and the practical. In order to 
achieve this thorny goal, four objectives are articulated, and the ultimate success of the 
research and the concomitant ability of the study to address the research question, 
depends upon the contribution it makes against each of these objectives. The objectives 
are reproduced here: 
   
1. Contribute to the understanding of the development of harmful radicalisation 
amongst members of certain communities. 
 
2. Develop a menu of indicators which predict or forewarn of the risk of 
radicalisation. 
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3. Establish perceptions of success of Neighbourhood Policing and the National 
Intelligence Model at identifying risk. 
 
4. Establish a ‘toolkit’ of options which might be utilised to mitigate risk by 
‘switching-off’ the radicalisation process, and developing multi-agency 
partnership strategies for the same purpose. 
 
 
This section will now consider each of these objectives in turn, linking the research 
findings with the corpus of literature examined in Chapter Three. In doing so, it will 
seek to provide answers to, or comment on aspects of, the series of questions posed at 
the close of Chapter Three, and reiterated in section 5.4.1 of Chapter Five: 
 
 How can state authorities, particularly the police, use the ‘common roots’ theory 
to identify communities which might be vulnerable to radicalisation and 
subsequent progression to terrorism? 
 
 Does a ‘ladder of escalation’ provide an additional mechanism whereby peaceful 
forms of social or political activity can be used to forewarn, in the medium to 
longer term, of  the potential for radicalisation and terrorism amongst some 
communities? 
 
 To what degree can ‘tension indicators’, developed after the urban riots in the 
UK, be adapted to forewarn of the growth of radicalisation and terrorists within 
a given community? 
 
 Is the National Intelligence Model, principally developed to tackle crime, 
capable of identifying radicalisation and terrorism risk factors, using the 
foregoing mechanisms, and developing appropriate partnership intervention 
strategy?  
 
 What role does ‘Neighbourhood Policing’ play, and can a ‘toolkit’ be developed 
which enables local officers to assist in the identification of vulnerable 
communities? 
 
 What relevance does the ‘social pre-conditions’ idea have to the current rise in 
gang related activity and the growth in radicalisation linked to Islam?  
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8.2.1 Objective 1:  The Development of Harmful Radicalisation 
 
I use the term ‘radicalisation’ to represent a political and social journey of an individual 
which involves polarisation and ‘fundamentalist’ ideas, becoming ‘harmful’ when an 
intention forms to cause damage to communities or people.  
 
In Chapter Three I examine the concept of radicalisation, and I draw on work by Al-
Alami and Krishnan (2007)
990
, which discussed the attraction of Islamic 
fundamentalism to Muslims living in Western societies. I also brought into the 
discussion the work of Cozzens (2006)
991
 since he notes an important caveat in his 
examination of ideology: that ideology cannot by itself satisfactorily explain Jihadi 
violence; research has demonstrated that it works in tandem with social processes and 
other grievances.
992
 I note that it is these social processes and grievances with which 
this research is primarily concerned. I close the section by using five key points from 
Choudhury (2007) which emerge from the literature on radicalisation and identity,
993
 
and use this to argue that the roots of the journey to harmful radicalisation and 
progression to terrorism are very similar to the roots of other forms of ‘social protest’ 
like urban unrest. In this way, I start to build the hypothesis that constitutes the ‘ladder 
of escalation’, arguing that the social preconditions which may make groups or 
individuals vulnerable to radicalisation include a sense of isolation, a lack of social 
identity, a lack of confidence in the political system, a lack of economic prospects, 
perceptions of blocked social mobility, all of which are amplified by experiences of 
discrimination and racism. I examine each of these in turn, below, to realise the first 
objective, and contribute to the understanding of the development of harmful 
radicalisation.  
 
8.2.1.1 Prima facie Evidence of the Development of Harmful Radicalisation 
I examine the concept and phenomenon of radicalisation in section 3.2, Chapter Three, 
and there are very close links with the subject of identity, also discussed in that section.  
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In section 7.3.3 of Chapter Seven, entitled ‘Opportunities for Intervention’, I outline an 
example described by police interviewees whereby the initial stages of the development 
of radicalisation was identified by youth services from the local authority. Here, a group 
was hiring kick-pitches, and organising football tournaments, recruiting from a certain 
age range from the male Asian community within the theatre of the case study. It was 
explained to me that intelligence demonstrated that extremism was at the core of the 
motivation for their activities. Although this had only come to light in the week 
immediately preceding my interviewing of these respondents, and thus was a highly 
sensitive issue, it demonstrates that the development of radicalisation exists.  
 
8.2.1.2 A Sense of Isolation 
 
That the communities in Oldham are polarised is undisputed: I demonstrate this first in  
the account of seminal event 4, Chapter Two, which describes the urban unrest in the 
Northern mill towns; then in section 5.4.2 of Chapter Five, where I articulate the case 
for choosing Oldham as the location of the study; and, finally, in section 7.1 of Chapter 
Seven, where I examine the location in much closer detail. These arguments receive 
further support from interviewees, described in section 7.4.1, Chapter Seven, entitled 
‘Polarisation and Community Tension’.  
 
Given the nature of the polarisation within Oldham, the degree of isolation that might be 
felt by communities is problematic to express. However, I utilise here two pieces of 
evidence to demonstrate the existence of isolation, one at the community level, the other 
at an individual level. The first is described in section 7.4.9, Chapter Seven. This was 
part of the participant observation component of the research, when I attended a 
Partners and Communities Together meeting held in the immediate aftermath of a fatal 
shooting of a young Asian male.  Despite the impact of the incident on the Asian 
community, and the fact that the meeting was held in an overwhelmingly Asian-
dominated community, very close to the location of the incident, the meeting was 
overwhelmingly white-dominated. I suggest here that this is evidence of an isolated 
community. 
 
The second was the behaviour exhibited by one 18 year old Pakistani male, described in 
section 7.5.4 of Chapter Seven. In this section, I describe how this particular respondent 
has utilised the internet, viewed DVDs and formed his own thoughts on the impact other 
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groups have had on Muslims across the world. It is a ‘journey’ which has strong 
resonance with the notion of a ‘radicalisation journey’ conducted largely alone through 
the use of the internet and other external sources. This is evidence of individual 
isolation within the wider context of an isolated community. 
 
8.2.1.3 A Lack of Social Identity 
 
A key theme of the risk of a person embarking on such a journey towards radicalisation 
seems to be their search for a social identity at a critical juncture in their lives: 
 
“The path to radicalisation often involves a search for identity at a moment of crisis. 
There is a ‘cognitive opening’, a moment when previous explanations and belief 
systems are found to be inadequate in explaining a person’s experience.”994 
  
 
In relation to young people, this is examined and well argued by Shiv Malik in an article 
in Prospect Magazine.
995
 Here, it is identified that the division occurs because parents 
attitudes to dress, jobs, schooling and socialising all act to drive youngsters away from 
their parent’s generation. Whose culture and values do you affiliate with? Your friends 
or your family? Your country or your community? This identity problem is capable of 
exploitation, making individuals and groups vulnerable to radical Islamic movements.
996
  
 
In Chapter Three, section 3.3, I discuss the potency of Islam as a religion, and I provide 
this quote from Macey (2002)
997
: 
 
 
“Whether this type of Islam is theologically legitimate is irrelevant: as long as men 
use Islam to justify violence, religion must be considered a significant variable in its 
analysis.”998 
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The persuasion of Islam was evidenced by many respondents in this study, both Muslim 
and non-Muslim, but I discuss it as a specific topic in section 7.7.3 of Chapter Seven. It 
plays directly into the issue of a search for identity, for as one respondent notes: 
 
“Islam is so powerful. Once somebody studies Islam, it’s a powerful religion. It’s so 
powerful, how can I describe this, it’s a way of life and people say this is it, this is 
what I’ve been looking for.”999 
 
 
I examine the issue of identity and vulnerability in section 7.4.3 of Chapter Seven. 
Although there is a general view amongst the respondents from the statutory agencies 
that there is a tension in young Asian minds linked to generational differences, this is 
not borne out by the views of the community members themselves. Instead, they prefer 
to point out that Islam is a struggle, and therefore there are degrees of success.  
 
But there clearly is a problem of identity, and a dearth of suitable role models, since the 
one theme which all respondents understood and acknowledged was the existence and 
influence of ‘Mr Big’, described in Section 7.4.4 of Chapter Seven. ‘Mr Big’ has clearly 
made his money from dealing in drugs, although many of the young Asian community 
respondents were strongly defensive of this, arguing that he may have made his money 
legitimately; it is just an assumption on behalf of the police that he has been acting 
illegally. That there is this shortage of influential role models is a potent indicator of a 
vulnerability to harmful external influence. Other influences also seem to be relevant: 
for example, the incidence of gang-related violent crime was raised by one agency 
respondent, and issues relating to alcohol and girls were common. Perhaps most 
important though is the widespread prevalence and use of illegal narcotics. To re-quote 
one young Asian respondent, “[Drugs] are corrupting our area. You need to sort it out.” 
These are street level issues, the tip of the iceberg of the more organised criminal gangs. 
 
In Chapter Three, section 3.1, I discuss the terrorism-organised crime nexus, arguing 
that the phenomena have important similarities. I develop this argument to discuss the 
local link between drugs and terrorism, quoting a respondent who was the same age, 
gender and ethnic identity as one of the 7/7 bombers, and from the same area:  
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“To be honest with you, the downfall was a few years back. There were a lot of drug 
addicts in the area, which dragged everything down... I wouldn’t say that we’re stuck 
up people, but you move to an area and spend your money on your property. You 
want to live there, and if somebody’s gonna come up and throw syringes in your 
garden and put a brick through your window, you want to fight the battle. At the end 
of the day, it’s your pride more than anything else.”1000 
 
 
I go on to point out that the article describes a gang established under the leadership of 
Mohammed Sidique Khan, leader of the 7/7 bombers in response to the drug problem, 
and I argue that this is a highly important contribution to the debate because it describes 
at the micro-level how organised crime, standing at the head of street-level drug 
problems, can directly help create the right conditions for radicalisation and ultimately 
terrorism to flourish. Moreover, I draw on the testimony of Courtenay Griffiths QC, 
who claims that those involved in gangs and gun crime are converting to radical Islam, 
and that this is a very dangerous mix.
1001
 I pose these questions: should certain types of 
crime be engaged as an indicator of radicalisation and terrorism, in addition to other 
social pre-conditions? And is the growth in gang related violent crime another 
consequence of social and political conditions which are similar in their roots to 
terrorism? 
 
Here, and in answer to these questions, I seek to propose that certain types of crime, 
especially those that are drug related, should be engaged as an indicator of increased 
risk of radicalisation and terrorism. This is because the shortage of role models and the 
veneration with which ‘Mr Big’ is held are strongly indicative of a vulnerable 
community. With regards to the second question, the research does not illuminate this 
properly; I did not examine the incidence of gang-related violent crime. However, there 
would be a certain logic behind the argument, and I suggest in the summary to this 
chapter that further work should be conducted in this area.  
 
Islam is a powerful and persuasive way of life. It can be corrupted by those who wish to 
use it to convey a violent intent: a vehicle which is capable of employment within the 
theatre of the case study to exploit vulnerable communities and individuals. 
 
 
                                                 
1000
 ibid p2 
1001
 Griffiths C (2007) Speech to Devon Racial Equality Council AGM, 12 September 2007 
 289 
8.2.1.4 A Lack of Confidence in the Political System  
 
In the review of relevant literature, and the examination of common roots of urban 
unrest, radicalisation and terrorism, I describe concepts which condense down to a lack 
of confidence in the political system. For instance, Newman (2006) talks about 
dispossession, and how particular groups might perceive that the political or social order 
denies them their social, cultural or ideological rights,
1002
 while Bjorgo (2005) discusses 
how a lack of democracy, an inequality of power, and the experience of social injustice 
are all capable of motivating terrorism.
1003
 He also says this: 
 
 
“Failure or unwillingness by the state to integrate dissident groups or emerging 
social classes may lead to their alienation from the political system. Large groups of 
highly educated young people with few prospects of a meaningful career will tend to 
feel alienated and frustrated. Excluded groups are likely to search for alternative 
channels through which to express and promote political influence and change. To 
some, terrorism can seem the most effective and tempting option.”1004 
 
 
Some of this failure is evident in the theatre of the case study. In section 7.3.4 of the 
previous chapter, I consider the ‘Trust Deficit’. Here, two respondents, one from the 
third sector, the other from the community, describe a latent mistrust between the police 
and the community; the application of anti-terrorism legislation apparently increases 
this gap. This is generally borne out in the evidence of the young Asian community 
respondents. They described police as racist, and gave examples of other practices 
which they felt were unfair. These are presented in section 7.3.9 of Chapter Seven, and 
tend to lend weight to the second of five categories described by Ahmed et al 
(2001),
1005
 which stated: 
 
 
“The local police have persistently pursued highly discriminatory policies against the 
ethnic and religious minorities of Oldham.”1006 
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Perhaps though, alienation from the political system in the theatre of the case study is 
brought into sharper focus in the section from the previous chapter entitled ‘The 
Democratic Deficit, the Homeland and Tribal Influence’, section 7.3.6. The impact of 
the ‘Biraderi’ – or clan – the complex mix of Asian politics with the British political 
system, and councillors who are not perceived as being very representative add up to a 
local political system which is lacking in efficacy and therefore cannot deliver 
confidence for local communities.  
 
Overlaying the impact of a lack of confidence in the local political system are global 
events in which the British Government have immersed the state; it is a commonly held 
notion that it is British foreign policy which is a main contributor to disenfranchised 
Muslim communities, because such foreign policy is an attack on Islam itself: “The 
relative weakness of Islamic states enables the West to be identified as an outside 
enemy and thus developing political cohesion amongst Muslim states and communities 
around the world.”1007 Indeed, a poll conducted for the BBC in 2002 found that 
Muslims thought that the so-called War on Terror was in fact a war on Islam.
1008
 This 
issue is examined in section 7.6 of Chapter Seven, which includes specific consideration 
of Afghanistan, Iraq and Gaza at section 7.6.2. The data in this area is mixed, with some 
respondents saying it does affect local people and communites, others saying it does 
not. It is worth noting, as one respondent did, that international issues can have a major 
impact in very short timescales,
1009
 and some of the interviews were carried out in the 
immediate aftermath of the Israeli attack in Gaza. Britain was slow to denounce this 
attack – condemning Hamas action only; the United States positively endorsed Israeli 
action as self defence.
1010
 
 
In general then, there does indeed appear to be a lack of confidence in the political 
system, which is primarily brought about at a local level through the complex interplay 
of the British political system with Asian politics: tribal and clan influences, and the 
desire of local political parties to court the Asian vote. The route for a “search for 
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alternative channels through which to express and promote political influence and 
change”1011 would appear to be open.  
 
8.2.1.5 A Lack of Economic Prospects 
 
In section 3.1.1 of Chapter Three, I review literature which examines the contribution 
deprivation, poverty and educational underachievement might make to the risk of 
radicalisation leading to terrorism. I also discuss perception of these issues, manifesting 
themselves as a discrepancy between what people believe they are rightfully entitled to, 
and what they can actually expect. The absolute links between terrorism, radicalisation 
and a lack of economic prospects are far from clear in the literature, but I suggest that 
there are indirect links. 
 
The social deprivation indices of the location of the case study are presented and 
described in section 7.1 of Chapter Seven; it is amongst the most deprived urban 
environments in the UK. In section 7.4.2 of Chapter Seven, I present findings dealing 
with the issue of deprivation and its potential impact on the vulnerability of young 
people. Interestingly, the picture in the area of the case study is similarly mixed 
regarding the impact deprivation has, with a member of the council’s community unit 
summing up effectively: “I think we’ve got a set of assumptions around this, and I don’t 
think there’s the evidence base at the moment…”1012 
 
Unemployment, which is also very high in the area, and is disproportionately high 
amongst Asian communities, plays an important part in the perception of a lack of 
economic prospects. In section 7.4.4 of Chapter Seven, I introduce the concept of ‘Mr 
Big’, and I discuss it in relation to identity, above. A component of the lure of ‘Mr Big’ 
is the perception that this is how money is made – legitimate methods of employment 
do not offer the same invitation to material gain. This is summed up by one respondent 
when he says that the younger generation do not want to follow in their father’s 
footsteps into running taxis or working in takeaways - they want more, influenced as 
they are by Western material gain as a measure of success.
1013
 This remark lends plays 
well into the same point made by Peach (2007), introduced in section 2.1.3 of Chapter 
Two: 
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 “..Low educational qualifications and occupational concentrations in restaurant- and 
taxi-driving-type occupations, with limited opportunities to progress, suggest that it 
will be difficult for them to escape their current economic position.”1014 
 
 
Young people themselves do not appear to have high levels of aspiration where 
employment is concerned. Where they have achieved educational success, the rewards 
seem limited; in one example, a well-educated Pakistani respondent had been unable to 
find suitable work commensurate with his qualifications in the theatre of the case 
study.
1015
 This tends to lend weight to the intellection of a gap between that to which 
people feel they are rightfully entitled, and what they can actually expect. These things 
are powerful drivers for crime, and the links between crime and radicalisation have 
already been discussed. 
 
8.2.1.6 Perceptions of Blocked Social Mobility 
 
Aspects of this area are closely linked to the last one, and deal with the issue of 
perception, which in turn is linked to certain types of social injustice, discussed below. 
But blocked social mobility per se is in evidence in the theatre of the case study, which 
can be demonstrated through the polarisation of communities along geographic lines as 
discussed above, and as described in section 7.1 of Chapter Seven. This is also partly 
linked, as highlighted in section 3.3 of Chapter Three, to Islamic doctrine. Macey 
(1999) makes several points in this regard -  for instance, that the prohibition on 
mortgages as usury and the cultural tradition of the extended family go some way 
towards explaining housing disadvantages and ethnic segregation; educational 
underachievement might be a function of very tired young Muslim males who have 
spent long hours at the Mosque; and Islamic definitions of gender roles pre-disposes 
females to focus on family and the home, giving them little access to employment, and a 
tendency towards very large families, all of which contribute to familial poverty.
1016
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A key phenomenon that presented itself during the course of the research, referred to by 
a number of respondents from agencies as well as the community, was what they called 
‘white flight’. This is described in section 7.4.6 of Chapter Seven, and I acknowledge 
that it is a term with sinister overtones. In essence, it is an expansion of the Asian 
community and population, and is linked to the arguments described by Peach (2007) 
and Macey (2002), described above. In fact, it is a real-life manifestation of the 
expectation described by Hewer (2006), described in section 2.1.3 of Chapter Two, 
which argues that there has to be a significant expansion of Muslim populations to reach 
demographic stability.
1017
 It is the manner of that expansion which appears to 
demonstrate a block to social mobility, and there are important links with Giddens’ 
theory of structuration, discussed in section 6.1.3 of Chapter Six.
1018
  In section 3.1.1, I 
quote Newman (2006) where he examines a number of ‘Permissive Structural Factors’ 
in his exploration of the root causes of terrorism.
1019
 One of these factors is: 
 
 
“Demography: ‘Significant demographic conditions include rapid population 
growth, and especially a burgeoning of young males; and uneven population shifts 
across different ethnic groups….A related demographic condition that has been 
associated with terrorism involves migration and shifts in the ethnic, religious , and 
social balance of society”1020 
 
 
 
The concept of ‘white flight’ fits very comfortably within this permissive structural 
factor. 
 
8.2.1.7 Experiences of Discrimination and Racism 
 
Underpinning much of the theoretical argument that surrounds the discussion of root 
causes of terrorism, radicalisation and other forms of social protest are experiences of 
discrimination and racism; a sort of ‘golden thread’ running as a theme, sometimes 
wrapped up as a grievance of sorts, sometimes as a notion of exclusion and social 
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inequality.
1021
 Other more recent research expands on some of these themes, bringing in 
to the debate the impact media has on a general culture of discrimination: 
 
 
“..we introduce empirical evidence that demonstrates tangible links between 
Islamophobia or anti-Muslim bigotry in both (i) mainstream political and media 
discourse and (ii) extremist nationalist discourse and anti-Muslim hate crimes…. The 
report provides prima facie and empirical evidence to demonstrate that assailants of 
Muslims are invariably motivated by a negative view of Muslims they have acquired 
from either mainstream or extremist nationalist report or commentaries in the media.” 
1022
 
 
 
In section 3.3 of Chapter Three, I reviewed literature which examined the concept and 
causes of urban unrest, beginning to construct the theoretical argument that terrorism, 
urban unrest and radicalisation have common roots. Two highly relevant papers were 
discussed in relation to Oldham, both produced in the aftermath of the riots there in 
2001; and I make the point in section 5.4.1 of Chapter Five that the issues raised lend 
considerable weight to the value of revisiting Oldham in this study. Ahmed et al (2001) 
came up with five broad categories having interviewed locals in Oldham, seeking to 
understand their perceptions: 
 
“(1) The Muslim youth face complete alienation from social and political processes 
due to deprivation and discrimination. 
 
(2) The local police have persistently pursued highly discriminatory policies against 
the ethnic and religious minorities of Oldham. 
 
(3) Various institutions including the police and the media provoked the disturbances 
through highly sensitive and inherently discriminatory practice in May 2001. 
 
(4) The far-right has developed and exploited Islamophobic sentiment. 
 
(5) Muslim youth concerns have been deliberately excluded by various authorities, 
from all relevant discussions about local problems both historically and in the wake 
of disturbances.”1023 
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In a paper which was arguably more independent, Ray and Smith (2004) identify four 
underlying structural conditions contributing to the unrest: systematic disadvantage (for 
instance, an inability to afford better quality housing), higher unemployment than in the 
majority, cultural cohesion problems and discrimination in council housing 
allocation.
1024
 
 
In section 7.3.8 of Chapter Seven, I present the views of a member of the council, who 
was of the opinion that the alleged discrimination against Asians was perception rather 
than reality, and I make the point that the distinction between perception and reality is 
blurred. It is a fact that the most deprived areas are mostly occupied by Asian 
communities, and I have discussed above some of the reasons for this. But it can create 
a perception of discrimination in council housing allocation. Conversely, these more 
deprived areas can attract higher levels of funding, to the exclusion of white working 
class estates, which has the effect of building community tension; these issues are 
extremely complex. Interestingly, one community respondent, who I quote in section 
7.3.8 of Chapter Seven, points out that frustrated communities will brand the police 
racist, the court racist, and everyone racist, when in fact they are not.
1025
  
 
I present data relating to the interaction between the police and young people in section 
7.3.9 of Chapter Seven. Many of the younger Asian community respondents spoke 
negatively of the police, and many had been stopped and searched by them. This 
negativity did not just extend to being stopped and searched, it also included calls for 
assistance from them, where they felt the police response was slower for them than 
others and therefore unfair. PCSOs are generally better accepted, and appear to do much 
for the interaction between the police and the community. The tension which occurs as a 
result of the police attempting to deal pro-actively with a significant drug problem and 
the need to maintain high levels of trust from the Asian communities, especially the 
younger members of the community, is clear. There is therefore a need to re-think the 
policing approach, which is revisited in the ‘Toolkit of Options’ section, below. The 
findings of the research in this area lend weight to the second point described by Ahmed 
et al (2001), above. 
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In Chapter Two, section 2.2.7, I highlight the hugely important role the media have in 
influencing public thought in relation to the police. Later, in section 3.3 of Chapter 
Three, I highlight with reference to the 2001 riots in Oldham, how the representations 
and perceptions presented by the media began to mould police activity. In fact, it is 
argued that, along with BNP activity, the influence and activity of the media was an 
additional factor in the precipitation of violence – partly explaining why rioting did not 
occur in neighbouring Rochdale, despite similar demographics and deprivation levels. 
The Oldham Evening Chronicle in particular was heavily criticised for its coverage and 
reporting at the time. In section 7.5 of Chapter Seven, I present findings in relation to 
the role the media appear to have in the theatre of the case study. The effects are 
profound. In relation to tolerance levels, the type and nature of reporting appears to be 
capable of lowering the expectations of people – matters become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. This then leads to the creation of perceptions, not least the perception 
amongst the wider community about Islam and Muslims: 
 
 
“…it’s the media now also, you know, like trying to demonise the Muslims you 
know, it’s like all the bombing, all the terrorism, so they feel you know, it’s the media 
and certain institutions also giving them a bad name because as a result of that they 
are not getting the job they are supposed to.”1026 
 
 
And then there is the issue of who is reading what. Readership in Oldham amongst the 
Asian communities of the local newspapers is extremely low 
1027
; they appear to be 
largely watching Asian television channels, in some cases concerning countries which 
they feel powerful resonance with, and yet have never visited.
1028
 Local newspapers are 
profit driven, they have a need to sell papers to survive, and therefore will shape their 
stories and reporting to appeal to their buying customers. All these things act as 
powerful drivers of division between communities, contributing to the sense of 
isolation, suspicion and disenfranchisement.  
 
Understanding the true effect of ‘racism’ is problematic but I present the findings of the 
research in section 7.4.7 of Chapter Seven. I show that it is prevalent in a number of 
forms, from systematic racism through to the use of pejorative terms such as ‘Paki 
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bastard’. In fact, the frequency and usage of this latter form of racism appears to be so 
common that it is almost expected and is therefore ignored – it is very rarely reported to 
the police, and I discuss these types of statistics and indicators in section 7.3.2 of 
Chapter Seven. But I pose the question, in conjunction with the myriad of other factors 
outlined above, what effect on the minds of individuals does this type of racism have? 
 
The findings of the research indicate that perceptions of racism, discrimination and 
social inequality are rife within the theatre of the case study. In many cases, the actual 
presence of racism, discrimination and social inequality also appear to be common.  
 
8.2.1.8 Objective 1: Summary and Conclusion 
 
In summarising the above, this section will address this question: How can state 
authorities, particularly the police, use the ‘common roots’ theory to identify 
communities which might be vulnerable to radicalisation and subsequent progression to 
terrorism? It draws to a close with a discussion of the ‘ladder of escalation’ proposed in 
Chapter Three. 
 
In the above discussion, I have used data from the research project to illuminate the 
position within the theatre of the case study of each of the emerging themes from 
Chapter Three that appear to constitute ‘common roots’ of radicalisation, urban unrest, 
some types of terrorism, and other forms of social protest, namely: a sense of injustice, 
a lack of political representation, declining perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities, 
relative deprivation (which may include unemployment, a gap between expectation and 
achievement) and discrimination. I have also demonstrated that levels of drug related 
crime are important. Of course, these findings can never be regarded as the absolute 
truth – I discuss in some depth the concept of truth and reality in section 5.1.1 of 
Chapter Five. The critical realist philosophical position adopted for this thesis permits 
an examination of issues, acknowledging the reality of the relationships but also allows 
for the double-hermeneutic, i.e. the actors interpretation of the relationships, and the 
observers interpretation of those interpretations.  
 
The findings appear to indicate the following: 
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a. There is currently evidence of radicalisation in communities from the 
theatre of the case study. 
 
b. There is evidence of a sense of isolation, both at a community level and 
at an individual level. 
 
c. Many young Asian men are experiencing a crisis of identity. This is 
highly complex, and not linked purely (and simply) to tensions which 
allegedly exist between traditional family values and Islam on the one 
hand, and the western influences such as drugs and girls on the other. 
Instead, it is mainly linked to aspiration – the measure of success being 
material gain. This makes some individuals vulnerable to role models 
who are criminal. Thus, the level and nature of crime, especially drug-
related crime, is very important as an indicator of a community 
vulnerable to external influence. 
 
d. There is a problem with the political system, and the degree to which 
Asian communities are truly represented by elected individuals. This is 
linked to the complexities of the interaction at a local level between 
Asian politics and the British political system. It particularly affects 
Pakistani communities owing to the influence of the ‘Biraderi’. Foreign 
policy appears to have less of an influence, though can be impactive on a 
short-term basis. 
 
e. There is a real gap between expectation and achievement, to the point 
that career aspiration is denuded amongst young Asian men. This feeds 
the attraction of a criminal route to material gain. 
 
f. There is evidence of blocked social mobility amongst Asian communities 
in geographic terms in the location of the case study, and this is linked to 
Islamic doctrine amongst other things. The term used to describe this 
phenomenon in the area is ‘white flight’, which has sinister overtones, 
and conveys a theme of polarised communities along racial lines. 
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g. Discrimination and racism are prevalent in a number of forms, from 
systematic racism through to the use of pejorative terms such as ‘Paki 
bastard’. Perceptions here are important, and the activity of the police 
amongst young people was perceived to be discriminatory, with similar 
risks around housing allocation. 
 
The fundamental pre-conditions of the unrest which occurred in Oldham in 2001, those 
same pre-conditions which can be distilled from the literature around urban unrest in 
other geographical locations and from other periods, are largely still in place. The 
existence of a radicalisation journey in the area at the time of the case study lends 
weight to the links between these various forms of social protest, and implies that there 
is still a material failure of state agencies to learn the lessons from the past, and thereby 
failing to mitigate risk of violence – whether that is urban unrest or acts of terrorism.  
State agencies can use this information to help identify where risk exists – key features 
consist of the elements identified above. There is evidence in Oldham of some 
pioneering work which certainly does reduce risk, and this is discussed below.  
 
In Chapter Three, I review literature which examines things which are at the root of 
‘social protest’ – and I specifically consider radicalisation, urban unrest and terrorism. I 
distil themes, identified above, which emerge from the literature and are common to 
each, and from this, I construct a hypothesis – an escalation framework which I call a 
‘ladder of escalation’, articulated in section 3.5 of Chapter Three, and reproduced 
below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    PEACEFUL    ------------------------------------------------------------ VIOLENT 
 
 
 
Voting     Demonstrations   Strikes     Increased levels of            Urban Unrest 
                                                         political extremist activity                             Terrorism           Civil war                 
 
 
        Petitions         Sedition        Increased levels                 Growth of radicalisation          Coup 
                                                                                                        and fundamentalism 
                                                                 of ‘hate’ crime 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Ladder of Escalation 
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I suggest that rungs on the ladder might be used as a set of indicators for state agencies 
to predict and forewarn of the development of radicalisation and progression towards 
terrorism.  I now assess the degree to which this might be true, and whether or not this 
gradational incremental structure is efficacious given the findings from the research 
study, and thus I answer the second question posed above: Does a ‘ladder of escalation’ 
provide an additional mechanism whereby peaceful forms of social or political activity 
can be used to forewarn, in the medium to longer term, of the potential for radicalisation 
and terrorism amongst some communities? 
 
Although a compelling theoretical argument, there is limited evidence from the case 
study to suggest that this model stands up to scrutiny because each of the steps does not 
necessarily need to occur, let alone occur in sequence. This means that over-reliance on 
it as an additional set of indicators would risk missing other vital signs. In part, the 
reason for this is that the triggering mechanisms vary. I have argued that social pre-
conditions are similar in relation to risk of the various forms of ‘social protest’, and I 
have presented evidence which supports this, but the factors which actually trigger a 
particular step are not the same. Crenshaw (1981) describes what she calls 
‘precipitants’,1029 and these are discussed in section 3.1.1 of Chapter Three. Instead, 
agencies should take a step back, and examine social pre-conditions in general terms, 
thus developing mitigation strategies which mitigate risk across the piece rather than 
one specific aspect of the ladder of escalation. I consider this in more depth below.  
 
8.2.2 Objective 2: A Menu of Indicators  
 
One of the key themes of this thesis is to provide an insight into how radicalisation and 
progression towards terrorism might be predicted by state agencies, and how effectively 
multi-agency strategies might be developed, using Neighbourhood Policing and the 
National Intelligence Model, to mitigate the anticipated risk. Thus, this section deals 
with the second objective, and argues that the research points towards a menu of 
indicators which can be used to predict or forewarn of the risk of radicalisation.   
 
In constructing the hypothesis above, and drawing the parallel between the risk of the 
development of radicalisation with the risk of urban unrest, it is a natural progression to 
examine the series of tension indicators developed after various periods of urban unrest 
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through the 1980s, and consider their applicability to the current crisis. In Chapter 
Three, section 3.4, I introduce tension indicators to the analysis and review of relevant 
literature, based upon the argument of Momboisse (1967): 
 
“Every race riot is preceded by a flood of rumour, expressions of increasing 
antagonism between groups and an increase in the number and intensity of clashes 
between members of antagonistic groups. By developing adequate methods for 
obtaining and recording necessary kinds of information, the police can tell 
approximately how much danger of a riot there is at any given time, what group 
would start it, who their victims would be, and where violence would be most likely 
to break out. Such knowledge would be invaluable both in preventive work and in 
handling any disorders that might occur”1030 
 
 
 
There was an attempt to translate this into statistical data, and Chief Constables were in 
receipt of Home Office Circular 39/1982, which contained a list of largely measurable 
indicators which might be used to forewarn of impending unrest; other lists were 
produced by the US Department for Justice, and these are reproduced in section 3.4. 
They include such things as increased numbers of assaults on police officers, increased 
levels of complaints of racial attacks, increased numbers of complaints against the 
police, and increased levels of racial graffiti. Tupman and O’Reilly (2004) suggest, in 
relation to these tension indicators, that “if “anti-American or anti-Westerner or anti-
foreigner” is substituted for ‘racist’ then the creation of ‘tension indicators’ in relation 
to terrorism, and thus the need for counter-terrorist intervention, is in the starting 
blocks.”1031 In Chapter Six, section 6.1., I critically examine in much more detail a 
number of these indicators, looking at crime as a phenomenon, the recording of crime in 
the UK in recent years, racial incidents, assaults on police officers and complaints 
against police officers. I expose serious flaws in these things as reliable indicators, and I 
demonstrate this by providing relevant data from the theatre of the case study at section 
7.1, Chapter Seven. 
 
Rather than rely on these questionable statistics, the findings of the research tend to 
support the value and strength of rumours, whispers and ‘feelings’ that occur within 
communities as indicators of what is going on within them, and thereby demonstrating 
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the vital importance of being close enough to the community to hear them. I discuss 
whispers, rumours and tension monitoring at section 7.3.7 of Chapter Seven, and 
present evidence of their efficacy in relation to the fatal shooting of Junaid at section 
7.4.9, and the identification of suspicious activity in relation to a kick-pitch at section 
7.3.3. In both cases, there is evidence of weakness, not in the ‘hearing’ of the rumour, 
rather in how the rumour is handled. I return to this issue, below. One police respondent 
suggests that it is the things not being reported to the authorities, in terms of raised 
community tension, which is important,
1032
 and yet there appears to be a continuing 
tendency to use statistical data in ‘tasking’ meetings (see section 4.12.1 of Chapter 
Four); I observed this as part of the participant observation component of the fieldwork, 
and refer to it at section 7.3.7 of Chapter Seven. This also represents a flaw in the 
process of using information and intelligence to tackle radicalisation, and this is 
discussed below too.  
 
There is another aspect to the manner in which tension monitoring takes place in 
relation to potential unrest, and it is linked to time-frames. As set out in section 4.12.1 
of Chapter Four, the local tasking meetings, which occur every two weeks, are linked to 
performance, and tend to focus on crime and incidents over the previous fortnight as a 
means to decide how to task resources (see also section 7.2.1 of Chapter Seven, which 
describes the delivery mechanisms in the theatre of the case study). Thus, the focus of 
these meetings is the performance period over the forthcoming two weeks, and while 
tension monitoring in relation to potential unrest in the form of a review of relevant 
crime and other statistical data occurs, this process does not lend itself to a more 
strategic review of risk in relation to potential radicalisation. This has occurred in part 
because of the systematic problem with the National Intelligence Model, highlighted 
and discussed at section 4.12.1, Chapter Four, and re-visited in section 8.2.3, below. 
 
To this extent, and in answer to the third question above: ‘to what degree can ‘tension 
indicators’, developed after the urban riots in the UK, be adapted to forewarn of the 
growth of radicalisation and terrorists within a given community?’ as currently 
constructed, their use is limited. They need to be considered in a less performance-
driven manner rather than is currently the case: the traditional task-focused, ‘action-
orientated’ approach which is so inherent within police culture,1033 is not fit for purpose, 
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and a softer, more integrated mechanism of engagement together with the means to 
capture and consider the information that is forthcoming is crucial to success in 
identifying and mitigating risk. The inherent problems with NIM contribute to this flaw. 
 
In section 7.5.3 of Chapter Seven, I discuss readership and community access to the 
local daily newspaper in Oldham, the Oldham Evening Chronicle, and demonstrate that 
the paper has low levels of readership amongst the Asian communities. I also show that 
letters and phone calls to the paper indicated ‘a rise in temperature’ in the lead up to the 
riots of 2001. I propose here that there is an opportunity to use these sources of 
information in a similar way to whispers and rumours heard from the community, and 
consider them as an indicator. I examine this proposal in more detail in the ‘Toolkit of 
Options’ section, below.   
 
8.2.2.1 Objective 2: Summary and Conclusion  
 
Here, I aim to summarise much of the foregoing, and suggest a menu of indicators 
which might be used by the police and their partner agencies to forecast the potential 
risk of the development of radicalisation within Asian communities. They are all closely 
linked and none are mutually exclusive. This will then meet objective two:  
 
(a) Evidence of community and individual isolation. This might be 
geographically obvious, but pro-active analytical and survey work may 
also be required. 
 
(b) Drug-related crime and activity. The level and nature of this is indicative 
of vulnerability within communities, and is linked to a crisis of identity 
which creates a void capable of exploitation. 
 
(c) Local political mechanisms and structures. Influential members of Asian 
communities may not truly represent the communities they purport to 
represent, and this creates a vacuum within communities such that they 
have no voice. 
 
(d) The gap between expectation and achievement. A sizeable gap between 
these two fuels vulnerability to a range of harmful sources. 
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(e) Perceptions of racism and discrimination, both through state activity, for 
instance stop and search, and at an inter-community level. These things 
serve to further enhance isolation, and may feed grievances.  
 
(f) Letters, emails and other communications to local media groups which 
are capable of interpretation and influence – monitoring, through a 
carefully cultivated relationship. 
 
(g) Whispers, rumours and feelings from communities. This requires a very 
close relationship with communities, and appropriate infrastructure to 
deal with the information. 
 
8.2.3 Objective 3: Perceptions of Success  
 
This section crystallises the perceptions of the degree of success of Neighbourhood 
Policing and the National Intelligence Model at detecting risk of radicalisation, and the 
effectiveness of the partnership response to mitigate that risk, to meet the third 
objective. It will also illuminate this question: ‘Is the National Intelligence Model, 
principally developed to tackle crime, capable of identifying radicalisation and terrorism 
risk factors, using the foregoing mechanisms, and developing appropriate partnership 
intervention strategy?’ 
 
In section 4.9.1 of Chapter Four, entitled ‘The machinery of local policing delivery’, I 
set out how Neighbourhood Policing and NIM are intended to work, and then, in section 
7.2.1 and 7.2.5, Chapter Seven, I set out how they work in the theatre of the case study. 
Throughout Chapter Seven, there are various references to the ‘participant observation’ 
component of the research, where I spent time with the local neighbourhood team, 
going out on footpatrol, attending tasking and coordinating meetings, and local ‘PACT’ 
(Partners And Communities Together) meetings. This enabled me to observe at first-
hand the effectiveness of these models and styles of policing at anticipating and 
mitigating the risk of harmful radicalisation. 
 
I comment on the effectiveness of Neighbourhood Policing and the value brought to it 
by PCSOs in section 8.1.4, above. In essence, the model appears to be working well; 
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PCSOs and neighbourhood police officers are working closely with communities, they 
understand them and in many cases enjoy levels of trust from groups within 
communities which have hitherto been very distant. Although there is still much room 
for improvement, especially around the relationship between patrol officers and young 
Asian men (see above comments regarding the perception of racism and 
discrimination), Neighbourhood Policing as a model appears to be successful. It has 
demonstrated its capability for listening to whispers and rumours (the kick-pitch 
example), and staff are aware of the value and importance of this type of intelligence.  
 
I have already implied that there are process and procedural problems with the National 
Intelligence Model, and in section 4.12.1, where I describe the model and how it is 
intended to work, I highlight that it is geared primarily towards crime and anti-social 
behaviour. This builds-in an inherent problem with its application to the current agenda. 
In practice, as discussed above, the tasking and coordinating group, which meets once a 
fortnight, reviews performance over the preceding two weeks, before tasking some 
actions to deal with perceived threats for the forthcoming fortnight. This looks primarily 
at crime, incidents and prolific offenders. Although partners attend the tasking meeting, 
there is little evidence of them actually being tasked; additionally, the meeting is very 
large, with over forty people present – making it cumbersome and sluggish in terms of 
producing tangible outputs.
1034
  
 
An example from the research serves to illustrate the problems with NIM in a practical 
sense. A police respondent, a local neighbourhood officer, confirms that on receipt of 
information or a concern, intelligence is submitted.
1035
 It should then go for analysis and 
tasking (in accordance with NIM), and it then it might be the case that something comes 
back from tasking for the safer neighbourhood team to do something in relation to that 
intelligence.  
 
This process of course relies on accurate and timely assessment of the intelligence; any 
delay might reduce the relevance of the intelligence. It also means that the safer 
neighbourhood team are waiting for instructions from a remote group of analysts and 
senior officers. Although submission of intelligence in this way may help assess other 
pieces of intelligence, it appears to miss an opportunity. The safer neighbourhood team 
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might be best placed to react to the issue there and then. This response might not 
involve a traditional police response – warrants, positive action etc, it might entail 
engaging local community groups, Mosques, and other partners for the specific purpose 
of reducing risk. This type of response is unlikely to emerge as a tasking from a remote 
tasking meeting because the attendees will not have sufficient knowledge of local 
neighbourhood links. There is a sense that there is a reliance on the submission of 
intelligence and then a pause, waiting for the subsequent tasking. In the above example, 
the respondent also comments about the number of meetings associated with NIM, 
which raises the question of bureaucracy – there might be a danger of stifling activity 
owing to the number and frequency of meetings. 
 
I also conclude that there is a fundamental impediment in the effectiveness of NIM in 
this context. In Chapter Six, I demonstrate the relationship between common roots, 
critical success factors and policing indicators. I re-produce the Figure here; however, 
using the description of the National Intelligence Model from section 4.12.1 in Chapter 
Four, I have added the most appropriate relevant NIM Levels: 
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Figure 2: Schematic showing the relationship between the ‘Common Roots’, ‘Critical 
Success Factors’, ‘Policing Indicators’ and the National Intelligence Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tackled by: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measured by: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, NIM is inherently ill-equipped to deal effectively with this agenda. It becomes 
slow and lacks the ability to respond dynamically and effectively as a direct result of its 
structure – i.e., each component part corresponds to a different level within NIM 
 
8.2.3.1 Objective 3: Summary and Conclusion 
 
Neighbourhood Policing is broadly working well, and the PCSOs have a major impact, 
but the ability of NIM to act and react effectively to whispers and rumours appears to be 
Common Roots : NIM Level 3 
13. A sense of injustice 
14. A lack of political representation 
15. Declining perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities 
16. Relative deprivation 
17. Discrimination 
18. Levels of drug-related crime 
Critical Success Factors: NIM Level 2 
11. The need to work in partnership with other agencies, especially education and 
housing. 
12. The police organisation needs to strive to reflect the community it serves 
13. Community representatives should be involved in training, especially 
community awareness training 
14. The local ‘beat officer’ or Neighbourhood Policing team has a vital role and 
must attract officers of high calibre 
15. Police organisations must work towards the elimination of racial discrimination 
of all types, and contribute towards the development of cohesive communities 
Policing Indicators: NIM Level 1 
Inter alia:  
15. Crime 
16. Hate crime 
17. Racist incidents 
18. Assaults on police officers 
19. Complaints against the police 
20. Activity on the ‘ladder of escalation’ 
21. Whispers and Rumours 
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compromised for a number of reasons. Firstly, as identified above, the primary focus is 
performance-driven, and is related to crime. Secondly, the nature of the processing of 
the information appears to be flawed – it is sluggish and vacuous when dealing with 
wider issues, such as the indicators listed above. Thirdly, NIM will work fully 
effectively only when there is full partner engagement and tasking, and this is absent. 
Finally, I suggest that its structure is fundamentally ill-equipped to deal with the counter 
terrorism agenda: common roots of the risk sit at NIM level 3, critical success factors sit 
at NIM level 2, and the relevant indicators, including whispers and rumours, sit at NIM 
level 1.  
 
8.2.4 Objective 4: A ‘Toolkit’ of Options  
 
Thus far, this chapter has considered the extent to which the ‘critical success factors’, 
distilled from the examination of policies and edicts in Chapter Four, are in place in the 
theatre of the case study. It has concluded that Greater Manchester Police are not 
successfully delivering three of the five ‘critical success factors’ there: they are not 
reflecting the community being served in their organisational make-up; the community 
awareness training is weak; and partnership working is flawed. They are largely 
delivering two of the critical success factors: they have high quality staff who are highly 
engaged with communities, delivering Neighbourhood Policing (though they are not, in 
the main, police officers); and they are working towards the elimination of racial 
discrimination.  
 
It has also contextualised the findings of the research within the review of literature 
from Chapter Three, and proposed a list of indicators which the police and their partners 
might use to assess the risk of the development of harmful radicalisation. 
 
By drawing on the arguments and ideas presented so far in this chapter, I now propose a 
‘toolkit’ of options which local agencies might use to inform and help mitigate the risk 
of the development of harmful radicalisation in communities. This meets objective four:  
 
(a) Self/Peer Assessment. In order to assess whether partner agencies, especially the 
police, are effectively delivering the ‘critical success factors’, I propose a 
focussed objective assessment. This might be carried out in the form of a critical 
self-assessment, but it probably has more value if an independent assessor is 
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used. In order to obviate the risk of public criticism and adverse media comment 
regarding the results of such an assessment, I suggest a partnership arrangement 
with a local university to carry out suitable work with appropriate academic 
integrity. The results of this assessment might determine further action, such as 
altering the deployment policies of the force when it recruits members of staff 
from certain minority communities. 
 
(b) Review of NIM. Although the National Intelligence Model is nationally 
mandated, it was designed to deal with crime and anti-social behaviour. A 
review would ensure that it is appropriately constructed to maximise the 
opportunity to mitigate risk associated with harmful radicalisation – capable of 
ensuring joint action in response to key community intelligence in the form of 
rumour and whispers. Testing of this might be possible using Sloggett’s theory 
of planting rumours.
1036
 This might therefore be done only in those geographic 
areas where key features are present.   
 
(c) Surveys. Although the police conduct surveys around things like ‘customer 
satisfaction’, information relating to perceptions of racism, discrimination, the 
gap between expectation and achievement and other perceptions would be 
highly useful information for the purposes of adjusting the policing style. Once 
again, independent survey work through an appropriate partnership with a local 
university would help to ensure academic integrity. Survey results may also 
determine further action, such as changes to the stop and search policy, or 
alterations to the community engagement mechanisms. I discuss policing style 
below. 
 
(d) Local political environment. This is potentially problematic, because it raises 
questions of legitimacy around the level to which the police can influence local 
democratic processes. I propose here a systematic review of the local political 
structures, and how they might be interpreted by some local people. Alternative 
methods of giving groups a voice might be required.  
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(e) Police culture. The action-orientated, task focused culture of police 
organisations is a potential inhibitor to the sensitivity and empathetic  style 
which would maximise the opportunity to hear whispers and rumours, and be 
aware of the ‘feelings’ of communities rather than the current focus on statistical 
data and hard performance indicators. This requires a different mindset around 
performance, and asks for different skill sets from front line police officers. This 
research indicates that PCSOs in the theatre of the case study are already 
delivering effectively in this area. It also strongly indicates that policing 
terrorism is far from a threat to community or Neighbourhood Policing, and 
should in fact be an enabler to shift some priorities, and redouble efforts in 
others, supporting conclusions of Murray (2005).
1037
 
 
(f) Partner intervention. One of the factors apparent in the research is that, despite 
good intention, the effectiveness of partnership working in the theatre of the case 
study is questionable for reasons already articulated. To be fully effective, 
partners need to carefully review their arrangements for dealing with a 
radicalisation threat, specifying which agency, and what person has 
responsibility for what. This should be linked to proper accountability structures. 
 
(g) Policing style. The research indicates that the policing style is capable of 
adjustment to promote an improved relationship with young Asian men in 
particular. The views held by young people about the police are generally 
negative, yet the police have to deal strongly and pro-actively with a significant 
drugs problem. The advantages of working closely with communities are self-
evident and have already been discussed; additional steps might be taken to 
enhance it. For instance, the use of independent advisory groups drawn from the 
local community to inform the police and the Crown Prosecution Service with 
regards to charging decisions; community resolutions as an alternative to 
prosecution or criminalisation might also be worthy of further examination. This 
issue raises questions of the role of police in society; I examine aspects of this in 
Chapter Two. 
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(h) Role models. The police and their partner agencies should critically examine 
communites, and ask ‘who are the role models?’ In large part, the role models in 
the theatre of the case study are criminal – people look up to ‘Mr Big’. There is 
much good work through youth clubs and similar, enhancing and supporting 
these will help fill the void around identity and vulnerability. In some cases, 
PCSOs and members of the council’s communities unit act as role models, and 
this might also be worthy of expansion. Identifying influential people from 
within the community, building a suitable relationship with them, and then using 
them to help inform young people about Islam, politics and a sense of 
community has occurred to a degree already in Oldham; much more potential 
exists.  
 
(i) Proactive management of media relationships at a local level. The research 
shows that the local newspaper, and in particular communication to the local 
paper from members of the community, is a valuable source of community 
intelligence. A close working relationship with the local media to act as a means 
of gathering additional information, an additional mechanism of listening to the 
community. 
 
(j) Active community investment by all partners. This was articulated by a 
Pakistani respondent from the third sector in Oldham.
1038
 When people move 
into an area through housing associations etc, there is a need for community 
infrastructure, and that active investment in these things is very important for 
better community cohesion and reduction in the risk of radicalisation. Such 
things might be mothers and toddlers groups, family support groups, and 
sessional play. Family support workers would go with people to support them at 
these groups, so there is active investment. Many of the local communities have 
been left to their own devices in excess of twenty years, and this has contributed 
to polarisation, a lack of understanding, and resultant community isolation. 
 
(k) A successful community. An educational establishment in Oldham, visited as 
part of the research, has proved extremely successful in promoting very good 
relationships between people from many different nationalities and cultures. The 
essence of the success, which should define the ethos of the partnership 
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approach to mitigating risk, is: “The creation of a place where consensus 
marginalises these people [those intent on causing harm] and pushes them to the 
edges”.1039 This raises questions of the influence and contribution of Islamic 
doctrine on the creation of the ‘white flight’ phenomenon, and what can be done 
to mitigate it. 
 
8.2.4.1 Objective 4: Summary and Conclusion  
 
In section 4.7.1 of Chapter Four, I reviewed The Cantle Report which was produced 
after the 2001 riots in Bradford and Oldham.
1040
 The Terms of Reference of the review 
team were “to obtain the views of local communities, including young people, local 
authorities, voluntary and faith organisations, in a number of representative multi-ethnic 
communities, on the issues that need to be addressed in developing confident, active 
communities and social cohesion.”1041 The team found a number of key issues related to 
social cohesion – they were struck by the depth of polarization, which included separate 
educational arrangements, employment, places of worship and social networks, 
meaning that communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives.
1042
 They also 
recognised that some communities had such a lack of hope and frustration borne out of 
poverty and deprivation that it created a fertile ground for disaffection to grow, yet these 
communities were not always well targeted, nor even identified. 
1043
 Recommendations 
applicable to policing include such things as protocols between councils and police 
authorities, and it talks of the value of community policing.
1044
 The Cantle Report is 
another good reason for re-visiting Oldham, and focusing the microscope – how far has 
Oldham progressed? 
 
The current research project was able to examine matters at a lower level in Oldham 
than the Cantle Report was able to do. This has meant that it has been able to offer a 
more detailed set of options for the police and partner agencies to consider.  But the 
findings demonstrate that many of the issues identified by Cantle remain stubbornly 
unchanged. There has been progress – Neighbourhood Policing and PCSOs in particular 
                                                 
1039
 B0027 
1040
 Cantle T (2001) Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team London: Home 
Office para 1.1 
1041
 Ibid 
1042
 Ibid para 2.1 
1043
 Ibid para 2.10 
1044
 Ibid para 5.11.4 
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have moved the police much closer to communities; there has been financial investment 
in parts of Oldham to improve things like housing, but the fundamentals of the 
fracturing within communities remain, and better multi-agency work, and active 
investment in communities is required. 
 
8.3 Extrapolation beyond the Material at Hand 
 
In my examination of the qualitative process at section 5.3.1 of Chapter Five, I build the 
argument for the nature of the research undertaken. I pose the question of how 
representative are the findings across a wider area, or a different location – i.e. is it 
possible to generalise? As I identify in that section, the aim of the case study is not 
merely to describe it, it is to use it as an instrumental case study.
1045
 In fact, I argue that 
the thesis offers the opportunity to extrapolate rather than merely generalise, the basis 
for extrapolation being one of similarity: the commonality between geographical areas 
of demographic, social and economic factors for example.
1046
 The argument of 
commonality between Oldham and other parts of the country is lent weight from two 
sources contained within this thesis (detailed comparison of indices of deprivation, for 
instance, would provide further evidence, but they are not analysed here).  Ted Cantle, 
who visited Bradford and Oldham, amongst other places, identified common features 
showing that communities operate on a basis of parallel lives (referred to above) in 
towns and cities affected by the riots in 2001.
1047
 And one of the respondents working in 
the third sector in Oldham has worked extensively over a long period of time in places 
like Bradford and Burnley, and was involved in a special investigation in these areas 
following the riots in 2001.
1048
 He had this to say: 
 
 
“I don’t think Oldham is fundamentally different from a number of similar places in 
West Yorkshire, in the Northern parts of Greater Manchester, and in Lancashire, and 
in the Potteries. It’s a place where the reason for it being there in the first place no 
longer applies.”1049 
 
                                                 
1045
 Stake R (2005) ‘Qualitative Case Studies in Denzin N and Lincoln Y (2005)  ‘Introduction: The 
Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research’ in ‘The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research’ 3rd Ed 
London: Sage Publications Ltd 
1046
 Alasuutari P (1995) Researching Culture: Qualitative Method and Cultural Studies London: Sage 
Publications, quoted in Silverman D (2005) ‘Doing Qualitative Research’ 2nd Ed, London: Sage 
Publications Ltd p136  
1047
 Cantle T (2001) op cit para 2.10 
1048
 B0024 
1049
 Ibid 
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And he goes on to describe the attraction to these locations for Asians seeking work in 
the cotton industry and the mills in decades past. 
 
I suggest here that the arguments and ideas which have presented themselves through 
the current research in Oldham, and which are articulated above, are capable of 
extrapolation to other areas in the country which have similar features to those of the 
case study. This is argued through in section 5.4.1 of Chapter Five. 
 
8.4 Further work 
 
In Chapter Five, I discuss the philosophy of research and science, examining 
ontological and epistemological issues. I present the position for the thesis as having a 
foundationalist ontology but an anti-positivist epistemology, and can be described as 
critical realist. Thus, this permits a belief in the reality of the relationships that exist 
between the police and communities, but deals with the perceptions of these things. 
Both qualitative and quantitative methods of research are consistent with critical 
realism, and I have utilised a largely qualitative method for the purposes of this work. I 
present a critical analysis of the type of quantitative data which might be used to 
demonstrate the reality of the relationship between the police and the community, 
beginning at section 6.1 of Chapter Six. In Chapter Seven, I present quantitative data for 
the case study in the areas discussed at the start for two purposes: firstly, to show that 
the available quantitative data is highly problematic, and therefore relying on it as the 
sole source of information for this type of study would be fatal to the project, and by the 
same token, should not be relied upon as the only mechanism to forewarn of impending 
social violence; and, secondly, to promote an understanding of the nature of the research 
location. Whilst these arguments stand, there is an opportunity to design and conduct a 
research experiment to complement this one, examining quantitative data, some of 
which might be obtained through bespoke survey work. The purpose of this is to isolate 
general relationships, and demonstrate them in accordance with the critical realist 
philosophy.   
 
The discussion above in relation to identity and vulnerability, and the void in relation to 
role models, poses some interesting questions about other influences on the lives of 
young people. At various points through the thesis, I have posited the possibility of a 
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link between this vulnerability and the development of other forms of violent crime, 
such as knife crime and gang related behaviour. If this link exists, then the options 
outlined above may prove capable of adaptation to deal with a different kind of threat. 
To this end, a research project along the current lines might be designed to test the 
theory, and develop mitigation strategies.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Semi-structured interview schedule 
 
 
 
Paperwork 
Consent form and Information Sheet 
 
Pre-amble (N6 Base Data) 
Name: 
Research code: (Use code from recorder) 
Age Group: 18-26, 27-35, 36-44, 45-53, 54-62, 63+ 
Sex: 
Work/Role/Ward: 
Level of education: 
Length of time in the UK: 
National heritage: 
 
 
1. Please can you give me your views on the area? 
 
How long have you lived/worked here? What sense of community is there? How 
well-off are people? How are different communities treated by state agencies like 
the police and housing providers? How fair is political representation in the area?  
 
2. Please can you tell me how you feel about social justice and local policing? 
 
 How do you and your friends feel about the police? How well do you think other 
agencies like social services, or the council, or the local school work with the 
police? How representative of communities are the local police? How do they 
engage with you? What do you think would happen in communities in Oldham in the 
event of perceived injustices, by, for example, the police or housing authorities? 
 
2(a).  Please can you tell me how you feel about perceptions of social justice and 
local policing? 
 
How do you think local communities view the police? What do you think they feel 
about other agencies like housing providers and councils? What are our views on 
how representative of local communities the police are? How effective do you think 
your engagement with communities is? What do you think would happen in 
communities in Oldham in the event of perceived injustices, by, for example, the 
police or housing authorities? 
 
 
 
3. How fair do you think the local papers and media are? 
 
What sort of things do the papers report? How fair are they? What do you think the 
impact on the area is? How do they make you feel about Oldham? How 
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representative is the media? What effect does the media have on community 
tension? 
 
 
4. What role does religion play in here?  
 
 How serious is the problem of Islamophobia here? What role does religion, 
especially Islam, play in helping young people to find an identity, or purpose? What 
do you understand by the term radicalisation?  
 
 
5. How are local Muslim communities affected by national and international 
events such as 7/7 and military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan? 
 
How do you feel about UK foreign policy and the way it impacts upon Muslims? 
What effect does the international situation have on local Muslim communities? 
 
 
 
Sections: 
 
 Policing and social justice 
 Local social conditions 
 The effect of the media 
 Global events 
 The role of religion 
 
These may also be considered in terms of arenas: organisational arena, community 
arena, communication arena, global arena, cultural arena and (matter for discussion and 
analysis, linking back to previous chapters). 
 
 
Stated Objectives: 
 
9. Contribute to the understanding of the development of harmful radicalisation 
amongst members of certain communities. 
10. Develop a menu of indicators which predict or forewarn of the risk of harmful 
radicalisation. 
11. Establish perceptions of success of neighbourhood policing and the national 
intelligence model at identifying risk. 
12. Establish a ‘toolkit’ of options which might be utilised to mitigate risk by 
‘switching-off’ the radicalisation process, and developing multi-agency 
partnership strategies for the same purpose. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Information/Consent Sheet 
 
 
Research Question: 
 
In Oldham, Greater Manchester, are neighbourhood policing and the national 
intelligence model fit for purpose in order to anticipate harmful radicalisation and 
develop local partnerships to mitigate risk?: A grass roots appraisal. 
 
Details of Project 
 
The project is largely concerned with highlighting shortfalls in police and state authority 
policy over the last three decades. It seeks to establish perceptions of success of modern 
policing methods by listening to street-level workers and people from the community. 
The objectives of the research may be outlined as follows:  
 
1. Contribute to the understanding of the development of harmful radicalisation 
amongst members of certain communities. 
2. Develop a menu of indicators which predict or forewarn of the risk of harmful 
radicalisation. 
3. Establish perceptions of success of neighbourhood policing and the national 
intelligence model at identifying risk. 
4. Establish a ‘toolkit’ of options which might be utilised to mitigate risk by 
‘switching-off’ the radicalisation process, and developing multi-agency 
partnership strategies for the same purpose. 
 
Researcher Details 
 
The researcher is a serving police officer with the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary. 
His professional role is a uniformed police inspector with geographical responsibility 
for policing East Devon. His previous role as force Diversity Inspector, with a remit of 
promoting mutually beneficial community/partnership relationships, led to the research 
proposal. 
 
Contact details: James Gale, PhD student, Department of Politics, Exeter University, 
Devon, UK. Tel: 01392 263240. Mobile: 07866 442434, Email: jrg202@exeter.ac.uk 
 
The supervisor, who has extensive experience in the field of police/community research, 
is Mr WA Tupman, and he is available for advice and a point of contact for any queries 
you may have. Email: watupman@exeter.ac.uk   
 
The research has received financial support from the Association of Chief Police 
Officers, and the Diversity Directorate, Devon and Cornwall Constabulary. However, 
the work is entirely independent and is the responsibility of the researcher alone. 
 
Confidentiality 
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Interview records and transcripts will be held securely and in confidence. They will not 
be used other than for the purposes described above and third parties will not be allowed 
access to them (except in the case of legal subpoena

). However, if you request it, you 
will be supplied with a copy of your interview transcript so that you can comment on 
and edit it as you see fit (please give your email below). 
 
Anonymity 
 
Would you prefer your interview information to be held and used on an anonymous 
basis, with no mention of your name? (Note that we still need to refer to the group(s) of 
which you are a member).   
   
PLEASE CIRCLE  YES  / NO 
 
IF YES           Pseudonym to be used :................................................................ 
          Member of which group:.............................................................. 
  
IF NO            Name of interviewee:.................................................................... 
            Signature: .................................................................................... 
            Email/phone:................................................................................ 
            Member of which group:............................................................... 
 
Consent  
 
I voluntarily agree to participate and to the use of my data for the purposes specified 
above. I can withdraw consent at any time by contacting the researcher. I agree that the 
interview records may be kept in a secure archive by the researcher for three years 
before controlled disposal. 
 
 
TICK HERE:       
 
DATE…………………………..... 
 
                                                 

 A legal subpoena (also known as a witness summons) is an order of the court directing a person to give 
evidence to a court or to disclose information or documents to a court in connection with specified legal 
proceedings. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Freedom of Information Act Request 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr J R Gale 
18 St Georges View 
Cullompton 
Devon 
EX15 1BA 
 
 
 
 
 
17 June 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
 
 
I write in order to seek information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in 
relation to the following questions: 
 
1. How many reports of assaults on police officers were recorded in the years 
2001-2002, and 2007-2008 in the Oldham West neighbourhood policing team 
area (sector)?  
 
2. How many reports of assaults on police officers were recorded in the years 
2001-2002, and 2007-2008 in the Oldham division? 
 
3. Please can you provide a breakdown of the ethnicity of the offenders in the data 
requested for questions 1 and 2? 
 
4. How many racial incidents were recorded in the years 2001-2002, and 2007-
2008 in the Oldham West sector? 
 
5. How many racial incidents were recorded in the years 2001-2002, and 2007-
2008 in the Oldham division? 
 
6. Please can you provide a breakdown of the ethnicity of the victims in the data 
requested for questions 4 and 5? 
 
7. How many complaints against police were recorded in the years 2001-2002, and 
2007-2008 in the Oldham West sector? 
 
 
Freedom of Information Act Coordinator 
Information Management Section 
Greater Manchester Police Headquarters 
PO Box 22 (S West PDO) 
Chester House 
Boyer Street 
Manchester 
M16 0RE 
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8. How many complaints against police were recorded in the years 2001-2002, and 
2007-2008 in the Oldham division? 
 
9. Please can you provide a breakdown of the ethnicity of the complainants in the 
data requested for questions 7 and 8? 
 
 
10. How many offences were recorded of burglary, robbery and assault (GBH and 
ABH) in the years 2001-2002, and 2007-2008 in the Oldham West sector? 
 
11. How many offences were recorded of burglary, robbery and assault (GBH and 
ABH) in the years 2001-2002, and 2007-2008 in the Oldham division? 
 
12. Please can you provide a breakdown of the ethnicity of the victims in the data 
requested for questions 10 and 11? 
 
I look forward to receiving your reply in hard copy to me at the above address. 
Please feel to contact me on 07866 442434 should you require additional clarity in 
relation to the request. The information is sought in support of an academic research 
project. 
 
Thank you, 
 
Yours faithfully 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
James Gale 
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Appendix 4 
Redacted Schedule of Interviewees 
 
 
Name Code Group Gender 
(M/F) 
Age 
Group 
National 
Heritage 
Muslim 
(Y/N 
Method 
 
 
 
A0016 Police M 45-53 British N Recorded 
 
 
 
A0018 Police F 36-44 British N Recorded 
 
 
A0019 Police M 27-35 British N Recorded 
 
 
 
A0020 Police F 27-35 British N Recorded 
 
 
 
A0021 Police M 54-62 British N Recorded 
 
 
 
B0023 Police M 36-44 Pakistani Y Recorded 
 
 
 
B0026 Police M 45-53 British N Recorded 
 
 
C0032 Police M 45-53 British N Recorded 
 
 
A0022 Council 
(Housing) 
M 27-35 British N Recorded 
 
 
B0025 Council 
(ASB) 
M 45-53 British N Recorded 
 
 
C0029 Council 
(Neighbourh
ood 
Managemen
t Teams) 
M 45-53 British N Recorded 
 
 
C0033 Council 
(Communiti
es Unit) 
M 45-53 British N Recorded 
 B0027 College M 54-62 British N Recorded 
 
 
C0030(a) College F 45-53 British N Recorded 
 
 
C0030(b) College F 45-53 British N Recorded 
 
 
C0031 Media M 63+ British N Recorded 
 
 
B0024 Community 
(third 
sector) 
M 54-62 British N Recorded 
 
 
E0028 Community 
(third 
M 27-35 Pakistani Y Contemp 
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sector) 
 
 
C0028 Community 
(third 
sector) 
M 27-35 Bengali Y Recorded 
 
 
E0020 Community 
(third 
sector) 
M 36-44 British N Contemp 
 
 
A0034 Community M 13-17 Bengali Y Recorded 
 
 
A0035(a) Community M 18-26 Bengali Y Recorded 
 
 
A0035(b) Community M 18-26 Bengali Y Recorded 
 
 
A0036(a) Community M 18-26 Bengali Y Recorded 
 
 
A0036(b) Community M 18-26 Bengali Y Recorded 
 
 
A0037 Community M 18-26 Pakistani Y Recorded 
 
 
A0038 Community M 13-17 Ukrainian N Recorded 
 
 
A0039(a) Community M 18-26 Bengali Y Recorded 
 
 
A0039(b) Community M 13-17 Bengali Y Recorded 
 
 
B0043 Community M 18-26 Pakistani Y Recorded 
 
 
D0042 Community F 54-62 Pakistani Y Recorded 
 
 
E0021(a) Community F 13-17 British N Contemp 
 
 
E0021(b) Community F 18-26 British N Contemp 
 
 
E0022(a) Community M 13-17 Pakistani Y Contemp 
 
 
E0022(b) Community M 13-17 Pakistani Y Contemp 
 
 
E0024(a) Community M 13-17 Pakistani Y Contemp 
 
 
E0024(b) Community M 13-17 Pakistani Y Contemp 
 
 
E0025(a) Community M 13-17 Pakistani Y Contemp 
 
 
E0025(b) Community M 13-17 Pakistani Y Contemp 
 
 
E0026 Community M 63+ Pakistani Y Contemp 
 
 
E0027 Community M 63+ Pakistani Y Contemp 
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